Judge: David B. Gelfound, Case: 24CHCV01741, Date: 2025-03-17 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 24CHCV01741    Hearing Date: March 17, 2025    Dept: F49

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F49

MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF COMPLAINT

Motion filed: 11/25/24

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Jose Valadez Reyes and Adriana Valadez

RESPONDING PARTY: None.

NOTICE: OK.

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order from this Court striking the prayer for punitive damages in the Complaint.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

This action arises from personal injuries that Plaintiffs allegedly sustained in an automobile collision that occurred on May 20, 2022.

On May 3, 2024, Plaintiffs Martha Lopez-Valenciano and Angel Velasquez, by and through Guardian ad Litem, (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed a Complaint against Defendants Jose Valadez Reyes, Adriana Valadez (collectively, “Defendants”) and Does 1 to 30, alleging three causes of action: (1) general negligence, (2) motor vehicle negligence, and (3) intentional tort.

On November 25, 2024, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint (the “Motion”).

No Opposition or Reply papers have been received by the Court.

ANALYSIS

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a); Stafford v. Shultz, 42 Cal. 2d 767, 782 (1954) [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].)    An immaterial or irrelevant allegation is one that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense; is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense; or a demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subd. (b).)  The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)

A.    Procedural Requirements

1.      Meet and Confer

“Before filing a motion to strike ... the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolves the objections to be raised in the motion to strike.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 435.5, subd. (a).)  If no agreement is reached, the moving party shall file and serve with the motion to strike a declaration stating either: (1) the means by which the parties met and conferred and that the parties did not reach an agreement, or (2) that the party who filed the pleading failed to respond to the meet and confer request or otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 435.5, subd. (a)(3).) 

The Court finds that the requirement for meet and confer declaration has been met, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 435.5, subdivision (a)(3)(B). (Hemati Decl. ¶¶ 3-4.)

2.      Timeliness

“Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof [e.g., 30 days after the service of the complaint or cross-complaint unless extended by court order or stipulation.]” (Code Civ. Proc. § 435, subd. (b)(1).)”

Here, the case record does not indicate that a Proof of Service for the Summons and Complaint has been filed, Consequently, the Court lacks sufficient information to determine the deadline for the moving party to respond to the Complaint. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs have not filed an Opposition or otherwise challenged the issue of timeliness.

Based on the above records, the Court proceeds to examine the merits of the Motion, operating under the assumption that the filing is timely.

A.    Motion to Strike Punitive Damages

Defendants move to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages listed under paragraph 14a(2) of the Complaint.

(1)   Punitive Damages

Under California law, “[m]ere negligence, even gross negligence, is not sufficient to justify such an award” for punitive damages.  (Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United California Bank (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 949, 958.)  The allegations supporting a request for punitive damages must be alleged with specificity; conclusory allegations without sufficient facts are not enough.  (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-1042.)

A motion to strike punitive damages is properly granted where a plaintiff does not state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, including allegations that defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud or malice.  (Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) 

“Malice” is defined as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct carried on with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) “‘Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiff’s rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate.’ [Citation.]” (Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1210.)

“Oppression” is defined as “despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(2).) The term “despicable” has been defined in the case law as actions that are “base,” “vile,” or “contemptible.” (See, e.g., Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal. App. 4th 847, 891.)

Here, the Complaint contains two paragraphs of factual pleading:

“Plaintiff was stopped at the red light on the first lane at Hubbard Street when suddenly she felt a strong impact to the rear-end of her vehicle. Defendant negligently failed to stop and collided into her vehicle. Defendant’s negligence caused bodily injury to Plaintiff and her passenger. Thereafter, Defendant refused to provide any information to Plaintiff and drove off. Plaintiff was able to take picture of Defendant license plate to obtain his information.” (Compl. at p. 4.)

“Defendant negligently failed to stop and collided into Plaintiff’s vehicle while at a red light. Defendant’s negligence caused bodily injury to Plaintiff and her passenger. Thereafter, Defendant refused to provide any information to Plaintiff and drove off. Defendant continues to deny that an accident took place, causing emotional distress to Plaintiff.” (Compl. at p. 6.)

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs failed to allege any specific facts showing outrageous and despicable conduct sufficient to warrant punitive damages. (Mot. at p. 5.) Even assuming Plaintiff’s allegations are true, California courts have held that fleeing the scene of an accident does not, by itself, constitute a tortious act beyond negligence, citing Brooks v. E.J. Willing Truck Transp. Co. (1953) 40 Cal.2d 669, 679 (Brooks). (Ibid.)

Notably, Brooks did not address whether punitive damages apply to hit-and-run conduct but held that such conduct only constitutes a separate tort if it results in additional injuries beyond those caused by the accident that precedes the hit and run. (Brooks, supra, 40 Cal.2d at p. 679.) For example, in Brooks,

Here, Plaintiffs assert claims for both negligence and intentional tort. Because a negligence claim does not support an award of punitive damages, the Court focuses on the allegations under the intentional tort cause of action. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that “Defendant refused to provide any information to Plaintiff and drove off. Defendant continues to deny that an accident took place, causing emotional distress to Plaintiff.” (Compl. at p. 6.)

First, the mere assertion of an intentional tort is not by itself sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. Plaintiffs must plead specific facts demonstrating that Defendants acted with oppression, fraud or malice. (See Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159.)

Second, the Complaint fails to allege any additional harm under Brooks. Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants’ denial of the accident caused emotional distress does not constitute a separate injury. Unlike in Brooks, where the plaintiff’s post-collision exposure led to further physical trauma, the alleged emotional distress here does not stem from any immediate danger, increased exposure to harm, or subsequent physical injury resulting from Defendant’s departure. (See Brooks, supra, 40 Cal.2d at 681.)

Accordingly, the Court finds Defendants’ argument persuasive and concludes that the Complaint fails to meet the threshold, as outlined in Brooks, to show that Defendants’ conducts after the accident – namely refusing to provide information and driving off the scene – gave rise to separate civil liability beyond negligence. (See Brooks, supra; see also People v. Corners (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 139, 148.)

Moreover, even assuming Plaintiffs had met their burden and specified additional damages arising from Defendants’ failure to stop and provide information, the conclusory assertion still does not rise to the level of malice, fraud, or oppression required under the Code of Civil Procedure section 3294. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the Motion.

B.     Leave to Amend

Courts generally allow leave to amend unless it is clear that there is no possibility of overcoming the issue. (See Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1227.) However, the burden of proving the existence of a reasonable possibility to cure the defect by amendment is squarely on the plaintiff. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)

Here, even when the allegations are accepted as true and construed liberally, they fail to establish a basis for punitive damages. The Complaint lacks any factual allegations suggesting that Defendants acted with oppression, fraud, or malice, as required under Civil Code section 3294. The deficiency renders the claim for punitive damage unsustainable.

Moreover, Plaintiffs have failed to oppose the Motion and, in doing so, have not met their burden of demonstrating the existence of a reasonable possibility to cure. Similarly, the absence of an Opposition constitutes a concession of the argument and waives any contention that the defects can be remedied. A failure to oppose weighs against granting leave to amend, as it suggests either an inability or unwillingness to articulate a viable amendment.  

Given these deficiencies, there is no reasonable basis to conclude that Plaintiffs could successfully amend the Complaint to state a valid claim for punitive damages.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Motion WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

CONCLUSION

The Motion to Strike is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

Defendants Jose Valadez Reyes and Adriana Valadez are ordered to file their Answer to the Complaint within 20 days.

Moving party to give notice.