Judge: David B. Gelfound, Case: 24CHCV01063, Date: 2025-01-10 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24CHCV01063 Hearing Date: January 10, 2025 Dept: F49
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Dept.
F49 |
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Date:
1/10/25 |
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Case
Name: Alfredo Aguilar Martinez & Susanna Felix v. FCA US LLC, and Does
1 through 10 |
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Case No.
24CHCV01063 |
LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT
NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT
DEPARTMENT F49
JANUARY 10, 2025
MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES
TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS
Los Angeles Superior
Court Case No. 24CHCV01063
Motion
filed: 9/13/24
MOVING PARTY: Plaintiffs Alfredo Aguilar
Martinez and Susanna Felix
RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant FCA USA LLC
NOTICE: OK.
RELIEF
REQUESTED: An
order compelling FCA to produce supplemental responses to Plaintiffs’ first set
of Special Interrogatories, Nos. 45-48, and imposing monetary sanctions against
FCA in the amount of $2,475.00.
TENTATIVE
RULING: The
motion is DENIED. The request for monetary sanctions is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs
Alfredo Aguilar Martinez and Susanna Felix (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed
this Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“SBA”) lawsuit over alleged defects in
their 2021 RAM 1500 with VIN: 1C6RREFT5MN593298 (the “Subject Vehicle”), which
was manufactured by Defendant FCA USA LLC (“Defendant” or “FCA”). Plaintiffs
allege that they purchased the Subject Vehicle on December 20, 2020, entering
into a warranty contract with FCA. (Compl. ¶ 8, 16.)
On March 26, 2024, Plaintiffs filed
their Complaint against Defendants FCA and Does 1 through 10, alleging a single
cause of action for Violation of SBA – Breach of Express Warranty.
Subsequently, FCA filed its Answer to the Complaint on April 29, 2024.
On September 13, 2024, Plaintiffs filed
the instant Motion to Compel Further Responses from FCA to their Special
Interrogatories, Set One, Nos. 45-48 (the “Motion”).
On December 30, 2024, FCA filed its
Opposition. Subsequently, Plaintiffs submitted their Reply on January 3, 2025.
ANALYSIS
“On receipt of a response to interrogatories, the
propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the
propounding party deems that any of the following apply: (1) An answer to a
particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete. (2) An exercise of the
option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the
required specification of those documents is inadequate. (3) An objection to an
interrogatory is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300,
subd. (a).)
A.
Procedural
Requirements
1.
Timeliness
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 2030.300, subdivision (c), notice of this motion must be given within
45 days following the service of the verified response, or any supplemental
verified response, or by a later date agreed-upon in writing, failing which the
propounding party waives any right to compel a further response to the
interrogatories. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (c); but see Golf &
Tennis Pro Shop, Inc. v. Superior Court (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 127, 134-136
[suggesting that the 45-day deadline does not apply to (i.e., it does not begin
to run with service of) objections-only responses; it only applies to responses
that are required to be verified].)
The 45-day deadline “is ‘jurisdictional’
in the sense that it renders the court without authority to rule on motions to
compel other than to deny them.” (Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58
Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.)
“Any period of notice, or any right or duty to do
any act or make any response within any period or on a date certain after the
service of the document, which time period or date is prescribed by statute or
rule of court, shall be extended after service by electronic means by two court
days[.]” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.6, subd. (a)(3)(B).)
Here, FCA served unverified responses
to Plaintiffs' first set of Special Interrogatories (“SROG”) on June 5, 2024,
with FCA’s verifications following on July 31, 2024. (Powell Decl. ¶ 3.) The
service of verification establishes the deadline for Plaintiff to file a motion
to compel further as September 18, 2024, calculated based on a 45-day period
with an extension of two court days per Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6,
subdivision (a)(3), accounting for the method of electronic service (Vawter
Decl. Exh. “2”).
Therefore, the Court finds the Motion is
filed timely as it was filed prior to the established deadline.
2. Meet
and Confer
“A motion under subdivision (a) shall be accompanied by a
meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
2030.300, subd. (b)(1).) “A meet and confer declaration in support of a motion shall
state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal
resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
2016.040.)
Here, Plaintiffs have satisfied the meet and confer
requirement. (Powell Decl. ¶¶ 5-6.)
3. Separate
Statement
The California Rules of Court rule
3.1345 (a)(2) explicitly states that “Any motion involving the content of a
discovery request or the responses to such a request must be accompanied by a
separate statement. The motions that require a separate statement include a
motion: ... (2) To compel further responses to interrogatories.” “A separate
statement is a separate document filed and served with the discovery motion
that provides all the information necessary to understand each discovery
request and all the responses to it that are at issue.” (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 3.1345(c).)
Here, Plaintiffs have fulfilled the
requirement by concurrently filing a separate statement with the Motion.
B.
Motion to
Compel Further Responses to SROG Nos. 45-48
“As a general matter, the statutory
scheme imposes no obligation on a party propounding interrogatories to
establish good cause or prove up the merits of any underlying claims.” (Williams
v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 550.) Indeed, a litigant “is
entitled to demand answers to its interrogatories, as a matter of right, and
without a prior showing, unless the party on whom those interrogatories are
served objects and shows cause why the questions are not within the purview of
the code section.” (Id. at p. 541, citing West Pico Furniture Co. v.
Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 422.)
Accordingly, the Court will proceed to
examine whether FCA’s objections have satisfied its burden to show cause when
considered in light of the arguments presented by Plaintiffs.
1)
The Interrogatories at Issue – SROG Nos. 45-48
Plaintiffs move to compel FCA to provide
supplemental responses to SROG, Nos. 45-48.
SROG No. 45 seeks, “At the time of
release for the 2021 RAM 1500 vehicles, state your anticipated range for
repairs per thousand vehicles sold (R/1000).”
SROG No. 46 requests, “State the repairs
per thousand vehicles sold (R/1000) for 2021 RAM 1500.”
SROG No. 47 asks, “Identify in order the
five symptoms with the highest repairs per thousand (R/1000) for 2021 RAM 1500 vehicles,
and the corresponding repairs per thousand.”
SROG No. 48 requests, “Identify in order
the five components with the highest repairs per thousand (R/1000) for 2021 RAM
1500 vehicles, and the corresponding repairs per thousand.”
2)
FCA’s Objections to SROG Nos. 45 - 48
FCA objects to SROG Nos. 45 - 48 on the
basis of irrelevance, stating that “this interrogatory seeks information that
is not relevant to the subject matter of this litigation and is therefore not
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (See
generally Powell Decl. Ex. “B.”) FCA further objects on the grounds of
overbreadth, arguing that the interrogatories at issue are “not limited to any
claim of defect or nonconformity in this case.” (Ibid.)
Plaintiffs argue that the
interrogatories at issue are relevant because “[the] would tend to show whether
a widespread defect or nonconformity – of the same type that Plaintiffs
experienced – exists in these types of vehicles. This
information could refute FCA’s affirmative defenses claiming that Plaintiffs
and/or others misused or abused the vehicle or engaged in unauthorized or
unreasonable use as the cause of the problems with the vehicle. If other owners
of the same type of vehicles experienced the same defects and nonconformities
on a wide scale, this information would tend to prove that the defects found in
Plaintiffs’ vehicle were not caused by misuse, abuse, or unreasonable use. ¶ Additionally, evidence regarding FCA’s practices in
handling consumer complaints is relevant to determining whether FCA willfully
violated the Song-Beverly Act...” (Mot.
at p. 4.)
Plaintiffs maintain that these
interrogatories are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence. (Mot. at p. 5.) To support their argument, Plaintiffs
assert that “the use of ‘other vehicle’ evidence at trial ‘certainly was
probative and not prejudicial,’” citing Donlen v. Ford Motor Co. (2013)
217 Cal.App.4th 138, 154 (Donlen). (Mot. at p. 5.)
Established case law supports that the
relevance of a manufacturer’s knowledge and inaction should be directly
connected to the defects as specifically alleged in the case. In Jensen v.
BMW of North America, LLC (S.D. Cal. 2019) 328 F.R.D. 557 (Jensen),
the federal district judge in San Diego ordered a defendant to search specific
databases for other customers’ complaints, but limited the scope to “vehicles
of the same year, make, and model as Plaintiff's subject vehicle and limited
to only those records reporting problems with the same defect codes listed in
any repair records pertaining to Plaintiff's vehicle and part numbers under
warranty in Plaintiff's vehicle, and to produce those documents.” (Jensen,
supra, at p. 564.) (Underlines added.) The Jensen court reasoned
that “information regarding whether the same defects were reported to
BMW in other cars of the same make, model, and year as Plaintiff’s subject
vehicle could conceivably be relevant to whether BMW acted reasonably in
denying Plaintiff’s warranty claim. A fact finder may find BMW’s knowledge or
lack of knowledge about the same defects to be a consideration in deciding
whether BMW acted in good faith as to Plaintiff’s specific case.” (Id.
at pp. 562-563.) (Underlines added.)
Additionally, upon careful review of the
Donlen ruling, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ SROG Nos. 45 - 48 exceed
the scope of the evidence upheld by the Donlen court. Donlen held
that the trial court had not erred in denying Ford’s motion in limine to
exclude evidence of other customers’ complaints about the same transmission
model Ford installed in plaintiff's truck and other vehicles. (Donlen,
supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 154.) (Underlines added.) However, this is
not what SROG Nos. 45-48 actually seek. These interrogatories ask to “identify
in order the five symptoms,” and “identify in order the five components,” “with
the highest repairs per thousand for 2021 RAM 1500 vehicles” (SROG Nos. 46 -
48). These interrogatories broadly seek data without narrowing the scope to the
same or similar nature of reported defects by Plaintiffs.
Furthermore, SROG No. 45 requests
information on “[FCA’s] anticipated range for repairs per thousand vehicles
sold,” which involves the constellation of any possible repairs. Those repairs
are also not limited to California but include other states as well.
As Plaintiffs acknowledge, the relevance
of requested information hinges on the assumption that “assuming that they [the
top five repaired components and symptoms] are the same as the problems
experienced by Plaintiffs.” (Mot. at p. 5.) However, this premise extends the
scope beyond what is supported by established precedent, including those set in
the Donlen case on which Plaintiffs rely.
Accordingly, in alignment with
established precedent, the Court concludes that information sought by
Plaintiffs’ SROG, Nos. 45-48, is irrelevant and overbroad, thereby sustaining
FCA’s objections on these grounds.
Based on the above, the Court DENIES the
Motion.
C.
Monetary
Sanctions
As the Court has denied the Motion, the request for
monetary sanctions, reserved for a prevailing party under Code of Civil
Procedure section 2030.300, subdivision (d), is also DENIED.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs Alfredo Aguilar Martinez and Susanna Felix’s
Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set One, Nos.
45-48, is DENIED.
Plaintiffs’ Request for Monetary Sanctions is DENIED.
Moving party to give notice.