Judge: David B. Gelfound, Case: 24CHCV03434, Date: 2025-03-25 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 24CHCV03434    Hearing Date: March 25, 2025    Dept: F49

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F49

MOTION TO DISQUALIFY PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL

Motion filed: 11/15/24

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Nicholas J. Costeines

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Ralph Sasson

NOTICE: OK.

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order disqualifying Plaintiff’s counsel in this matter.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

On September 23, 2024, Plaintiff Ralph Sasson (“Plaintiff” or “Ralph”) initiated this action. Subsequently, on October 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed his operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against Defendants Nicholas John Costeines (“Costeines”), Lauren Sasson (“Lauren”) (collectively, “Defendants”), and Does 1 through 100, alleging the following four causes of action: (1) Attempted Civil Extortion, (2) Civil Conspiracy, (3) Conversion, (4) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

On November 15, 2024, Defendant Costeines filed the instant Motion to Disqualify Plaintiff’s Counsel (the “Motion”). Subsequently, on March 6, 2025, Plaintiff filed an Opposition. No Reply papers have been filed.

ANALYSIS

Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(5), authorizes the Court to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial proceeding before it, in every matter pertaining thereto.  This authority necessarily includes disqualifying an attorney.  (Metro-Goldwyn Mayer, Inc. v. Tracinda Corp. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1832, 1837–1838.)  The issue of disqualification ultimately involves a conflict between the clients’ right to counsel of their choice and the need to maintain ethical standards of professional responsibility.  (Ibid.) However, the paramount concern must be the preservation of public trust in the scrupulous administration of justice and the integrity of the bar and the recognized and important right to counsel of one’s choosing must yield to considerations of ethics that run to the very integrity of our judicial process.  Whether an attorney should be disqualified is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.  (Henriksen v. Great Am. Sav. & Loan (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 109, 113.)  In exercising that discretion, the trial court is required to make a reasoned judgment which complies with the legal principles and policies applicable to the issue at hand.  (Ibid.) 

A.    Defendant Costeines Lacks Standing to Bring This Motion.

Standing to challenge a conflict on the part of opposing counsel must arise from a breach of duty owed to the complaining party.  (DCH Health Services Corp. v. Waite (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 829, 832; Strasbourger Pearson Tulcin Wolff Inc. v. Wiz Technology, Inc. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1399, 1404, 1409, 1410-1411, fn. 6.) Only a party who has (or has had) a fiduciary relationship with a lawyer has standing to disqualify a lawyer. Thus, the opposing party has no standing to disqualify counsel who represents parties with conflicting interests.  (Dino v. Pelayo (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 347, 357-358; DCH Health Services, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at pp. 832-833.) 

Courts have consistently recognized that “‘[a] ‘“standing” requirement is implicit in disqualification motions.’ [Citation.] A party moving to disqualify counsel must have a legally cognizable interest that would be harmed by the attorney's conflict of interest.” (Moreci v. Scaffold Solutions, Inc. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 425, 432.) Generally, standing is found when there is a current or former attorney-client relationship between the party seeking disqualification and the attorney sought to be disqualified. (Ibid.) Some courts, however, described as the “minority” view for standing, “‘have slightly broadened the scope of that general rule,’ holding that a nonclient may bring a disqualification motion based on an attorney's breach of a duty of confidentiality owed to the nonclient.” (Ibid.)

Even under this minority view, standing requires “harm arising from a legally cognizable interest which is concrete and particularized, not hypothetical.” (Great Lakes Construction, Inc. v. Burman (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1347, 1357.)

Here, Plaintiff contends that Costeines lacks standing to seek disqualification. (Opp’n. at p. 2.) Plaintiff argues that Costeines neither claims to have been a client of Plaintiff’s counsel nor alleges that Plaintiff’s counsel owes him any duty of confidentiality. (Id. at pp. 3-4.)

            The Court finds Plaintiff’s argument persuasive. Costeines’s two-and-a-half-page Motion is purportedly based on allegations of conflict of interest and unethical conduct, specifically asserting that: “(1) “an attorney’s loyalty and responsibilities should remain unbiased” (Mot. at p. 1); (2) that Plaintiff’s counsel has a “documented pattern of frivolous litigation” (Id., at p. 2); and (3) that the “relationship between Plaintiff and Karapetyan raises significant questions of impartiality.” (Id., at p. 3).

However, none of these assertions demonstrate that Costeines has any right to expect loyalty or confidentiality from Plaintiff’s counsel. The Motion fails to cite any specific facts or legal basis to support standing.

Because Defendant Costeines was not a client of Plaintiff’s counsel and has not shown any legally cognizable interest that would be harmed, he lacks standing to bring this Motion.

            Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant Costeines has failed to establish his standing and therefore DENIES the Motion.

CONCLUSION

Defendant Nicholas J. Costeines’s Motion to Disqualify Plaintiff’s Counsel is DENIED.

Moving party to give notice.

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F49

MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE

Motion filed: 11/12/24

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Nicholas J. Costeines

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Ralph Sasson

NOTICE: OK.

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order quashing service of summons and complaint.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

On September 23, 2024, Plaintiff Ralph Sasson (“Plaintiff” or “Ralph”) initiated this action. Subsequently, on October 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed his operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against Defendants Nicholas John Costeines (“Costeines”), Lauren Sasson (“Lauren”) (collectively, “Defendants”), and Does 1 through 100, alleging the following four causes of action: (1) Attempted Civil Extortion, (2) Civil Conspiracy, (3) Conversion, (4) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

On November 12, 2024, Defendant Costeines filed the instant Motion to Quash Service (the “Motion”). Subsequently, on January 21, 2025, Plaintiff submitted an Opposition.

ANALYSIS

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10, “[a] defendant . . . may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes: (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (a).) “[C]ompliance with the statutory procedures for service of process is essential to establish personal jurisdiction. [Citation.]” (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1444 (Dill).) “[T]he filing of a proof of service creates a rebuttable presumption that the service was proper” but only if it “complies with the statutory requirements regarding such proofs.” (Id. at pp. 1441-1442.)

When a defendant moves to quash service of the summons and complaint, the plaintiff has “the burden of proving the facts that did give the court jurisdiction, that is the facts requisite to an effective service.” (Coulston v. Cooper (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 866, 868 (Coulston).) “A court lacks jurisdiction over a party if there has not been proper service of process.” (Ruttenberg v. Ruttenberg (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 801, 808.)

A.    Motion to Quash Service

Defendant Costeines brings this Motion on the following grounds: (1) the service was not made at his residence, (2) lack of consent for electronic service, and (3) inconsistent statements and factual inaccuracies concerning the proof of service filed by Plaintiff. (Mot. at p. 1.)

(1)   The Motion is Not Moot.

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff argues that the Motion is moot due to Costeines’s subsequent filing of an Objection to Subpoena and a Motion to Disqualify Counsel.

The Court disagrees.

Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10 provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes: (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (a).)

Additionally, “[f]ailure to make a motion under this section at the time of filing a demurrer or motion to strike constitutes a waiver of the issues of lack of personal jurisdiction, inadequacy of process, inadequacy of service of process, inconvenient forum, and delay in prosecution.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (e)(3).)

The Court of Appeal in Air Machine Com SRL v. Superior Court (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 414, explained:

“Under subdivision (e)(3) of section 418.10, a party still will be deemed to have “generally appeared” in the action if the party fails to file a motion under subdivision (a) of 418.10 and otherwise engages in acts or activities that recognize the court's jurisdiction over the party. If, however, a party files a motion under that subdivision before or simultaneously with an act that would otherwise constitute a general appearance, under subdivision (e) of section 418.10 that party will not be deemed to have “generally appeared” in the action, but instead will be deemed to have “specially appeared” and not waived the party's jurisdictional challenge.” (Id. at p. 426, emphasis in original.)

Here, Costeines filed the Motion to Quash on November 12, 2024. Subsequently, Costeines filed the Objection to Subpoena and Motion to Disqualify Counsel on November 15, 2024. Because the Motion to Quash was filed first and had not been ruled on at the time of the Costeines’s subsequent filings on November 15, 2024, the Objection to Subpoena and Motion to Disqualify Counsel constitute a “special appearance” and do not waive Costeines’s jurisdictional challenge. 

Therefore, the Motion is not moot.

(2)   Plaintiff’s Personal Service of Initial Pleading Established Jurisdiction.

Personal service of process is defined as “by personal delivery of a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the person to be served.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 415.10.)

Under California law, personal service is not required to be made at a person’s residence but may be made by merely depositing the process in some appropriate place where it would be most likely to come to the attention of the person being served. (Crescendo Corp. v. Sheltered, Inc. (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 209, 212.)

The essence of personal service of process is the passing of the document from the hand of the process server into the hands of the defendant, or an equivalent act in case defendant refuses to take the same. (Hunstock v. Estate Development Corp. (1943) 22 Cal.2d 205, 209, 210.) “An equivalent act” must be determined by the court to be fit within the narrow exceptions to the requirement of manual physical delivery. (See, e.g., In re Ball (1934) 2 Cal.App.2d 578, 579 (In re Ball))

Attempted delivery to a recalcitrant defendant, in his presence, is permitted. Examples are collected in Sternbeck v. Buck (1957) 148 Cal.App.2d 829, 833 (Sternbeck) and include flinging the process at a retreating defendant while telling him what it is (see In re Ball, supra), or putting it under the windshield of his retreating automobile. (See Trujillo v. Trujillo (1945) 71 Cal.App.2d 257, at p. 259-260 (Trujillo).)

Importantly, these cases “do not rewrite the requirement of personal service and permit some other service, but rather, analyze the facts of the service and find they are tantamount to a personal delivery.” (In re Abrams (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 685, 695.)

Here, the case record indicates that Plaintiff filed a proof of service on Costeines on October 11, 2024. The proof of service states that on Sunday, October 6, 2024, at 1:35 p.m., a registered California process server, George Semerjian (“Semerjian”), personally served the process upon Costeines. (See 10/11/24 Proof of Service.) Additionally, the service was done at the address of 10052 Glade Avenue, Chatsworth, CA 91311 (the “Chatsworth Address”). (Ibid.)

In the Opposition, Plaintiff submits a declaration of diligence signed by the registered process server Semerjian on November 4, 2024, indicating that on September 25, 2024, Semerjian arrived at the Chatsworth Address and spoke to an unidentified female through the door. (Karapetyan Decl. Ex. “1.”) As Semerjian was leaving, a man arrived in a Black Honda Accord with a license plate “PHORCE,” whom Semerjian later identified as Defendant Costeines. (Ibid.) Semerjian asked for Defendant Lauren, but was told by Costeines that she was not home and will be back later tonight. (Ibid.) When Semerjian tried to confirm Costeines’s identity, Costeines refused, saying “it doesn’t matter.” (Ibid.) Subsequently, on October 6, 2024, Semerjian arrived at the Chatsworth Address again and encountered Costeines backing out of the driveway. Semerjian approached the car window and showed Costeines the legal documents. Costeines exited the car and demanded that Semerjian leave the property. (Ibid.) Semerjian declares that “[Costeines] did not want to accept service for himself or substitute service for Lauren Sasson.” (Ibid.) While Costeines was recording, Semerjian dropped the legal documents “in front of [Costeines’s] car where he pulled back into his driveway and ran the documents over.” (Ibid.) Semerjian returned to his car and made a U-turn to leave the neighborhood. When he looked back toward the driveway, both Costeines and the documents were no longer there. (Ibid.)

Plaintiff’s evidence indicates that physical delivery was not accepted by Costeines and that the documents were instead dropped in front of Costeines’s car. (Karapetyan Decl. Ex. “1.”) These facts require the Court to determine whether this act was tantamount to personal service.

The Court finds that the facts are analogous to those in the established precedent, and that the personal service on Costeines to be valid.

First, the evidence shows that on October 6, 2024, Costeines was physically present and identified by Semerjian. Second, Semerjian demonstrated intent to serve by presenting the documents and attempting to hand them over. Third, Costeines was clearly uncooperative, as he demanded Semerjian leave the property and refused to accept the documents. This recalcitrance aligns with the scenarios in Sternbeck and Trujillo. Fourth, Semerjian dropped the documents in front of Costeines’s car, a location in Costeines’s immediate vicinity. Fifth, although Costeines drove over the documents, this does not invalidate service. Costeines had the opportunity to retrieve the documents and the fact that both Costeines and the documents were later “no longer on the driveway” further supports a finding of accessibility.

Furthermore, although Costeines asserts that there are inconsistent statements and factual inaccuracies concerning the proof of service filed by Plaintiff, he fails to specify any facts contradicting the declaration made by a registered process server. As such, his argument is insufficient to rebut the presumption of proper service established by the filing of a proof of service. (Dill, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1441-1442 [the filing of a proof of service creates a rebuttable presumption that the service was proper.”]

 Accordingly, the Court determines that Semerjian’s service on October 6, 2024, is tantamount to a valid personal service.

(3)   Service by Mail is Permitted for the Service of First Amended Complaint

Under California law, an amended complaint does not typically require a reservice of summons if the defendant was already properly served with the original summons and complaint. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 471.5.) Additionally, service by mail is permitted under Code of Civil Procedure section 1013 for subsequent pleadings, even if the defendant has not yet appeared, as long as the Court’s jurisdiction was established by the initial service. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1013, subdivision (a), service by mail must be made to (1) the defendant’s office address as last given in a filed document, or (2) otherwise, the defendant’s place of residence.

Here, the FAC was mailed to two addresses associated with Costeines: (1) the Chatsworth Address, and (2) 7032 Milwood Ave. Apt 6 Canoga Park, CA 91303 (the “Canoga Park Address”). (10/16/2024 Proof of Service.)

While Costeines contends that these addresses were not his residence and provided a new address of 450A Country Club Dr. Simi Valley CA 93065, Plaintiff had a reasonable basis to use the addresses above. One of the residential addresses – 10052 Glade Ave. – was the location where Costeines was personally served on October 6, 2024. Additionally, the registered process server’s declaration of diligence further establishes that Costeines claimed the Chatsworth Address was his property when he demanded the process server “step off his property.” (Karapetyan Decl. Ex. “1.”) Furthermore, it appears Costeines had actual notice of the FAC, as evidenced by his timely filing of this Motion.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has substantially complied with the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 1013, subdivision (a) for service by mail.

            Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES the Motion to Quash Service.

CONCLUSION

Defendant Nicholas J. Costeines’s Motion to Quash Service is DENIED.

Moving party to give notice.