Judge: David B. Gelfound, Case: 24CHCV01063, Date: 2025-01-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24CHCV01063    Hearing Date: January 10, 2025    Dept: F49

Dept. F49

Date: 1/10/25

Case Name: Alfredo Aguilar Martinez & Susanna Felix v. FCA US LLC, and Does 1 through 10

Case No. 24CHCV01063

 

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F49

 

JANUARY 10, 2025

 

MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS

Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 24CHCV01063

 

Motion filed: 9/13/24

 

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiffs Alfredo Aguilar Martinez and Susanna Felix

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant FCA USA LLC

NOTICE: OK.

 

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order compelling FCA to produce supplemental responses to Plaintiffs’ first set of Special Interrogatories, Nos. 45-48, and imposing monetary sanctions against FCA in the amount of $2,475.00.

 

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is DENIED. The request for monetary sanctions is DENIED.

 

BACKGROUND

 

Plaintiffs Alfredo Aguilar Martinez and Susanna Felix (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“SBA”) lawsuit over alleged defects in their 2021 RAM 1500 with VIN: 1C6RREFT5MN593298 (the “Subject Vehicle”), which was manufactured by Defendant FCA USA LLC (“Defendant” or “FCA”). Plaintiffs allege that they purchased the Subject Vehicle on December 20, 2020, entering into a warranty contract with FCA. (Compl. ¶ 8, 16.)

 

On March 26, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint against Defendants FCA and Does 1 through 10, alleging a single cause of action for Violation of SBA – Breach of Express Warranty. Subsequently, FCA filed its Answer to the Complaint on April 29, 2024.

 

On September 13, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion to Compel Further Responses from FCA to their Special Interrogatories, Set One, Nos. 45-48 (the “Motion”).

 

On December 30, 2024, FCA filed its Opposition. Subsequently, Plaintiffs submitted their Reply on January 3, 2025.

 

ANALYSIS

 

“On receipt of a response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that any of the following apply: (1) An answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete. (2) An exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate. (3) An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a).)

 

A.    Procedural Requirements

 

1.      Timeliness

 

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300, subdivision (c), notice of this motion must be given within 45 days following the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or by a later date agreed-upon in writing, failing which the propounding party waives any right to compel a further response to the interrogatories. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (c); but see Golf & Tennis Pro Shop, Inc. v. Superior Court (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 127, 134-136 [suggesting that the 45-day deadline does not apply to (i.e., it does not begin to run with service of) objections-only responses; it only applies to responses that are required to be verified].)

 

The 45-day deadline “is ‘jurisdictional’ in the sense that it renders the court without authority to rule on motions to compel other than to deny them.” (Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.)

 

Any period of notice, or any right or duty to do any act or make any response within any period or on a date certain after the service of the document, which time period or date is prescribed by statute or rule of court, shall be extended after service by electronic means by two court days[.]” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.6, subd. (a)(3)(B).)

           

Here, FCA served unverified responses to Plaintiffs' first set of Special Interrogatories (“SROG”) on June 5, 2024, with FCA’s verifications following on July 31, 2024. (Powell Decl. ¶ 3.) The service of verification establishes the deadline for Plaintiff to file a motion to compel further as September 18, 2024, calculated based on a 45-day period with an extension of two court days per Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6, subdivision (a)(3), accounting for the method of electronic service (Vawter Decl. Exh. “2”).

 

Therefore, the Court finds the Motion is filed timely as it was filed prior to the established deadline.

 

2.      Meet and Confer

 

“A motion under subdivision (a) shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (b)(1).) “A meet and confer declaration in support of a motion shall state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.040.)

 

Here, Plaintiffs have satisfied the meet and confer requirement. (Powell Decl. ¶¶ 5-6.)

 

3.      Separate Statement

 

The California Rules of Court rule 3.1345 (a)(2) explicitly states that “Any motion involving the content of a discovery request or the responses to such a request must be accompanied by a separate statement. The motions that require a separate statement include a motion: ... (2) To compel further responses to interrogatories.” “A separate statement is a separate document filed and served with the discovery motion that provides all the information necessary to understand each discovery request and all the responses to it that are at issue.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(c).)

 

Here, Plaintiffs have fulfilled the requirement by concurrently filing a separate statement with the Motion.

 

B.     Motion to Compel Further Responses to SROG Nos. 45-48

 

“As a general matter, the statutory scheme imposes no obligation on a party propounding interrogatories to establish good cause or prove up the merits of any underlying claims.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 550.) Indeed, a litigant “is entitled to demand answers to its interrogatories, as a matter of right, and without a prior showing, unless the party on whom those interrogatories are served objects and shows cause why the questions are not within the purview of the code section.” (Id. at p. 541, citing West Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 422.)

 

Accordingly, the Court will proceed to examine whether FCA’s objections have satisfied its burden to show cause when considered in light of the arguments presented by Plaintiffs.

 

1)      The Interrogatories at Issue – SROG Nos. 45-48

 

Plaintiffs move to compel FCA to provide supplemental responses to SROG, Nos. 45-48.

 

SROG No. 45 seeks, “At the time of release for the 2021 RAM 1500 vehicles, state your anticipated range for repairs per thousand vehicles sold (R/1000).”

 

SROG No. 46 requests, “State the repairs per thousand vehicles sold (R/1000) for 2021 RAM 1500.”

 

SROG No. 47 asks, “Identify in order the five symptoms with the highest repairs per thousand (R/1000) for 2021 RAM 1500 vehicles, and the corresponding repairs per thousand.”

 

SROG No. 48 requests, “Identify in order the five components with the highest repairs per thousand (R/1000) for 2021 RAM 1500 vehicles, and the corresponding repairs per thousand.”

 

2)      FCA’s Objections to SROG Nos. 45 - 48

 

FCA objects to SROG Nos. 45 - 48 on the basis of irrelevance, stating that “this interrogatory seeks information that is not relevant to the subject matter of this litigation and is therefore not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (See generally Powell Decl. Ex. “B.”) FCA further objects on the grounds of overbreadth, arguing that the interrogatories at issue are “not limited to any claim of defect or nonconformity in this case.” (Ibid.)

 

Plaintiffs argue that the interrogatories at issue are relevant because “[the] would tend to show whether a widespread defect or nonconformity – of the same type that Plaintiffs experienced – exists in these types of vehicles. This information could refute FCA’s affirmative defenses claiming that Plaintiffs and/or others misused or abused the vehicle or engaged in unauthorized or unreasonable use as the cause of the problems with the vehicle. If other owners of the same type of vehicles experienced the same defects and nonconformities on a wide scale, this information would tend to prove that the defects found in Plaintiffs’ vehicle were not caused by misuse, abuse, or unreasonable use. Additionally, evidence regarding FCA’s practices in handling consumer complaints is relevant to determining whether FCA willfully violated the Song-Beverly Act...”  (Mot. at p. 4.)

 

Plaintiffs maintain that these interrogatories are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (Mot. at p. 5.) To support their argument, Plaintiffs assert that “the use of ‘other vehicle’ evidence at trial ‘certainly was probative and not prejudicial,’” citing Donlen v. Ford Motor Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, 154 (Donlen). (Mot. at p. 5.)

 

Established case law supports that the relevance of a manufacturer’s knowledge and inaction should be directly connected to the defects as specifically alleged in the case. In Jensen v. BMW of North America, LLC (S.D. Cal. 2019) 328 F.R.D. 557 (Jensen), the federal district judge in San Diego ordered a defendant to search specific databases for other customers’ complaints, but limited the scope to “vehicles of the same year, make, and model as Plaintiff's subject vehicle and limited to only those records reporting problems with the same defect codes listed in any repair records pertaining to Plaintiff's vehicle and part numbers under warranty in Plaintiff's vehicle, and to produce those documents.” (Jensen, supra, at p. 564.) (Underlines added.) The Jensen court reasoned that “information regarding whether the same defects were reported to BMW in other cars of the same make, model, and year as Plaintiff’s subject vehicle could conceivably be relevant to whether BMW acted reasonably in denying Plaintiff’s warranty claim. A fact finder may find BMW’s knowledge or lack of knowledge about the same defects to be a consideration in deciding whether BMW acted in good faith as to Plaintiff’s specific case.” (Id. at pp. 562-563.) (Underlines added.)

 

Additionally, upon careful review of the Donlen ruling, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ SROG Nos. 45 - 48 exceed the scope of the evidence upheld by the Donlen court. Donlen held that the trial court had not erred in denying Ford’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of other customers’ complaints about the same transmission model Ford installed in plaintiff's truck and other vehicles. (Donlen, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 154.) (Underlines added.) However, this is not what SROG Nos. 45-48 actually seek. These interrogatories ask to “identify in order the five symptoms,” and “identify in order the five components,” “with the highest repairs per thousand for 2021 RAM 1500 vehicles” (SROG Nos. 46 - 48). These interrogatories broadly seek data without narrowing the scope to the same or similar nature of reported defects by Plaintiffs.

 

Furthermore, SROG No. 45 requests information on “[FCA’s] anticipated range for repairs per thousand vehicles sold,” which involves the constellation of any possible repairs. Those repairs are also not limited to California but include other states as well.

 

As Plaintiffs acknowledge, the relevance of requested information hinges on the assumption that “assuming that they [the top five repaired components and symptoms] are the same as the problems experienced by Plaintiffs.” (Mot. at p. 5.) However, this premise extends the scope beyond what is supported by established precedent, including those set in the Donlen case on which Plaintiffs rely.

 

Accordingly, in alignment with established precedent, the Court concludes that information sought by Plaintiffs’ SROG, Nos. 45-48, is irrelevant and overbroad, thereby sustaining FCA’s objections on these grounds.

 

Based on the above, the Court DENIES the Motion.

 

C.    Monetary Sanctions

 

As the Court has denied the Motion, the request for monetary sanctions, reserved for a prevailing party under Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300, subdivision (d), is also DENIED.

 

CONCLUSION

 

Plaintiffs Alfredo Aguilar Martinez and Susanna Felix’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set One, Nos. 45-48, is DENIED.

 

Plaintiffs’ Request for Monetary Sanctions is DENIED.

 

Moving party to give notice.