Judge: David B. Gelfound, Case: 23CHCV02062, Date: 2024-10-29 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 23CHCV02062    Hearing Date: October 29, 2024    Dept: F49

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F49

MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF BOBBY BURGESS SR.’S FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE; REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS

Motion filed: 8/1/24

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Ford Motor Company

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Bobby Burgess Sr.

NOTICE: OK.

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order compelling Plaintiff Bobby Burgess Sr. to produce supplemental responses to Defendant Ford Motor Company’s first set of Special Interrogatories, and imposing monetary sanctions in the amount of $560.00.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is DENIED. The request for monetary sanctions is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Bobby Burgess Sr. (“Burgess Sr.”) and Bobby Burgess Jr. (“Burgess Jr.”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act lawsuit over alleged defects in their 2020 Ford Ranger, VIN 1FTER1EH6LLA77085 (the “Subject Vehicle”), which was manufactured by Defendant Ford Motor Company (“Ford”). Plaintiffs purchased the Subject Vehicle on or about December 28, 2020, entering into a warranty contract with Ford. (Compl. ¶¶ 10, 58.)

On July 13, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against Defendants Ford, AutoNation Ford Valencia (“AutoNation”), and Does 1 through 10, alleging the following causes of action: (1) Violation of Subdivision (D) of Civil Code Section 1793.2 (against Ford), (2) Violation of Subdivision (B) of Civil Code Section 1793.2 (against Ford), (3) Violation of Subdivision (A)(3) of Civil Code Section 1793.2 (against Ford), (4) Breach of The Implied Warranty of Merchantability (Civ. Code, § 1791.1; § 1795.5) (against Ford), (5) Fraudulent Inducement – Concealment (against Ford), and (6) Negligent Repair (against AutoNation). Subsequently, on November 8, 2023, Ford and AutoNation filed their Answer to the Complaint.

On August 1, 2024, Ford filed the instant Motion to Compel Burgess Sr.’s Further Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set One (the “Motion”). Subsequently, Burgess Sr. filed his Opposition to the Motion on October 15, 2024, and Ford replied on October 23, 2024.

ANALYSIS

“On receipt of a response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that any of the following apply: (1) An answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete. (2) An exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate. (3) An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a).)

A.    Timeliness

Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300 provides that “[u]nless notice of [a motion to compel further responses to interrogatories] is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the propounding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the propounding party waives any right to compel a further response to the interrogatories.” (§ 2030.300, subd. (c).)

The 45-day limitation is “‘jurisdictional’ in the sense that it renders the court without authority to rule on [untimely] motions to compel other than to deny them.” (Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410, fn. omitted (Sexton).) But nothing in section 2030.300 precludes a party who misses the deadline for compelling further responses to one form of discovery from attempting to obtain the same information by a different form of discovery. (See Carter v. Superior Court (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997 (Carter).)

            Here, it is undisputed that Burgess Sr.’s responses to the Special Interrogatories, Set One, were served on March 22, 2024, and verifications were subsequently served on April 29, 2024. (Weiser Decl. ¶ 4.) The 45-day clock started to tick when the verifications were served, establishing the 45-day deadline as June 13, 2024. (Ibid.)

However, Ford asserts that Burgess Sr.’s counsel agreed to extend Ford’s deadline to notice the Motion. (Mot. at p. 6, Moawad Decl. ¶ 5.) In its Reply, Ford states that “the parties came to an agreement to provide Plaintiffs with additional time to serve supplemental responses to Ford’s Interrogatories. [] In this agreement, Plaintiffs likewise agreed to provide an extension to Ford’s deadline to notice a motion to compel to August 1, 2024.” (Reply at p. 4, Amin Decl., ¶¶ 6-8.)

Ford’s counsel presents a copy of its June 17, 2024 email to Burgess Sr.’s counsel, stating, in part, “This email is to confirm and summarize our discussion and mutual agreement reached earlier today.... Therefore, you have until July 11, 2024, to provide supplemental responses in the following matters [including the present case]. Accordingly, Ford’s motion to compel deadlines will be extended the same to August 1, 2024.”  (Moawad Decl. Ex.  “G.”) (Underlines added.)

In response, Plaintiff Burgess Sr. argues that Ford waived its right to file the Motion by failing to meet the 45-day deadline, which expired on June 13, 2024. Furthermore, Burgess Sr. contends that the discussion on June 17, 2024, occurred after this waiver had already taken effect, and no subsequent agreement to extend the filing deadline was made between the parties. (Opp’n. at pp. 2-4.)

Specifically, Plaintiff’s counsel, Anna Weiser (“Wiser”), attests that “[o]n June 17, 2024, I had a call with Defendant’s counsel, Zack Amin, regarding Plaintiffs’ responses to Defendant’s discovery requests. Defendant’s counsel requested supplemental responses for a few matters. Following our call, Defendant’s counsel sent an email of 24 cases. However, nowhere in the conversation did I agree to supplement 24 cases. I never confirmed in writing to extend Defendant’s Motion to Compel deadline in this matter. The previous phone conversation took approximately 2 minutes.” (Weiser Decl. ¶ 8.)

The Court notes that as with any issue of statutory interpretation, “[w]e begin ... with the statute's actual words, the ‘most reliable indicator’ of legislative intent, ‘assigning them their usual and ordinary meanings, and construing them in context. If the words themselves are not ambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the statute's plain meaning governs. On the other hand, if the language allows more than one reasonable construction, we may look to such aids as the legislative history of the measure and maxims of statutory construction. In cases of uncertain meaning, we may also consider the consequences of a particular interpretation, including its impact on public policy.” (Wells v. One2One Learning Foundation (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1164, 1190.)

Here, the language of Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300, subdivision (c) is clear: a valid extension requires written agreement by both the propounding and responding parties. This indicates that oral or implied consent is insufficient, even if a party’s actions suggest acceptance. Affirmative written consent from both parties is required.   

            Ford does not contend that Burgess Sr. or his counsel has “agreed in writing” to the extension. Nor does Ford suggest that the statute’s language is ambiguous or allows more than one reasonable construction. On the contrary, the Court finds that the statute’s ordinary meaning aligns with the Legislature’s intent to require clear, definitive written consent from both sides to avoid precisely this type of dispute over extension agreements beyond the statutory 45-day limit.

            Accordingly, the Court finds that Ford’s claim of a mutually agreed extension to file this Motion is not supported by the evidence required under the statute. Consequently, the 45-day limit applies in this case.

            Since the Motion was filed on August 1, 2024, failing to meet the statutory deadline of June 13, 2024, this failure to meet the 45-day limit renders the Court without authority to rule on the untimely Motion, other than to deny it.

            Therefore, the Motion is DENIED.

B.     Monetary Sanctions

Ford also requests the imposition of monetary sanctions against Burgess Sr. in the amount of $560.00 (Mot. at p. 13.)

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300, subdivision (d), “The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a further response to interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”

However, as the Court has denied the Motion, it finds that the monetary sanctions are inapplicable in this instance.

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Ford’s request for sanctions.

CONCLUSION

The Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set One, filed by Defendant Ford Motor Company, is DENIED.

Defendant Ford Motor Company’s request for monetary sanctions is DENIED.

Moving party to give notice.