Judge: David B. Gelfound, Case: 24CHCV01287, Date: 2025-01-21 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24CHCV01287 Hearing Date: January 21, 2025 Dept: F49
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Dept.
F49 |
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Date:
1/21/25 |
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Case
Name: Ny’Kol Turner v. Magic Mountain, LLC, and Does 1 through 50 |
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Case No.
24CHCV01287 |
LOS
ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT
NORTH
VALLEY DISTRICT
DEPARTMENT
F49
JANUARY 21,
2025
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FIRST
AMENDED COMPLAINT
Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 24CHCV01287
Motion
filed: 10/31/24
MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Ny’Kol Turner
RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Magic Mountain, LLC
NOTICE: OK.
RELIEF
REQUESTED: An
order granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint.
TENTATIVE
RULING: The
motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
This
action arises from alleged personal injuries sustained by Plaintiff while
riding a roller coaster at Defendant’s amusement park in Valencia, California.
On April 11, 2024, Plaintiff Ny’Kol Turner (“Plaintiff” or
“Turner”) filed a Complaint against Defendant Magic Mountain, LLC (“Defendant”
or “Magic Mountain”) and Does 1 through 10, alleging a single cause of action
for Negligence (Common Carrier). Subsequently, on May 15, 2024, Magic Mountain
filed its Answer to the Complaint.
On October
31, 2024, Turner filed the instant Motion for Leave to File First Amended
Complaint (the “Motion”). Subsequently, Magic Mountain filed its Opposition on
January 7, 2025, and Turner submitted a Reply on January 13, 2025.
ANALYSIS
Code of Civil
Procedure section 473 subdivision (a) permits the court to grant leave to a
party to amend a pleading. The court’s discretion regarding granting leave to
amend is usually exercised liberally to permit amendment of pleadings. (Nestle
v. Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 939.) “If the motion to amend is
timely made and the granting of the motion will not prejudice the opposing
party, it is error to refuse permission to amend and where the refusal also
results in a party being deprived of the right to assert a meritorious cause of
action or a meritorious defense, it is not only error but an abuse of
discretion.” (Morgan v. Superior Court (1959) 172 Cal. App. 2d 527,
530.) Courts may grant a motion to amend as late as the time of trial and even
postpone the trial if necessary to further the interest of justice. (Honig
v. Financial Corp. of America (1992) 6 Cal. App. 4th 960, 965.) But despite
the general policy of liberality in allowing amendments, it is proper and
within the discretion of the trial court to deny leave to file a proposed
amendment unless the proponent of the amendment can show the amendment will not
be prejudicial to other parties in the action and the delay in bringing the
amendment was excusable. (Melican v. Regents of University of California
(2007) 151 Cal. App. 4th 168, 175.)
Under California Rules of Court rule 3.1324(a), a motion to
amend a pleading shall (1) include a copy of the proposed amendment or amended
pleading, which must be serially numbered to differentiate it from previous
pleadings or amendments; (2) state what allegations in the previous pleading
are proposed to be deleted, if any, and where, by page, paragraph and line
number, the deleted allegations are located; and (3) state what allegations are
proposed to be added to the previous pleading, if any, and where, by page,
paragraph, and line number, the additional allegations are located.
Additionally, a separate declaration must accompany the
motion and must specify (1) the effect of the amendment; (2) why the amendment
is necessary and proper; (3) when the facts giving rise to the amended
allegations were discovered; and (4) the reasons why the request for amendment
was not made earlier. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(b).)
Even if a good amendment is proposed in proper form, a
long, unwarranted and unexcused delay in presenting it may be a good reason for
denial. In most cases, the factors for timeliness are: (1) lack of
diligence in discovering the facts or in offering the amendment after knowledge
of them; and (2) the effect of the delay on the adverse party. If the
party seeking the amendment has been dilatory, and the delay has prejudiced the
opposing party, the judge has discretion to deny leave to amend. (Hirsa
v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 490.) Prejudice exists
where the amendment would require delaying the trial, resulting in loss of
critical evidence, or added costs of preparation such as an increased burden of
discovery. (Magpali v. Farmers Group, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471,
486-488.) However, “it
seems unreasonable to deny a party the right to amend where the only apparent
hardship to the defendants is that they will have to defend.” (Landis v.
Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 548, 557.)
A.
Motion for Leave to
File First Amended Complaint
The Motion includes both a redlined
copy and a clean copy of the proposed First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). The
proposed FAC seeks to refine the factual allegations of the Negligence claim
and adds a second cause of action for Strict Liability (Common Carrier). Accordingly,
the Court finds the Motion complies with the procedural requirements under
California Rules of Court rule 3.1324(a).
Substantively, Plaintiff asserts
that the amendment is necessary and proper because the Motion was filed
promptly after Plaintiff’s counsel discovered new, pertinent information on
October 14, 2024, just 17 days before filing the Motion. (Piccuta Decl. ¶¶ 4, 7.)
Plaintiff emphasizes that the
promptness of the Motion can be inferred from the timeline. Specifically,
within this 17-day period, Plaintiff’s counsel reviewed nearly 200 pages of
documents produced by Defendant, sought additional related information, drafted
a proposed amendment, met and conferred with Defendant’s counsel, and prepared
the Motion. (Piccuta Decl. ¶¶
4-5, 7-8, Reply at p. 2)
The newly discovered facts underpinning
the amendment pertain to “Defendant’s failure to provide supplemental
restraints or constraining devices” (Piccuta Decl. ¶ 7), which were “available for the ride on which
Plaintiff was injured.” (Id. ¶
5.) These allegations are material to Plaintiff’s claim and directly relevant
to the issue of liability.
Based on the above declarations,
the Court concludes that Plaintiff has satisfied the substantive requirement
set forth in California Rules of Court rule 3.1324(b), by demonstrating both
the necessity of the amendment and the promptness with which it was sought.
Furthermore, Plaintiff argues that
Defendant will not be unduly prejudiced by the proposed amendment. (Mot. at pp.
2-3.)
In its Opposition, Magic Mountain
contends that allowing Plaintiff to add a new cause of action will force
Defendant to conduct additional fact-specific discovery to rebut such a
fundamentally different legal theory. (Opp’n. at p. 6.) It estimates that the additional
time and costs associated with the FAC would amount to at least $30,000.00,
comprising $10,000 for additional discovery and $20,000 for filing a demurrer
and a motion for summary adjudication. (Ibid.)
In response, Plaintiff reiterates
that, although the new cause of action for Strict Liability (Common Carrier)
constitutes a different legal theory, it is based upon the same general set of
facts originally pleaded. (Reply at p. 3, Mot. at p. 4.) Plaintiff asserts that
additional discovery required would be limited and not unduly burdensome.
The Court notes that it is well-established in Austin v.
Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 596 that “[t]he
fact that amendment actually changes the cause of action is no longer a ground
for routine rejection” [of amendment]. (Id. at p. 600.) The
court said amendment is to be allowed and will relate back to overcome the bar
of the statute if recovery is sought “on the same general set of facts.” (Ibid.) For purposes of amendment, the Austin
decision clarified that the term “cause of action” includes any claim based on
the same “general” set of facts.
Here,
it is evident from the pleadings that both the original causes of action and
the newly proposed causes of action in the FAC arise from the same incident.
Specifically, both are based on the occurrence where Plaintiff was a passenger
on the X2 ride and allegedly sustained injuries due to the lack of proper restraining or containing devices.
(See FAC, ¶¶ 32-35.)
In alignment with the holding in Austin,
supra, the Court finds that the proposed cause of action for Strict
Liability (Common Carrier) is based on the same operative facts which give rise
to the originally pleaded basic cause of action for Negligence (Common
Carrier).
Moreover, the Court notes that a
trial date has not been set, and ample time before trial remains to permit
Defendant to prepare its defense. Defendant has not claimed a situation of loss
of critical evidence or other circumstances that would create undue prejudice.
Therefore, at the current pretrial
stage of the proceedings, the Court finds that additional discovery and motion practice
do not constitute undue prejudice to Defendant, particularly where the only
apparent hardship identified is the need to defend against the amended claims.
Lastly, the Court does not find
that the proposed FAC contradicts any material admission in the original
pleading or changes the basic cause of action.
Based on the foregoing, the Court
GRANTS the Motion.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Ny’Kol Turner’s Motion
for Leave to File First Amended Complaint is GRANTED.
Plaintiff Ny’Kol Turner is ordered
to serve and file the First Amended Complaint within 5 days.
Moving party to give notice.