Judge: David B. Gelfound, Case: 23CHCV01334, Date: 2024-11-14 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 23CHCV01334    Hearing Date: November 14, 2024    Dept: F49

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F49

DEMURRER

Motion filed: 7/26/24

MOVING PARTY: Defendant City of Los Angeles

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Gerardo Reyna 

NOTICE: OK.

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order sustaining Defendant City of Los Angeles’s Demurrer to the Third Cause of Action in Plaintiff’s Complaint.

TENTATIVE RULING: The Demurrer is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

BACKGROUND

This action arises from alleged personal injuries and damages Plaintiff sustained in an automobile collision on May 5, 2022.

On May 5, 2023, Plaintiff Gerardo Reyna (“Plaintiff” or “Reyna”) filed a Complaint against Defendants Jorge Alberto Flores (“Flores”), Hanmar LLC (“Hanmar”), the City of Los Angeles (“City of LA”), the County of Los Angeles (“County of LA”), and Does 1 to 30. The Complaint alleges the following causes of action: (1) Motor Vehicle Liability (against Flores and Hanmar), (2) Negligence (against Flores and Hanmar), and (3) Dangerous Condition of Public Property (Cal. Gov. Code, § 835, et seq.) (against City of LA and County of LA). Subsequently, Flores and Hanmar filed their Answer to the Complaint on April 26, 2024. On August 23, 2024, County of LA was dismissed with prejudice at Plaintiff’s request.

On April 26, 2024, Flores and Hanmar filed their Cross-Complaint (“4/26/24 Cross-Complaint”) against Roes 1 through 100, alleging (1) Implied Indemnity, (2) Contribution, and (3) Declaratory Relief. Subsequently, Flores and Hanmar substituted City of LA and City of Pacoima as Roe 1 and Roe 2, respectively.

On July 11, 2024, City of LA filed its Cross-Complaint (“7/11/24 Cross-Complaint”) against Hanmar and Flores, and Roes 1 to 20, alleging (1) Apportionment of Fault, (2) Indemnification, and (3) Declaratory Relief. Subsequently, Flores and Hanmar filed their Answer to the 7/11/24 Cross-Complaint on August 9, 2024.

On July 26, 2024, City of LA filed the instant Demurrer to the Complaint. Subsequently, Plaintiff Reyna filed an Opposition to the Demurrer on October 31, 2024. No Reply papers have been received by the Court.

ANALYSIS

A demurrer is an objection to a pleading, the grounds for which are apparent from either the face of the complaint or a matter of which the court may take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a); see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The purpose of a demurrer is to challenge the sufficiency of a pleading “by raising questions of law.” (Postley v. Harvey (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 280, 286.)

At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts sufficient to apprise the defendant of the factual basis for the claim against them. (Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 714, 721.) “In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) The court “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law[.]” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525 (Berkley).) In applying these standards, the court liberally construes the complaint to determine whether a cause of action has been stated. (Picton v. Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.)

A.    Request for Judicial Notice

Defendant/Cross-Complainant City of LA requests that the Court take judicial notice of the following matters:

1.      Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”) No. 1: Plaintiff’s Claim for Damages served on the City of Los Angeles on October 5, 2022 (RJN Ex. “A.”)

2.      RJN No. 2: Plaintiff’s Complaint filed on May 5, 2023. (RJN Ex. “B.”)

Evidence Code section 425 provides, in pertinent part, “Judicial notice may be taken of the following matters: ... (c) Official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States…. (h) Facts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” Additionally, “official acts” includes the existence of the records and files of a state public entity. (See Hogan v. Valley Hospital (1983) 147 Cal. App. 3d 119, 195 [“Records and files of an administrative board are properly the subject of judicial notice.”]) 

            Accordingly, the Court GRANTS RJN No. 1.

However, the court need not take notice of filings within its own case record. Judicial notice of court filings recognizes only the fact of their filing and that the statements therein were made; the court does not take notice of their contents’ truth. (Wolf v. CDS Devo (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 903, 914-915.) The facts of the documents’ filing and contentions are already in the case file. To take unnecessary, redundant judicial notice would only create confusion.

            Accordingly, the Court DENIES RJN No. 2.

B.     Meet and Confer

A party filing a demurrer “shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc., section 430.41(a).) A failure to meet and confer does not constitute grounds to sustain or overrule a demurrer. (See Code Civ. Proc., sections 430.41 (a)(4).)

Here, City of LA’s good faith efforts to meet and confer were sufficient. (Pinder Decl. ¶¶ 4-6.)

C.    Third Cause of Action – Dangerous Condition of Public Property (Gov. Code, § 835 et seq.)

Government Code section 835 provides, in pertinent part, that “a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either: ¶ (a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or ¶ (b) The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.” 

1)      Dangerous Condition

Pursuant to Government Code section 830, “Dangerous condition” means “a condition of property that creates a substantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of injury when such property or adjacent property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used.” (Gov. Code, § 830, subd. (a).)

Furthermore, “[a] condition is not a dangerous condition within the meaning of this chapter merely because of the failure to provide regulatory traffic control signals, stop signs, yield right-of-way signs, or speed restriction signs, as described by the Vehicle Code, or distinctive roadway markings as described in Section 21460 of the Vehicle Code.” (Gov. Code, § 830.4.) Cases interpreting this statute have held that it provides a shield against liability only in those situations where the alleged dangerous condition exists solely as a result of the public entity's failure to provide a regulatory traffic device or street marking. However, the immunities of Government Code section 830.4 do not govern a case where the intersection was dangerous not only because of the absence of regulatory traffic devices; but also because of other basis. (See Washington v. City and County of San Francisco (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1531, 1535 (Washington) [the court found that as a matter of law the immunity of section 830.4 does not apply where a dangerous condition was due to vision limitations caused by (1) the metal pillars in the middle of 13th Street, and (2) the shadow caused by the freeway above.])

            Significantly, case law establishes a distinction between misleading traffic lights and inoperative traffic lights.

            In Mathews v. State of California ex rel. Dept. of Transportation (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 116 (Mathews), the court found that malfunctioning traffic control signals – where the east-west traffic signal was stuck on green while the north-south traffic signal remained stuck on red – constituted a dangerous condition within the meaning of Government Code section 830. (Mathews, supra, at p. 122.) The court reasoned that a motorist travelling on a busy roadway approaching a green signal, without the knowledge of the signals being stuck in their positions, can be deceptively lulled into a sense of freedom from interference by cross traffic. (Ibid.) 

Conversely, in Chowdhury v. City of Los Angeles (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1187 (Chowdhury), the Court of Appeal held that extinguished, inoperative traffic lights did not constitute a “dangerous condition” as a matter of law. Since the signals were entirely off, they neither misled nor misdirected motorists. (Chowdhury, supra, at p. 1195.) The Chowdhury court emphasized that, in such cases, motorists approaching an intersection with inoperative traffic signals are governed not by the City’s extinguished lights, but by the provisions of the Vehicle Code section 21800, which effectively transform an inoperative signal light into a stop sign. (Ibid.)

Here, the Complaint alleges that “when [Plaintiff] was struck by Defendant FLORES who failed to yield the right of way to traffic while the traffic lights within the intersection were non-operable.” (Compl. ¶ 14.) Additionally, in Plaintiff’s Claim for Damages filed on October 5, 2022, Plaintiff describes the incident, stating, in part: “The traffic lights at the time were not working and instead of indicating a malfunction by flashing red, they were completely off. Claimant and another driver were thus unaware of any traffic lights. Claimant entered the intersection and was struck on his driver’s side door.” (RJN Ex. “A.”)

            This situation aligns with the circumstances in Chowdhury, where the traffic lights at the intersection were extinguished and inoperative, rather than misleading or creating a false impression of safety. In contrast, Mathews involved traffic signals that were malfunctioning but still visibly active, with one direct stuck on green the other on red, where a motorist could reasonably be misled into believing cross-traffic would not proceed into the intersection. Here, however, Plaintiff cannot claim that he was deceptively lulled into a sense of safety by the extinguished, inoperative lights.

Moreover, although Plaintiff asserts that he was “unaware of any traffic lights,” he acknowledges that he “entered the intersection.” (RJN Ex. “A.”) As noted the Chowdhury, an inoperative signal light at the intersection is turned into a four-way stop by the operation of Vehicle Code section 21800, which sets forth, in part, that  “The driver of any vehicle approaching an intersection which has official traffic control signals that are inoperative shall stop at the intersection, and may proceed with caution when it is safe to do so.” (Veh. Code, § 21800, subd. (d)(1).) While any property can be dangerous if used in a sufficiently improper manner, a four-way stop is not inherently dangerous condition when used with due care by the general public and the only risk of harm was from a motorist who failed to exercise due care by obeying the de facto stop signs.

            Consequently, in alignment with established precedent, when the traffic signals were entirely turned off, their defective condition could not mislead nor misdirect the injured party. “The same result obtains whether the traffic signals are extinguished by design or by accident.” (Chowdhury, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 1195.)         

In the present case, where the traffic lights were “non-operable” and “completely off,” as alleged by Plaintiff, liability does not attach to City of LA as a matter of law.

            Additionally, the Court finds Plaintiff’s argument – that the Chowdhury decision relied on extensive discovery and is therefore inapplicable at the demurrer stage – misguided. As Plaintiff notes, in Chowdhury, the City of Los Angeles was found to have acted in accordance with the Department of Transportation Manual of Policies and Procedures. However, this finding, along with the supporting evidence, addressed a different issue: whether the “concealed trap” statute applies to the accidents proximately caused by confusion arising from pedestal stop signs posted, by the city employees, at other intersections, though not at the one where the accident occurred. (Chowdhury, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at 1197.) As for the issue before us – whether inoperative traffic lights constitute a dangerous condition – the Chowdhury court clearly held that they do not, as a matter of law.  

Furthermore, the factual allegations in the Complaint, which are treated as true for the purpose of reviewing the Demurrer, directly implicate the immunity for City of LA provided under Government Code section 830.4. Plaintiff alleges that a dangerous condition exists solely as a result of the City of LA's failure to provide operational traffic signals at the intersection. Plaintiff does not allege any additional conditions, such as obstruction or shadow limiting his vision, caused the intersection to be a dangerous condition. (See Washington, supra, 219 Cal.App.3d at p. 1535.)

            Accordingly, the Court finds Chowdhury instructive. Assuming the truth of the factual allegations, the Court concludes that the inoperative traffic lights at the time of the accident do not constitute a dangerous condition as matter of law.

            Therefore, the Court SUSTAINS the Demurrer on this ground.

2)      City of LA’s Liability under Government Code sections 815.2 and 840.2

City of LA further argues that Plaintiff has failed to allege a statutory liability against it under Government Code sections 815.2 and 840.2 (Mot. at pp. 10, 14.)

Government Code section 815.2 provides, in pertinent part, “A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative.” (Gov. Code, § 815.2, subd. (a).) This statue creates vicarious liability on the part of a public entity for the torts of its employees. (Hoff v. Vacaville Unified Sch. Dist. (1988) 19 Cal. 4th 925, 932.)

            Government Code section 840.2 provides, “An employee of a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of public property if the plaintiff establishes that the property of the public entity was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either: ¶ (a) The dangerous condition was directly attributable wholly or in substantial part to a negligent or wrongful act of the employee and the employee had the authority and the funds and other means immediately available to take alternative action which would not have created the dangerous condition; or ¶ (b) The employee had the authority and it was his responsibility to take adequate measures to protect against the dangerous condition at the expense of the public entity and the funds and other means for doing so were immediately available to him, and he had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section 840.4 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.”

            The Court notes that the Complaint does not allege that any employee of the City of LA created a dangerous condition on public property. Additionally, Plaintiff’s Opposition does not address the liability under these code sections, thereby waiving these issues raised in the Demurrer. Furthermore, as the Court has concluded that inoperative traffic lights, in the circumstance, do not constitute a dangerous condition, the Complaint has failed to sufficiently state a cause of action under Government Codes 815.2 and 840.2.

            Based on the above, the Court SUSTAINS the Demurrer on this ground.

D.    Leave to Amend

Generally, leave to amend is available when “the defect raised by a motion to strike or by demurrer is reasonably capable of cure . . . to give the plaintiff a chance to cure the defect in question.” (CLD Construction, Inc. v. City of San Ramon (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1146.) A demurrer may be sustained without leave to amend where, “‘the facts are not in dispute, and the nature of the plaintiff's claim is clear, but, under the substantive law, no liability exists.’ [Citation.]” (Seidler v. Municipal Court (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1233.) The burden of proving the existence of a reasonable possibility to cure the defect by amendment is squarely on the plaintiff. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)

As discussed above, the factual allegations are undisputed that the traffic lights were extinguished and inoperative at the time of the accident. Furthermore, the nature of Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action clearly rests on City of LA’s liability based solely on the inoperative traffic lights. The Court has determined that, under the substantive law, no liability attaches as inoperative traffic lights do not constitute a dangerous condition within the meaning of Government Code section 830.

Therefore, the Court finds no reasonable possibility that Plaintiff can cure this defect through amendment.

Accordingly, the Court DENIES the request for leave to amend.

CONCLUSION

Defendant City of Los Angeles’s Demurrer to Third Cause of Action in the Complaint is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

Moving party to give notice.