Judge: David B. Gelfound, Case: 23CHCV02853, Date: 2025-06-02 Tentative Ruling

Counsel wishing to submit on a tentative ruling may inform the clerk or courtroom assistant in North Valley Department F49, 9425 Penfield Ave., Chatsworth, CA 91311, at (818) 407-2249.  Please be aware that unless all parties submit, the matter will still be called for hearing and may be argued by any appearing/non-submitting parties. If the matter is submitted on the court's tentative ruling by all parties, counsel for moving party shall give notice of ruling. This may be done by incorporating verbatim the court's tentative ruling. The tentative ruling may be extracted verbatim by copying and pasting, as unformatted text, from the Los Angeles Superior Court’s website, http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org.
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Case Number: 23CHCV02853    Hearing Date: June 2, 2025    Dept: F49

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F49

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES

Motion filed: 1/14/25

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiffs Christopher Lizardo and Javier Lizardo

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC

NOTICE: OK.

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order awarding attorney fees and costs in the amount of $50,760.00, in addition to $1,637.03 in costs, against Defendant Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is GRANTED IN PART.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Christopher Lizardo and Javier Lizardo (“Plaintiffs”) filed this Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act lawsuit over alleged defects in their 2018 Jaguar XE, VIN: SAJAR4FX3JCP35904 (the “Subject Vehicle”), which was manufactured by Defendant Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC (“Jaguar N.A.”). Plaintiffs purchased the Subject Vehicle as a Certified Pre-Owned vehicle on September 23, 2022, entering into an express written warranty contract with Jaguar N.A.

On September 25, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against Jaguar N.A., Galpin Jaguar Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. (“Galpin”) (collectively, “Defendants”) and Does 1 through 50, alleging the following four causes of action: (1) violation of Song-Beverly Act – breach of express warranty; (2) violation of Song-Beverly Act – breach of implied warranty; (3) violation of the Song-Beverly Act section 1793.2(b); (4) violation of Song-Beverly Act section 1796.5. Subsequently, on November 21, 2023, Defendants Jaguar N.A. and Galpin filed their joint Answer to the Complaint.

On September 4, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Settlement.

On January 14, 2025, Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion for Attorney Fees (the “Motion”). On May 19, 2025, Defendants filed an Opposition, and on May 23, Plaintiffs filed a Reply.

ANALYSIS

Attorney fees are allowed as costs when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10).)¿ In a lemon law action, costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees, may be recovered by a prevailing buyer under the Song-Beverly Act. (See Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).)¿

“If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).)¿

Thus, the statute includes a “reasonable attorney’s fees” standard.¿ The attorney bears the burden of proof as to the “reasonableness” of any fee claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (c)(5).) This burden requires competent evidence as to the nature and value of the services rendered. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.) “Testimony of an attorney as to the number of hours worked on a particular case is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records.” (Ibid.)¿

A plaintiff’s verified billing invoices are prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services listed were necessarily incurred. (See Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.) “In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488, quoting Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.) The Court has discretion to reduce fees that result from inefficient or duplicative use of time. (Horsford v. Bd. of Trustees of California State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal. App. 4th 359, 395.)¿

In determining reasonable attorney fees, the trial court begins with the lodestar, i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 36.) The lodestar may then be adjusted based on factors specific to the case in order to fix the fee at the fair market value of the legal services provided. (Ibid.) These factors include (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. (Ibid.)¿ 

A.    Motion for Attorney Fees

(1)   Prevailing Party

Plaintiffs are the prevailing party pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, which designates them as such for the fee motion (Saeedian Decl. ¶ 20), and based on their $12,000 net monetary recovery (id. ¶ 19), which reflects a successful outcome in achieving their litigation objective of obtaining relief for the defective vehicle.

(2)   Reasonableness of Hourly Rates

“The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in [their] court.” (Ibid.) 

Plaintiffs seek to recover attorney fees for work performed by five attorneys: (1) Michael Saeedian at $695 per hour; (2) Adina Ostoia at $695 per hour; (3) Courtney Perdue at $695 per hour; (4) Christopher Urner at $525 per hour; and (5) Jorge L. Acosta at $350 per hour. Additionally, Plaintiffs request fees for two law clerks’ work at a rate of $250 per hour. (Saeedian Decl. ¶¶ 15, 22.)

In Opposition, Defendants contend that the requested rates at $695 per hour and $525 per hour are not reasonable, arguing that these rates should be reduced to $450 per hour in line with the work performed in this case. (Opp’n. at p. 4.)

Plaintiffs provide supporting evidence of prevailing rates in similar consumer protection cases, including reference to the Laffey Matrix for lodestar comparability and case law approving comparable rates. (Saeedian Decl. ¶ 16.) They also demonstrate the qualifications and lemon law litigation experience of each attorney. (Id. ¶¶ 2-7.) Additionally, Plaintiffs’ counsel undertook representation on a full contingency basis, advancing all costs. (Saeedian Decl. ¶ 12.)

The Court evaluates the reasonableness of the requested rates by considering the case’s procedural posture and complexity. This matter resolved prior to trial, following discovery and motion practice, including disputes involving multiple defendants and discovery. While the case presented moderate complexity, it did not involve novel legal issues or extensive litigation sufficient to justify the upper end of the hourly rates spectrum.

Based on the specific facts of this case, the Court exercises its discretion to adjust the requested hourly rates to more accurately reflect the prevailing rates in the community for similar work:

Michael Saeedian, Adina Ostoia, and Courtney Perdue: $520 per hour;

Christopher Urner: $400 per hour;

Jorge Acosta: $300 per hour;

Wojciech Kowalczyk and Evelyn Ghazarian (law clerks): $200 per hour.

These adjusted rates balance the skill and experience of counsel with the nature and complexity of the case, and consistent with rates awarded in similar Song-Beverly cases as well as PLCM Group and other applicable authorities.

(3)   Reasonableness of Hours Incurred

“A trial court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney ... involved in the presentation of the case.” (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.) “The reasonableness of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court, to be determined from a consideration of such factors as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the experience and expertise of counsel and the amount of time involved. The court may also consider whether the amount requested is based upon unnecessary or duplicative work.” (Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.) 

Here, Plaintiffs’ lodestar is supported by a detailed contemporaneous billing statement (Saeedian Decl. Ex. “A.”) reflecting 88.7 hours of legal work performed across multiple stages of litigation, including: pleadings, discovery, and motion practice; meet and confer efforts; settlement negotiation and documentation; and preparation and filing of the Motion. (Ibid.) Specifically, the 88.7 hours are comprised of the following: 0.8 hours by Michael Saeedian; 30.4 hours by Adina Ostoia; 27.3 hours by Courtney Perdue; 7.5 hours by Christopher Urner; 19.7 hours by Jorge L. Acosta; and a combined 3.0 hours by law clerks Wojciech Kowalczyk and Evelyn Ghazarian. (Id. ¶ 22.)

The Court notes that Plaintiffs’ counsel declares under oath that the billing entries were created contemporaneously or in accordance with the firm policy. (Saeedian Decl. ¶ 13.) The Court finds the billing records credible, and the hours expended to be largely reasonable.

Defendants dispute the reasonableness of certain work.

First, they argue that the billings related to several withdrawn discovery motions should be cut. (Opp’n. at p. 5.)

Defendants present that Plaintiffs’ premature filing of discovery motions against Galpin, without proper meet-and-confer, violated court rules, and their withdrawal suggest that the 8.1 hours were not reasonably necessary. As to the four motions against Jaguar N.A., Defendants contend that the necessity is questionable given its substantial responses (655 pages). (Opp’n. at p. 6.)

The Court acknowledges that Plaintiffs correctly note that meet and confer is not required if the responding fails to provide any responses to the discovery. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290.) Additionally, Plaintiffs’ evidence justifies the necessity of the motions against Defendant Galpin to enforce discovery, as their success – prompting Defendants’ responses – supports their reasonableness.

However, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ filing of four additional discovery motions against Jaguar N.A. was excessive or inefficient, particularly given that the motions were unresolved due to the settlement occurring before Jaguar N.A.’s opposition was due. Plaintiffs’ Reply fails to adequately justify why multiple separate motions were necessary or to address the limited impact on the resolution of the case. In light of this, and because only a portion of the 10.7 hours claimed is deemed unreasonable under the circumstances, the Court concludes that a reduction of five hours from the total claimed time for attorney Courtney Perdue, at the adjusted rate of $520/hr., is appropriate. (See Saeedian Decl. Ex. A. at pp. 10-11.)

Second, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs claimed 4.6 hours for researching recall and technical service bulletins (TSBs) should be deducted entirely, arguing these are unnecessary and irrelevant as proving the cause for defect is not required for a Song-Beverly Act claim. (Opp’n. at p. 7.)

The Court finds the research to be reasonably necessary to the litigation for Plaintiffs to assess the prevalence of the vehicle’s defects, evaluate the reasonableness of Defendant’s repair attempts. Additionally, the claimed 4.6 hours at the rate of a law clerk are proportionate to the case’s needs, justifying the inclusion of these hours.

Third, Defendants assert that duplicative billing patterns appear for multiple occasions from September 20, 2023 to July 17, 2024, justifying a reduction from $1,622.50 to $811.25. (Opp’n. at pp. 7-8.)

In the Reply, Plaintiffs clarify that the September 20, 2023, entries as distinct tasks (class action research and case file documentation), which justifies retention of $1.5 hours at Christopher Urner’s rate. (Reply, at p. 10.) However, Plaintiff does not address other duplications.

As such, the Court makes the following reductions: 0.1 hours on February 27, 2024, and 0.2 hours on March 4, 2024, at Adina Ostoia’s hourly rate; 0.1 hours on May 10, 2024, and 0.1 hours on May 28, 2024, at Jorge L. Acosta’s hourly rate; and 0.1 hours on July 17, 2024, at Courtney Perdue’s hourly rate.

Fourth, Defendants argue that 4.85 hours spent drafting the Complaint and 4.1 hours for drafting boilerplate discovery are excessive, citing their boilerplate nature. (Opp’n. at p. 8.)

The Court finds these hours reasonable. While these documents are largely standardized, they require tailored modifications to include case-specific factual allegations and details. Accordingly, the Court deems these hours are justified.

Lastly, the Court finds that fees for discovery motions against Galpin are recoverable from Jaguar N.A., as they were reasonably incurred in prosecuting the Song-Beverly Act claims, and the Settlement Agreement does not exclude such fees. (Saeedian Decl. ¶ 21; Civ. Code § 1794(d).)

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART the Motion as to attorney fees and finds the reasonable lodestar total to be $37,062.00, calculated as follows:

Michael Saeedian: $520/hr. x 0.8 hr. = $416.00

Adina Ostoia: $520/hr. x (30.4 hr. -0.1 hr. -0.2 hr.) = $15,652.00

Courtney Perdue: $520/hr. x (27.3 hr. -5 hr. -0.1 hr.) = $11,544.00

Christopher Urner: $400/hr. x 7.5 hr.= $3,000.00

Jorge L. Acosta: $300/hr. x (19.7 hr.- 0.1 hr. – 0.1 hr.) = $5,850.00

Wojciech Kowalczyk: $200/hr. x 0.9 hr. = $180.00

Evelyn Ghazarian: $200/hr. x 2.1 hr. = $420.00

Total: $37,062.00

(4)   Reasonable Costs and Expenses

Under the Song-Beverly Act, a prevailing buyer shall be allowed to recover as part of the

judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses. (See Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (d).) The California Legislature intended the word “expenses” to cover outlays not included in the detailed statutory definition of “costs,” and the Song-Beverly Act’s legislative history demonstrates the Legislature exercised its power to permit recovery of a host of litigation

expenditures beyond those permitted by Code of Civil Procedure § 1033.5. (See Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 137-138.)

A properly verified memorandum of costs generally satisfies the prevailing party’s initial burden of establishing that the claimed costs were necessarily incurred. (Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.)

Here, Plaintiffs submitted a verified memorandum of costs totaling $1,637.03. (Saeedian Decl. Ex. “B.”) Plaintiffs provide detailed worksheets for items allowable as costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (a): filing, motion, jury fees, and service of process expenses. (Id. at pp. 3-4.)

The Court finds them reasonably incurred based on Plaintiffs’ verified memorandum and supporting worksheets. Additionally, Defendants do not challenge the costs or identify specific objectionable items in their Opposition, constituting a waiver of any objections. The Court therefore awards them in full.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Motion as to reasonable costs and expenses.

            Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART the Motion, awarding Plaintiffs $37,062.00 in attorney fees, in addition to $1,637.03 in reasonable costs, totaling $38,699.03.

CONCLUSION

The Motion for Attorney Fees is GRANTED IN PART. The Court awards $38,699.03, consisting of $37,062.00 in reasonable attorney fees and $1,637.03 in costs, against Defendant Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC, in favor of Plaintiffs Christopher Lizardo and Javier Lizardo.

Moving party to give notice.