Judge: David B. Gelfound, Case: 24CHCV00067, Date: 2024-05-14 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24CHCV00067    Hearing Date: May 14, 2024    Dept: F49

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F-49

MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Motion filed: 3/27/24

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Carson Alan Cotton (“Defendant”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs Jorge Gorgonio and David Gorgonio (“Plaintiffs”)

NOTICE: OK 

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order from this Court striking the Fourth Cause of Action for punitive damages, in its entirety.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

This action arises from alleged personal injuries caused by an automobile accident that occurred on February 21, 2022. (FAC, ¶¶ 7, 42.)

On January 8, 2024, Plaintiffs initiated the action. Subsequently, on February 28, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against Defendant and Does 1 through 50, alleging four causes of action: (1) Negligence; (2) Negligence Per Se; (3) Statutory Liability; and (4) Punitive Damages.

On March 27, 2024, Defendant filed the instant Motion to Strike Portions of the FAC (the “Motion”).

Subsequently, on May 1, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their Opposition. Defendant replied on May 2, 2024.

ANALYSIS

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a); Stafford v. Shultz, 42 Cal. 2d 767, 782 (1954) [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].)    An immaterial or irrelevant allegation is one that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense; is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense; or a demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subd. (b).)  The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)

A.    Procedural Requirements

1.      Meet and Confer

“Before filing a motion to strike ... the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolves the objections to be raised in the motion to strike.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 435.5, subd. (a).)  If no agreement is reached, the moving party shall file and serve with the motion to strike a declaration stating either: (1) the means by which the parties met and conferred and that the parties did not reach an agreement, or (2) that the party who filed the pleading failed to respond to the meet and confer request or otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 435.5, subd. (a)(3).) 

Here, Defendant’s counsel attests that he emailed Plaintiffs’ counsel on March 25, 2024, to outline the deficiencies in the FAC. In response, Plaintiffs’ counsel posited that the FAC had enough facts to support the claim for punitive damage. As a result, the parties were unable to reach a resolution prior to the filing of the Motion. (Mendoza Decl., ¶ 2.)

Accordingly, the Court finds that the requirement for meet and confer declaration has been met, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 435.5, subdivision (a)(3)(B).

2.      Timeliness

“A party served with a cross-complaint may within 30 days after service move, demur, or otherwise plead to the cross-complaint in the same manner as to an original complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 432.10) 

“Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof [e.g., 30 days after the service of the complaint or cross-complaint unless extended by court order or stipulation.]” (Code Civ. Proc. § 435, subd. (b)(1).)”

“Any period of notice, or any right or duty to do any act or make any response within any period or on a date certain after the service of the document, which time period or date is prescribed by statute or rule of court, shall be extended after service by electronic means by two court days, but the extension shall not apply to extend the time for filing any of the following[.] [inapplicable here]” (Code Civ. Proc., §1010.6, subd. (a)(3)(B).)

Here, the case record does not reflect a filed Proof of Service for the FAC. Additionally, Plaintiffs do not contest the issue of timeliness. Furthermore, the Motion was served and filed on March 27, 2024, assumed to be within 30 days of the service of the FAC filed on February 28, 2024.

Based on the above records, the Court proceeds to examine the merits of the Motion, operating under the assumption that the filing is timely.

A.    Motion to Strike the Fourth Cause of Action

Defendant moves for the Court to strike the Fourth Cause of Action for Punitive Damages in its entirety, comprising the following paragraphs:

“As additional damages against Defendants CARSON ALAN COTTON, an individual, and DOES 1 THROUGH 50, Inclusive, and each of them (“Defendants”), Plaintiffs allege that Defendants were guilty of malice and oppression within Civil Code Section 3294, and that Plaintiffs should recover punitive damages in addition to actual and general damages.” (FAC, ¶ 40.)

“The facts supporting Plaintiffs’ claims for punitive damages against Defendants CARSON ALAN COTTON, an individual, and DOES 1 THROUGH 50, Inclusive, is as follows:” (FAC, ¶ 41.)

“On February 21, 2022, at or near INTERSTATE 5 near unincorporated community of Castaic, County of Los Angeles, Defendant knowingly, willfully, recklessly and wantonly drove an automobile on a public road while in an unsafe manner, at excessive speed, crashing into Plaintiffs, and then failed to stop and fled the scene, willfully disregarding the safety of persons or property of others around them, in violation of California Vehicle Code Sections 12500, 22350, 20001, 20002, and 23123. Based on information and belief, Defendant CARSON ALAN COTTON, left the scene right after the impact, causing the alleged car crash. It is Plaintiffs’ belief that Defendant COTTON was cited and arrested for a Misdemeanor Hit & Run under CCP 20002.” (FAC, ¶ 42.)

“The Defendant willfully fled the scene of the accident well knowing that there were more likely than not injured people as a result of this crash, as it was by no means a minor impact but a very serious and powerful crash as it can be seen by looking at Plaintiffs’s damaged vehicle.” (FAC, ¶ 43.)  

“Witnesses at the scene saw the Defendant leave his vehicle and run away right after the impact. The Defendant was later found by law enforcement and arrested. “ (FAC, ¶ 44.)

“As a result of Defendant’s actions and omissions in blatant disregard for the laws and safety of others on the road, Defendant caused great bodily injury to Plaintiffs.” (FAC, ¶ 45.)

“The Defendant failed to provide reasonable assistance to any of the other drivers and/or passengers involved in the incident. The Defendant could have made a reasonable effort to attempt to assist the people he had injured by calling law enforcement or for medical services but instead decided to run away and leave every other injured person behind.” (FAC, ¶ 46.)

“Defendants knew that it was reckless to operate a motor vehicle at excessive speed, failing to stop at the scene, in violation of California Vehicle Code Sections 12500, 22350, 20001, 20002, and 23123.” (FAC, ¶ 47.)

“Defendants acted with knowledge that probable serious injury to others would result from driving at excessive speed, and failing to stop at the scene on public roads where other cars and individuals were present, and in willful and conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences of his actions.” (FAC, ¶ 48.)

“Despite having the knowledge that probable serious injury to others would result from driving at excessive speed, and failing to stop at the scene on public roads where others are present, Defendant willfully failed to avoid such consequences.” (FAC, ¶ 49.)

“Defendants acted with willful and with conscious disregard that serious injury to others would result from their actions, specifically, Defendant operated his vehicle while knowing that driving at excessive speed, and failing to stop at the scene, on INTERSTATE 5, a major thoroughfare, was dangerous, and did so operate their vehicle knowing that such conduct was dangerous.” (FAC, ¶ 50.)

“In acting and in failing to act as aforementioned, the Defendants acted in a negligent, reckless, careless and improper manner, and with gross negligence, and conscious disregard, and that Defendants were otherwise careless and negligent in the instance.” (FAC, ¶ 51.)  

“In addition, it is alleged that each and every Defendant which will be found to have been an owner, registrant, lessor, lessee, bailor and/or bailee of the aforementioned FORD negligently entrusted said FORD to the driver thereof, and that said Defendants were otherwise careless and negligent in the instance.” (FAC, ¶ 52.) 

“In contrast at said time and place, Plaintiffs was [sic] acting with due caution, attention and care and did not in any way contribute to or cause the incident and/or injuries as described hereinafter.” (FAC, ¶ 53.) 

“As a proximate result of said acts of the Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiffs was [sic] hurt and physically injured, sustaining medical bills, loss of earnings/earnings capacity, pain, suffering, loss of enjoyment of life and other damages, loss of use, and other associated charges and damages, and will continue to sustain such damages in the future.” (FAC, ¶ 54.) 

“The Plaintiffs’ general and special damages are in an amount in excess of the jurisdictional limits of all lower Courts, which will be shown according to proof at time of trial.” (FAC, ¶ 55.) 

“By reason of the foregoing, Plaintiffs have been damaged in a sum which exceeds the jurisdictional limits of all lower Courts, which would otherwise have jurisdiction.” (FAC, ¶ 56.) 

“Plaintiffs requests punitive damages against all Defendants.” (FAC, ¶ 57.) 

1)      Improper Labeling for the Fourth Cause of Action

In California, it is settled there is no separate cause of action for punitive damages. (McLaughlin v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1132, 1164.) Instead, a claim for punitive damages is merely an additional remedy that is dependent on a viable cause of action for an underlying tort. (Brewer v. Second Baptist Church of Los Angeles (1948) 32 Cal.2d 791, 801-802; Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1137.)

Here, the FAC improperly alleges the Fourth Cause of Action for Punitive Damages against All Defendants, which is not a legally recognizable cause of action according to established California law.

            Moreover, the first paragraph under the Fourth Cause of Action asserts, “

[a]s additional damages against Defendants CARSON ALAN COTTON, an individual, and DOES 1 THROUGH 50, Inclusive, and each of them (“Defendants”), Plaintiffs allege that Defendants were guilty of malice and oppression within Civil Code Section 3294, and that Plaintiffs should recover punitive damages in addition to actual and general damages.” (Underlines added.)

It is evident that punitive damages are additional damages Plaintiffs seek to recover when asserted in parallel with “actual and general damages.”

Furthermore, Civil Code Section 3294 explicitly provides that “[i]n an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) (Underlines added.)

Notably, Civil Code “Division 4. General Provisions” encompass sections 3274 to 9566, where the particular section 3294 is under “Part 1. Relief,” “Title 2 Compensatory Relief,” and “Chapter 1 Damages in General.”

Thus, based on its own language and structural placement in the code, it is clear that the statute does not create a cause of action but provides additional relief for damages.

            Plaintiffs argue that their allegations contain sufficient substantive factual allegations to establish a relief for punitive damages, without regard to the issue of labeling it as a separate cause of action. (Opp’n., at pp. 7-8.) Plaintiffs maintain that case law sets forth that an attack on the pleading may not be sustained based on grounds of the uncertainty of mislabeling a cause of action, citing Willaims v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139.

The Court agrees that mislabeling a cause of action, by itself, is not grounds to strike the factual pleadings within it.

Consequently, the Court concludes that the heading of the “Fourth Cause of Action For Punitive Damages Against All Defendants” should be stricken, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 436, subdivision (a).

The Court now proceeds to examine whether punitive damages are supported by sufficient factual allegations as a remedy in the FAC.

2)      Punitive Damages

i.                    Punitive Damages Based on Negligence

“Mere negligence, even gross negligence, is not sufficient to justify such an award” for punitive damages.  (Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United California Bank (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 949, 958.)  The allegations supporting a request for punitive damages must be alleged with specificity; conclusory allegations without sufficient facts are not enough.  (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-1042.)

A motion to strike punitive damages is properly granted where a plaintiff does not state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, including allegations that defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud or malice.  (Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) 

“Malice” is defined as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct carried on with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) “‘Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiff’s rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate.’ [Citation.]” (Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1210.)

“Oppression” is defined in as “despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(2).) The term “despicable” has been defined in the case law as actions that are “base,” “vile,” or “contemptible.” (See, e.g., Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal. App. 4th 847, 891.)

Here, the FAC asserts that “[i]n acting and in failing to act as aforementioned, the Defendants acted in a negligent, reckless, careless and improper manner, and with gross negligence, and conscious disregard, and that Defendants were otherwise careless and negligent in the instance.” (FAC, ¶ 51.)

However, such conclusory allegations do not meet the threshold required for punitive damages for the First and Second Causes of Action based on Negligence.

Therefore, the Court finds Defendant’s argument to be persuasive, warranting the striking punitive damages on this basis.

ii.                  Punitive Damages Based on Violation of California Vehicle Code

Here, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s intentional violation of the California Vehicle Code sections 22350 (not driving at an excess speed), 20001 (hit and run), 20002 (hit and run), 21658 (not changing lanes in an unsafe manner), and 23123 (not using phone while driving), raises to the level of malice and oppression as defined in California Civil Code section 3294, based on the finding of willful and reckless disregard for the safety of others. (Opp’n., at p. 6.)

In response, Defendant argues that Plaintiff must allege the hit and run caused additional damages beyond those incurred from the accident itself to warrant punitive damages, citing Brooks v. E. J. Willing Truck Transp. Co. (1953) 40 Cal.2d 669, 679 (Brooks), and Karl v. C.A. Reel Lumber Co. (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 358, 361.)

Notably, the Court observes that Brooks did not address whether punitive damages can be imposed based on a hit and run. It did, however, affirm that such an act only constitutes a tort if the act itself causes the plaintiff additional damages above and beyond the damages caused by the accident that precedes the hit and run. (Brooks, supra, 40 Cal.2d at p. 679.)

Here, the FAC alleges that “witnesses at the scene saw the Defendant leave his vehicle and run away right after the impact. The Defendant was later found by law enforcement and arrested” (FAC, ¶ 44); that “[t]he Defendant failed to provide reasonable assistance to any of the other drivers and/or passengers involved in the incident. The Defendant could have made a reasonable effort to attempt to assist the people he had injured by calling law enforcement or for medical services but instead decided to run away and leave every other injured person behind” (Id., ¶ 46); and that “[a]s a result of Defendant’s actions and omissions in blatant disregard for the laws and safety of others on the road, Defendant caused great bodily injury to Plaintiffs.” (Id., ¶ 45.)

The Court finds the allegations to be insufficient to state that Defendant’s failure to stop and render aid after the automobile accident resulted in liability for the aggravation of injuries sustained in the accident or additional injuries incurred after it. (Cf. Brooks, supra, 40 Cal.2d at 681 [for example, the plaintiff’s amended complaint contained specific factual showing regarding the additional damage, by alleging, including other things, that “[the defendant] drove away from the scene of the accident leaving [the plaintiff] lying on the highway in a helpless condition, and thereafter [the plaintiff] was struck and run over by another vehicle and died as a result thereof.”])

Consequently, the Court concludes that the FAC has not met the threshold, as outlined in Brooks, to show that Defendant’s violation of Vehicle Code gives rise to separate civil liabilities beyond those associated with negligence claims. (See Brooks, supra; see also People v. Corners (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 139, 148.)

The Court further notes that even assuming that Plaintiffs have met the burden and specified the additional damages resulting from the Defendant’s failure to stop and render aid, the FAC’s allegations do not rise to the level of malice, fraud, or oppression, as defined by the Code of Civil Procedure section 3294. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND the Motion to Strike.

CONCLUSION

The Motion to Strike is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

Plaintiffs are ordered to serve and file their Second Amended Complaint within 20 days.

Moving party is ordered to give notice.