Judge: David B. Gelfound, Case: 23CHCV00694, Date: 2024-02-20 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 23CHCV00694    Hearing Date: March 26, 2024    Dept: F49

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F49

MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, SET ONE

Motion filed: 10/18/23

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Claudia Aceves (“Plaintiff”) 

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant General Motors, LLC (“Defendant” or “GM”) 

NOTICE: ok 

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order compelling Defendant GM to provide further responses to Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents, Set One, Nos. 16-21 within 10 days.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings this action under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civil Code §§ 1790 et seq.) over alleged defects in a 2019 Chevrolet Blazer (the “Subject Vehicle”). Plaintiff alleges that in 2019, she purchased the Subject Vehicle for which Defendant General Motors, LLC (“GM”) issued the manufacturer’s express warranty. (Compl. ¶¶ 5, 9.)

On March 9, 2023, Plaintiff filed her Complaint, alleging against Defendants GM and Does 1 through 10 the following causes of action: (1) Violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (d); (2) Violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (b); (3) Violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (a)(3); (4) Breach of Express Written Warranty; and (5) Breach of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability. On April 19, 2023, GM filed its Answer.

            On October 18, 2023, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production of Documents, Set One, Nos. 16-21 (the “Motion”).

            On March 13, 2024, Defendant GM opposed the Motion. Subsequently, on March 19, 2024, Plaintiff replied.

ANALYSIS

A motion to compel further responses to a demand for inspection or production of documents (“RFP”) may be brought based on: (1) incomplete statements of compliance; (2) inadequate, evasive or incomplete claims of inability to comply; or (3) unmerited or overly generalized objections.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(a).) 

A.    Procedural Requirements

1.      45-Day Rule

“Unless notice of this motion [to compel further responses to production of documents] is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the propounding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the propounding party waives any right to compel a further response to the demand for productions.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (c).)

GM served its responses to Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents, Set One, on August 21, 2023. (Sue Decl., Ex.7; Pappas Decl., ¶ 4.) However, verification to the responses was not received by Plaintiff until August 31, 2023 (Sue Decl., ¶ 18). Considering the dates were not contested by GM, the Court deems that August 31, 2023 is the date when GM served its verified initial responses, thereby establishing that the deadline for Plaintiff to file a Motion to Compel Further under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310 subdivision (c) as October 15, 2023.

  Plaintiff filed the instant Motion on October 18, 2023, thus failing to meet the deadline. However, given that GM does not contest this procedural defect, the Court proceeds to review the instant Motion, operating under the assumption that both parties have stipulated to an extension for filing.

2.      Meet and Confer

A motion to compel further responses to demand for productions must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(2).)

            After receiving GM’s unverified responses on August 21, 2023, Plaintiff sent Defendant a meet and confer letter, outlining issues within the responses. (Sue Decl., ¶ 20.) Defendant responded to the meet and confer letter on September 6, 2023, providing a proposed protective order. (Sue Decl., ¶ 21.) Following this, Plaintiff sent second and third meet and confer letters on September 13 and October 5, 2023, respectively. (Sue Decl., ¶ 22.) Despite the efforts, parties were unable to resolve the issue prior to the filing of the instant Motion. (Sue Decl., ¶ 23.)

            Therefore, the Court determines that the meet and confer requirements as specified in Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310 subdivision (b)(2) are satisfied.

3.      Separate Statement

A motion to compel further responses to a demand for production must be accompanied by a separate statement. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(a)(3).) “A separate statement is a separate document filed and served with the discovery motion that provides all the information necessary to understand each discovery request and all the responses to it that are at issue.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(c).)

Plaintiff has met the above requirement by filing a separate statement explaining the demand for production at issue, Plaintiff’s responses, and why further responses are necessary.

B.     Good Cause

A motion to compel further responses to requests for production shall “set forth specific facts showing good cause”. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(b)(1).) To establish “good cause,” the moving party must show (1) the items demanded are relevant to the subject matter and (2) specific facts justify discovery of the requested items (e.g., why such information is necessary for trial preparation or to prevent surprise at trial). (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(b)(1); see Glenfed Develop. Corp. v. Sup. Ct. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117.) If “good cause” is shown by the moving party, the burden is then on the responding party to justify any objections made to document disclosure. (Kirkland v. Sup. Ct. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.)

Here, the Motion concerns GM’s responses to Request for Production (“RFP”) Nos. 16 -21.

“All DOCUMENTS, including but not limited to electronically stored information and electronic mails, concerning or relating to any internal analysis or investigation by YOU or on YOUR behalf regarding the TRANSMISSION DEFECT in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the SUBJECT VEHICLE. [This request shall be interpreted to include, but not be limited to, any such investigation to determine the root cause of such TRANSMISSION DEFECT, any such investigation to design a permanent repair procedure for such TRANSMISSION DEFECT, any such investigation into the failure rates of parts associated with such TRANSMISSION DEFECT, any cost analysis for implementing a proposed repair procedures, any savings analysis not implementing a proposed repair procedures, etc.]” (RFP No. 16.)

“All DOCUMENTS, including but not limited to electronically stored information and electronic mails, concerning or relating to any communications YOU have had regarding TRANSMISSION DEFECT in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the SUBJECT VEHICLE.” (RFP No. 17.)

“All DOCUMENTS, including but not limited to electronically stored information and electronic mails, concerning or relating to any decision to issue any notices, letters, campaigns, warranty extensions, technical service bulletins and recalls concerning the TRANSMISSION DEFECT in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the SUBJECT VEHICLE.” (RFP No. 18.)

“All DOCUMENTS, including but not limited to electronically stored information and electronic mails, concerning customer complaints, claims, reported failures, and warranty claims related to TRANSMISSION DEFECT, in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the SUBJECT VEHICLE, including but not limited to any databases in YOUR possession with information from dealers, service departments, parts departments, or warranty departments, and all documents concerning YOUR response to each complaint, claim or reported failure.” (Underlines added.) (RFP No. 19.)

“All DOCUMENTS, including but not limited to electronically stored information and electronic mails, concerning failure rates of vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the SUBJECT VEHICLE as a result of TRANSMISSION DEFECT.” (RFP No. 20.)

“All DOCUMENTS, including but not limited to electronically stored information and electronic mails, concerning or relating to any fixes for TRANSMISSION DEFECT in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the SUBJECT VEHICLE.” (RFP No. 21.)

Plaintiff argues that the above-listed RFP Nos are directly relevant to her claims under the Song-Beverly Act. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the documents sought relate to GM’s internal investigation, GM’s analysis of the defects, and GM’s knowledge of and inaction to the defects. (Mot., at 9.) (See¿Civ. Code §§ 1791.1, 1793.2, 1794; Oregel¿v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc.¿(2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094; Johnson v. Ford Motors Company (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1191; Kwan v. Mercedes-Benz of North America (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 174, 186.) 

For RFP No. 16, Plaintiff further asserts that GM had investigated the defect and made certain determinations regarding the cause of such defect, arguing that this evidence is highly probative of whether GM could repair the transmission defect. (Pl.’s Separate Statement, at 5.)

For RFP Nos. 17-18, Plaintiff states that GM had various communications (both internally and with others) and provided various repair procedures concerning the defect. Plaintiff posits that this evidence is probative as to GM’s general awareness that it was unable to fix the defect, potentially leading to a finding that GM willfully failed to promptly repurchase the vehicle despite such awareness. (Id., at 13, 21.)

For RFP Nos. 19-21, Plaintiff argues that the requested documents concerning customer complaints and warranty repairs, which have been routinely compelled for production in other Lemon Law cases, citing Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 973, 978-979, 986.) (Mot., at 10.) Furthermore, Plaintiff maintains that responsive documents, even those involving vehicles other than plaintiff’s, are probative and not unduly prejudicial, as outlined in Donlen v. Ford Motor Co. (2013) 217 Cal. App. 4th 138, 154, (Mot., at 11.) 

The Court finds that Plaintiff has met her burden of demonstrating the relevance and justification for requesting the documents. The Court also agrees with Plaintiff that the information sought regarding complaints about other vehicles of the same year, made, and model could indicate a pervasive defect or non-conformity, potentially showing GM’s awareness of the issue or its lack of action in response. (See Santana v. FCA US LLC (2020) 56.Cal.App.5th 334; Donlen v. Ford Motor Company , supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at 154, [“‘other vehicle testimony was not unduly prejudicial. It did not concern simply other vehicles. It was limited to the [defective component] in [p]laintiff’s truck and other vehicles. [plaintiff’s expert] described what Ford itself had done to notify dealers and technicians about problems with this [defective component] model. Thus, everything about which they testified that applied to other vehicles applied equally to [p]laintiff’s vehicle. Such evidence certainly was probative and not unduly prejudicial.”].)

            Based on these arguments, the Court concludes that good cause exists. The burden now shifts to Defendant to justify its objections.

C.    Objections

1.      Relevance, Vague, Overbroad, Burdensome, Oppressive

As to the overbreadth objection, “any party may obtain discovery regarding any matters, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”¿ (CCP § 2017.010.)¿ “[A]n implicit waiver of a party's constitutional rights encompasses only discovery directly relevant to the plaintiff's claim and essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit.”¿ (Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 842.)¿ However, discovery should not be denied if the information sought has any relevance to the subject matter.¿Thus, while relevancy is a possible ground for an objection, it is difficult to adequately justify it.  (See generally Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 217.)  “These rules are applied liberally in favor of discovery, and (contrary to popular belief),¿fishing¿expeditions¿are¿permissible in some cases.”¿ (Gonzalez v. Superior Court¿(1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546 [internal citation omitted].)¿  

Under the Song-Beverly Act, “[i]f the buyer establishes that the failure to comply was willful,” the buyer may be entitled to receive a civil penalty, up to two times the amount of actual damages.  (Civ. Code § 1794(c).)  A defendant that did not replace or refund a vehicle under a “good faith and reasonable belief that the facts imposing the statutory obligation were not present” is not willful.¿(Lukather v. General Motors, LLC¿(2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1051.)  Nor does willfulness require a showing of malice or wrongdoing towards the other party.  (Ibrahim v. Ford Motor Co.¿(1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 878, 894.)  Rather, willful “amounts to nothing more than this: that the defendant knows what it is doing and intends to do what it is doing.”  (Bishop v. Hyundai Motor America¿(1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 750, 759.)  “Whether a manufacturer willfully violated its obligation to repair the car or refund the purchase price is a factual question for the jury[.]” (Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc.¿(2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1104.) 

As previously noted, the Court has determined the relevance of these RFP Nos. under its analysis of good cause. Defendant’s relevance objection does not overcome the established basis that relevance in Plaintiff’s argument. Therefore, the Court OVERRULE all relevance objections.

Furthermore, Defendant’s overbreadth objection overlooks the specific limitations imposed on all RFP Nos. at issue. Plaintiff’s requests specifically target information related to the “transmission defect”, a term defined by the Request for Production of Documents, Set One. This information has also been further limited to pertain to vehicles of the “same year, make, and model as the SUBJECT VEHICLE.”

Given this context, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s RFP Nos. 16-21 are relevant and not overbroad.

2.      Confidential, Proprietary, and Trade Secret Material

The party claiming a trade secret privilege has the burden of establishing its existence.  (Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1384, 1393.) The propounding party must then make a showing that the discovery sought is relevant and necessary to proving or defending against an element of one or more causes of action in the case and that it is reasonably essential to resolving the lawsuit. (Id.) Upon this showing, it is up to the holder of the privilege to show that a protective order would be inadequate. (Id.) “Either party may propose or oppose less intrusive alternatives to disclosure of the trade secret, but the burden is upon the trade secret claimant to demonstrate that an alternative to disclosure will not be unduly burdensome to the opposing side and that it will maintain the same fair balance in the litigation that would have been achieved by disclosure.” (Id.) 

GM alleges that RFP Nos. 16-21 seek confidential, proprietary, and trade secrets information. In support, GM asserts that the documents requested affects GM’s design decisions, and its design decisions are how it separates itself from other competitors. (Opp’n., at 6.) Similarly, GM contends that the responsive information may include personal identifiable information (“PII”). (Id., at 7.)

However, GM has not provided any argumentation or evidence demonstrating that a protective order would be inadequate to safeguard its trade secrets and confidential information. Notably, GM has proposed a Stipulation and Protective Order to which Plaintiff has agreed. (Sue Decl., ¶ 23, Ex. “12.”)

Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant GM has not met its burden to demonstrate that further responses should not be compelled due on valid objections.

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production of Documents, Set One, Nos. 16-21.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel GM’s Further Responses to Request for Production of Documents, Set One, Nos. 16-21 is GRANTED.

Defendant GM is ordered to provide verified supplemental responses, without objections, to Request for Production of Documents, Set One, Nos. 16-21, within 10 days.

Moving party is ordered to provide notice of this order.