Judge: David B. Gelfound, Case: 23CHCV00372, Date: 2024-08-22 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 23CHCV00372    Hearing Date: August 22, 2024    Dept: F49

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F49

MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT PURSUANT TO C.C.P. § 664.6; REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS

Motion filed: 7/16/24

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Miguel Angel Godinez (“Plaintiff” or “Godinez”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant County of Los Angeles (“Defendant” or “County”)

NOTICE: OK.

RELIEF REQUESTED: Plaintiff requests that the Court enter judgment in conformance with the terms of the settlement agreement, in the amount of $34,000.00, against Defendant County. Plaintiff also seeks an order from the Court awarding attorney’s fees, costs, and interest in the amount of $6,900.96, against Defendant County and its counsel, jointly and severally.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is DENIED. The request for fees and costs is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

This action arises out of a motor vehicle accident.

On February 8, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendant County for two causes of action: (1) Motor Vehicle liability, and (2) General Negligence. Subsequently, on March 13, 2023, Defendant County filed its Answer to the Complaint.

On February 8, 2024, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a written settlement agreement. Plaintiff subsequently filed a Notice of Settlement on February 15, 2024.

On July 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Enforce Settlement pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 (the “Motion”). Subsequently, Defendant filed its Opposition on August 9, 2024, and Plaintiff replied on August 14, 2024.

ANALYSIS

“If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.  If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6.) 

In hearing a section 664.6 motion, the trial court may receive evidence, determine disputed facts, and enter terms of a settlement agreement as a judgment.  (Bowers v. Raymond J. Lucia Companies, Inc. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 724, 732.)  The court may interpret the terms and conditions of settlement (Fiore v. Alvord (1985) 182 Cal.App.3d 561, 566), but the court may not create material terms of a settlement, as opposed to deciding what terms the parties themselves have previously agreed upon (Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 810). 

Strict compliance with the statutory requirements is necessary before a court can enforce a settlement agreement under this statute.  (Sully-Miller Contracting Co. v. Gledson/Cashman Construction, Inc. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 30, 37.)  The party seeking to enforce a settlement “must first establish the agreement at issue was set forth ‘in a writing signed by the parties’ (§ 664.6) or was made orally before the court.  [Citation.]”  (Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 299, 304 [holding that a letter confirming the essential terms of a settlement agreement was not a “writing signed by the parties” sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Section 664.6].)  “Parties” under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 means the litigants themselves, and not their attorneys, must expressly consent to settlement. (Levy v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 578, 586 [“we conclude that the term ‘parties’ as used in section 664.6 means the litigants themselves, and does not include their attorneys of record”].) 

Here, the written agreement (“Agreement”) is signed by Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s attorney. However, it does not include the signatures of Defendant or its counsel. (Rapaport Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. “A;” Opp’n. Ex. “A.”) In its Opposition, Defendant highlights Section Seven of the Agreement, which states, “Resolution of the Lawsuit is contingent upon obtaining requisite approval by the Los Angeles County Claims Board and Board of Supervisors. In the event such approval is not obtained, this Agreement shall be of no further force or effect.” (Opp’n. Ex. “A.”)

Based on this express contingency provision and the evidence that the Agreement does not include the signature of Defendant County, the Court determines that the Agreement does not take effect until approval by the Los Angeles County Claims Board and Board of Supervisor is obtained.

Here, Plaintiff claims that on January 2, 2024, when the parties reached a settlement through negotiation, Defendant’s counsel stated that “payment will likely occur in late March or early April.” (Rapaport Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. “B.”) However, established case law holds that a letter confirming the essential terms of a settlement agreement was not a “writing signed by the parties” sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Section 664.6. (Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 304.) Consequently, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s argument – that payment should have occurred according to the email statement by Defendant’s counsel – lacks merit.

Additionally, Plaintiff argues that California Code of Insurance Regulations section 2695.7(h) applies to the self-insured Defendant County and governs the payment time limit , stating, “[u]pon acceptance of the claim in whole or in part, when necessary, upon receipt of a properly executed release, every insurer, ... shall immediately, but in no event more than thirty (3) calendar days later, tender payment or otherwise take action to perform its claim obligation.” (Reply, at p. 2) (Underlines added.)

However, the Court notes that the Definition section of the regulation states, “‘insurer’ means a person licensed to issue or that issues an insurance policy or surety bond in this state, or that otherwise transacts the business of insurance in the state ...” (Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 10, § 2695.2.) Consequently, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s assertion that section 2695.7(h) applies Defendant County, who is not licensed or otherwise transacts business of insurance, is unconvincing.

Furthermore, in the Reply, Plaintiff indicates that on July 16, 2024, on the date of filing of the instant Motion, Defendant County issued the check for settlement funds, which was received by Plaintiff on July 18, 2024. (Rapaport Decl. ¶ 2.)

Based on the above records, the Court determines that Defendant County has not unreasonably delayed payment.

Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Motion as moot, as the settlement payment was received by Plaintiff on July 18, 2024, prior to the Court’s hearing on the Motion.

Regarding the request for fees and cost, Plaintiff relies on the authority of the fee-shifting provision in the Agreement, which provides, “In the event of any controversy or dispute arising out of this Agreement or the breach thereof, the prevailing party or parties shall be entitled to recover its reasonable expenses, including attorney fees and costs actually incurred, from the adverse party or parties.” (Rapaport Decl. Ex. “A.”)

Here, as the Court has determined the Motion to be moot and found that there was no unreasonable delay in the County’s payment, it concludes that Plaintiff is not a “prevailing party,” and is therefore not entitled to the recovery of fees and costs.  

Therefore, the Court DENIES the Request for Attorney Fees and Costs. 

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Settlement is DENIED.

Plaintiff’s Request for Fees and Costs is DENIED.

Moving counsel to give notice.