Judge: David B. Gelfound, Case: 23CHCV00168, Date: 2024-03-18 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 23CHCV00168    Hearing Date: March 18, 2024    Dept: F49

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F49

MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS

Motion filed: 8/7/23

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Miguel Ascencion (“Plaintiff”) 

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant General Motors, LLC (“Defendant” or “GM”) 

NOTICE: ok 

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order compelling Defendant GM to provide further responses to Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents, and awarding Plaintiff monetary sanctions in the amount of $3,210.00.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is GRANTED. The request for monetary sanction is GRANTED IN PART.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings this action under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civil Code §§ 1790 et seq.) over alleged defects in his 2022 Chevrolet Silverado 1500 (the “Vehicle”), which was manufactured by Defendant GM. Plaintiff alleges that he entered a warranty contract with GM regarding the Vehicle on July 12, 2022.

On January 20, 2023, Plaintiff initiated this action against Defendants GM and Does 1 through 10 (collectively, “Defendants”). The Complaint alleges for two causes of action: (1) violation of Song-Beverly Act – breach of warranty; and (2) violation of Song-Beverly Act – breach of implied warranty. Subsequently, GM filed its Answer to the Complaint on February 24, 2023.

On August 7, 2023, Plaintiff filed the instant motion (the “Motion”).

On October 23, 2023, GM filed its Opposition. Subsequently, on November 2, 2024, Plaintiff filed his Reply.

ANALYSIS

A motion to compel further responses to a demand for inspection or production of documents (“RFP”) may be brought based on: (1) incomplete statements of compliance; (2) inadequate, evasive or incomplete claims of inability to comply; or (3) unmerited or overly generalized objections.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(a).) 

Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310 subdivision (h) provides, in part, that “Except as provided in subdivision (j) [inapplicable here], the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”

A.    All Procedural Requirements Are Met

1.      45-Day Rule

“Unless notice of this motion [to compel further responses to production of documents] is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the propounding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the propounding party waives any right to compel a further response to the demand for productions.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (c).)

GM served its responses to Defendants’ Request for Production of Documents, Set One, with verifications on July 25, 2023. (Yaraghchian Decl., ¶ 3.) Plaintiff filed the instant Motion on August 7, 2023, within the 45-day rule limit.

2.      Meet and Confer

A motion to compel further responses to demand for productions must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(2).)

            Plaintiff sent a meet and confer letter to Defendant on May 26, 2023, outlining the deficiencies in GM’s responses and objections. (Thomas Decl., ¶ 10.) Following this, Plaintiff sent a second meet and confer letter on June 23, 2023, further explaining Plaintiff’s request. (Id., ¶ 12.) Subsequently, on July 5, 203, GM responded to Plaintiff’s June 23, 2023, meet and confer letter. (Id., ¶ 13.) On July 20, 2023, GM also produced additional documents subject to a stipulated protective order. (Id., ¶ 15.) However, the parties were unable to achieve an informal resolution of this dispute before the filing of the instant Motion. (Id., ¶ 19.)

            Therefore, the Court determines that the meet and confer requirements as specified in Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310 subdivision (b)(2) are satisfied.

3.      Separate Statement

A motion to compel further responses to a demand for production must be accompanied by a separate statement. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(a)(3).) “A separate statement is a separate document filed and served with the discovery motion that provides all the information necessary to understand each discovery request and all the responses to it that are at issue.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(c).)

Plaintiff has met the above requirement by filing a separate statement explaining the demand for production at issue, Plaintiff’s responses, and why further responses are necessary.

B.     Good Cause

A motion to compel further responses to requests for production shall “set forth specific facts showing good cause”. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(b)(1).) To establish “good cause,” the moving party must show (1) the items demanded are relevant to the subject matter and (2) specific facts justify discovery of the requested items (e.g., why such information is necessary for trial preparation or to prevent surprise at trial). (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(b)(1); see Glenfed Develop. Corp. v. Sup. Ct. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117.) If “good cause” is shown by the moving party, the burden is then on the responding party to justify any objections made to document disclosure. (Kirkland v. Sup. Ct. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.)

Here, the Motion concerns GM’s responses to Request for Production (“RFP”) Nos. 16, 19-32, 37-41, and 45-46.

Plaintiff’s RFP Nos. 16 and 19-32 are aimed at obtaining documents related to GM’s general policies and procedures relied upon when handling vehicle repurchase or replacement.

Plaintiff argues that these documents are relevant to the case at bar because they could reveal whether Defendant maintains a policy that systematically violates the Song-Beverly Act. (Mot., at 5.) (See¿Civ. Code §§ 1791.1, 1793.2, 1794; Oregel¿v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc.¿(2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094; Johnson v. Ford Motors Company (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1191; Kwan v. Mercedes-Benz of North America (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 174, 186.) 

Plaintiff’s RFP Nos. 37-41 are focused on acquiring documents that would explain the various codes used as shorthand in the repair orders and other internal documents produced by Defendant.

Plaintiff maintains that understanding these codes is relevant and material to an analysis of whether Plaintiff is entitled to civil penalties for any willful violation of the Song-Beverly Act. (Mot., at 7.) Specifically, these codes are deemed essential for interpreting the repair orders and internal GM documents produced in this litigation, and to prove that GM has a record of the same or similar issues for the year, make and model of the Subject Vehicle, and that GM has knowledge of the same or similar issues and consumer complaints. (Ibid.)

 Plaintiff’s RFP Nos. 45-46 aim to uncover how GM’s handles similarly situated consumers’ complaints concerning the same problems, with the same year, make, and model of vehicle as the Plaintiff’s vehicle.

Plaintiff argues that these documents are material to prove his cause of action under the Song-Beverly Act. Specifically, Plaintiff must demonstrate that the vehicle had a defect covered by GM's warranty that substantially impaired its use, value, or safety, and that GM failed to repair this defect after a reasonable number of attempts to repair it. (Civ. Code §§ 1790 et seq.; CACI No. 3201.)

The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the information sought about other similar vehicle complaints could indicate a pervasive defect or non-conformity, potentially showing GM’s awareness of the issue or its inaction in response. (See Santana v. FCA US LLC (2020) 56.Cal.App.5th 334; Donlen v. Ford Motor Company (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, 154 [“‘other vehicle testimony was not unduly prejudicial. It did not concern simply other vehicles. It was limited to the [defective component] in [p]laintiff’s truck and other vehicles. [plaintiff’s expert] described what Ford itself had done to notify dealers and technicians about problems with this [defective component] model. Thus, everything about which they testified that applied to other vehicles applied equally to [p]laintiff’s vehicle. Such evidence certainly was probative and not unduly prejudicial.”].)

            Based on these arguments, the Court concludes that good cause exists. The burden now shifts to Defendant to justify its objections.

C.    Objections

1.      Relevance

“[D]oubts as to relevance should generally be resolved in favor of permitting discovery … An appellate court cannot reverse a trial court’s grant of discovery under a ‘relevancy’ attack unless it concludes that the answers sought by a given line of questioning cannot as a reasonable possibility lead to the discovery of admissible evidence or be helpful in preparation for trial.”  (Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Sup. Ct. (1982) 31 Cal. 3d 785, 790 (quoting Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Sup. Ct. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 173).) 

Here, Plaintiffs’ claims under the Song-Beverly Act include allegations for breach of the express warranty and breach of the implied warranty. Plaintiffs’ requests are aiming at uncovering information related to GM’s awareness and lack of action regarding defects in vehicles of the same make, model, and year. Additionally, they seek documents related to Defendant’s warranty, and policies, procedures, and practices concerning vehicle repurchase.

Giving this context, the Court concludes that it is reasonably possible that admissible evidence may be discovered by these requests. Accordingly, the Court finds the requests relevant.

2.      Overbroad

“[The] rules are applied liberally in favor of discovery [Citations], and (contrary to popular belief), fishing expeditions are permissible in some cases. (Gonzalez v. Sup. Ct. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546.) The key question is whether a discovery request is “reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010 (emphasis added).) The court weighs the cost, time, expense, and disruption of normal business against the probative value of the material which might be disclosed. (Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 223.) The burden rests on the propounding party to provide evidence for a court to determine if these conditions are met. (Id.)  

Here, Plaintiff’s RFPs are specifically tailored to gather information about the particular defects nonconformities noted in the repair orders and other documents produced by Defendant concerning the Subject Vehicle. Moreover, Plaintiff’s RFP Nos. 19-32 and 40-41 are scoped to only include documents created since 2022.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s RFP Nos. at issue are not overbroad.

3.      Trade Secret Material

The party claiming a trade secret privilege has the burden of establishing its existence.  (Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1384, 1393.) The propounding party must then make a showing that the discovery sought is relevant and necessary to proving or defending against an element of one or more causes of action in the case and that it is reasonably essential to resolving the lawsuit. (Id.) Upon this showing, it is up to the holder of the privilege to show that a protective order would be inadequate. (Id.) “Either party may propose or oppose less intrusive alternatives to disclosure of the trade secret, but the burden is upon the trade secret claimant to demonstrate that an alternative to disclosure will not be unduly burdensome to the opposing side and that it will maintain the same fair balance in the litigation that would have been achieved by disclosure.” (Id.) 

GM alleges that trade secrets are involved in relation to Plaintiff’s RFP Nos. at issue. In support, Defendant provides the declaration of Huizhen Lu, which elaborates on the types of trade secrets that may form part of discovery as a result of Plaintiffs’ motion. (Opp’n., at 8, Yaraghchian Decl., Ex. “A.”)

However, GM has not provided any argumentation or evidence demonstrating that a protective order would be inadequate to safeguard its trade secrets. Notably, GM and Plaintiff previously stipulated to the LASC Model Stipulated Protective Order on June 23, 2023. (Thomas Decl., ¶ 14.)

Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant GM has not carried its burden to show that a protective order would be inadequate. 

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production of Documents, Nos. 16, 19-32, 37-41, and 45-46.

D.    Opposition – Responsive Documents Have Already Been Produced.

GM asserts that it has already produced “its Warranty Policy & Procedure Manual and the policies and procedures used to evaluate lemon law claims” and “repurchase requests” in response to Request for Production Nos. 16 and 19-32. (Opp’n., at 7.) Moreover, in response to Request for Production Nos. 45 and 46, GM claims that it has already produced “other customer complaints within GM’s ESI database that are substantially similar to Plaintiffs’ complaints concerning the alleged defects, for vehicles purchased in California of the same year, make and model as the Subject Vehicle.” (Ibid.) GM argues that there is no further action for this Court to compel.

            In the response, Plaintiff acknowledges the receipt of some documents from GM in relation to RFP Nos. 16, and 19-32 on July 23, 2023, subsequent to Plaintiff signing GM’s LASC Model Protective Order. However, Plaintiff notes that GM has refused to produce documents responsive to Requests Nos. 37-41, and maintains that GM’s document production fails to comply with Code of Civil Procedure § 2031.280 subdivision (a), which sets forth that any documents or category of documents produced in response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling must be identified with the specific request number to which the documents respond.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.280, subd. (a), Reply, at 2, Mot., 4.)

            Here, Plaintiff highlights an issue that GM’s document production, pointing out that it consists of several hundred .pdf files identified only by a Bates number without an index or any method to identify these documents by title or subject matter. (Thomas Decl., ¶¶ 6, 9, 15.)

            GM has not directly addressed Plaintiff’s contention regarding the non-compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.280 subdivision (a).

            Given the circumstances, the Court concludes that GM should be compelled to either provide a new set of documents with titles for each file or to supply an index sufficiently identifying which documents in its previous production correspond to each of requests, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.280 subdivision (a).

E.     Sanctions

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (h), the Court concludes that Defendant GM and its’ counsel may be properly subjected to monetary sanctions against them, jointly and severally, for unsuccessfully opposing the instant Motion.

Plaintiff has requested monetary sanctions in the amount of $3,200.00 based on an hourly rate of $450.00 for a total of 7 hours of work, in addition to $60.00 filing fee. (Thomas Decl., ¶ 22.) The Court finds the hourly rate to be reasonable but adjusts the total number of hours to a reasonable 5.5 hours. This time allocation includes 3 hours for drafting the Motion, 2 hours for reviewing the Opposition and preparing the Reply, and 0.5 hours anticipated for attending the hearing. Consequently, this adjustment results in a total of $2,535.00, calculated based on $450/hr. x 5.5 hours. + $60.00 filing fee.

Therefore, the Court GRANTS IN PART Plaintiff’s request for monetary sanctions, awarding a total amount of $2,535.00.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel GM’s Further Responses to Request for Production of Documents, Set One, Nos. 16, 19-32, 37-41, and 45-46 is GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s Request for Monetary Sanction is GRANTED IN PART.

Defendant GM is ordered to provide verified supplemental responses, without objections, to Request for Production of Documents, Set One, Nos. 16, 19-32, 37-41, and 45-46, within 15 days.

Defendant GM and its counsel of record are ordered, jointly and severally, to pay Plaintiff monetary sanctions in the amount of $2,535.00 within 15 days.

Moving party is ordered to provide notice of this order.