Judge: David B. Gelfound, Case: 23CHCV01873, Date: 2025-01-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23CHCV01873    Hearing Date: January 7, 2025    Dept: F49

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F49

MOTION TO COMPEL ANSWERS TO DEPOSITION QUESTIONS

Motion filed: 9/16/24

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Sanah “Sonya” Hamad

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Prezzee, Inc.

NOTICE: OK.

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order from this Court compelling nonparty deponents Ms. Michelle Schober and Ms. Victoria Volfovski to provide responses to questions unanswered at the May 30 and May 31, 2024, depositions, respectively. Additionally, opposing party requests monetary sanctions against Plaintiff in the amount of $4,000.00

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is DENIED. Defendant Prezzee, Inc.’s request for monetary sanctions is GRANTED IN PART.

BACKGROUND

On June 27, 2023, Plaintiff Sanah “Sonya” Hamad (“Plaintiff” or “Hamad”) initiated this action. Subsequently, on January 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint (“FAC”).

On May 10, 2024, Plaintiff filed her operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) against Defendants Prezzee, Inc. (“Prezzee”), Peter Durham (“Durham”) (collectively, “Defendants”) and Does 1 through 10, alleging eleven causes of action: (1) Reproductive Health Decision-Making Discrimination in Violation of FEHA (Gov. Code, §§ 12940 et seq.), (2) Sex Discrimination in Violation of FEHA (Gov. Code, §§ 12940 et seq.), (3) Disability Discrimination in Violation of FEHA (Gov. Code, §§ 12940 et seq.), (4) Retaliation in Violation of FEHA (Gov. Code, §§ 12940 et seq.), (5) Harassment in Violation of FEHA (Gov. Code, §§ 12940 et seq.), (6) Failure to Prevent Discrimination, Harassment and/or Retaliation in Violation of FEHA (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (k)), (7) Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process in Violation of FEHA (Gov. Code, §§ 12940 et seq.), (8) Failure to Accommodate in Violation of FEHA (Gov. Code, §§ 12940 et seq.), (9) Retaliation in Violation of Labor Code § 1102.5, (10) Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy, and (11) Failure to Reimburse Business Expenses. Subsequently, on June 6, 2024, Defendants filed their Answer to the SAC.

  On September 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Compel Michelle Schober and Victoria Volfovski to Answer Questions at Deposition (the “Motion”). Subsequently, Defendant Prezzee filed its Opposition on December 23, 2024, and Plaintiff replied on January 2, 2025.

ANALYSIS

“If a deponent fails to answer any question or to produce any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing under the deponent’s control that is specified in the deposition notice or a deposition subpoena, the party seeking discovery may move the court for an order compelling that answer or production.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.480, subd. (a).) Additionally, “This motion shall be made no later than 60 days after the completion of the record of the deposition, and shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.480, subd. (b).)

“The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel an answer or production, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.480, subd. (j).)

A.    Meet and Confer

The Court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied the meet and confer requirement (See Bodell Decl. ¶ 5.)

B.     Timeliness

A motion to compel a deponent to answer a question must be “made no later than 60 days after the completion of the record of the deposition.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.480, subd. (b).)

Here, the certified completed deposition transcripts of non-party deponents Michelle Schober (“Schober”) and Victoria Volfovski (“Volfovski”) were served by the court reporter on June 19 and June 25, 2024, respectively. (Opp’n. at p. 3, Bronstein Decl. ¶¶ 12, 13.) Defendant Prezzee contends that the Motion is untimely, arguing that the deadlines to file a motion to compel answers were August 19, 2024, for Schober and August 25, 2024, for Volfovski. However, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion on September 16, 2024, more than three weeks after these deadlines had passed. (Opp’n. at p. 3.)

By contrast, Plaintiff contends that her Motion is timely, asserting that the 60-day time limit under Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.480 is not triggered until after the 30-day period for deponents to correct and sign the transcript, citing Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.520. (Reply at p. 2.) Plaintiff relies on subdivision (b) of section 2025.520, which states, in pertinent part, that “[f]or 30 days following each notice under subdivision (a), unless the attending parties and the deponent agree on the record or otherwise in writing to a longer or shorter time period, the deponent may change the form or the substance of the answer to a question, and may either approve the transcript of the deposition by signing it, or refuse to approve the transcript by not signing it.”

Plaintiff acknowledges the procedural distinction between “the reporter giving notice that the deposition transcript has been completed” and “[the expiration of] the time for the deponent to correct and sign the transcript has expired.” (Reply at p. 2.) Nevertheless, Plaintiff contends that the phrase “completion of the record of the deposition” under Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.480 should be interpreted to mean the same as “approv[al] [of] the transcript” under Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.520. Plaintiff fails to provide any legal authority to support this interpretation, and the Court finds it unpersuasive.

Section 2025.480 and 2025.520 address distinct issues, as evidenced by their placement under separate articles of the Code of Civil Procedure and the remedies they provide. Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.480 authorizes the party seeking discovery to move the court for an order compelling that answer or production, which is directly on point for the instant Motion. By contrast, Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.520 governs the deponent’s right to approve or correct the transcript or seek to suppress the deposition. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.520, subds. (b), (f) and (g).) If the deponent files a seasonable motion to suppress the deposition, “the court may determine that the reasons given for the failure or refusal to approve the transcript require rejection of the deposition in whole or in part.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.520, subd. (g).)

Plaintiff’s interpretation imposes a condition on section 2025.480’s 60-day deadline, contingent on an uncertain period during which a court might resolve a motion under section 2025.520. This reading lacks support in the statutory text or legislative intent. Courts consistently hold that if the statutory language is not ambiguous on its face and no latent ambiguity is identified, “‘“we presume the Legislature meant what it said and the plain meaning of the statute governs.”’” (Pratt v. Vencor, Inc. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 905, 909.)

The Court observes that the language of Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.480 neither states nor implies that its 60-day time limit is contingent upon a separate procedural or its outcome under section 2025.520. In other words, the latter section does not alter or extend the mandatory 60-day deadline. The plain language of section 2025.480 establishes that the 60-day deadline is triggered by the court reporter’s notice of the deposition record’s completion, rather than by the deponent’s approval or correction of the transcript. Therefore, Defendant Prezzee correctly states that the deadlines for Plaintiff’s motion to compel answers were August 19 and August 25, 2024, respectively. Since Plaintiff filed the motion on September 16, 2024, it is untimely under the statute.

Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Motion.

C.    Monetary Sanctions

“The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel an answer or production, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.480, subd. (j).)

            Defendant Prezzee seeks monetary sanctions against Plaintiff in the amount of $4,000.00. (Opp’n. at p. 7, Bronstein Decl. ¶ 20.)

            The Court finds the mandatory sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.480, subdivision (j) applicable under the circumstances. Utilizing the lodestar approach, the Court determines the total and reasonable amount of attorney’s fees and costs incurred for the Defendant Prezzee’s work performed in connection with its Opposition to the Motion to be $900.00, calculated based on a reasonable hourly rate of $450.00 for 2 hours of work reasonably spent.

Therefore, the Court GRANTS IN PART Defendant Prezzee’s request for monetary sanctions, awarding Prezzee $900.00 against Plaintiff for unsuccessfully making the Motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.480, subdivision (j).

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff Sanah “Sonya” Hamad’s Motion to Compel Michelle Schober and Victoria Volfovski to Answer Questions at Deposition is DENIED.

Defendant Prezzee, Inc.’s request for monetary sanctions is GRANTED IN PART.

Plaintiff Sanah “Sonya” Hamad and her attorney of record are ordered to pay $900.00, jointly and severally, to Defendant Prezzee, Inc.’s attorney of record.

Moving party to give notice.