Judge: David B. Gelfound, Case: 23CHCV02792, Date: 2025-01-30 Tentative Ruling

Counsel wishing to submit on a tentative ruling may inform the clerk or courtroom assistant in North Valley Department F49, 9425 Penfield Ave., Chatsworth, CA 91311, at (818) 407-2249.  Please be aware that unless all parties submit, the matter will still be called for hearing and may be argued by any appearing/non-submitting parties. If the matter is submitted on the court's tentative ruling by all parties, counsel for moving party shall give notice of ruling. This may be done by incorporating verbatim the court's tentative ruling. The tentative ruling may be extracted verbatim by copying and pasting, as unformatted text, from the Los Angeles Superior Court’s website, http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org.
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Case Number: 23CHCV02792    Hearing Date: January 30, 2025    Dept: F49

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F49

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Motion filed: 10/21/24

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Orkideh Csukay and Julius Csukay

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Zahra Farjami

NOTICE: OK.

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order granting the Motion for Summary Judgment on the Complaint.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

This action arises out of alleged premises liability at 10314 Farralone Ave. Chatsworth, California 91354 (the “Premises”), the residence of Defendants, where Plaintiff was employed as a caretaker and babysitter.

On September 19, 2023, Plaintiff Zahra Farjami (“Plaintiff” or “Farjami”) filed a Complaint against Defendants Orkideh Csukay (“Orkideh”) and Julius Csukay (“Julius”) (collectively, “Defendants”), and Does 1 to 50, alleging two causes of action: (1) General Negligence, and (2) Premises Liability. Subsequently, Defendants filed their Answer to the Complaint on December 8, 2023.

On October 21, 2024, Defendants filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Motion”). Subsequently, Plaintiff filed her Opposition on November 15, 2024, and Defendants submitted their Reply on January 24, 2025.

ANALYSIS

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.”  (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)

“A party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a)(1).)

“The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In determining if the papers show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact, the court shall consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers, except the evidence to which objections have been made and sustained by the court, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence, except summary judgment shall not be granted by the court based on inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence if contradicted by other inferences or evidence that raise a triable issue as to any material fact.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) 

“[I]f the moving papers establish a prima facie showing that justifies a [ruling] in the [moving party’s] favor, the burden then shifts to the [opposing party] to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable material factual issue.”’ [Citation.]" (See's Candy Shops, Inc. v. Superior Court (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 889, 900, quoting Rehmani v. Superior Court (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 945, 950.) “The defendant or cross-defendant shall not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) 

A.    Negligence and Premises Liability

            The elements of premises liability and negligence cause of action are the same: duty, breach, causation, and damages. (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.)  “The owner of premises is under a duty to exercise ordinary care in the management of such premises in order to avoid exposing persons to an unreasonable risk of harm.  A failure to fulfill this duty is negligence.”  (Brooks v. Eugene Burger Management Corp. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1611, 1619 (Brooks); Annocki v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 37.)  “‘Liability is particularly appropriate where the landowner has actual knowledge of the danger, e.g., where he has created the condition.’  [Citation.]”  (Robison v. Six Flags Theme Parks Inc. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1304.)  While an owner of premises is not an insurer of the safety of its patrons, the owner still owes them a duty to exercise reasonable care in keeping the premises reasonably safe.  (Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1205.)

Here, Defendants argue that they owed no duty to Plaintiff because the condition on the Premises was not dangerous but trivial, open, and obvious. (Mot. at pp. 9-11.)

The Court will separately address the two elements at issue – duty and breach of duty – in turn.

(1)   Defendants’ Duty of Care

The general rule is that a landowner “owes certain affirmative duties of care, as to conditions or activities on the land, to persons who come on the land.” (Hoffmann v. Young (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1257.) Civil Code section 1714 provides that every person “is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property ....” (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).)

“If a danger is so obvious that a person could reasonably be expected to see it, the condition itself serves as a warning, and the landowner is under no further duty to remedy or warn of the condition. [Citation.] In that situation, owners and possessors of land are entitled to assume others will ‘perceive the obvious’ and take action to avoid the dangerous condition. [Citation.]” (Jacob v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 438, 447.)

However, “the obviousness of a condition does not necessarily excuse the potential duty of a landowner, not simply to warn of the condition but to rectify it.”  (Martinez v. Chippewa Enterprises, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1184.)  The obviousness of a danger “may obviate the duty to warn of its existence,” but “if it is foreseeable that the danger may cause injury despite the fact that it is obvious (e.g., when necessity requires persons to encounter it), there may be a duty to remedy the danger, and the breach of that duty may in turn form the basis for liability . . .”  (Osborn v. Mission Ready Mix (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 104, 122.)         

The Court may, in appropriate circumstances, determine a condition is open and obvious where “photographs prima facie established the obviousness” of the condition.  (Martinez, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1184.)  In examining photographs, the court should consider: (1) the photograph’s subject (i.e., its focal point); (2) the view of the subject (e.g., close-up, distant isolated, in context); (3) the photograph’s perspective (e.g., eye-level, overhead, ground-level); (4) the use of any plain-view altering devices (e.g., camera color filter, fish-eye lens, computer-manipulation); (5) the characteristics of the photograph (e.g., sharp and clear, blurry, grainy, color or black and white); (6) whether the photograph was taken under identical or substantially similar conditions (e.g., timing, lighting, weather); and (7) any other relevant circumstances (e.g., addition of extrinsic aids, such as a ruler or pointer).  (Kasparian, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at pp. 24-25.) 

i.                    Defendants’ Initial Burden

Here, Defendants argue that the open and obvious nature of any such alleged defect or condition in the nursery room relieves them of any duty to remedy or to warn of the condition. (Mot. at p. 11.)

Defendants’ undisputed material facts (“UMF”) establish that the Premises is Defendants’ residence. (Def.’s UMF No. 1.) Defendant states that the nursery room was not pitch-black at the time of the incident – specifically, Plaintiff’s fall – Plaintiff had enough visibility to play with the baby and change the baby’s diaper without difficulty, recall how many diapers were in the nursery, and search around the room for the trash bin. (Id. Nos. 9-10.)

Additionally, Defendants submit two photographs of the incident scene, authenticated by Plaintiff during her deposition, which purportedly show that Plaintiff fell in the center of the nursery room. (Mot. at p.6, Reply, at p. 5, Moskovian Decl. ¶ 5.)

The Court cannot conclude from Defendants’ photographic evidence that the alleged defect in the nursery room is open and obvious.

First, the photographs do not depict the lighting conditions of the nursery room at the time of the incident. Defendants’ own evidence indicates that Plaintiff expressly distinguished the lighting conditions in the photographs from those at the time of the incident, stating “[t]he window shades were closed, and the curtains had also been drawn,” and that “It’s now that I’m seeing this room clearly [in the picture] because she [grandmother] showed it to me when it was dark[.]” (Moskovian Decl. Ex. “B,” 38:8-11, 41:11-16.)

Second, the photographs do not depict the alleged defect –  a footstool – which Plaintiff claims caused her fall in the middle of the nursery room. (Id. Ex. “B, 38:15-19.) The footstool is described as low-lying, measuring 12-inch by 14-inch. (Pl.’s Additional Material Facts (“AMF”) No. 4.) Notably, Defendants concede that the footstool was used in the nursery room as a small table for placing baby bottles whenever they feed their child. (Def.’s UMF No. 14.)

Accordingly, the critical elements necessary to establish an open-and-obvious condition in this case - the visibility of the room and the physical presence of the footstool – are not reflected in Defendants’ photographs. As a result, the Court finds that Defendants’ evidence does not sufficiently substantiate the claim that the defect was open and obvious.

ii) Triable Issue of Material Fact

In contrast, Plaintiff has met her burden in demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of material fact. Plaintiff presents evidence showing that she was not familiar with the nursery room as it was her first day of work at the Premises and she did not enter the nursery room until minutes before the incident. (Pl.’s Additional Material Facts (“AMF”) No. 9.) The baby’s grandmother asked Plaintiff to put the baby back to sleep. (Id. No. 10b.) The nursery room was intentionally darkened during the baby’s nap time (Id. Nos. 8, 10a.) At the time of the incident, it was dark in the nursery room, with no lights on, windows closed, and curtains drawn. (Id. No. 10.) It is undisputed that Plaintiff was looking for the trash bin to dispose of the soiled diaper and was turning to walk to the bathroom when she was allegedly caught falling in the middle of the nursery.  (Def.’s UMF No. 10.)

Additionally, Plaintiff submitted a declaration from civil engineer, Brad P. Avrit (“Avrit”), who opines: “[T]he lack of a cleared, illuminated pathway would make it difficult for an unfamiliar person, such as Plaintiff, to perceive and recognize the footstool while walking from the nursery to the bathroom.” (Avrit Decl. ¶ 11.)

The evidence establishes a triable issue as to whether the allegedly low-lying, 12-inch by 14-inch footstool, positioned in the middle of the nursery room, was open and obvious to Plaintiff at the time of the incident, given that the nursery room was darkened, and it was Plaintiff’s first day at the Premises.

As such, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that the alleged defect was open and obvious.

Similarly, Defendants’ argument that the defect is open and obvious – based on Plaintiff’s deposition testimony in which, she stated that she did not know what caused her to fall or could not identify what solid object went under her foot – is unpersuasive.

The Court recognizes a well-settled principle that a party or witness cannot manufacture a triable issue of fact by providing contradictory testimony. (See, e.g., Alvis v. County of Ventura (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 536, 549.) However, in this case, Plaintiff did not provide contradictory testimony.

Plaintiff testified as follows: “I just know that something went under my foot ... something that had height ... that they have moved, and this might have been here, the footrest[.] No. I’m not making the assumption. I’m certain that something had – that had height, and it was large went under my foot like this[.] Specifically, I do know that it was something wooden, and solid.” (Farjami Depo. At 46:22-47:17, 48:6-7.)

While there may be some discrepancy between Plaintiff’s deposition testimony and her assertions regarding the exact size of the footstool (see AMF No. 4), this inconsistency is a matter for the trier of fact to resolve. It is the role of the trier of fact, not the Court at the summary judgment stage, to assess Plaintiff’s credibility. (Fuentes v. AutoZone, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1233.)

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has met her burden in demonstrating that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the duty element in both causes of action for negligence and premises liability.

(2)   Breach of Duty – Existence of Dangerous Condition

“An initial and essential element of recovery for premises liability under the governing statutes is proof a dangerous condition existed.”  (Stathoulis v. City of Montebello (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 559, 566.) 

“The existence of a dangerous condition ordinarily is a question of fact, but the issue may be resolved as a matter of law if reasonable minds can come to only one conclusion.”¿¿(Peterson v. San Francisco Comm. College Dist.¿(1984) 36 Cal.3d 799, 810.)

Here, Defendants contend that “the purported defect at issue – whether from the large footstool, or an even larger rocking chair, or any other furniture in ... [the] nursery room – was clearly trivial.” (Mot. at p. 10.)

However, the Court finds that Defendants have failed to demonstrate that reasonable minds can reach only one conclusion – that the alleged defect is trivial as a matter of law.

i)                   Triviality

“A property owner is not liable for damages caused by a minor, trivial or insignificant defect in property.”  (Caloroso v. Hathaway (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 922, 927 (Caloroso).)  The “trivial defect defense” is an aspect of duty that a plaintiff must plead and prove and allows a court to determine whether a defect is trivial as a matter of law.  (Ursino v. Big Boy Restaurants (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 394, 398.)  “If the defect is of such trivial character that it presents no element of conspicuousness or notoriety, its continued existence does not impart constructive notice” to the landowner.  (Barrett v. City of Claremont (1953) 41 Cal.2d 70, 73.)  To assign liability for a defect, the landowner must have notice not only of the condition of the sidewalk, but also of the dangerous character of such condition.  (Whiting v. National City (1937) 9 Cal.2d 163, 165.) 

To determine whether a condition is¿trivial¿as a matter of law, “[t]he legal analysis involves several steps.  First, the court reviews evidence regarding the type and size of the defect.  Suppose that preliminary analysis reveals a¿trivial¿defect. In that case, the court considers evidence of any additional factors such as the weather, lighting and visibility conditions at the time of the accident, the existence of debris or obstructions, and plaintiff’s knowledge of the area.  If these additional factors do not indicate the defect was sufficiently dangerous to a reasonably careful person, the court should deem the defect trivial as a matter of law....”¿¿(Stathoulis¿v. City of Montebello¿(2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 559, 567-568.)

Here, the size of the alleged defect – namely, a footstool – is not trivial. Plaintiff alleges, relying on Defendant Julius Csukay’s deposition testimony, that the footstool may be 12-inch by 14-inch in size (Csukay Decl. at 35:25-36:1).

Additionally, the defect is not alleged solely by the size of the footstool but rather by the combined effect of the room’s visibility conditions and Plaintiff’s knowledge of the area. While Defendants present evidence showing that the room was not pitch-dark and Plaintiff was able to care for the baby under those conditions (Def.’s UMF No. 9), it remains undisputed that the room was darkened with curtains and blinds drawn and it was Plaintiff’s first time at the Premises.

Considering the totality of the evidence, the Court finds that a triable issue exists as to whether a low-lying, 12-inch by 14-inch footstool, under these conditions, posed a sufficient danger to a reasonably careful person.

Accordingly, the Court finds that in the present case, it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that the alleged defect was so trivial that reasonable minds could not differ as to whether the condition was dangerous or defective. As such, Plaintiff has satisfied her burden of establishing a triable issue of material fact regarding triviality.

Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES the Motion.

CONCLUSION

The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Orkideh Csukay and Julius Csukay is hereby DENIED.

Moving party to provide notice.