Judge: David B. Gelfound, Case: 23CHCV03281, Date: 2024-10-28 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 23CHCV03281    Hearing Date: October 28, 2024    Dept: F49

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F49

MOTION FOR JOINDER PURSUANT TO C.C.P. § 389

Motion filed: 10/3/24

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Sarah Keys

RESPONDING PARTY: None.

NOTICE: OK.

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order from this Court joining Maya Giuliani as an additional plaintiff in this action.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

This action arises from alleged personal injuries and damages sustained by Plaintiff Sarah Keys (“Keys”) as a result of an automotive collision on September 4, 2023.

On December 27, 2023, Keys initiated the action against Defendants Kileyanne Ramian (“Ramian” or “Defendant/Cross-Complainant”), Alyrath Rivongkham (“Rivongkham” or “Defendant/Cross-Defendant”) and Does 1 to 10, alleging the following causes of action: (1) Motor Vehicle Liability, and (2) General Negligence. The Complaint alleges that a violent collision occurred due to Defendant Rivongkham negligently attempting to make a left turn while Co-Defendant Ramian was driving inattentively and speeding. Plaintiff, a passenger seated in the rear of Ramian’s vehicle, allegedly sustained injuries to her organs from the collision. (Compl. at p. 5.) Subsequently, on December 22, 2023, Defendant Ramian filed an Answer to the Complaint; on December 28, 2023, Keys filed a Request for Entry of Default against Rivongkham as to the Complaint, which was entered by the Clerk on the same day.

On December 22, 2023, Ramian filed a Cross-Complaint against Rivongkham and Roes 1 to 50, alleging (1) Contribution, (2) Implied Indemnity, and (3) Equitable Indemnity. Subsequently, Rivongkham filed an Answer to the Cross-Complaint on January 25, 2024.

On October 3, 2024, Keys filed the instant Motion for Joinder pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 389 (the “Motion”).

No Opposition or Reply papers have been received by the Court.

ANALYSIS

“Necessary” parties are defined under Code of Civil Procedure section 389, subdivision (a): “A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party.”¿ 

“Code of Civil Procedure section 389 limits compulsory joinder to those situations where the absence of a person may result in substantial prejudice to that person or to the parties already before the court.” (Morrical v. Rogers (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 438, 461.) 

A determination that a person is a necessary party under Code of Civil Procedure section 389, subdivision (a) is the predicate for the determination whether he or she is an indispensable party under Code of Civil Procedure section 389, subdivision (b.) (Dreamweaver Andalusians, LLC v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1168, 1173.) A “necessary” party only becomes “indispensable” if the Court undertakes the analysis set forth under Code of Civil Procedure section 389, subdivision (b) and determines that the action cannot proceed without that party. (City of San Diego v. San Diego City Employees' Retirement System (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 69, 83-84.) “The term ‘indispensable’ actually is a conclusion that, absent joinder of the party in question, the case must be dismissed.” (Edmon and Kernow, Cal. Prac. Guide: CPBT (Rutter Group 2020), ¶2:155.) 

“Whether a party is necessary and/or indispensable is a matter of trial court discretion in which the court weighs ‘factors of practical realities and other considerations.” (City of San Diego v. San Diego City Employees' Retirement System (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 69, 84.) “For example, where existing and absent parties' interests are sufficiently aligned such that the absent¿party's rights will not be affected or impaired by the judgment or proceeding, the absent party need not be joined.” (Ibid.)  

A.    Necessary Party Under Code of Civil Procedure Section 389(a)

Plaintiff Keys moves to join Maya Giuliani (“Giuliani”) as an additional plaintiff to the Complaint, arguing that Giuliani is a necessary party because complete relief cannot be accorded among the current parties. (Mot. at p. 4)

The “complete relief” clause requires joinder when nonjoinder precludes the court from effecting relief not in some overall sense, but between extant parties. (Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 785, 794 (Countrywide).) “Properly interpreted, [the ‘complete relief’ clause] is not invoked simply because some absentee may cause future litigation.” (Ibid.)

Here, Keys’s counsel, Stephanie H. Ng (“Ng”), claims that Giuliani was the front passenger in Ramian’s vehicle at the time of the collision (Mot. at p. 2), and has “retained counsel specifically for claims arising out of the same transaction and occurrence.” (Ng Decl. ¶¶ 3, 6.)

The Court finds that the above evidence, assuming it to be true, is insufficient to establish that Giuliani is a necessary party to the Complaint.

First, the implication of Giulian’s potential future litigation based on the same collision does not invoke the “complete relief” clause under the Code of Civil Procedure section 389, subdivision (a). (Countrywide, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 794.)

Second, even focusing on the “arising out of the same transaction and occurrence” element, Ng’s statement merely establishes that Keys and Giuliani possess independent claims against Defendants for their respective injuries. Assuming Keys prevails in this action, her damages can be ascertained, and judgment can be rendered even if Giuliani is not a party. Thus, it follows that the joinder is not necessary to accord Keys’s own “complete relief.”

Third, Keys has failed to show that nonjoinder could pose a risk of harm to either Giuliani or herself. Keys argues that Defendants’ settlement within available policy limits could potentially affecting Giuliani’s future recovery because “[t]he allocation and availability of policy limits would be in question if Giuliani remains a non-party.” (Mot. 5.) However, Keys fails to specify whether the policy limit applies per person or per accident. Giuliani retains her right to pursue a separate action and seek damages beyond the policy limit. Furthermore, if settlement occurs, Giuliani’s interests remain unaffected by Keys’s good faith settlement determination, as Giuliani is not a “joint tortfeasor” but rather a potential co-claimant.

The Court also determines that Giuliani’s willingness to voluntarily join, while noted by Keys, is irrelevant under Code of Civil Procedure section 389, subdivision (a), which does not consider a potential party’s voluntary participation as grounds for necessary joinder.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Keys has failed to establish that Giuliani is a necessary party to the Complaint.

Therefore, the Court DENIES the Motion.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff Sarah Keys’s Motion for Joinder is DENIED.

Moving party to give notice.