Judge: David B. Gelfound, Case: 24CHCV01493, Date: 2024-09-03 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24CHCV01493    Hearing Date: September 3, 2024    Dept: F49

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F49

MOTION FOR RELIEF PURSUANT TO CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 473

Motion filed: 7/11/24

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Gerardo Zavala

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

NOTICE: OK.

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order granting relief pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 576 to allow Plaintiff to file the First Amended Complaint following October 25, 2023 hearing on Defendant’s demurrer

TENTATIVE RULING: The Motion for Relief is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Gerardo Zavala (“Plaintiff” or “Zavala”) filed this Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act lawsuit over alleged defects in his 2022 Honda Accord (the “Subject Vehicle”), which was manufactured by Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (“Defendant” or “AHM.”) Plaintiff purchased the Subject Vehicle new on March 8, 2022, entering into an express written contract with AHM. (Compl. §§ 8-9.)

On May 22, 2023, Plaintiff filed his Complaint against Defendant AHM and Does 1 through 10, alleging the following causes of action: (1) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Express Warranty; and (2) Fraudulent Inducement - Concealment. AHM filed its Answer to the Complaint on March 14, 2024.

On July 11, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Relief to file the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). Subsequently, AHM filed its Opposition on August 20, 2024, and Plaintiff replied on August 26, 2024.

ANALYSIS

Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (a)(1), provides in relevant part: “The court may likewise, in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars; and may upon like terms allow an answer to be made after the time limited by this code.”

Code of Civil Procedure section 576 states: “Any judge, at any time before or after commencement of trial, in the furtherance of justice, and upon such terms as may be proper, may allow the amendment of any pleading or pretrial conference order.”

Trial courts have discretion to permit amendments, which should be exercised liberally in favor of amendments to promote the judicial policy to resolve all disputed matters in one lawsuit. (Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1047.) “But this policy applies only [w]here no prejudice is shown to the adverse party.” (Melican v. Regents of University of California (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 168, 175 (Melican), [quotation marks omitted.])

“[H]owever, leave to amend should not be granted where . . . amendment would be futile.” (Vaillette v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 680, 685.) “Moreover, even if a good amendment is proposed in proper form, unwarranted delay in presenting it may—of itself—be a valid reason for denial.” (Melican, supra, 151 Cal.App.4^th at p. 175, [quotation marks omitted.])

A.    Motion for Relief

Plaintiff moves the Court to grant him leave to file his FAC, asserting that his failure to file the FAC within the time set by the Court following its ruling on AHM’s demurrer was due to counsel’s mistake, inadvertence, and excusable neglect. (Lupinek Decl. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff argues that granting leave to amend will not cause meaningful prejudice to Defendant. (Mot. at pp. 3-4.)

In response, AHM contends that Plaintiff has failed to show a satisfactory excuse for their mistake, surprise, inadvertence, or neglect.  (Opp’n. at p. 2.) AHM further argues that it will suffer prejudice if Plaintiff is allowed to amend his Complaint more than six months after the deadline to do so. (Opp’n. at p. 3.)

            The Court agrees with AHM’s contention.

1)      Plaintiff’s Proposed FAC is Unwarrantedly Delayed.

Plaintiff concedes that a staff member of his counsel’s office emailed counsel on November 20, 2023, advising that the deadline, set by the Court’s Minute Order dated October 25, 2023, to file the FAC was November 24, 2023. (Mot. at p. 3.) Plaintiff’s counsel was present at the hearing on Defendant AHM’s demurrer on October 25, 2023. (10/25/23 Minute Order.) Additionally, the case records indicate that AHM’s counsel served and filed a separate notice of ruling on the same day. (Reynolds Decl. ¶ 2.)

Based on these records, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that his failure to file the FAC within the Court’s set time frame was due to excusable neglect.

Moreover, the instant Motion was filed on July 11, 2024, more than seven months past the deadline. The Court finds that Plaintiff has unwarrantedly delayed seeking relief in this matter.

2)      Plaintiff’s Proposed Amendment is Futile.

The Second Cause of Action alleges Fraudulent Inducement – Concealment. The elements of a fraudulent concealment cause of action are: (1) concealment or suppression of a material fact, (2) a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) intentional concealment or suppression of the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) that the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would not have acted as they did if they had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiffs sustained damage. (Boschma v. Home Loan Center, Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 230, 248; See also Civil Code Section 1709, 1710.) Additionally, every element of a fraud cause of action must be alleged with factual specificity. (Stansfield v. Starkey (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 59, 73-74.) When pleading fraud against a corporation, a plaintiff must allege the names of the persons who made the misrepresentations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote and when it was said or written. (Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 157.)

In its ruling on AHM’s demurrer, the Department F47 Court found that Plaintiff failed to allege facts showing AHM’s definite knowledge about the purportedly concealed information such that AHM could have intentionally concealed or suppressed it. (10/25/23 Minute Order.) Nor did the allegations establish that AHM omitted a material fact that was contrary to a material representation made to Plaintiff by either AHM or a dealership. (Ibid.) It was also determined that Plaintiff failed to allege facts showing that AHM owed a duty to disclose. (Ibid.)

The proposed FAC does not amend any pleadings under the Second Cause of Action. (See Lupinek Decl. Ex. “A.”) Moreover, the addition of new paragraphs 88-95 in the proposed FAC under the heading “PLAINTIFF’S EXPERIENCES” does not overcome any of the findings in the Minute Order dated October 25, 2023.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s proposed amendment would be futile.

            Based on the above, the Court DENIES the Motion for Relief to file the FAC.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473 is DENIED.

Moving party to give notice.




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LOS
ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH
VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT
F49

MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES
TO PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, SET ONE; REQUEST FOR
SANCTIONS

Motion
filed: 1/29/24

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Gerardo Zavala

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant American Honda Motor
Co., Inc.

NOTICE: OK.¿¿¿ 

RELIEF
REQUESTED: An
order from this Court compelling Defendant American
Honda Motor Co., Inc. to
provide further responses to Plaintiff’s first set of Request for Production of
Documents Nos. 24-27, 30-33, 37-38, and 44, and imposing monetary sanctions in
the amount of $3,060.00.

TENTATIVE
RULING: The
motion is GRANTED IN PART. The request for monetary sanctions is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff
Gerardo Zavala (“Plaintiff” or “Zavala”) filed this Song-Beverly Consumer
Warranty Act lawsuit over alleged defects in his 2022 Honda Accord (the
“Subject Vehicle”), which was manufactured by Defendant American Honda Motor
Co., Inc. (“Defendant” or “AHM.”) Plaintiff purchased the Subject Vehicle new
on March 8, 2022, entering into an express written contract with AHM. (Compl.
§§ 8-9.)

On May 22,
2023, Plaintiff filed his Complaint against Defendant AHM and Does 1 through
10, alleging the following causes of action: (1) Violation of Song-Beverly Act
– Breach of Express Warranty; and (2) Fraudulent Inducement - Concealment.

On October 25,
2023, the Department F47 Court sustained AHM’s demurrer with motion to strike,
filed on July 5, 2023, granting Plaintiff 30 days leave to amend. (10/25/2023
Minute Order.) No First Amended Complaint was filed within the 30-day time limit,
and AHM subsequently filed its Answer to the Complaint on March 14, 2024.

On January 29,
2024, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request
for Production of Documents, Set One. Subsequently, AHM filed its Opposition on
August 20, 2024, and Plaintiff replied on August 26, 2024.

ANALYSIS

A motion to compel further responses to a demand for inspection
or production of documents may be brought based on: (1) incomplete statements
of compliance; (2) inadequate, evasive or incomplete claims of inability to
comply; or (3) unmerited or overly generalized objections. (Code Civ. Proc., §
2031.310(a).) To prevail, the party moving for the order must first offer specific
facts demonstrating “good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1).) This burden “is met simply by a
fact-specific showing of relevance.” (TBG Ins. Servs. Corp. v. Superior
Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.) If “good cause” is shown by the
moving party, the burden shifts to the responding party to justify any
objections made to document disclosure. (Kirkland v. Superior Court
(2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.) 

A.   
Procedural
Requirements

1.      Timeliness

“Unless notice of this motion [to compel
further responses to production of documents] is given within 45 days of the
service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on
or before any specific later date to which the propounding party and the
responding party have agreed in writing, the propounding party waives any right
to compel a further response to the demand for productions.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 2031.310, subd. (c).)

Here, AHM served its responses to Plaintiff’s Request
for Production of Documents, Set One, (“RFP”), via electronic service, on
December 11, 2023. (Nandivada Decl., ¶ 8.) This response set the deadline for
Plaintiff to file a motion to compel further responses as January 29, 2024, the
first court day after calculating 45 days plus two court days for the method of
service under Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6, subdivision (a)(3).

Since the Motion was served and filed on January 29,
2024, it meets the established deadline. Accordingly, the Motion is timely.

2.      Meet
and Confer

A motion to compel further responses to demand for
productions must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(2).) “A meet and confer declaration in support of
a motion shall state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an
informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
2016.040.)

After receiving AHM’s responses on December 11, 2023,
Plaintiff sent Defendant a meet and confer email on January 9, 2024, outlining
the alleged deficiencies within AHM’s responses. (Nandivada Decl., ¶ 9.)
Subsequently, on January 18, 2024, Plaintiff sent AHM a second meet and confer
letter to further narrow the scope of productions and requested a response by
January 25, 2024. (Id. ¶ 11.) However, AHM did not respond to Plaintiff’s meet
and confer communications. (Ibid.)

Accordingly, the Court finds that the meet and confer
requirements are sufficiently met.

3.      Separate
Statement

A motion to compel further responses to
a demand for production must be accompanied by a separate statement. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(a)(3).) “A separate statement is a separate
document filed and served with the discovery motion that provides all the
information necessary to understand each discovery request and all the
responses to it that are at issue.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(c).)

Plaintiff has met the above requirement
by filing a separate statement explaining the demand for production at issue, AHM’s
responses, and why further responses are necessary.

B.    
Motion to
Compel Further

Plaintiff moves to compel
AHM’s further responses to his RFP Nos. 24-27, 30-33, 37-38, and 44, arguing
that AHM’s objections are too general and without merit. (Mot. at p. 6.)

RFP No. 24: “All
DOCUMENTS from 2022 to present evidencing YOUR goals to reduce warranty costs,
including all warranty trend reports for this period.”

RFP
No. 25: “All DOCUMENTS from 2022 to present evidencing or discussing YOUR goals
to reduce the number of vehicle repurchases or replacements.”

RFP
No. 26: “All DOCUMENTS from 2022 to present evidencing or discussing YOUR goals
to reduce the costs associated with repurchases or replacements.”

RFP No. 27: “All
DOCUMENTS evidencing or describing statistics for the number of repurchases and
replacements YOU have made in California in response to consumers’ personal
requests (i.e. a consumer request without an attorney) from 2022 to present.”

RFP
No. 30: “All surveys, reports, summaries, and other DOCUMENTS in which owners
of 2022 Honda ACCORD vehicles have reported to YOU any SENSING DEFECTS.”

RFP
No. 31: “All DOCUMENTS evidencing, describing, or tracking vehicle repurchases
made by YOU of 2022 Honda ACCORD vehicles allegedly containing SENSING
DEFECTS.”

RFP
No. 32: “All DOCUMENTS which evidence or describe the numbers of owners of 2022
Honda ACCORD vehicles who have complained of any of the conditions, defects, or
nonconformities for which the SUBJECT VEHICLE was presented.”

RFP
No. 33: “All DOCUMENTS evidencing quality problems identified by YOU in the
SENSING SYSTEM used in 2022 Honda ACCORD vehicles.”

RFP
No. 37: “All DOCUMENTS evidencing the agendas and/or minutes of YOUR board of
directors or committee meetings, at which any quality concerns of the SENSING
SYSTEM in 2022 Honda ACCORD vehicles were addressed or discussed.”

RFP
No. 38: “All DOCUMENTS evidencing the agendas and/or minutes of YOUR board of
directors or committee meetings, at which YOUR warranty spending or reacquired
vehicle spending pertaining to 2022 Honda ACCORD vehicles was addressed or
discussed.”

RFP
No. 44: “All DOCUMENTS evidencing complaints by owners of 2022 Honda ACCORD
vehicles regarding any of the complaints for which the SUBJECT VEHICLE was
presented for repair.”

1)     
Plaintiff’s
Demonstration of Good Cause

A motion to compel further responses to
requests for production shall “set forth specific facts showing good cause”.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(b)(1).) To establish “good cause,” the moving
party must show (1) the items demanded are relevant to the subject matter and
(2) specific facts justify discovery of the requested items (e.g., why such
information is necessary for trial preparation or to prevent surprise at
trial). (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(b)(1); see Glenfed Develop. Corp. v.
Sup. Ct. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117.) If “good cause” is shown by the
moving party, the burden is then on the responding party to justify any
objections made to document disclosure. (Kirkland v. Superior Court
(2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.)

To
prove a cause of action under the Song-Beverly Act, Plaintiff must prove, among
other elements, that their vehicle had a defect covered by AHM’s warranty that
substantially impaired its use, value, or safety, which AHM was unable to
repair after a reasonable number of repair attempts. (Civ. Code, §§ 1790 et
seq.; CACI No. 3201.) Additionally, Plaintiff may be entitled to an award of
civil penalties if Plaintiff can establish that Defendant’s refusal to promptly
repurchase or replace Plaintiff’s vehicle was willful. (Civ. Code, § 1794(c).)

Code of Civil Procedure section
2017.010 permits a party to “obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter . . . if the matter is
either itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Furthermore, established case law
instructs, “For discovery purposes, information should be regarded as
‘relevant’ to the subject matter if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating
the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement. (Gonzalez
v. Sup.Ct.  (1995) 33 CA4th 1539, 1546 [Citation omitted]; Lipton
v. Sup.Ct. (1996) 48 CA4th 1599, 1611 [Citation omitted]; Stewart v.
Colonial Western Agency, Inc. (2001) 87 CA4th 1006, 1013 [Citation Omitted.])

i)                  
RFP Nos. 30, 32-33, and 44

Plaintiff argues that the above-listed RFP Nos are
relevant to Plaintiff’s underlying claims. (Mot. at p. 6.) Plaintiff contends
that RPD Nos. 30, 32-33, and 44 are likely to prove (1) the existence of a
defect or nonconformity in the Subject Vehicle; and (2) AHM’s failure or
inability to repair the defect or nonconformity in the Subject Vehicle. (Ibid.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff
has met the burden of showing that these RFP Nos seek documents relevant to the
case and that may lead to the discovery of admissible evidence regarding the
elements of cause of action.

In response, AHM argues that Plaintiff’s requests are
vague and overly broad, as they seek information relating to Plaintiff’s
definition of “Sensing Defect” including symptoms and components that were not
at issue with the Subject Vehicle. (Opp’n. at pp. 6-7.)

The Court notes that AHM’s objection on the grounds of
vagueness and overbreadth will be addressed in the next step, after the burden
shifts to AHM. However, these objections do not negate the Court’s finding of
relevance as previously discussed.

AHM also argues that other owners’ experiences are
irrelevant to Plaintiff’s case, citing Ibrahim v. Ford Motor Co. (1989)
214 Cal.App.3d 878(Ibrahim). (Opp’n. at p. 8.) The Court disagrees.

In Jensen v.
BMW of North American, LLC (S.D. Cal. 2019) 328 F.R.D. 557, 562-563(Jensen),
the Jensen Court finds that “information regarding whether the same
defects reported to BMW in other cars of the same make, model, and year as
Plaintiff’s subject vehicle could conceivably be relevant to weather BMW acted
reasonably in denying Plaintiff’s warranty claims. A fact finder may find BMW’s
knowledge or lack of knowledge about the same defects to be a consideration in
deciding whether BMW acted in good faith as to Plaintiff’s specific case.”

The Court notes
the Jensen Court’s findings are not inconsistent with AHM’s reliance on Ibrahim,
in which AHM cites “[the jury’s attention should not be confused] with a wholly
extraneous moral assessment of [the defendant’s] conduct.” (Opp’n., at 10.)
Putting the quoted language in context, the Ibrahim Court states, “The
[jury] instruction should have told the jury that a civil penalty could be
awarded to plaintiff if the jury determined that Ford knew of its obligations
but intentionally declined to fulfill them. Instead, the jury’s attention was
confused with language which virtually compelled a wholly extraneous moral
assessment of Ford’s conduct. The trial court would have been better advised to
have used the instructions proposed by plaintiff.” (Ibrahim, at 894.) It
is clear to this Court that a language compelling moral assessment is distinct
from factual evidence of complaints reported by other consumers regarding the
same defects and of the same make, model, and year of Plaintiff’s Subject Vehicle.
Consequently, the Court finds AHM’s argument on this ground unpersuasive.

Accordingly, the Court finds RFP Nos. 30, 32-33, and
44 to be relevant. The burden now shifts to AHM to justify its objections.

ii)                
RFP Nos. 24-27, and 31

Moreover, Plaintiff argues that RFP Nos. 24-26, 27,
and 31 are relevant to the issue of civil penalties. Specifically, RFP Nos.
24-26 seek documents evidencing AHM’s costs associated with warranty repair and
vehicle repurchases and its goals to reduce those costs, which would evidence
AHM’s goals to reduce these costs or lack thereof and to prove that AHM willfully
fails to comply its obligations under the Song-Beverly Act or that its current
or prospective policies in place are not sufficient to meet the requirements
under the Act. (Mot. at p. 10.) RFP Nos. 27, and 31 seek documents evidencing
the overall statistics of the number of repurchases and service contracts given
regarding repurchases. (Ibid.) Plaintiff argues that these requests
could prove that AHM either willfully failed to comply with its obligations
under the Act or that its failure to utilize available information constitutes
willful noncompliance. (Ibid.)

In response, AHM contends that these requests are
irrelevant because they seek to establish willfulness based on how AHM handled
repurchases for other customers who may have had different vehicles, repair
histories, and circumstances altogether. (Opp’n. at p. 12.)

The Court finds AHM’s contentions persuasive. Firstly,
the Court notes that whether AHM acted “willfully” under the obligation of the
Song-Beverly Act does not hinge on its “goals”. “Willful” means that a
defendant knew of its legal obligations and intentionally declined to follow
them. (See CACI 3244.) Lukather v. General Motors, LLC (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1041(Lukather)
is instructive. In that case, the Court of Appeal found that “there was
sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s willfulness finding. [The
consumer’s] testimony and GM’s telephone logs permitted the trial court to make
the following reasonable inferences: GM knew or reasonably should have known
from information available from the dealer on March 8, 2007, that the Cadillac
was a “lemon” and Lukather had selected the restitution option. Nevertheless,
for the next two months GM did not act in good faith to provide Lukather with
the restitution remedy; rather, GM actively discouraged Lukather from pursuing
this remedy by telling him that the Cadillac was repaired and he should pick it
up, that he should select another car at the dealer, that he would not get all
of his money back, and that it would take several months for GM to act on his
request for restitution. GM fails to persuade us that the evidence is
insufficient to support the finding that its violation was willful so as to
trigger the imposition of a civil penalty.” (Lukather, supra, at
pp. 1051-1052.) [Underlines added].)

Here, the above-listed requests do not seek information
regarding AHM’s knowledge of the Subject Vehicle’s defects or its intentional
failure to fulfill its obligation. Instead, these requests focus on AHM’s
“goals” to reduce warranty costs, the number of vehicle repurchases or
replacements, and the costs associated with repurchases or replacements of any
vehicles sold by AHM. (See RFP Nos. 24-27.) It is clear that these are
irrelevant to determine whether AHM acted willfully in failing to comply with
any obligation under the Song-Beverly Act with regard to Plaintiff’s Subject
Vehicle. 

Accordingly, the Court determines that Plaintiff has failed
to satisfy the burden in demonstrating the relevance.

Therefore, the Court DENIES the Motion as to RFP Nos. 24-27,
and 31.  

iii)              
RFP Nos. 37-38

Furthermore, Plaintiff argues that documents sought by
RFP Nos. 37-38 are relevant because they could demonstrate AHM’s exclusive and
superior knowledge of non-public information regarding the defective nature of
the alleged Honda Sensing Defect. (Mot. at p. 12.)

The Court finds RFP Nos. 37-38 to be relevant. The
burden now shifts to AHM to justify its objections.

2)     
AHM’s Objections

“If the responding party objects
to the demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of an item or
category of item, the response shall do both of the following:
(1) Identify with particularity any document, tangible thing, land, or
electronically stored information falling within any category of item in the
demand to which an objection is being made. (2) Set forth clearly the
extent of, and the specific ground for, the objection. If an objection is based
on a claim of privilege, the particular privilege invoked shall be stated. If
an objection is based on a claim that the information sought is protected work
product under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 2018.010), that claim shall be
expressly asserted.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.240, subd. (b).)

“If
an objection is based on a claim of privilege or a claim that the information
sought is protected work product, the response shall provide sufficient factual
information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim, including,
if necessary, a privilege log.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.240, subd.
(c).)

i)                  
RFP Nos. 30, 32-33, 37-38 and 44

1.     
Overbreadth

In
its Opposition, AHM argues that the above-listed RFP Nos are overly broad as
they seek information without limitation as to the Subject Vehicle’s alleged
defect. (Opp’n. at p. 5.) Specifically, AHM states that it objects to the extent
the Subject Vehicle was never presented for or otherwise did not exhibit
symptoms related to the vehicle system and/or component included in Plaintiff’s
definition of “Sensing Defect” or “Sensing System.” (AHM’s Separate Statement,
at p. 29; see also RFP Nos. 30, 32-33, 44.)

Furthermore,
AHM asserts that Plaintiff’s definition of the term “Sensing Defect” fails to
describe with reasonable particularity the documents or categories of documents
being requested, in violation of Code of Civil Procedure, section
2031.030(c)(1). (AHM’s Separate Statement, at p. 24.)

Here,
RFP No. 32 seeks, “All DOCUMENTS which evidence or
describe the numbers of owners of 2022 Honda ACCORD vehicles who have
complained of any of the conditions, defects, or nonconformities for which
the SUBJECT VEHICLE was presented.” (Underlines added.)

RFP
No. 44 requests, “All DOCUMENTS evidencing complaints by
owners of 2022 Honda ACCORD vehicles regarding any of the complaints for
which the SUBJECT VEHICLE was presented for repair.” (Underlines added.)

The
Court finds that RFP Nos. 32 and 44 specifically narrow their scope to vehicles
of the same make and model as the Subject Vehicle and to complaints that
Plaintiff’s Subject Vehicle allegedly presented.

Thus,
the Court OVERRULES the vagueness and overbreadth objections as to RFP Nos. 32
and 44. 

In
contrast, RFP Nos. 30, 33, 37-38 do not describe such specific limitations, instead
referring broadly to “any [Sensing Defects]” (see RFP No. 30), “problems ... in
the [Sensing System]” (see RFP No. 33), “any quality concerns of the [Sensing
System]” (RFP No. 37), and “pertaining to 2022 Honda Accord vehicles” (RFP No.
38.)

Although
the Court previously overruled AHM’s relevance objections to the information
from other consumers, it nevertheless concludes that the scope of RFP Nos. 30,
33, and 37-38 are unreasonably overbroad. This overbreadth stems from the
request’s extension to a generalized “Sensing System,” which may include
unrelated components not “reasonably related to the issues in
the case.” (See Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424,
431.)

Therefore,
the Court SUSTAINS Defendant AHM’s overbreadth objection as to RPD Nos. 30, 33,
and 37-38. Plaintiff is advised to narrow the scope to focus specifically on
the alleged defects of the Subject Vehicle.

Accordingly,
the Court DENIES the Motion as to RFP Nos. 30, 33, and 37-38.

2.     
Other
Objections - Undue Burden and Trade Secret

“The
objection based upon burden must be sustained by evidence showing the quantum
of work required, while to support an objection of oppression there must be
some showing either of an intent to create an unreasonable burden or that the
ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought.” (West
Pico Furniture Co. v. Super. Ct. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417.) There
is a legislative acknowledgment that some burden is inherent in all demands for
discovery. (Id. at p. 418.) Yet, “[t]he objection of burden is valid
only when that burden is demonstrated to result in injustice.” (Ibid.)

The party claiming a trade secret privilege has the burden
of establishing its existence. (Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Superior
Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1384, 1393.) The propounding party must then
make a showing that the discovery sought is relevant and necessary to proving
or defending against an element of one or more causes of action in the case and
that it is reasonably essential to resolving the lawsuit. (Ibid.) Upon
this showing, it is up to the holder of the privilege to show that a protective
order would be inadequate. (Ibid.) “Either party may propose or oppose
less intrusive alternatives to disclosure of the trade secret, but the burden
is upon the trade secret claimant to demonstrate that an alternative to
disclosure will not be unduly burdensome to the opposing side and that it will
maintain the same fair balance in the litigation that would have been achieved
by disclosure.” (Ibid.)

Here,
AHM bears the burden of substantiating its undue burden objection by
demonstrating why such requests are unreasonably burdensome, such as the number
of vehicles involved, the nature of the undertaking to find the requested
information, and the time and costs of doing so. However, AHM has not fulfilled
its burden by providing the necessary factual showing.

Similarly,
as the trade secret claimant, AHM, has the burden of demonstrating
that an alternative to disclosure will not be unduly burdensome to the opposing
side and that it will maintain the same fair balance in the litigation that
would have been achieved by disclosure. Additionally, there is no indication in
the case file that a protective order has been sought or stipulated by the
parties.

Therefore,
the Court OVERRULES the objections on the grounds of undue burden and trade
secret.

In
summary, the Court GRANTS the Motion as to RFP Nos. 32 and 44. The Court DENIES
the Motion as to RFP Nos. 24-27, 30-31, 33, and 37-38.  

3)     
Monetary
Sanctions

Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310 subdivision (h)
provides, in the pertinent part, that “the court shall impose a monetary
sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party,
person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel
further response to a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the
sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make
the imposition of the sanction unjust.”

Here, Plaintiff
requests monetary sanctions against AHM in the amount of $3,060.00. (Mot. at p.
15.) In its Opposition, AHM also requests sanctions against Plaintiff in the
amount of $1,635.00. (Opp’n. at p. 13.)

However, as the
Court has previously determined that it GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the instant
Motion, the mandatory monetary sanctions in Code of Civil Procedure section
2031.310 subdivision (h), awarding the prevailing party in the motion, are
inapplicable.

            Therefore, the Court DENIES both
parties’ requests for monetary sanctions.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s
Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production of Documents, Set
One, is GRANTED IN PART, consistent with the analysis above.

Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc. is ordered to provide
supplemental responses to Request Nos. 32 and 44 within 20 days.

Plaintiff’s
Request for Monetary Sanctions is DENIED.

Defendant
American Honda Motor Co., Inc.’s Monetary
Sanctions is DENIED.

Moving
party to give notice.