Judge: David B. Gelfound, Case: 23CHCV01932, Date: 2024-08-07 Tentative Ruling

Counsel wishing to submit on a tentative ruling may inform the clerk or courtroom assistant in North Valley Department F49, 9425 Penfield Ave., Chatsworth, CA 91311, at (818) 407-2249.  Please be aware that unless all parties submit, the matter will still be called for hearing and may be argued by any appearing/non-submitting parties. If the matter is submitted on the court's tentative ruling by all parties, counsel for moving party shall give notice of ruling. This may be done by incorporating verbatim the court's tentative ruling. The tentative ruling may be extracted verbatim by copying and pasting, as unformatted text, from the Los Angeles Superior Court’s website, http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org.
All hearings on law and motion and other calendar matters are generally NOT transcribed by a court reporter unless one is provided by the party(ies). 

Case Number: 23CHCV01932    Hearing Date: August 7, 2024    Dept: F49

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F49

APPLICATION FOR DETERMINATION OF GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT (C.C.P. Section 877.6(a)(2)); MOTION TO CHALLENGE

Motion filed: 3/12/24

MOVING PARTY: Cross-Defendants Erik Ramirez and Marcelino Ramirez (collectively, “Cross-Defendants” or “Applicants”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant/Cross-Complainant Gabriel Ramirez (“Defendant/Cross-Complainant”)

NOTICE: OK.¿¿¿ 

RELIEF REQUESTED: an order determining that the settlement entered into between Cross-Defendants and Plaintiff Jakeline Cabrera and Juan Cabrera (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) was made in good faith under Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6, subdivision (a)(2), and dismissing the Cross-Complaint and barring future claims against Cross-Defendants for equitable comparative contribution. Defendant/Cross-Complainant’s motion seeks to contest the good faith settlement.

TENTATIVE RULING: The application is GRANTED. The motion to contest is DENIED. The Applicants’ request for an order dismissing the Cross-Complaint and barring future claims is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

This action arises out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on January 17, 2023, on the westbound Interstate 210 Freeway in Sylmar, California (the “Accident”).

On July 3, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint against Defendant/Cross-Complainant for personal injuries arising from the Accident. The Complaint alleges motor vehicle and general negligence causes of action. (Compl. ¶ 10.) Subsequently, Defendant/Cross-Complainant filed an Answer to the Complaint on December 1, 2023.

On the same day, December 1, 2023, Defendant/Cross-Complainant filed his Cross-Complaint against Cross-Defendants, alleging indemnity contribution. Subsequently, Cross-Defendants filed their Answer to the Cross-Complaint on February 29, 2024.  

On March 12, 2024, Cross-Defendants filed the instant Application for Determination of Good Faith Settlement (the “Application”) Subsequently, Defendant/Cross-Complaint filed his Opposition to the Application on April 2, 2024. A separate Motion to Challenge the Good Faith Settlement was filed by Defendant/Cross-Complainant on May 9, 2024 (“Motion to Challenge”).

On July 23, 2024, Cross-Defendants filed their Opposition to Defendant/Cross-Complainant’s Opposition and Motion to Challenge.

ANALYSIS

Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6, subdivision (a)(2) provides, in pertinent part, that “a settling party may give notice of settlement to all parties and to the court, together with an application for determination of good faith settlement and a proposed order. The application shall indicate the settling parties, and the basis, terms, and amount of the settlement. The notice, application, and proposed order shall be given by certified mail, return receipt requested, or by personal service. Proof of service shall be filed with the court. Within 25 days of the mailing of the notice, application, and proposed order, or within 20 days of personal service, a nonsettling party may file a notice of motion to contest the good faith of the settlement.”

The determination as to whether a settlement is in good faith is a matter left to the discretion of the trial court.” (Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1349 (Mattco).)

A.    Timeliness

“Within 25 days of the mailing of the notice, application, and proposed order, or within 20 days of personal service, a nonsettling party may file a notice of motion to contest the good faith of the settlement.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (a)(2).) (Underlines added.) “No paper may be rejected for filing on the ground that it was untimely submitted for filing. If the court, in its discretion, refuses to consider a late filed paper, the minutes or order must so indicate.” (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1300(d).)

Here, the Application was served on April 2, 2024, establishing a deadline for a nonsettling party to file a motion to challenge by April 29, 2024, which is the first court day at the end of the 25-day period. Applicants argue that Defendant/Cross-Complainant’s Motion to Challenge, filed on May 12, 2024, exceeded the time limit.

Defendant/Cross-Complainant asserts that he had previously served and filed the Opposition papers on April 2, 2024. However, a separate filing was made subsequently due to a clerical mistake that the hearing on Motion Re: Opposition to Good Faith Settlement was not reserved. (Mot. to Challenge, at p. 7.)

Notably, Applicants assert that Defendant/Cross-Complainant himself accepted the global settlement offer by signing the release on November 30, 2023, and agreeing to accept the $7,500.00 settlement. (Capra-Cunningham Decl. ¶ 8.) This agreement makes Defendant/Cross-Complainant no longer a “nonsettling party” to which the 25 days limit explicitly applies.

Furthermore, given the clerical mistakes presented by Defendant/Cross-Complainant, the Court considers the Motion to Challenge in its analysis below. (See Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1300(d).)

B.     Determination of Good Faith Settlement

The California Supreme Court held in Tech-Bilt that the trial court’s determination of good faith is based on “a number of factors,” including “[1] a rough approximation of plaintiffs’ total recovery and the settlor’s proportionate liability, [2] the amount paid in settlement, [3] the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs, . . . [4] a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial. . . [5] the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants, as well as [6] the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of nonsettling defendants.” ¿(Tech-Bilt, Inc.v. Woodword-Clyde & Assocs. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499 (Tech-Bilt); see also Far West Financial Corp. v. D&S Co.¿(1988) 46 Cal.3d 796, 816, fn. 16 [expanding on Tech-Bilt factors].) “[W]hen the good faith nature of a settlement is disputed, it is incumbent upon the trial court to consider and weigh the Tech-Bilt factors.” (City of Grand Terrace v. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1261 (City of Grand Terrace).

i.                    Rough Proximation and Settling Defendant’s Proportionate Liability

 The first Tech–Bilt factor consists of two parts: a rough approximation of the plaintiff’s total recovery and the settling defendant’s proportionate liability. (Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 962 (Cahill).)

When approximating a plaintiff’s total recovery or the settling defendant’s proportionate liability, “judges should . . . not yearn for the unreal goal of mathematical certainty.¿ Because the application of section 877.6 requires an educated guess as to what may occur should the case go to trial, all that can be expected is an estimate, not a definitive conclusion.”¿ (North County Contractor’s Assn. v. Touchstone Ins. Services (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1090.)

Furthermore, the defendant's settlement figure must not be grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the settlement, would estimate the settling defendant's liability to be. (Dole Food Co., Inc. v. Superior Court (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 894, 909 (Dole).)  After the court first makes a rough approximation of the total amount the plaintiff is likely to recover, the court then determines what, if any, the settling defendant’s proportionate share of that total recovery would be, and then determines whether the settlement amount was “within the ballpark” of reasonable settlement amounts based on the first two factors.” (Ibid.)

Here, the settlement terms stipulate the total amount is $30,000.00, which represents the full amount of the insurance policy limit held by Cross-Defendants. (Capra-Cunningham Decl. ¶ 3.) The $30,000.00 total amount is allocated as follows: $7,500.00 to Plaintiff Jackline Cabrera (“Jakeline”), $7,500.00 to Plaintiff Juan Cabrera (“Juan”), $$7,500.00 to nonparty Jessica Cardona (“Jessica”), and $7,500.00 to Defendant/Cross-Complainant. (Capra-Cunningham Decl., ¶ 4; Ex. “A.”)

As to the potential total liability, Defendant/Cross-Complainant asserts that Plaintiff Jakeline has alleged $6,710.00 in past medical expenses and as well as future treatment amounting to $15,000 for each injection. (Mot. to Challenge, at p. 4.) Similarly, it is stated that Plaintiff Juan has alleged $9,0074.14 in past medical expenses and future medical treatment amounting to $15,000 for each injection. (Ibid.) Additionally, both Plaintiffs also allege unspecified amount for pain and suffering. (Ibid.) Notably, these claimed amounts do not reflect any potential reductions. (See e.g. Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provision, Inc. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 541.)

In his Cross-Complaint, Defendant/Cross-Complainant alleges that Cross-Defendants’ car caused his car to collide with the back of the car in which Plaintiffs were riding. (Capra-Cunningham Decl. ¶ 2.) In their Answers to the Cross-Complaint, Cross-Complaints assert defenses of (1) comparative negligence, (2) apportionment, (3) failure to mitigate damages, and (4) failure to state a cause of action. (See generally 2/29/24 Answer).

Based on the limited information before the Court, it is unreliable at this stage to predict a liability distribution. However, even if Cross-Defendants are ultimately found to be more than 50% liable for the Accident, the $30,000 paid to the settling parties reasonably constitutes a rough approximation of their potential liability.

Furthermore, it is important to note that the reasonableness of the settling defendant's figure must be assessed at the time of the settlement. (Dole, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 909.) Defendant/Cross-Complainant concedes that at the time of settlement with Plaintiffs, it was – and in fact still is – entirely uncertain whether Plaintiffs will actually require any future treatments for their alleged injuries and if so, how much these future treatments will cost. (Mot. to Challenge, at p. 6.)  Additionally, the Court notes that Defendant/Cross-Complainant himself accepted the global settlement with Cross-Defendants (Capra-Cunningham Decl. ¶ 8), indicating his acknowledgment of the reasonableness and fairness of the settlement terms at the time they were agreed upon.

            Based on the above records and its own judicial experience, the Court rationally concludes that a reasonable person could find that the settlement amount is within the ballpark of their proportionate liability.  

            Therefore, the first and second Tech-Bilt factor supports the determination of good faith settlement.

ii.                  Settling Defendant’s Financial Condition

Here, Cross-Defendant Erick Ramirez (“Erick”) attests that the settlement amount is the policy limit per accident under his State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company Policy No. 6565-456-75, and he did not carry any other liability insurance or carry any excess coverage or umbrella policies. (Erick Decl. ¶¶ 3-4.)

Based on this record and given the Court’s previous determination that the settlement amount is already in the ballpark of Cross-Defendants’ proportionate liability, it concludes that the analysis of this factor is also in favor of the determination of the good faith settlement.

iii.                The Existence of Collusion, Fraud, or Tortious Conduct Aimed to Injure the Interests of Nonsettling Defendants

The “existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of nonsettling defendants” is another relevant consideration. (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at 499.)

            Here, there is no evidence of “the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of” Anderson. There is also no argument made by Defendant/Cross-Complainant in relation to this factor. Thus, the Court finds this Tech-Bilt factor supports the determination of good faith settlement.

            Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that its analysis of Tech-Bilt factors supports the determination of good faith settlement.

            Therefore, the Court GRANTS the Application for Determination of Good Faith Settlement.

C.    Request for Order Dismissing Pending Cross-Complaint

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6, subdivision (c), “determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.”

Procedural requirements for good faith settlement determinations pursuant to section 877.6 include special and distinct procedures established by case law. “Specifically, it is error for a court automatically to dismiss such a cross-complaint following a good faith settlement determination in the absence of a separate motion seeking to dispose of the cross-complaint, such as a demurrer, summary judgment or motion to dismiss. (Paragon Real Estate Group of San Francisco, Inc. v. Hansen (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 177, 188 (Paragon”); see, e.g., Shane v. Superior Court (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1237, 1246 (Shane) [“A distinct procedure is not only procedurally necessary but also serves the important salutary function of focusing the court's attention distinctly on two completely different substantive questions, whether the settlement was in good faith and whether the claim sought to be dismissed is of such a nature as to be barred by a good faith settlement.”]; Housing Group v. Superior Court (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 549, 553 (Housing Group).)

            In alignment with the precedents set in Paragon, Shane, and Housing Group, the Court determines that Cross-Defendants are required to file a separate motion seeking to dispose of the Cross-Complaint against them.

            Accordingly, the Applicants’ Request for Order dismissing the pending Cross-Complaint and barring future claims against Cross-Defendants for equitable comparative contribution is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

Cross-Defendants’ Application for Determination of Good Faith Settlement is GRANTED.

Cross-Defendants’ Request for Order Dismissing the Pending Cross-Complaint against Them and Barring Any Further Claims for Equitable Comparative Contribution is DENIED.

Defendant/Cross-Complainant’s Motion to Challenge the Good Faith Settlement Application is DENIED.

Applicants to give notice.