Judge: David B. Gelfound, Case: 23CHCV00086, Date: 2024-09-13 Tentative Ruling

Counsel wishing to submit on a tentative ruling may inform the clerk or courtroom assistant in North Valley Department F49, 9425 Penfield Ave., Chatsworth, CA 91311, at (818) 407-2249.  Please be aware that unless all parties submit, the matter will still be called for hearing and may be argued by any appearing/non-submitting parties. If the matter is submitted on the court's tentative ruling by all parties, counsel for moving party shall give notice of ruling. This may be done by incorporating verbatim the court's tentative ruling. The tentative ruling may be extracted verbatim by copying and pasting, as unformatted text, from the Los Angeles Superior Court’s website, http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org.
All hearings on law and motion and other calendar matters are generally NOT transcribed by a court reporter unless one is provided by the party(ies). 

Case Number: 23CHCV00086    Hearing Date: September 13, 2024    Dept: F49

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F49

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Motion filed: 6/11/24

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Vintage at Bouquet Canyon LP

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Alfred Badal

NOTICE: OK.

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Complaint.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

This action arises from injuries that Plaintiff Alfred Badal (“Plaintiff” or “Badal”) allegedly sustained during a trip-and-fall incident on January 19, 2021. The fall occurred during a power outage at Defendant’s premises, a senior housing apartment located at 26705 Bouquet Canyon Road, Santa Clarita, California (the “Property”).

On January 11, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendant Vintage at Bouquet Canyon LP (“Defendant” or “Bouquet Canyon”), alleging two causes of action: (1) Premises Liability, and (2) General Negligence. Subsequently, Defendant filed its Answer to the Complaint on June 5, 2023.

            On June 11, 2024, Defendant filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Motion”). Subsequently, Plaintiff filed an Opposition on August 30, 2024, and Defendant replied on September 6, 2024.

ANALYSIS

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.”  (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)

“A party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a)(1).)

“The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In determining if the papers show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact, the court shall consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers, except the evidence to which objections have been made and sustained by the court, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence, except summary judgment shall not be granted by the court based on inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence if contradicted by other inferences or evidence that raise a triable issue as to any material fact.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) 

“[I]f the moving papers establish a prima facie showing that justifies a [ruling] in the [moving party’s] favor, the burden then shifts to the [opposing party] to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable material factual issue.”' (Citation.)" (See's Candy Shops, Inc. v. Superior Court (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 889, 900, quoting Rehmani v. Superior Court (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 945, 950.) “The defendant or cross-defendant shall not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) 

A.    Evidentiary Objections

The court has reviewed the voluminous evidentiary objections submitted by both parties. While all objections have been considered, due to their extensive nature, the Court will not address each objection individually in this tentative ruling. Instead, the Court's analysis will focus on the substance of the objections raised and their relevance to the determination of the Motion at hand. Parties are advised to review the Court's analysis and raise any specific concerns during the oral argument.

B.     Motion for Summary Judgment

1)      Issues Framed by the Pleadings

The Complaint alleges only two causes of action: (1) Premises Liability, and (2) General Negligence. Plaintiff claims Defendants “negligently and carelessly owned, operated, maintained, serviced, inspected and otherwise controlled the premises so that a dangerous condition was permitted to exist on said premises which caused Plaintiff to sustain physical injuries” under the first cause of action. (Compl. at p. 4.) Similarly, the Complaint asserts a general allegation for the second cause of action, “Defendants owned, operated, entrusted, and controlled, the subject property in such a negligent and reckless manner so as to allow a dangerous condition so as to cause and/or contribute to plaintiff's injuries and damages as alleged herein.” (Compl. at p. 6.)

Defendant argues that the Complaint’s scope is limited to the Plaintiff’s original discovery responses to the Special Interrogatory Nos. 51 and 54, which state that “State in detail all facts that support YOUR claim for [General Negligence/Premises Liability] against VINTAGE AT BOUQUET CANYON LP as outlined in YOUR complaint filed in the Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. 23CHCV00086.” (Mot. at pp. 5-6.)

Plaintiff’s original responses to the interrogatories in question assert that Bouquet Canyon “failed to follow the National Fire Protection Association (“NFPA”) 110 regulations” (Mot. at p. 6, Aziz Decl. Ex. “10”), and that Bouquet Canyon “[failed] to protect Plaintiff from the dangerous conditions on the premises, including inadequate lighting in staircases and failure to maintain alternate source(s) of electrical power on the premises in the event the primary electrical power source failed.” (Mot. at p. 7, Aziz Decl. Ex. “10.”)

However, the Court notes that discovery responses are not pleading, which are defined in Code of Civil Procedure section 420 as “the formal allegations by the parties of their respective claims and defenses, for the judgment of the Court.” Additionally, “[t]he pleadings allowed in civil actions are complaints, demurrers, answers, and cross-complaints.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 422.10.)

Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s Opposition attempts to raise new issues not encompassed in the pleadings, including the argument on Defendant’s failure to comply with the 1994 Uniform Building Code.

The Court emphasizes that generally, “[t]he pleadings delimit the issues to be considered on a motion for summary judgment. [Citation.]” (Turner v. State of California (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 883, 891.) Thus, a “defendant moving for summary judgment need address only the issues raised by the complaint; the plaintiff cannot bring up new, unpleaded issues in his or her opposing papers.” (Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 95, 98–99, fn. 4.)

            The case file indicates that no demurrer was filed. Accordingly, the Court finds that the issues framed by the pleadings are not automatically limited to Plaintiff’s responses to written discoveries, as such responses do not qualify as “pleadings.” While new factual issues presented in Opposition are not categorically excluded, they remain subject to exclusion under applicable laws, as discussed below.

2)      Defendant’s Initial Burden – Premises Liability and General Negligence

“The elements¿of a cause of action for¿premises¿liability¿are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages.” (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.)

“As in a general negligence cause of action, a plaintiff bringing an action for premises liability based on a negligence theory must plead and prove that the defendant breached a duty of care owed to the plaintiff that proximately caused injury and damages.” (Annocki v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 37(Annocki).)

  “Those who own, possess, or control property generally have a duty to exercise ordinary care in managing the property in order to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm.” (Annocki, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 37.)  One that owns, possesses, or controls the property can be liable if he knew or by the exercise of reasonable care should have known of the dangerous condition. (Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1209.) California utilizes the substantial factor test for cause-in-fact determinations and under that standard, a cause-in-fact is something that is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury and includes situations in which there may be independent or concurrent causes in fact. (Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 969.)  The question is whether the defendant’s breach of duty was a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff’s harm. (Mayes v. Bryan (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1093.)

            In the Motion, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not established, and cannot reasonably expect to establish the element of duty or liability based on the following grounds: (1) it is not required to follow the NFPA 110 regulations, and (2) Plaintiff was aware of the alleged dangerous condition which was also open and obvious, and there was no necessity for Plaintiff to encounter it.

i)                   NFPA 110 Regulations

Defendant presents declarations by its senior vice president, Maureen Picarella, stating that “Bouquet Canyon is an apartment complex for ages 55 and over.” (Picarella Decl. ¶ 3.) “Bouquet Canyon does not provide any type of medical care for its residents.” (Id. ¶ 4.) “Bouquet Canyon is not an assisted living facility, it is not a nursing home and it is not a hospital.” (Id. ¶ 5.)

            Defendant asserts that the evidence negates Plaintiff’s claim that “all assisted care, nursing homes, and medical facilities must meet the backup-emergency power codes of NFPA 110 and NEC 700,” thereby demonstrating that there is no duty for Bouquet Canyon to have a backup power source during blackouts. (Mot. at p. 6.) Defendant further argues that “there is no case law, building, City nor State code establishing such a duty,” and therefore, “Plaintiff cannot establish the elements of duty.” (Ibid.)

            The Court finds that Defendant has met its initial burden in establishing a prima facie showing that it is not required to follow NFPA 110 regulations.

ii)                 Open and Obvious Condition

Defendant argues, as an alternative ground, that based on the general rule, the owner of the property is not liable for injuries to an invitee resulting from a danger that was obvious or should have been observed in the exercise of reasonable care, citing cases including Florez v. Groom Dev. Co. (1959) 53 Cal.2d 347, 355, Brown v. San Francisco Ball Club, Inc., (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 484, 486, Dingman v. A.F. Mattock Co., (1940) 15 Cal.2d 622, 624.

Defendant also correctly acknowledges an exception to the general rule: when it is necessary for Plaintiff to encounter the dangerous condition, the obviousness of danger may negate any duty to warn, however, it does not necessarily negate the duty to remedy. (Mot. at pp. 7-8, Osborn v. Mission Ready Mix (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 104, 121-122(Osborn).)

Here, Defendant presents its undisputed material facts that Plaintiff was aware of the power outage as he admitted that he had notice of the power outage on January 19, 2021, due to Southern California Edison’s rolling blackout. (UMF, No. 7, Heineman Decl. Ex. “D.”) Defendant further asserts that the alleged dangerous condition of the dark stairwell was open and obvious to Plaintiff. (UMF, No. 12, Heineman Decl. Ex. “G.”)   

            Despite the above, Defendant does not provide direct evidence showing that there is unnecessity for Plaintiff to encounter the dangerous condition – specifically, walking through the stairwell. Defendant relies on inferential evidence, arguing that it was unnecessary for Plaintiff to climb the dark stairs for the reasons that (1) Plaintiff was not a resident at Bouquet Canyon, (2) Plaintiff could have brought a light source to illuminate the dark stairwell, (3) Plaintiff could have asked or hired someone else to visit his mom in the Property, and (4) Plaintiff could have exercised reasonable care by carrying nothing in his hands and using onto the railing to prevent his fall. (Mot. at p. 8.)

            The Court finds this argument does not meet Defendant’s initial burden. The issue of necessity in this context is generally a question of fact. In Osborn, the court addresses a situation where the workman invitee plaintiff fell from a dangerous plank which was the only means furnished to reach a faucet that was the only place where water was available. (Osborn, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at p. 119.) The Osborn court stated, “The jury was entitled to balance the [plaintiff’s] necessity against the danger, even if it be assumed that it was an apparent one. This was a factual issue. [Citations omitted.]” (Ibid.)

Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff visited his mom, a third-floor resident of Bouquet Canyon, every day to assist with every aspect of her care, including sitting up, lying down, eating, drinking, bathing, toileting, dressing, and grooming. (Pl.’s UMF No. 57, Aziz Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. “1,” Badal Decl. ¶ 3.) Additionally, the interior staircase where Plaintiff fell serves as an exit path of the Subject Premises. (Pl.’s UMF No. 23, Zaretsky Decl. ¶ 10.) Consequently, the Court finds that the undisputed facts support an inference of necessity for Plaintiff to encounter the black stairwell on January 19, 2021.

Therefore, the Court concludes that Defendant has failed to demonstrate the absence of triable factual material issue as to the necessity. Accordingly, Defendant has failed to show a prima facie case to satisfy its initial burden on this alternative basis.

3)      Plaintiff’s Burden – Existence of Triable Material Factual Issues as to Duties Owed by Defendant

            Previously the Court concluded that Defendant has met its initial burden of showing that it does not owe a duty, the burden now shifts to Plaintiff. The Court has also determined that the scope of the pleading is not limited by Plaintiff’s responses which only asserted a failure to follow NFPA 110 regulations. Therefore, the Court proceeds to examine Plaintiff’s admissible evidence on whether a trial material factual issue exists as to the duty element.

            Here, Plaintiff contends that Defendant had a duty to provide adequate illumination during an emergency, which is imposed by several legal sources – specifically, the 1994 Uniform Building Code, the Los Angeles County Development Authority, and the common law principle articulated in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108. (Opp’n. at pp. 15-16.)

i)                   Uniform Building Code

As evidence, Plaintiff relies solely on the declarations of his expert witness, Alex Zaretskiy, who concludes that “the Property was designed, plan-checked, and constructed under the jurisdiction and model standards of the 1994 Uniform Building Code,” Section 1012 of which “specially indicated that exists ‘… shall be illuminated at any time the building is occupied …’” (Zaretskiy Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. “C.”) “Based on the videos taken by Plaintiff following the Incident, there was no illumination within the stairwell.” (Id. ¶ 7.) (Underlines added.)

“A properly qualified expert may offer an opinion relating to a subject that is beyond common experience, if that expert's opinion will assist the trier of fact. (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a). There are limits to expert testimony, not the least of which is the prohibition against admission of an expert's opinion on a question of law. (Ferreira v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 120.)  

Here, the Court concludes that it is foreclosed to consider Plaintiff’s expert testimony based on two reasons.

First, it is indisputable that “[t]he question of duty is ... a legal question to be determined by the court. [Citations.]” (Staten v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1628, 1635.) Consequently, expert testimony as to whether or what legal duties arise from building codes is inappropriate, as it constitutes a legal conclusion.

Second, Plaintiff’s expert’s conclusion that Defendant violated certain sections of the Uniform Building Code lacks evidentiary support due to contradictory discovery responses.

“California's civil discovery process aims to unearth the truth of the case, thus facilitating

settlement on the basis of the mutually expected value of the suit. Evasive discovery responses

frustrate this goal by concealing the truth. A party cannot evade discovery duties and then try to defeat summary judgment by adding factual claims to create last-minute disputed issues.” (Field v. U.S. Bank; 79 Cal.App.5th 703, 705) (Underlines added.) “A party opposing summary judgment may not move the target after the proponent has launched its arrow.” (Id. at pp. 707,708.)

The sham declaration doctrine comes into play when a party offers a later declaration that contradicts a prior clear and unequivocal admission made in a deposition. In this situation, such a declaration alone cannot establish a triable issue of fact. (Harris v. Thomas Dee Engineering Co., Inc. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 594, 603.)  This conclusion, however, follows only if there is no credible explanation for the supposed inconsistency. (Id. at p. 605.)  The doctrine does not apply when a reasonable explanation resolves the supposed discrepancy. (Id. at p. 606.)

Here, the two videos upon which Plaintiff’s expert relied were initially admitted to have been taken in May 2021. However, in Plaintiff’s revised discovery responses, dated August 29, 2024 – one day before filing the Opposition – Plaintiff claimed that the videos were taken on January 19, 2021, the day of Plaintiff’s fall, directly contradicting the original responses. This distinction is crucial, as it determines whether the video depicts relevant evidence – the condition of the stairwell at the time of Plaintiff’s injury.

Given the direct contradiction, the late revision, and the absence of any explanation, the Court applies the sham declaration doctrine to Plaintiff’s revised responses to Form Interrogatories, Set One, No. 12.4, dated August 29, 2024.

Consequently, the Court does not consider Plaintiff’s expert declarations on this issue, as it states a legal conclusion and relies on inadmissible evidence.

Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not presented admissible evidence to establish that there exists a triable factual issue as to Defendant’s duty to follow the 1994 Uniform Building Code or breached such a duty.

ii)                 Los Angeles County Development Authority’s (LACDA) Housing Quality Standards

Plaintiff contends that LACDA regularly conducts inspections of the Property, including checking the lighting in common areas such as staircases. Plaintiff states that two inspection reports, dated April 23 and May 18, 2021, respectively, by LACDA inspector Anthony Herrera indicate that the Property failed to meet its housing quality standards. Plaintiff asserts that “Anthony Herrera reviewed the January 19, 2021 videos recorded by Plaintiff … depicting the pitch-black condition of the hallways and Subject Staircase and determined that the [Property] was ‘very unsafe for senior occupants to maneuver to get outdoor or Health Care Providers to enter senior occupants rooms to provided assistance.” (Babal Del. ¶¶ 22, 24.)

However, as the Court has previously determined that the revised assertion regarding the date of the videos – purportedly taken on January 19, 2021 – is subject to exclusion under the sham declaration doctrine, the Court will not consider the LACDA reports, as they were based on inadmissible evidence.

iii)                 Rowland Factors

“Whether a duty should be imposed on a defendant [in a premises liability action] depends on a variety of policy considerations, known as the Rowland factors.” (Jacobs v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 446.)

The “most important” of these considerations or factors is “the foreseeability of injury to another.” (Osborn, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at p. 122) “Foreseeability of harm is typically absent when a dangerous condition is open and obvious.” (Id, at p. 447.) (Underlines added.)

Here, Plaintiff presents evidence aimed to establish a triable issue of material facts as to whether the dangerous condition was open and obvious. Plaintiff argues that the dangerous condition of the dark stairwell was not open or obvious, stating that when he left [Bouquet Canyon] at 11:00 AM on January 19, 2021, the stairs were fully visible due to natural light entering into the stairwell from the second and third floor windows. Plaintiff had never before entered the stairwell during sunset on a winter day during a power outage and had no reason to know that the stairwell would be dark upon the closing of the door.” (See Pl.’s UMF Nos. 70, 76, 77.) (Underlines added.)

Plaintiff attempts to distinguish between the conditions of the stairwell in natural light and the condition without it. A reasonable inference from Plaintiff’s evidence is that only the latter constitutes a dangerous condition. However, this distinction is undermined by Plaintiff’s own evidence, which states that “[w]hen Plaintiff returned to the Subject Premises at approximately 4:30 PM on January 19, 2024, there was still daylight because the sun was still setting…. When Plaintiff opened the door at the first floor of the Subject Staircase, natural light entered into the staircase and Plaintiff could see the stairs. After Plaintiff entered the Subject Staircase, in the split-second during which Plaintiff attempted to place his foot on the first stair, the door of the staircase closed, leaving the entire area in pitch black.” (Pl.’s UMF Nos. 72, 74, 75.)

Therefore, Plaintiff’s argument hinges on the claim that the dangerous condition, as alleged, arose from the power outage, which lasted until “the late afternoon of a winter day” (Pl.’s UMF No. 77), and limited natural light entering from the second and third floor windows into the stairwell (Id. UMF No. 67.)

However, Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that the power outage or its duration was foreseeable, nor has he shown that the dark stairwell was a condition that could have been reasonably anticipated given the time of the day or season. In contrast, a reasonable person, especially one aware of the ongoing power outage, would be expected to exercise due care when entering a dark stairwell.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden of demonstrating “foreseeability of injury,” the most important Rowland factor in determining whether a duty of care exists.

As a result, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie showing, supported by competent evidence, that there exists a triable issue of material fact regarding the “duty” element in either cause of action.

Based on the foregoing, the Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

CONCLUSION

Defendant Vintage at Bouquet Canyon LP’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

Moving party to provide notice.