Judge: David B. Gelfound, Case: 23CHCV01389, Date: 2025-05-22 Tentative Ruling

Counsel wishing to submit on a tentative ruling may inform the clerk or courtroom assistant in North Valley Department F49, 9425 Penfield Ave., Chatsworth, CA 91311, at (818) 407-2249.  Please be aware that unless all parties submit, the matter will still be called for hearing and may be argued by any appearing/non-submitting parties. If the matter is submitted on the court's tentative ruling by all parties, counsel for moving party shall give notice of ruling. This may be done by incorporating verbatim the court's tentative ruling. The tentative ruling may be extracted verbatim by copying and pasting, as unformatted text, from the Los Angeles Superior Court’s website, http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org.
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Case Number: 23CHCV01389    Hearing Date: May 22, 2025    Dept: F49

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F49

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES

Motion filed: 9/11/24 (duplicate motion refiled on 1/31/25)

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiffs Timothy Jones and Katherine Svoboda

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Ford Motor Company

NOTICE: OK.

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order awarding attorney fees and costs in the total amount of $43,975.08, consisting of (1) $38,842.00 in attorney fees, and (2) $5,132.58 in costs.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is GRANTED IN PART.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Timothy Jones and Katherine Svoboda (“Plaintiffs”) filed this Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act lawsuit over alleged defects in their 2019 Ford Mustang GT, VIN: 1FA6P8CF7K5202429 (the “Subject Vehicle”), which was manufactured by Defendant Ford Motor Company (“FMC”). Plaintiffs purchased the Subject Vehicle on January 14, 2020, entering into an express written warranty contract with Ford. (Compl. ¶¶ 5, 10.)

On May 10, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against Ford, Sunrise Ford (“Sunrise”) and Does 1 through 50, alleging the following five causes of action: (1) violation of Song-Beverly Act – breach of express warranty; (2) violation of Song-Beverly Act – breach of implied warranty; (3) violation of the Song-Beverly Act section 1793.2(b); (4) violation of Song-Beverly Act section 1796.5; and (5) negligent repair. Subsequently, on August 10, 2023, FMC filed its Answer to the Complaint, erroneously styled as a joint Answer on behalf of both FMC and Sunrise. This error was corrected by a November 8, 2023, stipulation striking references to Defendant Sunrise from the Answer.

On April 30, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Settlement.

On September 11, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion for Attorney Fees (the “Motion”). On January 17, 2025, FMC filed an Opposition, and on January 24, Plaintiffs filed a Reply. Subsequently, on January 31, 2025, Plaintiffs refiled the identical Motion.

ANALYSIS

Attorney fees are allowed as costs when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10)(B).)¿ In a lemon law action, costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees, may be recovered by a prevailing buyer under the Song-Beverly Act. (See Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).)¿

“If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).)¿

Thus, the statute includes a “reasonable attorney’s fees” standard.¿ The attorney bears the burden of proof as to the “reasonableness” of any fee claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (c)(5).) This burden requires competent evidence as to the nature and value of the services rendered. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.) “Testimony of an attorney as to the number of hours worked on a particular case is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records.” (Ibid.)¿

A plaintiff’s verified billing invoices are prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services listed were necessarily incurred. (See Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.) “In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488, quoting Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.) The Court has discretion to reduce fees that result from inefficient or duplicative use of time. (Horsford v. Bd. of Trustees of California State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal. App. 4th 359, 395.)¿

In determining reasonable attorney fees, the trial court begins with the lodestar, i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 36.) The lodestar may then be adjusted based on factors specific to the case in order to fix the fee at the fair market value of the legal services provided. (Ibid.) These factors include (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. (Ibid.)¿ 

A.    Motion for Attorney Fees

(1)   Procedural Effect of Continuance and Refiling of the Motion

The hearing for the Motion was originally set for January 31, 2025. Defendant FMC timely filed its Opposition on January 17, 2025, and Plaintiffs filed a timely Reply on January 24, 2025. Plaintiffs’ subsequent refiling of the identical Motion on January 31, 2025, does not reset the motion schedule.

As such, the continuance does not invalidate these filings. The Motion, filed on September 11, 2024, remains the operative filing, and the Opposition and Reply are directly applicable.

Accordingly, the Court will consider the arguments raised in the Opposition and Reply.

(2)   Prevailing Party

Plaintiffs seek an award of attorney fees pursuant to the settlement agreement reached by the parties. (Saeedian Decl. ¶¶ 25-26.) It is undisputed that Plaintiffs are the prevailing party in this action and are entitled to a reasonable amount in attorney fees.

(3)   Reasonableness of Hourly Rates

“The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in [their] court.” (Ibid.) 

Plaintiffs seek to recover attorney fees for work performed by five attorneys: (1) Michael Saeedian at $695 per hour; (2) Adina Ostoia at $695 per hour; (3) Christopher Urner at $525 per hour; (4) Jorge L. Acosta at $350 per hour; and (5) Sergo Aivazov at $300 per hour. Additionally, Plaintiffs request fees for paralegal services at a rate of $250 per hour. (Saeedian Decl. ¶¶ 16, 28.)

In Opposition, Defendant FMC contends that the requested rates are excessive for what it characterizes as a straightforward case. FMC cites the Real Rate Report’s First Quartile rates – $252/hr. for partners, $231/hr. for associates, and $130/hr. for paralegals – as a more appropriate benchmark. (Opp’n. at pp. 16-17.)

The Court finds the Real Rate Report of limited persuasive value in this context. The report reflects average billing rates for non-contingent, general liability work and does not account for the enhanced risk borne by counsel in Song-Beverly Act cases prosecuted on a contingency basis. Here, Plaintiffs’ counsel undertook representation on a full contingency basis, advancing all costs. (Saeedian Decl. ¶ 6.)

Plaintiffs provide supporting evidence of prevailing rates in similar consumer protection cases, including reference to the Laffey Matrix for lodestar comparability and case law approving comparable rates. (Id. ¶ 12.) They also demonstrate the qualifications and lemon law litigation experience of each attorney. (Saeedian Decl. ¶¶ 1-5.)

The Court evaluates the reasonableness of the requested rates by considering the case’s procedural posture and complexity. This matter resolved prior to trial, following discovery and motion practice, including disputes involving multiple defendants and discovery. (See Urner Decl. Ex. “A” [showing discovery disputes].) While the case presented moderate complexity, it did not involve novel legal issues or extensive litigation sufficient to justify the upper end of the hourly rates spectrum.

Based on the specific facts of this case, the Court exercises its discretion to adjust the requested hourly rates to more accurately reflect the prevailing rates in the community for similar work:

Michael Saeedian and Adina Ostoia: $520 per hour;

Christopher Urner: $400 per hour;

Jorge Acosta and Sergo Aivazov: $300 per hour;

Paralegal: $200 per hour.

These adjusted rates balance the skill and experience of counsel with the nature and complexity of the case, consistent with PLCM Group and other applicable authorities.

(4)   Reasonableness of Hours Incurred

“A trial court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney ... involved in the presentation of the case.” (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.) “The reasonableness of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court, to be determined from a consideration of such factors as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the experience and expertise of counsel and the amount of time involved. The court may also consider whether the amount requested is based upon unnecessary or duplicative work.” (Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.) 

Here, Plaintiffs’ lodestar is supported by a detailed contemporaneous billing statement (Saeedian Decl. Ex. “A.”) reflecting 92.5 hours of legal work performed across multiple stages of litigation, including: pleading, discovery, and motion practice; meet and confer efforts; settlement negotiation and documentation; and preparation and filing of the Motion. (Ibid.)

Defendant FMC disputes the reasonableness of certain work, arguing: (1) Plaintiffs’ opposition to the stipulated ex parte application to strike Sunrise’s Answer was unnecessary; (2) several withdrawn or vacated discovery motions were unnecessary; (3) fees for client intake and Complaint drafting are excessive; (4) fees for research and document summarization are excessive; and (5) tasks such as receiving proofs of service and scheduling appearances are non-legal and should be stricken. (Opp’n. at pp. 1-9, 11-12.) Furthermore, FMC argues that a 20% negative multiplier is warranted. (Id. at p. 18.)

The Court first rejects FMC’s argument for a negative multiplier. Here, FMC provides no evidence of unreasonable conduct, inefficiency, or disproportionate effort by Plaintiffs’ counsel. The Court’s adjustment of the hourly rates already accounts for the case’s moderate complexity and procedural posture, rendering a negative multiplier unnecessary.

Next, the Court notes that Plaintiffs’ counsel declares under oath that the billing entries were created contemporaneously or in accordance with the firm policy (Saeedian Decl. ¶ 9); that time entries were reviewed for clerical, or non-essential tasks and adjusted accordingly (id. ¶ 10). The Court finds the billing records credible and the hours expended to be largely reasonable.

The Court further finds that the requested fees related to the October 6, 2023, ex parte application and withdrawn/vacated discovery motions are recoverable, as they responded to opposing counsel’s tactics. (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 47.) FMC’s claim that a stipulation negates fees lacks legal support and evidence of bad faith. (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.) Additionally, fees for tasks like receiving and updating files are billable as legal work integral to case management. (Guinn v. Dotson (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 262, 269; Salton Bay Marina, Inc. v. Imperial Irrigation Dist. (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 914, 951.) FMC’s examples are minimal and do not prove purely clerical work.

As to drafting the Complaint and conducting research, the Court acknowledges that they are critical, given the case’s multiple defendants and discovery disputes. However, because the Complaint resembles a standard lemon law template, a modest reduction of 1.5 hours (from 9 to 7.5 hours, aggregated from December 9, 2022, to May 11, 2023), at the paralegal rate of $200/hr. is warranted.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART the Motion as to attorney fees and finds the reasonable lodestar total to be $29,800.00, calculated as follows:

Michael Saeedian: $520/hr. x 21.9 hr. = $11,388.00

Adina Ostoia: $520/hr. x 0.1 hr. = $52.00

Christopher Urner: $400/hr. x 18.3 hr.= $7,320.00

Jorge L. Acosta: $300/hr. x 8.9 hr.= $2,670.00

Sergo Aivazov: $300/hr. x 0.1 hr. = $30.00

Paralegal: $200/hr. x (43.2 -1.5) hr. = $8,340.00

Total: $29,800.00

(5)   Reasonable Costs and Expenses

Under the Song-Beverly Act, a prevailing buyer shall be allowed to recover as part of the

judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses. (See Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (d).) The California Legislature intended the word “expenses” to cover outlays not included in the detailed statutory definition of “costs,” and the Song-Beverly Act’s legislative history demonstrates the Legislature exercised its power to permit recovery of a host of litigation

expenditures beyond those permitted by Code of Civil Procedure § 1033.5. (See Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 137-138.)

A properly verified memorandum of costs generally satisfies the prevailing party’s initial burden of establishing that the claimed costs were necessarily incurred. (Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.)

Here, Plaintiffs submitted a verified memorandum of costs totaling $5,132.58. (Saeedian Decl. Ex. “B.”) Plaintiffs provide detailed worksheets for items allowable as costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (a): filing, motion, and jury fees, deposition costs, and service of process expenses. (Id. at pp. 3-4.)

Additionally, Plaintiffs indicate that the vast majority of the “other” costs are attributable to the vehicle inspection fee in the amount of $2,097.39. (Id. at p. 6.) Although the “other” category includes costs not expressly enumerated in Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (a), these costs are recoverable under subdivision (c) as they were reasonably necessary to the conduct of litigation. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (c)(2).)

Here, the vehicle inspection fee of $2,097.39, in particular, was reasonably necessary for Plaintiffs’ evaluation of the vehicle’s nonconformities under Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (d), and contributed directly to the resolution of the case. FMC does not contest the $5,132.58 in costs, and the Court finds them reasonably incurred based on Plaintiffs’ verified memorandum and supporting worksheets, awarding them in full.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Motion as to reasonable costs and expenses.

            Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART the Motion, awarding Plaintiffs $34,932.58, comprising $29,800.00 in attorney fees and $5,132.58 in reasonable costs.

CONCLUSION

The Motion for Attorney Fees is GRANTED IN PART. The Court awards $34,932.58 in reasonable attorney fees and costs against Defendant Ford Motor Company, and in favor of Plaintiffs Timothy Jones and Katherine Svoboda.

Moving party to give notice.