Judge: David B. Gelfound, Case: 24CHCV02495, Date: 2025-03-14 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24CHCV02495    Hearing Date: March 14, 2025    Dept: F49

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F49

MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE, REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS

Motion filed: 12/5/24

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Matthew Flor Matis and Eric A. Matias

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Alp Sake

NOTICE: OK.

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order compelling Plaintiff Alp Sake to provide supplemental responses to Defendants’ first set of Form Interrogatories, No. 2.6, and first set of Special Interrogatories, No. 5, and imposing monetary sanctions against Plaintiff and his attorney of record in the amount of $810.00. In Opposition, Plaintiff seeks monetary sanctions against Defendants in the amount of $1,000.00.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is GRANTED IN PART. The requests for monetary sanctions are DENIED.

BACKGROUND

This action arises from personal injuries that Plaintiff allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle collision that occurred on July 22, 2022 (the “Incident”).

On February 28, 2025, Plaintiff Alp Sake (“Plaintiff” or “Sake”) filed a Complaint against Defendants Matthew Flor Matias, Eric A. Matias (collectively, “Defendants”) and Does 1 to 20, alleging a single cause of action for negligence. Subsequently, Defendants filed their joint Answer to the Complaint on September 9, 2024.

On December 5, 2024, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Compel Further Responses to Interrogatories (the “Motion”). Subsequently, Plaintiff filed an Opposition on February 28, 2025.

No Reply papers have been received by the Court.

ANALYSIS

“On receipt of a response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that any of the following apply: (1) An answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete. (2) An exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate. (3) An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a).)

A.    Procedural Requirements

1.      Timeliness

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300, subdivision (c), notice of this motion must be given within 45 days following the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or by a later date agreed-upon in writing, failing which the propounding party waives any right to compel a further response to the interrogatories. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (c); but see Golf & Tennis Pro Shop, Inc. v. Superior Court (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 127, 134-136 [suggesting that the 45-day deadline does not apply to (i.e., it does not begin to run with service of) objections-only responses; it only applies to responses that are required to be verified].)

The 45-day deadline “is ‘jurisdictional’ in the sense that it renders the court without authority to rule on motions to compel other than to deny them.” (Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.)

“Any period of notice, or any right or duty to do any act or make any response within any period or on a date certain after the service of the document, which time period or date is prescribed by statute or rule of court, shall be extended after service by electronic means by two court days[.]” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.6, subd. (a)(3)(B).)

Here, on October 21, 2024, Plaintiff served verified responses to Defendants’ first set of discoveries, including objections to Special Interrogatories No. 5. (Mahlstedt Decl. ¶ 3.) Subsequently, on November 26, 2024, Plaintiff provided their supplemental verified responses to Form Interrogatories No. 2.6. (Rita Decl. ¶ 8.)

 For Form Interrogatories No. 2.6, the service of responses sets the deadline for Defendants to file a motion to compel as January 10, 2025. As to Special Interrogatories No. 5, since Plaintiff’s objections were included in the verified responses served on October 21, 2024, without any subsequently supplemental responses, the 45-day clock started to click on October 21, 2024, establishing that the deadline to compel further responses as to Special Interrogatories No. 5 by December 5, 2024. These deadlines are calculated based on a 45-day period. The Court recognizes that extension may apply based on the method of service.

The Motion was filed on December 5, 2024, meeting the applicable deadlines.

Therefore, the Court finds the Motion is timely.

2.      Meet and Confer

“A motion under subdivision (a) shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (b)(1).) “A meet and confer declaration in support of a motion shall state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.040.)

Here, Defendants assert that the meet and confer efforts took place on October 22 and November 15, 2024, leading to Plaintiff’s subsequent service of supplemental responses. However, Defendants failed to establish any further meet and confer efforts specifically addressing the remaining issues in the supplemental responses, which are the subject of the Motion.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants have not fully complied with the meet and confer requirements. Nonetheless, the Court exercise its discretion to consider the merits of the Motion and Opposition papers.

3.      Separate Statement

The California Rules of Court rule 3.1345 (a)(2) explicitly states that “Any motion involving the content of a discovery request or the responses to such a request must be accompanied by a separate statement. The motions that require a separate statement include a motion: ... (2) To compel further responses to interrogatories.” “A separate statement is a separate document filed and served with the discovery motion that provides all the information necessary to understand each discovery request and all the responses to it that are at issue.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(c).)

Here, Defendants have substantially fulfilled the requirement by attaching to a “Statement of Questions and Answers in Dispute.”

B.     Motion to Compel Further Responses to Interrogatories

Under California law, “the statutory scheme imposes no obligation on a party propounding interrogatories to establish good cause or prove up the merits of any underlying claims.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 550 (Williams).) Indeed, a litigant “is entitled to demand answers to its interrogatories, as a matter of right, and without a prior showing, unless the party on whom those interrogatories are served objects and shows cause why the questions are not within the purview of the code section.” (Id. at p. 541, citing West Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 422.)

Accordingly, the Court will proceed to determine whether Plaintiff’s objections and responses satisfy the required burden to show cause, considering the legal arguments and justifications presented.

1)      Form Interrogatories No. 2.6

Form Interrogatories (“FROG”) No. 2.6 states:

“(a) the name, ADDRESS, and telephone number of your present employer or place of self-employment; and

(b) the name, ADDRESS, dates of employment, job title, and nature of work for each employer or self-employment you have had from five years before the INCIDENT until today.”

(Rita Decl. Ex. “2.”)

            Plaintiff provided the following supplemental responses: “Plaintiff objects on the grounds that the information sought by this interrogatory is irrelevant to the subject matter of this lawsuit and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The requested information is protected by Responding Party’s constitutional right to privacy. A person's work history (e.g., names of employers, dates of employment, job titles, full or part-time) is protected by a right of privacy. Alch v. Sup.Ct. (Time Warner Entertainment Co.) (2008) 165 CA4th 1412, 1426–1427, 82 CR3d 470, 482–483. Subject to and without waiving the said objection(s), Plaintiff responds as follows: (a)-(b) Uber Eats – delivery driver; from September 2022 to present.” (Rita Decl. Ex. “2.”)

i.                    Relevance

The Court notes that under California law, discovery is broadly permitted for any information that is relevant to the subject matter of the litigation and reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.)  Additionally, courts should construe discovery statutes liberally in favor of discovery. (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 540-541.) “Relevancy to the subject matter has been construed to be broader than relevancy to issues . . . .” (Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1384, 1391.) For discovery purposes, information is relevant if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement.” (Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546.)  

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s prior employment history is relevant because it may disclose work-related injuries or worker’s compensation claims that could be related to the injuries alleged in this case. Additionally, Defendants assert that the information is relevant to Plaintiff’s claim for general damages. (Def.’s Separate Statement, at p. 2.)

In response, Plaintiff contends that because he is not making a claim for loss of earnings, his employment history prior to the Incident is irrelevant. Plaintiff further argues that his verified response to FROG No. 11.3 explicitly denies filing any worker’s compensation claims, making further inquiry unnecessary. (Opp’n. at pp. 3-4.)

The Court finds Defendants’ argument persuasive.

Here, Plaintiff asserts that he is not making a claim for loss of earnings. (Opp’n. at p. 3.) However, the Complaint’s prayer for relief is broad, seeking both “general damages according to proof,” and “special damages according to proof.” (Compl. at p. 4.) Additionally, Plaintiff explicitly alleges that “[a]t the time of the above-mentioned incident, Plaintiff was gainfully employed. As a further and direct and proximate result of the negligence of the Defendant(s), Plaintiff was unable to attend to their usual employment and have lost income.” (Id. ¶ 15.) The Complaint further states that Plaintiff will seek leave to amend to specify the exact amount of lost income. (Ibid.)  Because the Complaint does not preclude a claim for lost earnings, Plaintiff’s prior employment history is directly relevant to establishing factors such as earning history, employment stability, and potential alternative explanations for wage loss.

Furthermore, if Plaintiff sustained prior work-related injuries that are similar or related to the injuries claimed in this case, such information is highly relevant to the causation and damages – two required elements of a negligence claim. A history of work injuries or worker’s compensation claims may reveal preexisting conditions or alternative causes for Plaintiff’s claimed injuries, which Defendants are entitled to explore through discovery. Thus, Plaintiff’s prior employment records may reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence concerning the nature, extent, and origin of the injuries alleged in the present case.

Although Plaintiff asserts that his responses to FROG No. 11.3 deny filing any worker’s compensation claims, this does not automatically render the interrogatory irrelevant or unnecessary. Defendants are entitled to obtain independent and corroborating information to verify Plaintiff’s responses and ensure accuracy. Interrogatories serve a distinct function from other discovery tools, and duplicative discovery does not preclude Defendant from seeking relevant information through multiple avenues.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s employment history prior to the Incident falls within the scope of discoverable information, subject to other limitations.

ii.                  Right to Privacy

Even highly relevant, nonprivileged information may be shielded from discovery if its disclosure would impair a person's “inalienable right of privacy” provided by California Constitution Article 1, section 1. (Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 855-856 (Britt).) The burden is on “the party asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and the seriousness of the prospective invasion,” and then the court must “weigh the countervailing interests the opposing party identifies.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 557.) 

If the three Hill factor for invasion of a privacy interest exist – a legally protected privilege interest, a reasonable expectation of privacy under the particular circumstances, and a serious invasion of interests – then the privacy interest ‘must be measured against other competing or countervailing interests in a ‘balancing test.’” (Alch v. Superior Court (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1423; Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 40 (Hill).)

However, a party seeking discovery of private information need not always establish a compelling interest or compelling need without regard to other considerations including the strength of the privacy interest itself, the seriousness of the invasion, and the availability of alternatives and protective measures. (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 557; Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th 1, at p. 34 [Where “the case involves an obvious invasion of an interest fundamental to personal autonomy, ... a ‘compelling interest’ must be present to overcome the vital privacy interest,” but if “the privacy interest is less central, or in bona fide dispute, general balancing tests are employed”].)

Here, the first Hill factor – a legally protected privilege interest – is satisfied in this case. Courts have consistently recognized that “personnel records and employment history are within the scope of the protection provided by the state and federal Constitutions.” (San Diego Trolley, Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1097, disapprove on other grounds.) As such, employment records are subject to privacy considerations, though this right is not absolute and must be weighed against competing interests.

The second Hill factor – an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances – is diminished. Plaintiff has explicitly raised the claim for lost earnings in the matter (Compl. ¶ 15), thereby substantially reducing any objectively reasonable expectation of privacy regarding Plaintiff’s prior employment records.

The third Hill factor – a serious invasion of interests – is not met.

Here, FROG No. 2.6 limits the scope of discovery to only the name, address, dates of employment, job title, and nature of work, from the five years before the incident. This type of information is not inherently sensitive, as it does not seek confidential financial records or medical history. Consequently, the Court finds that mere disclosure of basic employment details does not constitute a serious invasion of privacy, particularly when balanced against Defendants’ right to obtain relevant information in defending against claims involving lost income or employment impact.

Applying the general balancing test, the Court finds that Defendants’ need for discovery outweighs Plaintiff’s privacy interests. The scope of discovery is narrowly tailored to mitigate any undue intrusion, ensuring that only relevant employment details are disclosed. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s privacy objection does not preclude disclosure and that Defendants are entitled to the requested information under FROG No. 2.6.

Therefore, the Court GRANTS the Motion to as FROG No. 2.6.

2)      Special Interrogatories No. 5

Special Interrogatories (“SROG”) No. 5: “State the complete name, ADDRESS, and telephone number of each and every health care provider, including but not limited to medical doctors, osteopaths, chiropractors, physical therapists, or other health care provider, who has provided health care services to you within the ten (10) years preceding the accident which forms the basis of plaintiff’s Complaint.” (Def.’s Separate Statement, at p. 2.)

Plaintiff objected to SROG No. 5 on the grounds of vague and ambiguous as to the term “ADDRESS;” relevance, privacy, and being overly broad, burdensome and harassing. (Def.’s Separate Statement, at p. 3.)

i.                    Relevance, Overbreadth, Undue Burden

Plaintiff concedes that disclosure of a party’s medical history can be compelled when directly related to those medical conditions that are in issue in the current action. (Opp’n. at p. 5.) However, Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ discovery is overbroad because it seeks discovery of all medical conditions without limitation, rather than limiting the inquiry to those injuries and body parts placed at issue in this action. (Ibid.)

The Court agrees. As currently phrased, the SROG No. 5 requests information for “each and every health care provider, including but not limited medical doctors, osteopaths, chiropractors, physical therapists, or other health care provider[.]” This unlimited scope does not restrict disclosure to treatment related to the body parts or injuries Plaintiff has placed at issue. As such, the request is overbroad and seeks information beyond the scope of permissible discovery.

Defendants argue that SROG No. 5 has already limited to ten years preceding the incident, arguing that further limitation would be difficult given Plaintiff’s responses to form interrogatories which lists thirty one injuries attributed to the Incident, “ranging from neck, entire back, to left shoulder, cervical and lumbar radiculopathy into feet and hands/fingers, and also includes headaches, post-concussion syndrome, and insomnia.”. (Def.’s Separate Statement at p. 4.)

While Defendants contend that a broad scope is necessary due to the number of injuries claimed, it cannot be without limits. The fact that Defendants were able to articulate the specific injuries Plaintiff attributes to the Incident suggests that Plaintiff has already defined the scope of relevant medical issues. (See Britt, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 876 [“[P]laintiffs are ‘entitled to retain the confidentiality of all unrelated medical or psychotherapeutic treatment they may have undergone in the past.” (Italics in original.)])

Accordingly, SROG No. 5 exceeds the permissible boundaries and includes matters irrelevant to the issues in the action.

ii.                  Right to Privacy

The right of privacy under the California Constitution extends to medical records. (Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 41.) However, the right to privacy is not absolute. In appropriate circumstances, this right must be balanced against other important interests. (Id. at p. 37.) As the California Supreme Court has emphasized, “[o]n occasion [a party's] privacy interests may have to give way to [the] opponent's right to a fair trial. Thus, courts must balance the right of civil litigants to discover relevant facts against the privacy interests of persons subject to discovery.” (Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 842.)

            In personal injury litigation, while Defendants are not entitled to unlimited medical discovery, it is well established that “[i]t is grossly unfair to allow the plaintiff to pursue a claim for personal injuries without allowing the defendant to obtain medical records related to the alleged injuries.” (Manela v. Superior Court (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1150.)

Here, Plaintiff has placed his medical condition at issue, thereby substantially lowering his expectation of privacy with respect to medical records relevant to the injuries he alleges. Additionally, California Evidence Code expressly provides that “[t]here is no privilege under this article as to a communication relevant to an issue concerning the condition of the patient in a proceeding to recover damages on account of the conduct of the patient if good cause for disclosure of the communication is shown.” (Evid. Code, § 999.)

Applying the balancing testing, the Court finds that Defendants’ interest in obtaining discovery of medical records relevant to Plaintiff’s alleged injuries outweighs Plaintiff’s right to absolute confidentiality. However, this does not grant Defendants unfettered access to Plaintiff’s entire medical history.

Accordingly, the scope of SROG No. 5 shall be limited to medical records reasonably related to the body parts, conditions, or injuries claimed in the present action, and time-restricted to a five-year period preceding the Incident.

Therefore, the Court GRANTS IN PART the Motion as to SROG No. 5, subject to the limitations set forth above.

C.    Monetary Sanctions

Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300, subdivision (d), provides: “The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a further response to interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”

Since the Court has GRANTED IN PART the Motion, it finds that the mandatory monetary sanctions provided for the prevailing party in the Motion are inapplicable under these circumstances.

            Accordingly, the Court DENIES both parties’ requests for monetary sanctions.

CONCLUSION

The Motion to Compel Further Responses to Interrogatories, filed by Defendants Matthew Flor Matis and Eric A. Matias, is GRANTED IN PART.

The scope of Special Interrogatories No. 5 is modified and limited to medical records reasonably related to the body parts, conditions, or injuries claimed in the present action, and time-restricted to five years preceding the accident.

Plaintiff Alp Sake is ordered to provide verified further responses to Form Interrogatories No. 2.6, and Special Interrogatories No. 5 (as modified), within 20 days.

Both parties’ requests for monetary sanctions are DENIED.

Moving party to give notice.