Judge: David B. Gelfound, Case: 23CHCV00713, Date: 2025-05-12 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 23CHCV00713    Hearing Date: May 12, 2025    Dept: F49

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F49

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Motion filed: 1/2/25

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiffs Miguel De La Mora and Pyramid Plaster Corp.

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant General Motors LLC

NOTICE: OK.

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order granting Miguel De La Mora and Pyramid Plaster Corp.’s Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Miguel De La Mora (“Mora”) and Pyramid Plaster Corp. (“Pyramid”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) bring this action under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“SBA”) (Civ. Code §§ 1790 et seq.) over alleged defects in their 2016 Chevrolet Silverado (the “Subject Vehicle”). Plaintiffs allege that on November 13, 2019, they purchased the Subject Vehicle for which Defendant General Motors LLC (“Defendant” or “GM”) issued a written warranty. (Compl. ¶ 9.)

On March 10, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against Defendants GM and Does 1 through 10. The Complaint alleges the following three causes of action: (1) violation of the Song-Beverly Act breach of express warranty, (2) violation of Song-Beverly Act breach of implied warranty, and (3) violation of the Song-Beverly Act section 1793.2(b). Subsequently, GM filed an Answer to the Complaint on April 19, 2023.

On January 2, 2025, Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion for Leave to File the First Amended Complaint (the “Motion”). Subsequently, GM filed an Opposition on April 28, 2025, and Plaintiffs filed a Reply on May 2, 2025.

ANALYSIS

The court may, in furtherance of justice, allow a party to amend any pleading upon any terms as may be proper.  (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 473, subd. (a), 576.)  Courts liberally grant leave to amend based on a strong policy favoring resolution of all disputes between parties in the same case.  (Nestle v. Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 939; Morgan v. Superior Court (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530.)  Thus, requests for leave to amend generally will be granted unless the party seeking to amend has been dilatory in bringing the proposed amendment, and the delay will cause prejudice to the opposing party if leave to amend is permitted.  (Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 490; see also Armenta ex rel. City of Burbank (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 636, 642 [“instances justifying the court’s denial of leave to amend are rare.”].)  Absent prejudice, delay alone is insufficient to deny leave to amend.  (Higgins v. Del Faro (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 564-565.) 

A party requesting leave to amend must state what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be deleted and added, as well as specify where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the changes are located.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(a)(1)-(3).) The moving party must also attach the proposed amended pleading with a declaration by counsel, describing (1) the effect of the amendment; (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) why the request was not made earlier.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(b)(1)-(4).)

A.    Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint

Plaintiffs have satisfied the procedural requirements under California Rules of Court rule 3.1324 by attaching a proposed First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) and submitting a declaration from their counsel, Siyun Yang (“Yang”). (Yang Decl. Ex. “3.”)

The proposed FAC would add four additional causes of action based on the Commercial Code and Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA): Fourth Cause of Action for Violation of California Uniform Commercial Code Breach of Express Warranties; Fifth Cause of Action for Violation of the California Uniform Commercial Code Breach of Implied Warranty; Sixth Cause of Action Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; and Seventh Cause of Action for Violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. (Yang Decl. ¶ 24.)

            Plaintiffs argue that the FAC is necessary in light of the California Supreme Court’s recent decision in Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC (2024) 17 Cal.5th 189 (Rodriguez II), which affirmed the Appellate Court’s ruling that “vehicle purchased with an unexpired manufacturer's new car warranty is not new motor vehicle under Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act unless warranty was issued with the sale; disapproving Jensen.” (Ibid.) This decision, issued on October 31, 2024, overruled prior precedent from Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, on which Plaintiffs had relied when initially filing this case. (Reply at p. 2.)

This sequence supports Plaintiffs’ argument that their delay in seeking leave was due to a need to respond to a significant legal development, rather than a lack of diligence. GM’s Opposition contends that Plaintiffs delayed unreasonably and that the facts underlying the new claims were available earlier. However, Plaintiffs have shown that additional supporting allegations emerged from GM’s document production served on February 14, 2024. (Yang Decl. ¶ 21; Reply at p. 3.) This reinforces that the timing of the Motion was both reasonable and justified.

            Next, GM argues that allowing amendment would result in prejudice due to added litigation costs and trial delay. (Opp’n. at p. 6.)

While the Court acknowledges that amendment may entail some additional preparation, these burdens are minimal in light of the circumstances. Plaintiffs’ new claims are based on the same subject vehicle, same alleged defects, and same transaction. Furthermore, the newly referenced facts are drawn from GM’s own discovery responses. (Yang Decl. ¶ 21.)

Therefore, only limited additional discoveries will be required, and GM is not unfairly surprised or burdened. As such, any prejudice is insufficient to deny leave under Higgins v. Del Faro (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 564-565.

Lastly, GM also asserts that the amendment is futile because the proposed causes of action are defective, and the MMWA claim depends on state law claims that allegedly lack merit. (Opp’n. at pp. 9-12.)

However, the Court finds Dagher v. Ford Motor Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 905, 928 (Dagher) instructive and persuasive. In Dagher, plaintiff similarly alleged Song-Beverly claims, and defendant Ford moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff lacked standing because the vehicle was purchased used from a private seller.  (Id. at p. 912.) While the motion for summary judgment was pending, the plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint to plead a new cause of action under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. (Id. at p. 913.)  The plaintiff admitted that he did not initially allege a claim under Magnuson-Moss for strategic reasons. (Id. at pp. 927-928.)  The trial court granted summary judgment and denied the request for leave to amend.  (Id. at p. 914.)  The Court of Appeal reversed, finding that plaintiff’s claim under the Magnuson-Moss Act was viable and defendant failed to show any prejudice by the delayed amendment.  (Id. at pp. 928-929.)

Here, as in Dagher, Plaintiffs’ delay is not attributable to bad faith or neglect, but rather reflects a reasonable strategic adjustment following the significant shift in legal interpretation announced in Rodriguez II. Like the plaintiff in Dagher, Plaintiffs seek to preserve a viable federal warranty claim after a change in Song-Beverly precedent foreclosed one legal theory. Moreover, the factual basis of the new claims essentially overlaps with the original complaint and arises from GM’s own records. GM’s arguments of delay and prejudice are no more compelling than those rejected in Dagher.

Accordingly, Dagher strongly supports granting leave to amend.

 The Court finds that the delay in making the proposed FAC is justified due to the Rodriguez II decision. Additionally, as the Commercial Code and MMWA claims are brought under essentially the same facts as the initial Song-Beverly causes, there will not need to be extensive discovery and prejudice to GM is minimal. Whether Plaintiffs’ amended causes of action ultimately survive is a matter better resolved through a demurrer or summary judgment motion, not at the leave-to-amend stage.

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs Miguel De La Mora and Pyramid Plaster Corp.’s Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint is GRANTED.

Plaintiffs are ordered to serve and file the First Amended Complaint within 10 days.  

Moving party to provide notice.

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F49

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Motion filed: 11/8/24

MOVING PARTY: Defendant General Motors LLC

RESPONDING PARTY: None.

NOTICE: OK.

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order granting Defendant General Motors LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment on all causes of action against it, including the First, Second, and Third Causes of Action in Plaintiff’s Complaint.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is DENIED AS MOOT.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Miguel De La Mora (“Mora”) and Pyramid Plaster Corp. (“Pyramid”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) bring this action under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“SBA”) (Civ. Code §§ 1790 et seq.) over alleged defects in their 2016 Chevrolet Silverado (the “Subject Vehicle”). Plaintiffs allege that on November 13, 2019, they purchased the Subject Vehicle, for which Defendant General Motors LLC (“Defendant” or “GM”) issued a written warranty. (Compl. ¶ 9.)

On March 10, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against Defendants GM and Does 1 through 10. The Complaint alleges the following three causes of action: (1) violation of the Song-Beverly Act breach of express warranty, (2) violation of Song-Beverly Act breach of implied warranty, and (3) violation of the Song-Beverly Act section 1793.2(b). Subsequently, GM filed an Answer to the Complaint on April 19, 2023.

On November 8, 2024, GM filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Motion”).

No Opposition or Reply papers have been filed.

ANALYSIS

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.”  (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)

“A party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a)(1).)

“The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In determining if the papers show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact, the court shall consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers, except the evidence to which objections have been made and sustained by the court, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence, except summary judgment shall not be granted by the court based on inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence if contradicted by other inferences or evidence that raise a triable issue as to any material fact.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) 

“[I]f the moving papers establish a prima facie showing that justifies a [ruling] in the [moving party’s] favor, the burden then shifts to the [opposing party] to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable material factual issue.’ [Citation.]" (See's Candy Shops, Inc. v. Superior Court (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 889, 900, quoting Rehmani v. Superior Court (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 945, 950.) “The defendant or cross-defendant shall not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) 

Here, the Court has granted Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), which replace the original Complaint as the operative pleading. As the instant Motion, directed solely at the three Song-Beverly Act claims in the original Complaint, it is rendered moot by the filing of the FAC. (State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Superior Court (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1131 [filing of amended complaint moots motion directed at superseded pleading].) Defendant GM may renew its summary judgment arguments, if appropriate, after the FAC is filed.

            Accordingly, the Motion is DENIED as moot.

CONCLUSION

Defendant General Motors LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED AS MOOT.

Moving party to provide notice.