Judge: David B. Gelfound, Case: 23CHCV01957, Date: 2024-12-20 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23CHCV01957    Hearing Date: December 20, 2024    Dept: F49

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F49

MOTION FOR RECOVERY OF ANTI-SLAPP ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

Motion filed: 8/7/24

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Jerald Baker and Sheila Baker

RESPONDING PARTY: None.

NOTICE: OK.¿¿¿ 

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order from this Court to award attorney’s fees and costs in the sum of $94,000 in favor of Defendants pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is GRANTED with a reduced award.

BACKGROUND

This action stems from allegations by Plaintiff Taylor Schwartz (“Plaintiff” or “Schwartz”), a realtor, who claims to have sustained damages caused by alleged breach of contract by Defendants Jerald Baker and Sheila Baker (collectively, “Defendants”) to sell their real property and by Defendants’ defamatory online statements against her.

On July 5, 2023, Plaintiff filed her Complaint against Defendants and Does 1 to 20, alleging the following causes of action: (1) Breach of Contract, (2) Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, (3) Libel Per Se, and (4) Trade Libel. Subsequently, on August 18, 2023, Defendants filed their Answer to the Complaint.

            On June 4, 2024, the Court granted Defendants’ special motion to strike the third and fourth causes of action of the Complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP Motion). (6/4/24 Minute Order.)

            On August 7, 2024, Defendants filed the instant Motion for Recovery of Anti-SLAPP Attorney’s Fees and Costs (the “Motion”).

            Subsequently, on December 13, 2024, Defendants filed their Reply and Notice of Non-Opposition to the Motion.

ANALYSIS

Attorney’s fees in anti-SLAPP motions are determined using the lodestar method. (Ketchum v Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.) “Under the lodestar method, the trial court must first determine the lodestar figure—the reasonable hours spent multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate—based on a careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney involved in the presentation of the case.” (Glaviano v. Sacramento City Unified School Dist. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 744, 751.)

The moving party bears the burden of proof as to “reasonableness” of any fee claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (c)(5).) The party seeking fees has the burden of documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates. (City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 784.) This burden requires competent evidence as to the nature and value of the services rendered. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.) A plaintiff’s verified billing invoices are prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services listed were necessarily incurred. (Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.)

The trial court has broad authority to determine the amount of a reasonable fee. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 (PLCM).)

A.    Request for Judicial Notice

Defendants request the Court take judicial notice of the following matters:

1.      Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”) No. 1: Defendants Jerald Baker and Sheila Baker’s Notice of Motion and Special Motion to Strike; Memorandum of Points and Authorities; Declarations of Jerald Baker, Sheila Baker, and Gerald L. Sauer filed in this matter on August 31, 2023. (RJN Ex. “A.”)

2.      RJN No. 2: Plaintiff Taylor Schwartz’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion and Special Motion to Strike; Memorandum of Points and Authorities; Declaration of Taylor Schwartz filed in this matter on January 3, 2024. (RJN Ex. “B.”)

3.      RJN No. 3: Defendants Jerald Baker and Sheila Baker’s Reply in Support of Special Motion to Strike filed in this matter on January 9, 2024. (RJN Ex. “C.”)

4.      RJN No. 4: Notice of Entry of Order Continuing Hearing on Defendants’ Anti-SLAPP Motion filed in this matter on January 10, 2024. (RJN Ex. “D.”)

5.      RJN No. 5: Notice of Ruling Re: (1) Defendants’ Special Motion to Strike and (2) Case Management Conference filed in this matter on June 5, 2024. (RJN Ex. “E.”)

6.      RJN No. 6: Declaration of Jillian P. Harris in Support of Motion for Mandatory Award of Attorneys’ Fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 subdivision (c)(1) filed in Los Angeles Superior Court Case Number 23STCV20562 on February 26, 2024. (RJN Ex. “F.”)

7.      RJN No. 7: Court’s Ruling Granting Motion for Attorney Fees filed in Los Angeles Superior Court Case Number 23STCV20562 on April 9, 2024. (RJN Ex. “G.”)

Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d) permits the court in its discretion to take judicial notice of the records of any court in this state. Upon taking notice of court records, the court accepts as true only that (1) they were filed and (2) the assertions therein were made; the court does not take notice of the truth of their contents. (See Joslin v. H.A.S. Ins. Brokerage (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 369, 374-375; see also Day v. Sharp (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 904, 916.)

Accordingly, the court GRANTS Defendants’ RJN Nos. 6-7 only to extent that the fellow courts made the findings and issued the rulings in question.

            However, the Court need not take notice of filings within its own case record. Judicial notice of court filings recognizes only the fact of their filing and that the statements therein were made; the court does not take notice of their contents’ truth. (Wolf v. CDS Devo (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 903, 914-915.) The facts of the documents’ filing and contentions are already in the case file. To take unnecessary, redundant judicial notice would only create confusion.

            Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendants’ RJN Nos. 1-5.

B.     Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs

(1)   Prevailing Party

“[T]he anti-SLAPP statute does not refer to parties that have “prevail[ed]” in a lawsuit; it refers specifically to defendants that have prevailed ‘on [the] special motion to strike.’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (c)(1), italics added.) A defendant that successfully moves to strike a plaintiff's cause of action, whether on merits or nonmerits grounds, has ‘prevailed’ on the motion, and therefore is entitled to attorney's fees and costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (c). This understanding of the scope of the anti-SLAPP's fee-shifting provision is consistent with its apparent purpose: namely, compensating the prevailing defendant for the undue burden of defending against litigation designed to chill the exercise of free speech and petition rights.” (Barry v. State Bar of California (2017) 2 Cal.5th 318, 327–328 [emphasis in original].) The fact that Defendant’s motion only challenged part of a cause of action is also permissible (see Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 393), and the Court stated as much in its ruling on the anti-SLAPP motion.

Here, Defendants are the prevailing party on the Anti-SLAPP motion to strike the third and fourth causes of action of the Complaint. (6/4/24 Minute Order.)

(2)   Reasonableness of Hourly Rates

“The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1095.) “[T]he trial court has discretion to determine the amount of reasonable fees to award based on ‘a consideration of such factors as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the experience and expertise of counsel and the amount of time involved.’” (Frym v. 601 Main St. LLC (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 613, 621.)

            Defendants seek to recover attorney’s fees for two attorneys who worked on the Anti-SLAPP motion: (1) Mr. Gerald L. Sauer (“Mr. Sauer”) at $1,250.00 per hour, and (2) Mr. Amir A. Torkamani (“Mr. Torkamani”) at $1,000.00 per hour. (Mot. at p. 6.) Mr. Torkamani declares that he is an experienced litigator and trial attorney with over 15 years of experience. (Torkamani Decl. ¶ 4.) Mr. Sauer presents that he is an experienced and successful civil trial attorney with over 40 years of trial experience in both state and federal courts. (Sauer Decl. ¶ 4.) Both counsels argue that their hourly rates are reasonable based on the current “Laffey Matrix” while recognizing that a court should factor in “the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required and the skill employed in handling the litigation, the attention given, the success of the attorney’s efforts, his learning, his age, and his experience in the particular type of work demanded; the intricacies and importance of the litigation, the labor and the necessity for skilled legal training and ability in trying the cause, and the time consumed,” citing Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 558. (Mot. at p. 7.)

            Significantly, the Court observes that, in determining a reasonable hourly rate, courts consider the rate prevailing in the community for similar work. (In re Tobacco Cases I (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 570, 582.) This market rate approach has been consistently applied in cases involving contingency fee agreements, in-house counsel, and pro bono representation. Notably, in each of these cases, courts have declined to compel the reasonable market rate to conform to the attorney’s individual rate as specified in the fee arrangement with the prevailing party. (See Persson v. Smart Inventions, Inc. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1172-1176 [contingency fee]; see also PLCM, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1096 [“Although the terms of [a fee] contract may be considered, they ‘do not compel any particular award.’”])

            Accordingly, consistent with the approach outlined in established case law, the Court finds that the individual rates asserted for Defendants’ counsels do not reflect the prevailing market rate in the community for similar work, notwithstanding the Court’s individualized consideration of the counsels’ qualifications, learning, age, and experience in the particular type of work.

            The Court further finds that issues presented in connection with the Anti-SLAPP Motion here are neither particularly complex nor extraordinary, and do not necessitate specialized skills or exceptional efforts beyond those ordinarily expected of competent counsel. Therefore, the Court, in its discretion, determines the reasonable hourly rate under the circumstances to be $600.00 per hour.

(3)   Reasonableness of Hours Incurred

“A trial court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney ... involved in the presentation of the case.” (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.) “The reasonableness of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court, to be determined from a consideration of such factors as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the experience and expertise of counsel and the amount of time involved. The court may also consider whether the amount requested is based upon unnecessary or duplicative work.” (Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)

            Defendants seek to recover the sum of 89.75 hours incurred in connection with the Anti-SLAPP Motion. Specifically, 17 hours are attributable to Mr. Sauer and 72.75 hours to Mr. Torkamani. (Mot. at p. 12, Torkamani Decl. ¶ 10, Sauer Decl. ¶ 9.)

            The Court finds that most of the hours expended on the Anti-SLAPP matter are reasonable, subject to the following adjustments: (1) a reduction of 5 hours for Mr. Torkamani for his “[p]reparation of draft of anti-SLAPP motion, supporting declarations, proposed order, and compilation of supporting evidence; (2) a reduction of 11 hours for Mr. Torkamani and 2 hours for Mr. Sauer for their “[a]nticipated time for review of opposition and drafting of reply,” and “anticipated time for preparation for and attendance at hearing;” and (3) a reduction of 6 hours for Mr. Torkamani for his “[r]esearch and drafting of Motion for Attorney’s Fees.” These reductions are made based on the totality of circumstances, including the nature of the issues, the absence of Opposition papers, and the availability of remote appearance for the hearing. As a result, the Court reduces the total reasonable hours to 65.75 approving 15 hours for Mr. Sauer and 50.75 hours for Mr. Torkamani. This results in a total award of $39,450.00, calculated as follows: $600.00/hr. x 15 hrs. + $600.00/hr. x 50.75 hrs.

            Based on the above, the Court GRANTS the Motion, awarding Defendants reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $39,450.00.

CONCLUSION

Defendants Jerald Baker and Sheila Baker’s Motion for Recovery of Anti-SLAPP Attorney’s Fees and Costs is GRANTED, with the award reflecting reduced attorney’s fees and costs.

The Court awards Defendants Jerald Baker and Sheila Baker $39,450.00 as reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

Plaintiff Taylor Schwartz is ordered to pay Defendants Jerald Baker and Sheila Baker attorney’s fees and costs of $39,450.00, jointly and severally.

Moving party to give notice.