Judge: David B. Gelfound, Case: 23CHCV03890, Date: 2025-03-21 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 23CHCV03890    Hearing Date: March 21, 2025    Dept: F49

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F49

MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO, REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS

Motion filed: 1/13/24

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Lilian Maglaris-Gabaldon

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Chatsworth Health Fitness, LLC.

NOTICE: OK.

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order compelling Defendant Chatsworth Health Fitness, LLC to provide supplemental responses to Plaintiff’s second set of Special Interrogatories, Nos. 169, 170, 180, 181, and 212-217, and imposing monetary sanctions against Defendant Chatsworth Health Fitness, LLC and its counsel of record in the amount of $2,060.00.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is GRANTED. The request for monetary sanctions is GRANTED IN PART.

BACKGROUND

This action arises from personal injuries that Plaintiff allegedly sustained in a fitness gym sauna (the “Sauna”) operated by Defendant Chatsworth Health Fitness, LLC.

On December 22, 2023, Plaintiff Lillian Maglaris-Gabaldon (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against Defendants Lowi Limited, a California Limited Partnership (“Lowi”); Crunch Fitness – Chatworth, a Business Entity of Unknown Form; Crunch Fitness, a Business Entity of Unknown Form (collectively, “Defendants”), and Does 1 through 20. The Complaint alleges the following causes of action: (1) General Negligence, and (2) Premises Liability. Subsequently, Lowi filed its Answer on March 6, 2024.

On January 5, 2024, Plaintiff submitted Amendments to Complaint, substituting Defendants Chatsworth Health Fitness, LLC (“CHF”) and Harman Fitness, LLC for Doe 1 and Doe 2, respectively. Subsequently, CHF filed its Answer to the Complaint on July 25, 2024.

On July 25, 2024, Plaintiff dismissed Defendant Harman Fitness, LLC. On August 15, 2024, Plaintiff dismissed Defendants Crunch Fitness – Chatsworth, a Business Entity of Unknown Form, and Crunch Fitness, a Business Entity of Unknown Form.

On January 13, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Compel Further Responses from CHF to her Special Interrogatories, Set Two (the “Motion”). On February 18, 2025, CHF filed an untimely Opposition, and Plaintiff submitted a Reply on March 14, 2024.

ANALYSIS

“On receipt of a response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that any of the following apply: (1) An answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete. (2) An exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate. (3) An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a).)

A.    Procedural Requirements

1.      Timeliness

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300, subdivision (c), notice of this motion must be given within 45 days following the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or by a later date agreed-upon in writing, failing which the propounding party waives any right to compel a further response to the interrogatories. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (c); but see Golf & Tennis Pro Shop, Inc. v. Superior Court (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 127, 134-136 [suggesting that the 45-day deadline does not apply to (i.e., it does not begin to run with service of) objections-only responses; it only applies to responses that are required to be verified].)

The 45-day deadline “is ‘jurisdictional’ in the sense that it renders the court without authority to rule on motions to compel other than to deny them.” (Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.)

“Any period of notice, or any right or duty to do any act or make any response within any period or on a date certain after the service of the document, which time period or date is prescribed by statute or rule of court, shall be extended after service by electronic means by two court days[.]” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.6, subd. (a)(3)(B).)

Here, Plaintiff’s counsel, Sasha J. Skaf (“Skaf”) states that CHF served its responses to Special Interrogatories (“SROG”), Set Two, on October 4, 2024. (Skaf Decl. ¶ 5.) Subsequently, CHF provided amended responses on December 2, 2024. (Id. ¶ 7.)

 The service of the Amended Responses established the deadline for Plaintiff to file a motion to compel as January 21, 2025, calculated based on a 45-day period with an extension of two court days per Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6, subdivision (a)(3), accounting for the method of electronic service (Skaf Decl. Exh. “5”). The Motion was filed on January 13, 2025.

Therefore, the Court finds the Motion is timely filed, as it was filed prior to the established deadline.

2.      Meet and Confer

“A motion under subdivision (a) shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (b)(1).) “A meet and confer declaration in support of a motion shall state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.040.)

Here, Plaintiff has satisfied the meet and confer requirement. (Skaf Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. “4.”)

3.      Separate Statement

The California Rules of Court rule 3.1345 (a)(2) explicitly states that “Any motion involving the content of a discovery request or the responses to such a request must be accompanied by a separate statement. The motions that require a separate statement include a motion: ... (2) To compel further responses to interrogatories.” “A separate statement is a separate document filed and served with the discovery motion that provides all the information necessary to understand each discovery request and all the responses to it that are at issue.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(c).)

Here, Plaintiff has fulfilled the requirement by concurrently filing a separate statement with the Motion.

B.     Motion to Compel Further Responses to SROG, Set Two

“As a general matter, the statutory scheme imposes no obligation on a party propounding interrogatories to establish good cause or prove up the merits of any underlying claims.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 550.) Indeed, a litigant “is entitled to demand answers to its interrogatories, as a matter of right, and without a prior showing, unless the party on whom those interrogatories are served objects and shows cause why the questions are not within the purview of the code section.” (Id. at p. 541, citing West Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 422.)

Accordingly, the Court will proceed to examine whether CHF’s objections and responses have satisfied its burden to show cause when considered in light of the arguments presented by Plaintiff.

1)      SROG Nos. 169, 170

SROG No. 169 states: “IDENTIFY who had access to the controls of the thermostat for the SAUNA on the day of the INCIDENT.” (Skaf Decl. Ex. “2,” at p. 5.)

SROG No. 170 requests: “IDENTIFY all of YOUR employees present on the day of the INCIDENT who had access to control the temperature of the SAUNA.” (Skaf Decl. Ex. “2,” at p. 5.)

CHF responded to SROG No. 169, stating “Responding Party respectfully objects to this Interrogatory to the extent that it is vague and ambiguous, and unduly burdensome. This Interrogatory also calls for confidential, private, and proprietary information. Responding Party objects to this Interrogatory on the basis that it seeks information of third-party persons that is protected by constitutional right to privacy. Cal. Const. Art. I, § 1; Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal. 3d 652, 656. This Interrogatory seeks information that is irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Subject to and without waving the aforementioned objections, Responding Party responds as follows: An thermostat automatically maintains a temperature not exceeding 180º degrees by using a combination of precise sensors. This system continuously monitors the temperature and adjusts the heating element in real time, gradually reducing power as it approaches the set point to avoid overshooting. Safety features such as overheat protection and automatic shutoff ensure that the temperature stays within safe limits, while programmable or smart capabilities allow for remote monitoring and adjustments. With these mechanisms in place, the thermostat reliably keeps the environment at or below the desired 180-degree threshold without manual intervention. Also everyone could manually control the temperature but again the thermostat would prevent from going over 180º. A person can manually control the temperature from 140º to not more than 180º degrees.” (Pl.’s Separate Statement, at pp.4-5.)

Similarly, in its responses to SROG No. 170, CHF stated: “Responding Party respectfully objects to this Interrogatory to the extent that it is vague and ambiguous, and unduly burdensome. This Interrogatory also calls for confidential, private, and proprietary information. Responding Party objects to this Interrogatory on the basis that it seeks information of third-party persons that is protected by constitutional right to privacy. Cal. Const. Art. I, § 1; Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal. 3d 652, 656. This Interrogatory seeks information that is irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Subject to and without waving the aforementioned objections, Responding Party responds as follows: Everyone in the fitness could manually control the temperature of the sauna, but again the thermostat would prevent from going over 180º. A person can manually control the temperature from 140º to not more than 180º degrees.” (Pl.’s Separate Statement, at p. 8.)

i.                    Relevance, Vagueness and Ambiguity Objection

First, the Court notes that under California law, discovery is broadly permitted for any information that is relevant to the subject matter of the litigation and reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.)

Here, SROG Nos. 169 and 170 seek information regarding potential witnesses who had access to and control over the operation of the Sauna. This information is relevant and reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Accordingly, the Court rejects CHF’s objection on the relevance grounds.

Similarly, the Court finds SROG Nos. 169 and 170 are specific and tailored to identify staff who had control over the Sauna’s thermostat on the day of the incident.

Therefore, CHF’s generic objection on the basis of “vague and ambiguous” is OVERRULED.

ii.                  Undue Burden Objection

Second, the objection based upon burden must be sustained by evidence “showing the quantum of work required, while to support an objection of oppression there must be some showing either of an intent to create an unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought.” (West Pico Furniture Co. v. Super. Ct. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417.) There is a legislative acknowledgment that some burden is inherent in all demands for discovery. (Id. at p. 418.) Yet, “[t]he objection of burden is valid only when that burden is demonstrated to result in injustice.” (Ibid.)

Here, CHF merely asserts that the interrogatory is “unduly burdensome” without providing any evidence showing the quantum of work required.

Accordingly, this objection is unsubstantiated and therefore OVERRULED.

iii.                Privacy Objection

Third, CHF’s objection on the basis of privacy also lacks merit. It is well established that the burden is on “the party asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and the seriousness of the prospective invasion,” and then the court must “weigh the countervailing interests the opposing party identifies.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 557 (Williams).)

Here, CHF alleges the interrogatory “seeks information of third-party persons that is protected by constitutional right to privacy,” citing Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal. 3d 652 (Valley Bank of Nevada). In Valley Bank of Nevada, the discovery at issue sought bank records pertaining to loan transactions between the bank and seven named persons and corporations “together with any and all records of any banking relationships withs the Teamsters Union and/or any casino owned, operated or mortgaged to the Teamsters Union.” (Id. at p. 655.) The Supreme Court of California stated that “the right of privacy extends to one’s confidential financial affairs as well as o the details of one’s personal life.” (Id. at p. 656.) After weighing the competing considerations, the court concluded that “before confidential customer information may be disclosed in the course of civil discovery proceedings, the bank must take reasonable steps to notify its customer of the pendency and nature of the proceedings and to afford the customer a fair opportunity to assert his interests by objecting to disclosure, by seeking an appropriate protective order, or by instituting other legal proceedings to limit the scope or nature of the matters sought to be discovered.” (Id. at p. 658.)

Unlike the bank records sought in Valley Bank of Nevada, Plaintiff does not seek disclosure of any transactions made between CHF and his employees. Plaintiff only seeks the names of those employees who had access to the Sauna’s thermostat control on the day of the incident. There is no cognizable privacy interest that attaches to an employee’s work assignment related to controlling or accessing the Sauna’s thermostat. As for the names, CHF has not established the extent and the seriousness of prospective invasion if those employees’ names are disclosed. A generalized assertion of privacy rights, without identifying the affected party or explaining the nature of the alleged invasion, is insufficient to sustain such an objection. Even assuming that CHF has met its burden, the Court determines that it can be reasonably concluded that Plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relevant discovery outweighs the modest privacy invasion occasioned by the disclosure of employee names.

Accordingly, the Court finds CHF’ objection based on privacy lacks merit.

Lastly, given the Court has determined that all of CHF’s objections to SROG Nos. 169 and 170 cannot be sustainable, it concludes that CHF’s response to SROG Nos. 169 and 170 are incomplete as no individuals were identified.

Therefore, the Court GRANTS the Motion as to SROG Nos. 169 and 170.

2)      SROG No. 180, 181

SROG No. 180 asks: “When was the SAUNA last turned off prior to approximately 7:30 p.m. on November 10, 2023?” (Skaf Decl. Ex. “2,” at p. 6.)

SROG No. 181 inquires, “Why was the SAUNA turned off the last time it was turned off prior to approximately 7:30 p.m. on November 10, 2023?” (Skaf Decl. Ex. “2,” at p. 7.)

CHF responded to SROG No. 180 by stating: “Responding Party objects to this Interrogatory to the extent that it is vague and ambiguous as to the term ‘turned off prior to approximately 7.30 p.m.’ As drafted it is unclear whether Propounding Party seeks information as to whether the sauna turned off on the day of the incident prior to the incident, or at any time prior to the incident, which may impede Responding Party’s ability to fully and adequately respond to this Interrogatory. Subject to and without waving the aforementioned objections, Responding Party responds as follows: The sauna was not turned off on the day of the incident prior to the incident.” (Pl.’s Separate Statement, at p. 11.)

Similarly, in its responses to SROG No. 181, CHF stated: “Responding Party objects to this Interrogatory to the extent that it is vague and ambiguous as to the term “ turned off prior to approximately 7.30 p.m.” As drafted it is unclear whether Propounding Party seeks information as to whether the sauna turned off on the day of the incident prior to the incident, or at any time prior to the incident, which may impede Responding Party’s ability to fully and adequately respond to this Interrogatory. Further this Interrogatory seeks information that is irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Subject to and without waving the aforementioned objections, Responding party responds as follows: The sauna was not turned off.” (Pl.’s Separate Statement, at p. 14.)

These two interrogatories seek information as to the operation of the Sauna from which Plaintiff allegedly sustained a burn injury. Therefore, the Court finds them relevant and are within the scope of discoverable information.

Moreover, the Court finds the interrogatories to be clear and specific. Even assuming that CHF initially had reason to interpret the inquiries as limited to the operation of the Sauna on the day of the incident, Plaintiff provided clarification in her meet and confer letter to CHF, dated October 28, 2024. In that letter, Plaintiff’s counsel explained: “[SROGs] 180-181... seek information related to when the subject sauna had been turned off prior to the date of the incident. They do not assume or say the sauna was turned off at all on the day of the incident, rather are asking when it had last been turned off, for any reason, PRIOR to the day of the subject incident.” (Skaf Decl. Ex. “4,” at p. 71, emphasis in original.) It appears that CHF did not respond to Plaintiff’s meet and confer letter, nor has it provided supplemental responses based on the clarifications therein.

CHF’s untimely Opposition does not contest the substantive arguments presented in the Motion. It asserts that defense counsel’s consistent efforts to obtain the required information demonstrate diligence and good faith in attempting to meet discovery requirements. (Opp’n. at p. 3.) Additionally, CHF contends that it engaged in meet and confer in good faith. (Ibid.) However, this argument does not override the Court’s findings above. Notably, Plaintiff’s meet and confer letter directly addressed CHF’s objections and provided clarifications to the interrogatories. Despite this, CHF has failed to provide further responses.

Therefore, the Court GRANTS the Motion as to SROG Nos. 180 and 181.

3)      SROG No. 212-217

SROG No. 212 asks, “Is the SAUNA subject to building code inspection requirements?”

SROG No. 213 requests: “DESCRIBE IN DETAIL all instances in which the SAUNA was inspected as part of a building code inspection in the 4 years prior to the INCIDENT.”

SROG No. 214 states, “IDENTIFY all DOCUMENTS RELATED TO all instances in which the SAUNA was inspected as part of a building code inspection in the 4 years prior to the INCIDENT.”

SROG No. 215 asks, “Is the SAUNA subject to city ordinance inspection requirements?”

SROG No. 216 seeks: “DESCRIBE IN DETAIL all instances in which the SAUNA was inspected as part of a city ordinance inspection in the 4 years prior to the INCIDENT.”

SROG No. 217 states: “IDENTIFY all DOCUMENTS RELATED TO all instances in which the SAUNA was inspected as part of a city ordinance inspection in the 4 years prior to the INCIDENT.

(Skaf Decl. Ex. “2,” at p. 11.)

CHF provided essentially uniform, objection-only responses to the above-listed SROG Nos. In its responses, CHF stated: “Responding Party respectfully objects to this Interrogatory as vague and ambiguous as to the term ‘building code inspection.’ Responding Party respectfully objects to this Interrogatory to the extent that it is overbroad as to time and scope, vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible. Responding Party is unclear as to what building code inspection Propounding Party is referring to. Further, this Interrogatory is overboard as to time and scope thus, it is unduly burdensome. This Interrogatory also calls for confidential, private, and proprietary information. This Interrogatory also seeks the production of documents protected by the privacy rights of third parties. Responding Party further objects to the extent that this Interrogatory seeks information that is irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. (See Brokopp v. Ford Motor Co. (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 841, 851. [‘It is a fundamental rule of evidence that you cannot prove the commission of an act by showing the commission of similar acts by the same person at other times and under other circumstances. Such evidence is simply not relevant[.]’].) Moreover, this Interrogatory may call for the disclosure of information subject to the attorney-client privilege and attorney work product doctrine.” (See, e.g., Pl.’s Separate Statement at p. 36.)

i)                   Relevance Objection

Here, the above-listed interrogatories seek information pertinent to the maintenance and code compliance of the Sauna which is reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence supporting Plaintiff’s causes of action for Negligence and Premises Liability.

Therefore, the Court OVERRULES CHF’s objection based on relevance.

ii)                 Vagueness, Ambiguity, and Overbreadth Objections

CHF asserts that these interrogatories are vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible as to the term “building code inspection” or “city ordinance inspection.” CHF further assert objection on the grounds of overbreadth as to the time and scope.

Plaintiff’s meet and confer letter, dated October 28, 2024, pointed out that “[CHF] by its very own responses to [SROGs] 184-187 in the very same discovery at issue, references the following, for example: ‘Per the California Building standard codes, Sauna heaters shall be equipped with a thermostat that will limit room temperature to 194°F (90°C). The thermostat in the sauna at issue here would limit the temperature up to 180o degrees Fahrenheit.’” (Skaf Decl. Ex. “4,” emphasis in original.)

It is evident to the Court that CHF correctly interpreted the meaning of “building code” in relation to the Sauna. As for any building codes CHF believes are implicated in the interrogatories, CHF must provide responses “as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available” to it. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.210, subd. (a).) If an interrogatory cannot be answered completely, it shall be answered to the extent possible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.210, subd. (b).)

Accordingly, the Court finds CHF’s objections on the grounds of vagueness, ambiguity, and overbreadth unpersuasive. The Court therefore concludes that CHF’s objection-only responses failed to comply with the code.

iii)               Privilege and Work Product Objections

The law is well-established: “[A] responding party may object to an interrogatory that seeks privileged information by clearly stating the objection and the particular privilege invoked. But the existence of a document containing privileged information is not privileged. [Citations.] Interrogatories may be used to discover the existence of documents in the other party's possession. [Citation.] If an interrogatory asks the responding party to identify a document, an adequate response must include a description of the document.” (Best Products, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1181, 1190 (Best Products).) Interrogatories may be used to discover the existence of documents in the other party's possession. If an interrogatory asks the responding party to identify a document, an adequate response must include a description of the document. (Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783 (Deyo).)

Here, CHF’s response – stating merely that “this Interrogatory may call for the disclosure of information subject to the attorney-client privilege and attorney work product doctrine” (Underlines added) – fails to meet the standard for asserting a valid privilege objection. Furthermore, even if CHF had properly asserted privilege, it would still not excuse its failure to respond. “[T]he existence of a document containing privileged information is not privileged.” (Best Product, Inc., supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 1190.) The interrogatories at issue explicitly request CHF to “identify all documents related to [the inspections],” which, under established law, requires CHF to provide an adequate response including a description of these documents. (Deyo, supra, 84 Cal.App.at p. 783.)  CHF has failed to do so.

Accordingly, the Court finds CHF’s objection-only responses to SROG No. 212-217 evasive and incomplete.

The Court therefore GRANTS the Motion as to SROG Nos. 212-217. 

C.    Monetary Sanctions

Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300, subdivision (d), provides: “The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a further response to interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”

Additionally, California Rules of Court rule 3.1348(a) further provides, “The Court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed, or opposition to the motion was withdrawn, or the requested discovery was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed.” (Underlines added.)

As the Court has granted the Motion, it finds that mandatory sanctions apply in this case. Utilizing the lodestar approach, the Court determines the total and reasonable amount of attorney’s fees and costs incurred for the work performed in connection with the Motion to be $1,310.00, calculated based on a reasonable hourly rate of $500.00 for 2.5 hours reasonably spent, plus a $60.00 filing fee.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff Lilian Maglaris-Gabaldon’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set Two, is GRANTED.

Defendant Chatsworth Health Fitness, LLC is ordered to provide verified supplemental responses to Special Interrogatories, Set Two, Nos. 169, 170, 180, 181, and 212-217 within 20 days.

Plaintiff Lilian Maglaris-Gabaldon’s request for monetary sanctions is GRANTED IN PART.

Defendant Chatsworth Health Fitness, LLC and its counsel of record are ordered to pay $1,310.00, jointly and severally, to Plaintiff’s counsel, within 20 days.

Moving party to give notice.