Judge: David B. Gelfound, Case: 23CHCV02241, Date: 2024-05-30 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 23CHCV02241    Hearing Date: May 30, 2024    Dept: F49

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F-49

MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

Motion filed: 3/21/24

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Sabrina Goodrum (“Plaintiff” or “Goodrum”)

RESPONDING PARTY: American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (“Defendant” or “AHM”)

NOTICE: OK¿¿ 

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order from this Court to compel Defendant to produce supplemental responses to Plaintiff’s Requests for Production of Documents (“RFP”), Set One,  Nos. 1-3, 7, 9, 12-14, 17-23, 28-29, 32-33, 36-37, 40-41, 46-47, 49-50, 63-68, 74, 79-80, 83-84, 89, 91-92, 111-114, and 125-130.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“SBA”) lawsuit over alleged defects in her 2019 Honda Pilot (the “Subject Vehicle”), which was manufactured by Defendant AHM. Plaintiff alleges that she leased the Subject Vehicle on April 1, 2019, entering into a warranty contract with AHM.

On July 27, 2023, Plaintiff initiated the action against Defendant, and Does 1 through 10. The Complaint alleges four causes of action: (1) Violation of Subdivision (d) of Civil Code section 1793.2; (2) Violation of Subdivision (b) of Civil Code section 1793.2, (3) Violation of Subdivision (a)(3) of Civil Code Section 1793.2, and (4) Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability (Civ. Code, §§ 1791.1; 1794; 1795.5) Subsequently, AHM filed its Answer to the Complaint on August 30, 2023.

On March 21, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Compel Further Responses to RFP, Set One (the “Motion”). Subsequently, on May 16, 2024, AHM filed its Opposition, and Plaintiff replied on May 22, 2024.

ANALYSIS

“On receipt of a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, the demanding party may move for an order compelling further response to the demand if the demanding party deems that … [a] statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete[;] … [a] representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive[; or] … [a]n objection in the response is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd., (a).)

A.    Procedural Requirements

1.      Timeliness

A motion to compel further responses to requests for production must be brought within 45 days of service of the verified response, supplemental verified response, or on a date to which the propounding and responding parties have agreed to in writing; otherwise, the propounding party waives the right to compel further responses. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (c); but see Golf & Tennis Pro Shop, Inc. v. Superior Court (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 127, 134-136 [suggesting that the 45-day deadline does not apply to (i.e., it does not begin to run with service of) objections-only responses; it only applies to responses that are required to be verified].)

“[T]he time within which to make a motion to compel production of documents is mandatory and jurisdictional just as it is for motions to compel further answers to interrogatories.”  (Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.) The 45-day deadline “is ‘jurisdictional’ in the sense that it renders the court without authority to rule on motions to compel other than to deny them.”  (Ibid.)

Here, Plaintiff attests that Defendant’s responses to the RFP, Set One, were served on February 2, 2024, with Defendant’s electronic verification following on February 6, 2024. (Theophil Decl. ¶¶ 18-19.)  The service of verification establishes the deadline for Plaintiff to file a motion to compel further as March 26, 2024, calculated based on a 45-day period with an extension of two court days per Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6, subdivision (a)(3), accounting for the method of electronic service.

            Therefore, the Court finds the Motion is filed timely as it was filed prior to the established deadline.

2.      Meet and Confer

“A motion [to compel further responses to requests for production] shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.290, subd. (b)(1).)

Here, Plaintiff has satisfied the meet and confer requirement. (Theophil Decl. ¶¶ 24-29.)

3.      Separate Statement

The California Rules of Court rule 3.1345 (a)(3) explicitly states that “Any motion involving the content of a discovery request or the responses to such a request must be accompanied by a separate statement. The motions that require a separate statement include a motion: ... (3) To compel further responses to a demand for inspection of documents or tangible things[.]”

Here, Plaintiff has fulfilled the requirement by concurrently filing a separate statement with the Motion.

B.     Motion to Compel Further Responses

1)      AHM’s Initial Responses (RFP Nos. 1-3, 7, 9, 12, 14, 17, 33, 83-84, 89, 91-92, 111-112, and 127-128)

i.                    RFP Nos. 1-2, and 91

Here, AHM’s responses to RFP Nos. 1 and 2, state, in pertinent part, “Pursuant to section 2031.280, AHM will produce the non-confidential Warranty History. Also pursuant to section 2031.280, AHM will produce the Warranty Registration and confidential Warranty History, which contain information that is confidential, commercially sensitive, proprietary, and/or trade secret, pursuant to the entry of an appropriate protective order.”

AHM’s response to RFP No. 91 states, in pertinent part, “Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.280, the following documents applicable to the SUBJECT VEHICLE during Plaintiff’s ownership will be produced: its guideline documents titled “Lemon Law Inquiries,” “Early Warning,” and “Attorney Involved,” which are confidential and contain proprietary, trade secret, and commercially sensitive information, and will be produced pursuant to the protective order in this case.” (See Plaintiff’s and AHM’s Separate Statement.)

Here, the case record reflects a Stipulation and Protective Order was filed and granted on April 16, 2024, satisfying the conditions for AHM to produce documents labeled as “confidential, commercially sensitive, proprietary, and/or trade secret” as agreed in its responses. Moreover, although Plaintiff challenges AHM’s objections, she does not address whether the documents AHM agreed to produce are insufficient. Thus, the Court deems the Motion, as it pertains to RFP Nos. 1, 2, and 91, to be moot.

Therefore, the Court DENIES the Motion as to RFP Nos. 1-2, and 91 for the reasons stated above.

i.                    RFP Nos. 3, 7, 9, 12, 14, 17, 33, 83-84, 89, 92, and 111-112

Here, AHM’s responses to the above-listed RFP Nos. state, in pertinent part, that “AHM has made a diligent search and reasonable inquiry in an effort to comply with this request and has located no documents responsive to this request and no responsive documents have ever existed.” (See Plaintiff’s and AHM’s Separate Statement.)

            The Court finds AHM’s responses in compliance with Code the Civil Procedure section 2031.230, which specifies, in the relevant part, “A representation of inability to comply with the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling shall affirm that a diligent search and a reasonable inquiry has been made in an effort to comply with that demand. This statement shall also specify whether the inability to comply is because the particular item or category has never existed, has been destroyed, has been lost, misplaced, or stolen, or has never been, or is no longer, in the possession, custody, or control of the responding party.”

Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Motion as to RFP Nos. 3, 7, 9, 12, 14, 17, 33, 83-84, 89, 92, and 111-112.

2)      Moving Party’s Showing of Good Cause (RFP Nos. 13, 18-23, 28, 32, 40, 46, 63, 65- 68, 79, and 113-114)

A motion to compel further responses to requests for production shall “set forth specific facts showing good cause”. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd., (b)(1).) To establish “good cause,” the moving party must show (1) the items demanded are relevant to the subject matter and (2) specific facts justify the discovery of the requested items (e.g., why such information is necessary for trial preparation or to prevent surprise at trial). (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd., (b)(1); see Glenfed Develop. Corp. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (Glenfed).) If “good cause” is shown by the moving party, the burden is then on the responding party to justify any objections made to document disclosure. (Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.)

i.                    RFP No. 13, 18-23, 28, 32, 40, 46, 63, 65-68, 79, and 113-114.

Plaintiff argues that RFP No. 13 seeks documents pertaining to the Subjective Vehicle, thus, they are indisputably relevant to Plaintiff’s SBA claims. (Mot. at p. 8.) Additionally, Plaintiff contends that the RFP Nos. 18-21, 28, 32, 40, 46, 63, 65-68, and 79 request documents and information concerning the Defects of Honda vehicles equipped with the same climate control system and electrical architecture as the Subject Vehicle. (Mot. at p. 8.) Furthermore, Plaintiff states that RFP Nos. 113-114 consists of documents and information showing AHM’s communications with any governmental agencies and third-party suppliers regarding the Defects of the Honda vehicles equipped with the same climate control system and electrical architecture as the Subject Vehicle. Plaintiff argues that such communications will be relevant to the finding of AHM’s knowledge of the defects. (Mot. at p. 10.)

In its Opposition, AHM argues that all of the above-listed RFP Nos. seek irrelevant information, as neither the “Electrical Defect(s)” nor the “Climate Control Defect(s)” were presented to AHM’s authorized repair facilities. Without Plaintiff’s showing that a nonconformity exists, or that AHM failed to repair a substantially impairing nonconformity within a reasonable number of attempts, the RFP requests are irrelevant to Plaintiff’s SBA claim. (Opp’n, at p.7.)

Moreover, AHM maintains that the Subject Vehicle’s repair history, as relied upon by Plaintiff in her Motion, shows none of her concerns fall within the definitions of these two defects set in the RFP, Set One. (Opp’n. at p. 11.)

In Reply, Plaintiff seeks to substantiate her claim by submitting a supplemental declaration from her counsel Naquia Brown. Plaintiff also refers to Hannah Theophil’s declaration, concurrently filed with the Motion, which incorporates the relevant repair orders. (Reply, at p. 2, Theophil Decl. ¶¶ 4-7, Ex. “1.”)

The RFP, Set One, provides the following definitions:

“The term “CLIMATE CONTROL DEFECT(S)” shall mean one or more defect(s)

within the climate control system of the HONDA Pilot vehicles equipped with the same climate

control system as the SUBJECT VEHICLE that can result in the (1) lack of cold and/or hot air,

(2) intermittent cold/hot air, (3) uneven air distribution, (4) noises coming from the climate

control system; as well as, any other similar concerns identified in the repair history for the

SUBJECT VEHICLE.”

“The term “ELECTRICAL DEFECT(S)” shall mean one or more defect(s)

within the electrical architecture of the HONDA Pilot vehicles equipped with the same

electrical architecture as the SUBJECT VEHICLE that can result in (1) loss of power, (2)

battery draining, (3) lights dimming or flickering, (4) power windows, doors or locks not

working, (5) failure to start, (6) malfunctioning of the instrument cluster, (7) malfunction or

failure of the auto start-stop feature (8) malfunction or failure of the engine stop-start (ESS)

feature (9) malfunctioning or failure of the fuses, modules, and/or relays; as well as, any other

similar concerns identified in the repair history for the SUBJECT VEHICLE.”

(Theophil Decl. Ex. “4.”)

The Court notes that these definitions are relatively broad and unsupported by the factual evidence presented in Plaintiff’s pleadings. For example, the attached repair orders do not indicate specific repairs related to any of the defects as defined in the above definition for Electric Defects or Climate Control Defects. (Theophil Decl. Ex. “1.’) Moreover, these repair receipts instead corroborate the showing that only two recalls (19-096 and 20-047) were performed, that Plaintiff complained that the outer handle cover for the left rear door needed repair, and that the technician could not duplicate Plaintiff’s abnormal smell concern from the AC. (Theophil Decl. ¶¶ 5-6.) The Court observes an inconsistency when the declaration seeks support from an exhibit that does not provide it.

Consequently, to meet the threshold burden of showing good cause, Plaintiff relies solely on a conclusion of fact, which states, “Indeed, Plaintiff presented the Subject Vehicle on no less than two (2) separate occasions with concerns related to Climate Control Defects and Electrical Defects. In response, the dealership performed various repairs attempting to fix the Defects. However, none of the repairs have fixed the Defects.” (Theophil Decl. ¶ 7.)

The Court finds this assertion alone does not establish “good cause,” requiring (1) that the items demanded are relevant to the subject matter, and (2) specific facts justifying the discovery of the requested items (e.g., why such information is necessary for trial preparation or to prevent surprise at trial). (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd., (b)(1); see also Glenfed, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at 1117.) As the moving party fails to meet the threshold hold, it is unnecessary for the Court to consider the validity of the objections raised by the opposing party.

Therefore, the Court DENIES the Motion as to the above-listed RFP Nos. on the basis that Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden in setting forth specific facts showing good cause.

3)      Relief Requested but Argument Omitted (RFP Nos. 29, 36-37, 41, 47, 49-50, 64, 74, 80, 125-126, and 129-130)

Plaintiff does not present any legal arguments concerning the above-listed RFP Nos.

Accordingly, the Court does not consider the Motion as to RFP Nos. 29, 36-37, 41, 47, 49-50, 64, 74, 80, 125-126, and 129-130.

Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES the Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production of Documents, Set One.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production, Set One, is DENIED.

Moving party to give notice.