Judge: David B. Gelfound, Case: 23CHCV03859, Date: 2024-06-17 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23CHCV03859    Hearing Date: June 17, 2024    Dept: F49

Dept. F49¿

Date: 6/17/24

Case Name: Sergey

Matevosyan v. Anush

Khachatryan, et al.

Case # 23CHCV03859

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F49

JUNE 17, 2024

DEMURRER

Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 23CHCV03859

Motion filed: 3/29/24

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Anush Khachatryan (“Khachatryan” or “Defendant”)

RESPONDING PARTY: none

NOTICE: OK

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order to sustain the Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint.

TENTATIVE RULING: The demurrer is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

BACKGROUND

This action arises from a dispute over the ownership of an alleged community property acquired during the parties’ prior marriage.

On December 20, 2023, Plaintiff filed his Complaint against the former wife Defendant, alleging: (1) quiet title, and (2) declaratory relief on an alleged community real property located at 9343 White Oak Avenue, Northridge, California 91325 (the “Subject Property”).

On March 29, 2024, Defendant filed her demurrer which was subsequently amended on May 22, 2024.

No Opposition papers have been received by the Court.

ANALYSIS

A demurrer is an objection to a pleading, the grounds for which are apparent from either the face of the complaint or a matter of which the court may take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a); see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The purpose of a demurrer is to challenge the sufficiency of a pleading “by raising questions of law.” (Postley v. Harvey (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 280, 286.) “In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial

justice between the parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) The court “‘“treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law ....”’” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525 (Berkley).) In applying these standards, the court liberally construes the complaint to determine whether a cause of action has been stated. (Picton v. Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.)

“[T]he policy of liberal construction of the pleadings ... will not ordinarily be invoked to sustain a pleading defective in any material respect. This particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which show, how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered” (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645 (Lazar) internal quotations and citations omitted).

A. Request for Judicial Notice

Defendant requests the Court to take judicial notice of one Decree of Divorce from a district court of the State of Nevada to which Plaintiff and Defendant are a party, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.30, Evidence Code section 452, and California Rules of Court rules 3.1113(l) and 3.1306(c).

The Court GRANTS the Request for Judicial Notice.

B. Meet and Confer

A party filing a demurrer “shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a).) A failure to meet and confer does not constitute grounds to sustain or overrule a demurrer. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(4).)

Here, the requirements for meet and confer have been satisfied. (Baghdaserians Decl., ¶¶ 3-6.)

C. First Cause of Action – Quiet Title

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s quiet title claim is subject to demurrer on several grounds: (1) Plaintiff, alleging an equitable interest, cannot maintain an action to quiet title against Defendant, the owner of the legal title; (2) the quiet title claim is barred under res judicata theory; (3) a direct attack on an otherwise final valid judgment can only be permitted where the complaining party was fraudulently prevented from presenting his claim or defense in the prior action. (Dem., at pp. 7-8.)

The Court now proceeds to examine these threshold issues.

1) Full Faith and Credit Principles Apply to the Nevada Judgment

Article IV, section 1 of the Constitution directs that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other State.” (Williams v. State of North Carolina, (1942) 317 U.S. 287, 293.) (Underlines added.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 1913 provides, in part, that “the effect of the judicial record of a sister state in the same in this state as in the state where it was made[.]”

“The [out-of-state] judgment is entitled to full faith and credit in California even if it was contrary to California’s law or policy.” (In re Marriage of Moore & Ferrie (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1472, 1479, citing Williams v. State of North Carolina, supra; Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co. (1980) 448 U.S. 261, 270.)

Conversely, an action to divide an omitted asset does not seek to modify or reopen the previous final judgment, but to divide a property interest that “arose independent of and predated the original decree of dissolution and property settlement.” (See Huddleson v. Huddleson (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1564, 1573; Casas v. Thompson (1986) 42 Cal.3d 131, 141-142, fn. 4; Henn v. Henn (1980) 26 Cal.3d 323, 330.)

Here, in his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that “during the marriage, the parties purchased real property located at 9343 White Oak Avenue, Northridge, CA 91325, which is the subject of this action. Title was taken solely in the name of Defendant, KHACHATRYAN; however, the property is community property due to the presumption set forth in California Family Code § 760.” (Compl., ¶ 10.)

Defendant presents a valid and final Decree of Divorce by District Court in Clark County, Nevada (“the “Nevada Judgment”). (Def.’s Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Ex. “A.”) Moreover, Defendant maintains that Plaintiff cannot be permitted to circumvent the Nevada Judgment by seeking this Court a different judgment concerning the division of assets based on California’s community property presumption as set forth in Family Code section 760. (Dem., at p. 9.) The Court agrees.

The Court observes that on the first page of the Nevada Judgment, it states that “the court finds as follows: 1. That all of the allegations contained in the documents on file are true.” (Def.’s RJN, Ex. “A.”) Moreover, on page 4, the Nevada Judgment states that the Court finds that “the terms, as they stated in the Petitioners’ Joint Petition, regarding the assets and debts, are hereby ratified, confirmed, and incorporated into this Decree as though fully set forth.” (Ibid.) Furthermore, as attached to the Nevada Judgment the Joint Petition for Divorce and UCCJEA Declaration, wherein the Section 17 Division of Community Property states, “Any community property has already been divided.” (Ibid.) On page 8, both Plaintiff and Defendant in this case entered their signatures. (Ibid.)

Here, Plaintiff does not contest the validity of the Nevada Judgment. Nor does he allege in the Complaint that the Subject Property is an omitted asset or that the acquisition of the Subject Property “arose independent of and predated the original decree of dissolution and property settlement.” Thus, the Court determines that the Subject Property was not excluded by the Decree of Divorce entered in the Nevada Judgment.

Accordingly, the Court determines that the full faith and credit principles obligate this Court to bar an action seeking to modify a sister state judgment, the effect of which is governed by the law of the State of Nevada, not California Family Code section 760 as Plaintiff relied upon.

Therefore, the Court SUSTAINS the Demurrer as to the Quiet Title claim on this basis.

2) Plaintiff Cannot Maintain an Action to Quiet Title against the Owner of the Legal Title.

The general rule is that the holder of equitable title cannot maintain a quiet title action against the holder of legal title. (Warren v. Merrill (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 96, 113.) But an exception exists “when legal title has been acquired through fraud.” (Id., at p. 114.)

Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts that “[the] [t]itle [of the Subject Property] was taken solely in the name of Defendant,” but Plaintiff claims equitable interest in the Subject Property based on the “community property” presumption during marriage. (Compl., ¶ 10.) Notably, the Complaint does not allege that the legal title was fraudulently acquired.

Accordingly, the general rule applies in this case and Plaintiff, seeking equitable interest in the Subject Property, cannot maintain a quiet title action against Defendant, the owner of the legal title.

Therefore, the Court SUSTAINS the Demurrer as to the first cause of action on this alternative ground.

D. Second Cause of Action – Declaratory Relief

“Strictly speaking, a demurrer is a procedurally inappropriate method for disposing of a complaint for declaratory relief.” (Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Continental Ins. Co. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 187, 221 [disapproved on other grounds].) Nevertheless, the court may sustain a demurrer to a declaratory relief claim if the complaint fails to allege an actual or present controversy, or that the controversy is not “justiciable.” The court also may sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if it determines that a judicial declaration is not “necessary or proper at the time under all the circumstances.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1061; DeLaura v. Beckett (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 542, 545.)

Here, the Complaint seeks “a Judgment declaring that Plaintiff has an ownership interest in the property by virtue of the community property presumption[.]” (Compl., ¶ 21.) However, as the Court has previously concluded that it lacks jurisdiction to modify an effective and valid Nevada Judgment, it determines that Plaintiff’s second cause of action for declaratory relief is not justiciable.

Moreover, by virtue of the allegations made in the Complaint, the second cause of action is wholly derivative of the cause of action for quiet title.

Given the Court has sustained the demurrer to the quiet title claim, it SUSTAINS the Demurrer to the second cause of action.

E. Leave to Amend

When a demurrer is sustained, the Court determines whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) When a plaintiff “has pleaded the general set of facts upon which his cause of action is based,” the court should give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint, since plaintiff should not “be deprived of his right to maintain his action on the ground that his pleadings were defective for lack of particulars.” (Reed v. Norman (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 892, 900.)

Here, the Court has concluded that it lacks jurisdiction to modify an out-of-state Judgment, and this threshold issue cannot be cured by an amendment.

Therefore, Defendants’ unopposed Demurrer is SUSTAINED, without leave to amend.

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s unopposed Demurrer is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

Moving party to give notice.