Judge: David B. Gelfound, Case: 24CHCV01426, Date: 2025-01-23 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24CHCV01426    Hearing Date: January 23, 2025    Dept: F49

Dept. F49

Date: 1/23/25

Case Name: Ashot Vardanyan, Liya Kapiyan v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, and Does 1 through 10

Case No. 24CHCV01426

 

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F49

 

JANUARY 23, 2025

 

MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, SET ONE

Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 24CHCV01426

 

Motion filed: 9/12/24

 

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiffs Ashot Vardanyan and Liya Kapiyan

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

NOTICE: OK.

 

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order from this Court to compel Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC’s further responses to Plaintiffs’ first set of Requests for Production of Documents, Nos.  1, 9, 11, 13, 14-21, 22-29, 30, and 31.

 

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is GRANTED IN PART.

 

BACKGROUND

 

Plaintiffs Ashot Vardanyan and Liya Kapiyan (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act lawsuit over alleged defects in their 2021 Mercedes-Benz S-Class, with VIN No.: W1K6G7GB4MA053232 (the “Subject Vehicle”), which was manufactured by Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (“Defendant” or “MBUSA”). Plaintiffs leased the Subject Vehicle in new condition on October 15, 2021, with a written warranty issued by Defendant MBUSA. (Compl. ¶ 8.)

 

On April 18, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against Defendant MBUSA and Does 1 through 10. The Complaint alleges two causes of action: (1) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Express Warranty, and (2) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Implied Warranty. Subsequently, MBUSA filed its Answer to the Complaint on May 22, 2024.

 

On September 12, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production of Documents, Set One (the “Motion”). Subsequently, on December 10, 2024, MBUSA filed its Opposition, and Plaintiffs submitted their Reply on January 17, 2025.

 

ANALYSIS

 

“On receipt of a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, the demanding party may move for an order compelling further response to the demand if the demanding party deems that … [a] statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete[;] … [a] representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive[; or] … [a]n objection in the response is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (a).)

 

A.    Procedural Requirements

 

1.      Timeliness

 

A motion to compel further responses to requests for production must be brought within 45 days of service of the verified response, supplemental verified response, or on a date to which the propounding and responding parties have agreed to in writing; otherwise, the propounding party waives the right to compel further responses. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (c); but see Golf & Tennis Pro Shop, Inc. v. Superior Court (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 127, 134-136 [suggesting that the 45-day deadline does not apply to (i.e., it does not begin to run with service of) objections-only responses; it only applies to responses that are required to be verified].)

 

“[T]he time within which to make a motion to compel production of documents is mandatory and jurisdictional just as it is for motions to compel further answers to interrogatories.”  (Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.) The 45-day deadline “is ‘jurisdictional’ in the sense that it renders the court without authority to rule on motions to compel other than to deny them.”  (Ibid.)

           

Here, Plaintiffs state that MBUSA served its verified responses to their first set of Requests for Production of Documents (“RFP”) on June 25, 2024. (Serrano Decl. ¶ 17, Ex. “F.”) Subsequently, the parties agreed that MBUSA would either provide supplemental responses and production or an update to their position no later than August 23, 2024. As part of this agreement, the deadline for Plaintiffs to file the motion to compel was extended to September 12, 2024. (Id. ¶ 20, Ex. “I.”)

 

            Plaintiffs filed the Motion on September 12, 2024, thereby meeting the extended deadline agreed upon by the parties.

 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the Motion is filed timely.

 

2.      Meet and Confer

 

“A motion [to compel further responses to requests for production] shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.290, subd. (b)(1).)

 

Here, Plaintiffs have satisfied the meet and confer requirement. (Serrano Decl., ¶¶ 18-21.)

 

3.      Separate Statement

 

The California Rules of Court rule 3.1345 (b)(5) explicitly states that “A separate statement is not required under the following circumstances: (1) When no response has been provided to the request for discovery[.]”

 

Here, Plaintiffs have satisfied the requirement by concurrently filing a separate statement with the Motion.

 

B.     Motion to Compel Further Responses

 

1)      Requests at Issue

 

Plaintiffs assert that Defendant MBUSA’s responses to RFP Nos. 1, 9, 11, 13, 14-21, 22-29, 30, and 31, are not code-compliant. (Mot., at p. 6.)

 

REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1: All DOCUMENTS regarding the SUBJECT VEHICLE that are within YOUR Customer Relations Center.

 

“SUBJECT VEHICLE” shall mean the vehicle which is the subject of this lawsuit and

identified as the 2021 Mercedes-Benz S-Class, bearing VIN W1K6G7GB4MA053232.

 

REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9: Produce all DOCUMENTS that refer to or relate to any CONTACT or COMMUNICATIONS between YOU and YOUR authorized repair facility regarding the SUBJECT VEHICLE.

 

REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11: Produce all DOCUMENTS that refer to or relate to any summaries of all amounts paid by YOU for warranty repairs performed on the SUBJECT VEHICLE.

 

REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13: All DOCUMENTS which evidence, describe, refer, or relate to any CONTACT or COMMUNICATIONS between YOU and the Plaintiffs.

 

REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14: All DOCUMENTS which evidence, describe, refer, or relate to any CONTACT or COMMUNICATIONS with any third-parties relating to the SUBJECT VEHICLE.

 

REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION NO. 15: All DOCUMENTS which evidence, describe, refer, or relate to YOUR rules, policies, or procedures since 2020 concerning the issuance of refunds to buyers or providing replacement vehicles to buyers in the State of California under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act.

 

REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION NO. 16: All DOCUMENTS which evidence, describe, refer, or relate to YOUR Call Center Policies and Procedures for escalating customer complaints relating to any defects present in their vehicle.

 

REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION NO. 17: All DOCUMENTS which evidence, describe, refer, or relate to YOUR Call Center Policies and Procedures for creating a Service Activity in response to customer complaints relating to any defects present in their vehicle.

 

REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION NO. 18: All DOCUMENTS which evidence, describe, refer, or relate to YOUR Policies and Procedures for determining whether a vehicle should be repurchased or replaced under the Song-Beverly Act.

 

REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION NO. 19: All DOCUMENTS which evidence, describe, refer, or relate to any flow charts used by YOU for the purpose of escalating customer complaints.

 

REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION NO. 20: All DOCUMENTS which evidence, describe, refer, or relate to any flow charts used by YOU for the purpose of evaluating whether a vehicle qualifies for repurchase or replacement under the Song-Beverly Act.

 

REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION NO. 21: All DOCUMENTS evidencing and/or describing YOUR training materials related to YOUR policy regarding how to calculate a repurchase.

 

REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION NO. 22: All DOCUMENTS referencing, evidencing, and/or relating to any policies or procedures followed by YOUR Customer Relation Center to advise customers to deliver their vehicles to YOUR authorized repair facilities for further diagnosis or repair instead of offering a repurchase or replacement of the vehicle under the Song-Beverly Act.

 

REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION NO. 23: Any DOCUMENT which refers or relate to YOUR Warranty Policy and Procedure Manuals provided to YOUR authorized repair facilities with respect to how to determine whether repairs should be covered under warranty from 2020 to the present.

 

REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION NO. 24: Any DOCUMENT which refers or relate to YOUR Warranty Policy and Procedure Manuals provided to YOUR authorized repair facilities with respect to whether repairs should be covered under warranty as “goodwill” from 2020 to the present.

 

REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION NO. 25: Any DOCUMENT which refers or relate to YOUR Warranty Policy and Procedure Manuals provided to YOUR authorized repair facilities with respect to repeated repair visits for similar complaints by the consumer from 2020 to the present.

 

REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION NO. 26: Any DOCUMENT which refers or relate to YOUR Warranty Policy and Procedure Manuals provided to YOUR authorized repair facilities on what type of repairs require approval by YOU in order to cover the repair under warranty from 2020 to the present.

 

REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION NO. 27: Any DOCUMENT which refers or relate to YOUR Warranty Policy and Procedure Manuals provided to YOUR authorized repair facilities on the length for test drives on certain customer complaints to be covered under warranty from 2020 to the present.

 

REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION NO. 28: Any DOCUMENT which refers or relate to YOUR Warranty Policy and Procedure Manuals provided to YOUR authorized repair facilities on what type of repairs will not be reimbursed by YOU as warranty repairs from 2020 to the present.

 

REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION NO. 29: Any DOCUMENT which refers or relate to YOUR Warranty Policy and Procedure Manuals provided to YOUR authorized repair facilities on how to handle customer concerns that are not duplicated at the time of the repair visit from 2020 to the present.

 

REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION NO. 30: All DOCUMENTS, in the form of a list or compilation, of other Customer Complaints in YOUR electronically stored information of database(s) that are SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR to complaints made by Plaintiff with respect to the SUBJECT VEHICLE in other 2021 Mercedes-Benz S-Class vehicles.

 

“SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR” shall mean similar customer complaint that would be the same nature of the reported system, malfunction, trouble code, Technical Service Bulletin Recommendation, dashboard indicator light, or other manifestation of a repair problem, as description listed in any warranty summary or repair order for the SUBJECT VEHICLE. [The customer complaints in this matter can be found in Defendant’s warranty history/summary and within the line items of the repair orders created at Defendant’s authorized repair facility. If YOU are having issues determining Plaintiffs’ Complaints, Plaintiffs are willing to meet and confer and list out the specific complaints and the language used to describe them. This should not include any routine or scheduled maintenance items.]

 

REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION NO. 31: All DOCUMENTS that refer to, reflect, or relate to any Field Service Action issued, or in the process of being issued, in response to complaints experienced by Plaintiffs as described in Defendant’s warranty history/summary and within the line items of the repair orders created at Defendant’s authorized repair facility.

 

(Serrano Decl. Ex. “E.”)

 

2)      Moving Party’s Showing of Good Cause

 

A motion to compel further responses to requests for production shall “set forth specific facts showing good cause”. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1).) To establish “good cause,” the moving party must show (1) the items demanded are relevant to the subject matter and (2) specific facts justify discovery of the requested items (e.g., why such information is necessary for trial preparation or to prevent surprise at trial). (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1); see Glenfed Develop. Corp. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (Glenfed).) If “good cause” is shown by the moving party, the burden is then on the responding party to justify any objections made to document disclosure. (Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.)

 

Here, Plaintiffs assert that these disputed requests are directly relevant to their claims and are imperative to support this case. (Mot. at pp. 9-10.) Plaintiffs claim that RFP Nos. 1, 9, 11, 13, and 14 seek documents relating to Plaintiffs’ Subject Vehicle; RFP Nos. 15-21 request MBUSA’s policies and procedures for handling Song-Beverely and lemon law cases; RFP Nos. 22-29 are related to MBUSA’s warranty and repurchase policies, and practices; and RFP Nos. 30-31 seek reports that MBUSA submitted to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”). (Mot. at p. 10.)

 

Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that reports generated during repair visits of the Subject Vehicle would aid Plaintiffs’ proof of a nonconformity that substantially impaired its use, value, or safety and that Defendant and/or its authorized representatives failed to repair after a reasonable number of attempts, in order to prevail on a claim under Song-Beverly Warranty Act (the “Ac”). (See generally, Pl.’s Separate Statement.) 

 

Additionally, Plaintiffs contend that their requests, seeking documents and information concerning MBUSA’s policies and procedures regarding its compliance under the Act, include information that encompasses Plaintiffs’ presentations of the Subject Vehicle to MBUSA’s authorized repair facilities. This information are relevant to Plaintiffs’ warranty claim and are probative of MBUSA’s liability under Section 1794(c). MBUSA’s written policies and procedures for safeguarding compliance with the Act, or lack thereof, are unequivocally relevant and proportional to the needs of this case, citing Code of Civil Procedure section 1794, subdivision (c), and Lukather v. General Motors, LLC (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1050. (See generally, Pl.’s Separate Statement.)

 

Furthermore, Plaintiffs argue that categorical production of “consumer complaints” encompassing the same and/or similar defects found in vehicles of the same year, make, and model, or substantially similar vehicles, corresponding to MBUSA’s service campaigns for the powertrain defects affecting the Subject Vehicle. The “consumer complaints” data is probative of MBUSA’s prior knowledge of the systemic defects/nonconformities found in the Subject Vehicle, and its willful statutory violation under Section 1794(c). (See generally, Pl.’s Separate Statement.)

 

Based on the foregoing argument and legal analysis, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently satisfied their burden of showing of good cause. The burden now shifts to MBUSA to justify its objections.

 

(3)   MBUSA’s Justification of Objections - RFP Nos. 1, 9, 11, 13-14

 

MBUSA includes a uniform response to the above-listed RFP Nos, stating, “[w]ithout waiving these objections, despite diligent search and reasonable inquiry, MBUSA has been unable to locate any documents responsive to Request No. []. On information and belief, MBUSA states that no such documents exist. Discovery and MBUSA’s investigation are ongoing, and MBUSA reserves the right to amend or supplement its response.” (See generally, MBUSA’s Separate Statement.)

 

It is evident that MBUSA is asserting its inability to comply with the requests. Plaintiffs contend that these responses fail to comply with the requirements under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.230. (Mot. at p. 8.) Plaintiffs further present evidence showing that from July 7, 2022, to February 26, 2024, Plaintiffs presented the Subject Vehicle to an MBUSA-authorized repair facility, on at least seven different occasions and the Subject Vehicle was down approximately sixty-three cumulative days for repairs. (Serrano Decl. ¶ 5.) The corresponding Repair Orders that were provided to Plaintiffs identify the performance of these remedial measures, as well as the use and creation of Xentry reports containing diagnostic trouble code reports – as instructed by the remedial measures. (Ibid.)

 

Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.230 provides: “A representation of inability to comply with the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling shall affirm that a diligent search and a reasonable inquiry has been made in an effort to comply with that demand. This statement shall also specify whether the inability to comply is because the particular item or category has never existed, has been destroyed, has been lost, misplaced, or stolen, or has never been, or is no longer, in the possession, custody, or control of the responding party. The statement shall set forth the name and address of any natural person or organization known or believed by that party to have possession, custody, or control of that item or category of item.”

 

Although MBUSA’s asserts that a diligent search and reasonable inquiry has been made, its responses do not specify whether these documents or communications never existed, have been destroyed, have been lost, misplaced, or stolen, or have never been, or in no longer, in the possession, custody, or control of MBUSA. The lack of specificity renders its responses noncompliant with Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.230.

 

Moreover, Plaintiffs’ evidence demonstrate that at least certain Xentry reports were generated during the numerous repairs. MBUSA’s failure to address the existence or nonexistence of these reports, or to specify their current status, undermines the completeness of its responses. If MBUSA knows or believes that a third-party has possession, custody, or control of the documents or communications, including the Xentry reports, it is required to provide the name and address of any natural person or organization. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.230.)

 

 

 

 

Given the evidence provided by Plaintiffs and the deficiencies in MBUSA’s responses, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ argument persuasive and concludes that MBUSA’s responses to the above-listed requests are insufficient.

 

Next, the Court will address the objections that MBUSA raises in response to these requests.

 

i.                    Vague, Ambiguous, Overly Broad as to the Phrase “All DOCUMENTS”

 

MBUSA argues that the omnibus Request seeking “All DOCUMENTS…” is improper because it is not sufficiently particularized and “the custodian of the records is not reasonably apprised of what he must produce.” (See MBUSA’s Separate Statement, at p. 4.) The Court disagrees.

 

First, the Court notes that the first set of the RFP defines the term “DOCUMENT” as follows:

 

The word “DOCUMENT” refers to all matters that fall within the definition of Evidence Code §250, and includes written or printed matter of any kind, including the originals and all non-identical copies thereof, whether different from the original by reason of any notation made on such copies or otherwise including, but not limited to, the following: advertisements, booklets, brochures, pamphlets, circulars, notices, periodicals, papers, contracts, agreements, photographs, minutes, memoranda, messages, appraisals, analyses, reports, financial calculations and representations, invoices, accounting and diary entries, inventory sheets, diaries, appointment books or calendars, teletypes, facsimiles, ledgers, trial balances, correspondence, telegrams, press releases, notes, working papers, drawings, schedules, tabulations, projections, mails, information or programs stored in a computer (whether or not ever printed out or displayed), and all drafts, alterations, modifications, changes or amendments of any of the foregoing, and all graphic or manual records or representations of any kind including, but not limited to, the following: microfiche, microfilm, audiotapes, videotapes, recordings and motion pictures, and all electronic, mechanical or electronic records or representations of any kind including, but not limited to, the following: Tapes, cassettes, discs, magnetic cards and recordings. “DOCUMENT” expressly includes all ELECTRONIC RECORDS, including but not limited, to electronic mail.”

 

(Serrano Decl. Ex. “E.”)

 

            Second, case law has established that “[w]hether the description of records is sufficient to inform their custodian of that which is desired, presents a question merely of whether under the circumstances and situation generally, considered in the light of reason and common sense, he ought to recognize and be able to distinguish or identify the particular thing that is required.” (Union Trust Co. of San Diego v. Superior Court (1938) 11 Cal.2d 449, 458.) Furthermore, “[i]nspection may not be had without adequate identification of the document sought to be inspected.” (West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 419.)

 

            Here, Plaintiffs’ definition provides sufficient identification of the document sought to be inspected. Importantly, the above-listed requests narrow the scope of the documents specifically related to the Subject Vehicle. Therefore, the definition of the term “DOCUMENT” does not contain unlimited characteristics or create ambiguities that could prevent the custodian from reasonably apprising of what must be produced.

 

MBUSA’s claim that the request constitutes an omnibus demand is unsubstantiated, as MBUSA fails to provide any legal analysis or detailed explanation to support its objection. Without a proper basis, MBUSA’s objection lacks merits.

 

            Therefore, the Court OVERRULES MBUSA’s objection on this ground.

 

ii.                  Privacy Rights of Third Person, and Protection under Privileges

 

MBUSA asserts that “[it] also objects to this Request to the extent it violates the privacy rights of third persons and/or seeks documents that are protected as confidential, proprietary, and/or commercially sensitive and/or documents protected by the attorney client privilege, the consulting expert privilege, and the attorney work-product doctrine.” (MBUSA’s Separate Statement, at pp. 14, 15.)

 

MBUSA’s objections based on the privacy rights of a third person lack merit because it fails to identify which third party’s privacy rights would allegedly be invaded. A generalized assertion of privacy rights, without identifying the affected party or explaining the nature of the alleged invasion, is insufficient to sustain such an objection.

 

Similarly, MBUSA’s objections based on a claim of privilege or protection under work product doctrine are deficient. Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.240, subdivision (c), requires a responding party to provide sufficient factual information to enable other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim, including, if necessary, a privilege log. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.240, subd. (c).) MBUSA has not provided such factual detail or a privilege log to substantiate its objections.

 

          Having failed to provide the required factual information for asserting privilege or work product protection, the Court finds MBUSA’s objections on these grounds to be deficient and not in compliance with the requirements under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.240, subdivision (c).

 

            Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES MBUSA’s objections on this ground.

 

iii.                Irrelevance Objection

 

MBUSA asserts that “[the] Request seeks irrelevant information and is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”

 

However, MBUSA’s objection is merely a conclusory statement and fails to provide any substantive explanation as to why documents and communications relating to the Subject Vehicle are irrelevant to the action. An objection must be supported by specific facts or legal arguments demonstrating why the requested discovery lacks relevance; a bare assertion is insufficient.

 

The Court has determined that there is good cause for the discovery request based on its relevance to the issues in this case. MBUSA’s unsupported objection does not undermine this determination.

 

Therefore, the Court finds MBUSA’s objection on the grounds of irrelevance unpersuasive and OVERRULES the objection.

 

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the Motion as to RFP Nos. 1, 9, 11, and 13-14.

 

(4)   MBUSA’s Justification of Objections - RFP Nos. 15-29

 

MBUSA asserts the same responses to all the above-listed requests, except for RFP Nos. 15 and 21.

 

For RFP Nos. 15 and 21, MBUSA states, “Without waiving these objections, MBUSA states that it does not have a written policy [described in this request]. MBUSA relies on the Act itself, which is equally available to Plaintiff. Additionally, MBUSA relies on the BBB Auto Summary. After a diligent search and reasonable inquiry, MBUSA will comply in whole with this Request and produce all documents within its possession, custody, or control, and to which it has no objection. Accordingly, MBUSA will produce: Documents No. E (BBB Auto Summary).” (Pl.’s Separate Statement, at pp. 17, 25.)

 

MBUSA responds to RFP No. 18, “Without waiving these objections, after a diligent search and reasonable inquiry, MBUSA will comply in whole with this Request and produce all documents within its possession, custody, or control, and to which it has no objection. Accordingly, MBUSA will produce all documents identified in its response to Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents, Set One, Request No. 1, including: Documents No. E (BBB Auto Summary).” (Pl.’s Separate Statement, at p. 21.)

 

            The Court finds these responses constitute a representation to comply in whole with the particular demand.

 

            Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Motion as to RFP Nos. 15, 18, and 21.

 

            However, in response to RFP Nos. 16-17, 19-20, and 22-29, MBUSA relies solely on objections asserting that the term “All DOCUMENT” is “vague, ambiguous, overly broad” and “[not] relevant.” However, MBUSA fails to provide any substantive explanation or evidence to support these objections.

 

As previously addressed by the Court, MBUSA’s objection on these grounds is without merit.

 

Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES the objection.

 

            In addition, MBUSA represents the same uniform answer that it lacks the ability to comply with these requests, stating: “Without waiving these objections, despite diligent search and reasonable inquiry, MBUSA has been unable to locate any documents responsive to Request No. []. On information and belief, MBUSA states that no such documents exist. Discovery and MBUSA’s investigation are ongoing and MBUSA reserves the right to amend or supplement its response.” (See generally Pl.’s Separate Statement, at pp. 18-35.)

 

            As the Court has previously determined, such a representation does not fully satisfy the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.230. Specifically, section 2031.230 requires that if a party responds it is unable to comply, the party must affirmatively state whether the documents were ever in its possession, custody, or control and set forth the name and address of a third party which it believes to have possession of the items.

 

            Therefore, the Court GRANTS the Motion as to RFP Nos. 16-17, 19-20, and 22-29.

 

(5)   MBUSA’s Justification of Objections - RFP Nos. 30-31

 

MBUSA contends that RFP No. 31 seeks information about vehicles of the same year or substantially similar vehicles, arguing that this information is not relevant to the case at hand. (Opp’n. at p. 2.) It posits that “[d]efects in other vehicles does not prove willfulness as it would not prove a defect in Plaintiffs’ vehicle. The question of whether a plaintiff is entitled to relief under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act is entirely unrelated to other consumer complaints for other vehicles, even those of the same year, make, and model.” (Ibid.)

 

Additionally, MBUSA argues that campaign documents not related to the Subject Vehicle are also not relevant to this case. (Opp’n. at p. 3.) 

 

In Donlen v. Ford Motor Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138 (Donlen), the Third District held that the trial court had not erred in denying Ford’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of other customers’ complaints about the same transmission model Ford installed in plaintiff’s truck and other vehicles. (Id. at p. 154, underlines added.) Similarly, in Jensen v. BMW of North America, LLC (S.D.Cal. 2019) 328 F.R.D. 557 (Jensen), the federal district court in San Diego found that, “information regarding whether the same defects were reported to BMW in other cars of the same make, model, and year as [p]laintiff’s subject vehicle could conceivably be relevant to whether BMW acted reasonably in denying [p]laintiff’s warranty claim. A fact finder may find BMW’s knowledge or lack of knowledge about the same defects to be a consideration in deciding whether BMW acted in good faith as to [p]laintiff’s specific case.” (Id. at pp. 562-63.) (Underlines added.) Both cases underscore that the admissibility of evidence concerning other customer complaints is contingent on the complaints being about the same defect or component as the one at issue in the plaintiff’s case.

 

The Court determines that information related to other customers’ complaints is not categorically irrelevant; however, it must fall within the evidentiary scope established in Donlen and Jensen.

 

Plaintiffs’ RFP No. 30 seeks “other Customer Complaints ... that are SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR to complaints made by Plaintiff with respect to the SUBJECT VEHICLE in other 2021 Mercedes-Benz S-Class vehicles.” (Pl.’s Separate Statement, at p. 7.) Plaintiffs further define “SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR” to mean “similar customer complaint that would be the same nature of the reported system, malfunction, trouble code, Technical Service Bulletin Recommendation, dashboard indicator light, or other manifestation of a repair problem, as description listed in any warranty summary or repair order for the SUBJECT VEHICLE.” (Ibid.) (Underlines added.)

 

While Plaintiffs attempt to qualify their request as being for complaints that are “substantially similar,” their definition is broader than the scope of evidence established in Donlen and Jensen. Specifically, Plaintiffs’ request encompasses a wide range of issues, including any “manifestation of a repair problem” or “Technical Service Bulletin Recommendation,” that may not directly relate to the specific defect or component at issue in this case. This approach exceeds the admissible scope upheld in Donlen and Jensen, where evidence was limited to the same defect or same component.

 

In alignment with established case law principles, including those outlined in Donlen and Jensen, Plaintiffs must narrow the scope of RFP No. 30 to focus on complaints about the same defect or component as those reported in the Subject Vehicle.

 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Motion as to RFP No. 30.

 

As to RFP No. 31, MBUSA’s responses and objection consist of the same representation of inability to comply. As discussed in detail above, the Court finds the response to be insufficient.

 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS the Motion as to RFP No. 31.

 

CONCLUSION

 

Plaintiffs Ashot Vardanyan and Liya Kapiyan’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production of Documents, Set One, is GRANTED IN PART.

 

Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC is ordered to produce verified supplemental responses to Requests for Production of Documents, Nos. 1, 9, 11, 13-14, 16-17, 19-20, 22-29, and 31, Set One, within 20 days.

 

The Court DENIES the Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production, Set One, as to Request Nos. 15, 18, 21, and 30.

 

Moving party to give notice.