Judge: David B. Gelfound, Case: 23CHCV02153, Date: 2024-11-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23CHCV02153    Hearing Date: November 21, 2024    Dept: F49

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F49

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

Motion filed: 8/22/24

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Cynthia Stoddart

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Alix A. Gutierrez

NOTICE: OK.

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment or, alternatively, Summary Adjudication.

TENTATIVE RULING: The Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, Summary Adjudication is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

This action arises from an alleged encroachment by Defendant, who caused the construction of a staircase that extended onto Plaintiff’s property located at 12325 Kagel Canyon Rd. Sylmar, California, 91342 (the “Subject Property”).

On July 20, 2023, Plaintiff Cynthia Stoddart (“Plaintiff” or “Stoddart”) filed a Complaint against Defendant Alix A. Gutierrez (“Defendant” or “Gutierrez”) and Does 1–100, alleging the following causes of action: (1) Trespass, (2) Private Nuisance, (3) Quiet Title (Code of Civ. Proc., §§ 760.020, et seq.), (4) Conversion, (5) Ejectment, and (6) Vandalism.

On September 19, 2023, at Plaintiff’s request, the Clerk entered Defendant’s default (the “Default”). On November 27, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Request for Default Judgment.

            On May 7, 2024, the Court granted Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside the Entry of Default dated September 19, 2023. Subsequently, on May 9, 2024, Defendant filed her Answer to the Complaint.

            On August 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment. Subsequently, Defendant filed an Opposition on November 7, 2024, and Plaintiff replied on November 13, 2024.

ANALYSIS

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)

“A party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a)(1).)

“The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In determining if the papers show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact, the court shall consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers, except the evidence to which objections have been made and sustained by the court, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence, except summary judgment shall not be granted by the court based on inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence if contradicted by other inferences or evidence that raise a triable issue as to any material fact.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)

“[I]f the moving papers establish a prima facie showing that justifies a [ruling] in the [moving party’s] favor, the burden then shifts to the [opposing party] to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable material factual issue.’ [Citation.]" (See's Candy Shops, Inc. v. Superior Court (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 889, 900, quoting Rehmani v. Superior Court (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 945, 950.) “The defendant or cross-defendant shall not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).)

A.    Request for Judicial Notice

Plaintiff requests the Court take judicial notice of the following matters or documents:

1.      Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”) No. 1: Defendant’s Response to Request for Admissions. (RJN Ex. “1.”)

2.      RJN No. 2: Deed of Trust (RJN Ex. “2.”)

3.      RJN No. 3: Legal Description of the Property (RJN Ex. “3.”)

4.      RJN No. 4: Survey report for the property (RJN Ex. “4.”)

Evidence Code section 452 provides, in pertinent part, that “[j]udicial notice may be taken of the following matters ... (c) Official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States.... (g) Facts and propositions that are of such common knowledge within the territorial jurisdiction of the court that they cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute. (h) Facts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.”

            Based on the above, the Court GRANTS RJN Nos. 2 and 3, pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (h).

            Furthermore, the Court acknowledges that “[a]ny matter admitted in response to a request for admission is conclusively established against the party making the admission ... unless the court has permitted withdrawal or amendment of that admission under [Code of Civil Procedure section] 2033.300.” (Monroy v. City of Los Angeles (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 248, 159-260.) However, the effect of such “conclusive admissions” is limited for the purpose of litigation and does not constitute “indisputable facts” that are “of such common knowledge within the territorial jurisdiction of the court” under Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (g).

            Therefore, the Court DENIES RJN No. 1

            Additionally, the Court DENIES RJN No. 4, as the survey report does not fall under any category of the judicially noticeable documents.     

B.     Evidentiary Objections

The Court OVERRULES Defendant’s evidentiary objections filed concurrently with her Opposition to the Motion.

C.    First Cause of Action - Trespass

“Trespass is an unlawful interference with possession of property.” (Staples v. Hoefke (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1397, 1406.) The elements of trespass are: “(1) the plaintiff's ownership or control of the property; (2) the defendant's intentional, reckless, or negligent entry onto the property; (3) lack of permission for the entry or acts in excess of permission; (4) harm; and (5) the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm.” (Ralphs Grocery Co. v. Victory Consultants, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 245, 262, see CACI No. 2000.)

1)      Plaintiff’s Initial Burden

Plaintiff presents undisputed facts that she has been the owner of the Subject Property since 2008. (Pl.’s Undisputed Material Facts (“UMF”) No. “1.”) On May 24, 2023, Plaintiff observed Defendant, along with other individuals, entering the Subject Property without Plaintiff’s permission, and installing a set of stairs on the Subject Property. (Id. Nos. “2” & “3.”) Subsequently, Defendant returned to the Subject Property on March 2, 2024, without Plaintiff’s permission and removed the staircase. (Id. No. “6.”) Both the construction and removal of the staircase caused damage to Plaintiff’s Subject Property. (Id. Nos. “5” & “6.”)

Based on the above evidence, the Court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied her initial burden to justify a ruling in her favor based on the UMFs. The burden now shifts to Defendant.

2)      Defendant’s Burden of Showing the Existence of a Triable Material Factual Issue

Defendant opposes the Motion on the grounds that she has no liability for Trespass because Defendant never intended to cause an encroachment. (Opp’n. at p. 6.) Defendant further disputes the damages to the hillside as claimed by Plaintiff. (Opp’n. at p. 8.)

i.                    Intent Requirement

Under California law, “[t]he essence of the cause of action for trespass is an ‘unauthorized entry’ onto the land of another. Such invasions are characterized as intentional torts, regardless of the actor's motivation.” (Miller v. National Broadcasting Co. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1463, 1480 (Miller), underlines added.) “The intent required as a basis for liability as a trespasser is simply an intent to be at the place on the land where the trespass allegedly occurred. . . . The defendant is liable for an intentional entry although he has acted in good faith, under the mistaken belief, however reasonable, that he is committing no wrong.” (Ibid., internal citation omitted.)

            Here, Defendant argues that her evidence is sufficient to overcome Plaintiff’s Trespass claim because she never intended to cause an encroachment and took precautions prior to installing the steps. (Opp’n. at p. 7). Defendant submits evidence that, as the owner of the adjacent lot, she believed that she was installing a set of stairs on her own property. (Gutierrez Decl. ¶¶ 4, 5, 6.) Defendant further declares that in May 2023, when she left the laborer on her lot to install the set of stairs, she believed they would utilize the property markers to appropriately measure out the location of the steps. (Id. ¶ 9.) Defendant did not realize, however, that there was a possible problem with the installation or measurements until Plaintiff approached her and claimed that the set of stairs was partially installed on Plaintiff’s Subject Property. (Id. ¶ 11.) Subsequently, Defendant hired a survey company, and based on the completed survey, “it became clear that there was a portion of the steps encroaching on Plaintiff’s Property.” (Id. ¶ 15.) Following this, Defendant had the set of steps removed, believing that Plaintiff consented to do so and that the removal of the steps would resolve the dispute between the parties. (Id. ¶ 17.)

            However, the Court finds that Defendant’s evidence is insufficient to establish the existence of a triable issue of material fact as to the intent element. Defendant acknowledges hiring laborers to install a set of stairs on what she believed, in good faith, to be her own property. Nonetheless, the subsequent survey revealed that a portion of the stairs is situated on Plaintiff’s Subject Property. (Gutierrez Decl. ¶¶ 9, 15.)

Consequently, Defendant’s argument – that she reasonably believed her laborers would rely on property markers to ensure the stairs were installed within her lot – does not negate the fact that a portion of the stairs was constructed on Plaintiff’s property. (See Miller, supra,  187 Cal.App.3d at p. 1480, [stating that the intent element for Trespass “is simply an intent to be at the place on the land where the trespass allegedly occurred ... although [defendant] has acted in good faith, under the mistaken belief, however reasonable, that he is committing no wrong.”])

Therefore, the Court finds Defendant’s argument on this ground to be unpersuasive.

ii.                  Damages

Defendant argues that there is insufficient proof of damages, contending that the hillside land faces exposure to the natural elements and Defendant promptly removed the stairs. (Opp’n. at p. 10.) Defendant presents evidence that Plaintiff, by way of her verified discovery responses, does not contend she has suffered any actual harm, nor has Plaintiff set forth evidence to prove the scope of damage to the property. (Def.’s UMF No. “5,” Hornbuckle Decl. ¶ 13.)

In response, Plaintiff contends that she has provided photographs clearly showing the state of the condition of the land. (Stoddart Decl. ¶ 7.) Additionally, Plaintiff states that Defendant’s encroachment necessitated her obtaining a survey report at a cost of $1,200.00 (Reply at p. 5). Moreover, Plaintiff claims that an estimate to stabilize the hillsides from potential mudslides is $700.00, along with $2,700.00 for the removal and cleanup of the wooden staircase. (Ibid.) Furthermore, Plaintiff suggests that additional damages include legal expenses incurred in bringing this action, as well as health issues that have taken a toll on her. (Reply at p. 6.)

The Court observes that, except for the photograph of the hillside attached to Plaintiff’s declaration, the other damages claimed by Plaintiff are reflected only in her Reply. However, statements made in briefs, including moving or opposition papers, are treated as the party’s arguments and positions, and do not constitute evidence. The Court must rely on the evidentiary materials attached to these papers to determine the facts. (See Grant-Burton v. Covenant Care, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1361.)

Consequently, the Court finds that the Defendant has presented sufficient evidence to establish the existence of a triable issue of material fact regarding the element of damages.

Therefore, the Court DENIES the Motion for Summary Judgment as to the Cause of Action for Trespass.

D.    Second Cause of Action – Private Nuisance

A private nuisance is a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land. (San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 893, 937 (San Diego Gas & Electric Co.)) A claim for private nuisance must involve substantial actual damage. (Ibid.)

Civil Code section 3479 provides, in the relevant part: “Anything which is ... indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property” is a nuisance.

The act that causes the interference may be intentional and unreasonable. Or it may be unintentional but caused by negligent or reckless conduct. Or it may result from an abnormally dangerous activity for which there is strict liability. However, if the act is intentional but reasonable, or if it is entirely accidental, there is generally no liability. (Lussier v. San Lorenzo Valley Water Dist. (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 92, 100, See CACI No. 2021.) (Underlines added.)

            Here, Plaintiff relies on the same evidence presented in support of the Trespass claim to argue that the elements for Private Nuisance are satisfied.

            Defendant contends that there exists a triable material fact as to whether her conduct was intentional, negligent, or accidental. Defendant asserts that she intended for the whole set of stairs to pass through her own property only and was unaware that the property markers had been removed. (Hornbuckle Decl. ¶ 13.)

            Furthermore, the Court notes that while nominal damages suffice for a Trespass claim (CACI No. 2000), “nominal damages alone are not available in cases involving intangible intrusions such as noise and vibrations; proof of actual damage to the property is required: “[T]he rule is that actionable trespass may not be predicated upon nondamaging noise, odor, or light intrusion . . . .” (San Diego Gas & Electric Co., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 936.) “[T]o proceed on a private nuisance theory the plaintiff must prove an injury specifically referable to the use and enjoyment of his or her land. The injury, however, need not be different in kind from that suffered by the general public.” (Koll-Irvine Center Property Owners Assn. v. County of Orange (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1041, internal citation omitted.)

            As analyzed above, the Court has previously determined that Defendant has satisfied her burden of showing the existence of a triable material fact as to the actual damages caused by the encroaching stairs. Given that the Private Nuisance and Trespass claims both arise from the same set of facts, the Court concludes that the finding of triable issues as to the damage element is applicable here.

            Therefore, the Court DENIES the Motion for Summary Judgment as to the Private Nuisance claim.  

E.     Third Cause of Action – Quiet Title (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 760.020 et. seq.)

A claim for quiet title requires: (1) the legal description and street address of the real property at issue, (2) title sought and the basis of the same, (3) any adverse claims against the title Plaintiff seeks, (4) date of which the determination is sought, and (5) prayer for relief. (Code Civ. Proc., § 761.020.)

In much the same way that a declaratory relief action requires an actual and present controversy, a quiet title action requires “antagonistic property interest[s].” (Friends of the Trails v. Blasius (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 810, 831, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 193.) In other words, a plaintiff cannot obtain a quiet title judgment unless someone claims a conflicting interest in the same property as the plaintiff. (Ibid.)

Plaintiff presents evidence that Defendant admits that Plaintiff is the true owner of the Subject Property (Pl.’s UMF No. “1,” Stoddart Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. “2,” and “3,” RJN No. 2.) However, Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendant asserts an adverse claim against the title of the Subject Property. On the contrary, Plaintiff concedes that the staircase has been removed by Defendant. (Pl.’s UMF No. “6,” referencing Defendant’s responses to Requests for Admission No. 21.)

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish that there is “actual controversy” regarding the ownership of the Subject Property.

Therefore, for the purpose of the instant Motion, the Court DENIES the Motion for Summary Judgment as to the Quiet Title claim.

F.     Fifth Cause of Action – Ejectment

California Civil Code Section 3375 states: “A person entitled to specific real property, by reason either of a perfected title, or of a claim to title which ought to be perfected, may recover the same in the manner prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure, either by a judgment for its possession, to be executed by the sheriff, or by a judgment requiring the other party to perfect the title, and to deliver possession of the property.”

The essential elements of an ejectment action are (1) the plaintiff's valid interest in the property and (2) the defendant's wrongful possession and withholding thereof. (Payne & Dewey v. Treadwell (1860) 16 Cal. 221, 243.)

Here, Plaintiff’s UMF and supporting evidence establish that Plaintiff is the owner of the Subject Property. (Pl.’s UMF No. “1.”) This satisfies the first essential element of Plaintiff’s valid interest in the property. 

However, as discussed above, Plaintiff has conceded that the staircase has been removed by Defendant, rendering Plaintiff’s injunctive relief moot. Additionally, the Court has determined that Plaintiff has failed to show the absence of triable issues of material fact regarding the actual damages, which forms the basis for the Court’s denial of the Motion.

Therefore, the Court DENIES the Motion for Summary Judgment as to the Ejectment claim.

G.    Fourth and Sixth Cause of Action – Conversion and Vandalism

In the Motion, Plaintiff merely states that if the Court grants summary judgment on the four causes of action listed above, Plaintiff will dismiss the remaining two causes of action for Conversion and Vandalism, without presenting substantively argument or legal analysis.

Consequently, the Court finds that Plaintiff has entirely failed to meet her initial burden of establishing a prima facie showing that justifies a ruling in her favor as to the remaining two causes of action.

Therefore, the Court DENIES the Motion for the Causes of Action for Conversion and Vandalism.

H.    Motion for Summary Adjudication

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 437c, subdivision (f), “[a] motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.

Having reviewed the evidence and arguments presented, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that any cause of action, or claim for damages, can be completely resolved under the applicable legal standards for summary adjudication.

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s alternative Motion for Summary Adjudication.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, Summary Adjudication is DENIED.

Moving party is ordered to give notice.