Judge: David B. Gelfound, Case: 23CHCV01052, Date: 2024-04-19 Tentative Ruling

Counsel wishing to submit on a tentative ruling may inform the clerk or courtroom assistant in North Valley Department F49, 9425 Penfield Ave., Chatsworth, CA 91311, at (818) 407-2249.  Please be aware that unless all parties submit, the matter will still be called for hearing and may be argued by any appearing/non-submitting parties. If the matter is submitted on the court's tentative ruling by all parties, counsel for moving party shall give notice of ruling. This may be done by incorporating verbatim the court's tentative ruling. The tentative ruling may be extracted verbatim by copying and pasting, as unformatted text, from the Los Angeles Superior Court’s website, http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org.
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Case Number: 23CHCV01052    Hearing Date: April 19, 2024    Dept: F49

Dept. F49 

Date: 4/19/24

Case Name: Michael John Garcia v. Enrique Moreno Roque; Cacho Landscape Maintenance Company Inc.; and Does 1-100

Case # 23CHCV01052

 

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F49

 

APRIL 19, 2024

 

MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

Los Angeles Superior Court Case # 23CHCV01052

 

Motion filed: 10/25/23

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Cacho Landscape Maintenance Company Inc., and Enrique Moreno Roque (“Defendants”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Michael John Garcia (“Plaintiff”)

NOTICE: ok. 

 

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order from this Court striking Plaintiff’s second cause of action, paragraphs 15 through 24, and the fifth prayer for exemplary and punitive damages of the second amended complaint.

 

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is GRANTED with LEAVE TO AMEND.

 

BACKGROUND

 

Plaintiff filed his Complaint alleging personal injuries caused by a vehicle operated by Defendant Enrique Moreno Roque (“Roque”).

 

On April 12, 2023, Plaintiff initiated the present action. Subsequently, on September 6, 2023, he filed the operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) against Defendants and Does 1 through 100, alleging (1) Negligence, and (2) Violations of Vehicle Code Section 20001 and 20003.

 

On October 25, 2023, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Strike portions of the SAC. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed his Opposition on April 5, 2024.

 

            On April 17, 2024, Defendants filed their untimely Reply.

 

ANALYSIS

 

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).)  The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].) 

 

Additionally, the court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with California law, a court rule, or an order of the court.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).)  An immaterial or irrelevant allegation is one that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense; is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense; or a demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subd. (b).)  The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.) 

 

A.    Procedural Requirements

 

1.      Meet and Confer

 

“Before filing a motion to strike . . . the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolves the objections to be raised in the motion to strike.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5, subd. (a).)  If no agreement is reached, the moving party shall file and serve with the motion to strike a declaration stating either: (1) the means by which the parties met and conferred and that the parties did not reach an agreement, or (2) that the party who filed the pleading failed to respond to the meet and confer request or otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5, subd. (a)(3).)   

 

            Here, Defendants’ counsel attests that email exchanges between the parties reflect that Plaintiff’s counsel believed sufficient facts for punitive damages have been pleaded and refused to amend the complaint. (Tusa Decl., ¶ 7.) However, these efforts did not meet the in-person or by telephone requirement as mandated by Code of Civil Procedure section 435 subdivision (a)(3). Consequently, the Court determines that the parties have not sufficiently fulfilled the meet and confer requirements.

 

            The Court directs the parties to adhere to the applicable meet and confer requirements for all future proceedings.

 

2.      Untimely Filing of Reply

 

All reply papers shall be filed at least five court days before the hearing. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b).) “No paper may be rejected for filing on the ground that it was untimely submitted for filing. If the court, in its discretion, refuses to consider a late filed paper, the minutes or order must so indicate.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1300(d).)

           

            The Court notes that Defendants’ Reply was filed two days late. However, it appears that Plaintiff was timely served with the Reply on April 12, 2024. (4/17/24 Proof of Service.)

 

            Accordingly, the Court will consider the Reply, but orders Defendants to adhere to the applicable Code of Civil Procedure and California Rules of Court requirements for timely filing of papers in all future proceedings.

 

B.     Second Cause of Action – Violations of Vehicle Code Sections 20001 and 20003

 

The Motion first seeks to strike the second cause of action of the SAC, specifically paragraphs 15-24. The SAC’s second cause of action alleges violations of Vehicle Code Sections 20001 and 20003. (Compl., at 4.)

 

Vehicle Code 20001 subdivision (a) provides, “The driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to a person, other than himself, or in the death of a person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident and shall fulfill the requirements of Sections 20003 and 20004.”

 

Vehicle Code 20003 sets forth: “(a) The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person shall also give his or her name, current residence address, the names and current residence addresses of any occupant of the driver’s vehicle injured in the accident, the registration number of the vehicle he or she is driving, and the name and current residence address of the owner to the person struck or the driver or occupants of any vehicle collided with, and shall give the information to any traffic or police officer at the scene of the accident. The driver also shall render to any person injured in the accident reasonable assistance, including transporting, or making arrangements for transporting, any injured person to a physician, surgeon, or hospital for medical or surgical treatment if it is apparent that treatment is necessary or if that transportation is requested by any injured person. (b) ... shall also, upon being requested, exhibit his or her driver’s license, if available, or, in the case of an injured occupant, any other available identification, to the person struck or to the driver or occupants of any vehicle collided with, and to any traffic or police officer at the scene of the accident.”

 

Violating section 20001 is a felony. (Vehicle Code, § 20001, subd. (b).) A violation of Vehicle Code Section 20001 gives rise to civil liability only if it is a proximate cause of further injury or death. (See People v. Corners (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 139, 148; see also Corenbaum v. Lampkin (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1340.) (Underlines added.) In Brooks v. E.J. Willig Truck Transp. Co. (1953) 40 Cal.2d 669(Brooks), the court held that a hit and run cannot give rise to damages unless the fact that the defendant fled the scene was “a proximate cause of further injury or death” beyond the accident itself.¿ (Id. at 679.)¿Brooks held that fleeing an accident scene only constitutes a tort if the act itself causes the plaintiff additional injury above and beyond the damages caused by the collision that preceded flight.¿ (Ibid.) 

 

Here, the SAC alleges that “[t]he nature of the collision and the resulting impact to Plaintiff’s vehicle [sic] was such that injuries were likely to occur to Plaintiff.” (SAC, ¶ 19.) The SAC does not plead that Defendant Roque’s flight from scene itself caused Plaintiff additional injury above and beyond the damages resulting from the collision.

 

Following the Brooks holding, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s SAC does not sufficiently establish civil liabilities against Defendants for violation of Vehicle Code Sections 20001 and 20003.

 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Motion to Strike as to Plaintiff’s second cause of action, specifically paragraphs 15-24.

 

C.    Punitive Damages

 

Punitive damages may be imposed where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)

 

“Malice” is defined as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct carried on with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) “‘Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiff’s rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate.’ [Citation.]” (Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1210.)

 

“Oppression” is defined in as “despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(2).) The term “despicable” has been defined in the case law as actions that are “base,” “vile,” or “contemptible.” (See, e.g., Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal. App. 4th 847, 891.)¿¿

 

Further, “[t]here must be evidence that defendant acted with knowledge of the probable dangerous consequences to plaintiff’s interests and deliberately failed to avoid these consequences.” (Flyer’s Body Shop Profit Sharing Plan v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1155; see also Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1228 [“Conscious disregard for the safety of another may be sufficient where the defendant is aware of the probably dangerous consequences of his or her conduct and he or she willfully fails to avoid such consequences”].)  

 

A motion to strike punitive damages is properly granted where a plaintiff does not state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, including allegations that defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud or malice.  (Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.)  “Mere negligence, even gross negligence, is not sufficient to justify such an award” for punitive damages.  (Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United California Bank (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 949, 958.)  The allegations supporting a request for punitive damages must be alleged with specificity; conclusory allegations without sufficient facts are not enough.  (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-1042.)

 

Here, Defendants move to strike the fifth prayer of the SAC: “For exemplary and punitive damages, according to proof against Defendants ENRIQUE MORENO ROQUE AND DOES 1 THROUGH 100[.]” (SAC, at 7.)

 

Plaintiff prays for punitive damages under both causes of action – negligence and violation of Vehicle Code sections. However, established law sets forth that mere negligence, even gross negligence or recklessness is insufficient to establish that a defendant acted with “willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal. App. 3d 82, 87.)

 

Furthermore, Plaintiff’s SAC does not expressly or implicitly allege “malice, oppression” under his first cause of action. Consequently, punitive damages may not be imposed.

 

As to the second cause of action, the Court has previously determined that the SAC failed to sufficiently plead Defendants’ civil liabilities for the alleged violations of Vehicle Code sections. Since there must be an actionable tort underlying any claim for punitive damages which cannot be asserted as an independent cause of action¿(Hilliard v. A.H. Robins Co. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 374, 391), punitive damages are unavailable under the second cause of action.

 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Strike the fifth prayer for exemplary and punitive damages and GRANTS Plaintiff LEAVE TO AMEND.

 

CONCLUSION

 

The Court GRANTS with LEAVE TO AMEND Defendants’ Motion to Strike.

 

Paragraphs 15-24 under the second cause of action and the fifth prayer of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint are hereby stricken.

 

Plaintiff is ordered to file a Third Amended Complaint within 20 days from the date of this order.

 

Moving party is to give notice.