Judge: David B. Gelfound, Case: 24CHCV04009, Date: 2025-05-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24CHCV04009    Hearing Date: May 22, 2025    Dept: F49

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F49

DEMURRER WITH MOTION TO STRIKE

Motion filed: 1/23/25

MOVING PARTY: Defendant State Farm Insurance

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Eileen Amato-Fogle

NOTICE: OK.

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order sustaining Defendant State Farm Insurance’s Demurrer to all causes of action asserted in the Complaint against it, and striking portions of the Complaint.

TENTATIVE RULING: The Demurrer is SUSTAINED IN PART. The Motion to Strike is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

This action arises from alleged damage that Plaintiff sustained as a result of Defendants’ failure to maintain Plaintiff’s property’s roof and timely handle insurance claims for water damage.

On November 1, 2024, Plaintiff Eileen Amato-Fogle (“Plaintiff” or “Fogle”) filed a Complaint against Defendants PMP Management (“PMP”) and State Farm Insurance (“SFI”) (collectively, “Defendants”) and Does 1 to 20, alleging the following five causes of action: (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing, (3) breach of fiduciary duty, (4) Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq, and (5) negligence. Subsequently, Defendant PMP filed its Answer on February 6, 2025.

On January 23, 2025, Defendant SFI filed the instant Demurrer and accompanying Motion to Strike. On May 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed an untimely Opposition to both the Demurer and the Motion to Strike.

No Reply papers have been filed.

ANALYSIS

A demurrer is an objection to a pleading, the grounds for which are apparent from either the face of the complaint or a matter of which the court may take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a); see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The purpose of a demurrer is to challenge the sufficiency of a pleading “by raising questions of law.” (Postley v. Harvey (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 280, 286.)

At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts sufficient to apprise the defendant of the factual basis for the claim against them. (Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 714, 721.) “In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) The court “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law[.]” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525 (Berkley).) In applying these standards, the court liberally construes the complaint to determine whether a cause of action has been stated. (Picton v. Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.)

A.    Timeliness

Code of Civil Procedure section 430.40, subdivision (a), provides: “A person against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may, within 30 days after service of the complaint or cross-complaint, demur to the complaint or cross-complaint.”

Additionally, an automatic 30-day extension of time shall be granted if the parties are not able to meet and confer at least 5 days before the date the responsive pleading is due. The 30-day extension shall commence from the date the responsive pleading was previously due. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(2).)

Here, the case record does not include a proof of service for the Complaint. However, SFI has submitted undisputed evidence establishing that its initial deadline to respond was December 23, 2024. (12/23/2024 Batezel Decl. ¶ 3)

SFI also filed a Declaration pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 435.5, confirming that the parties were unable to timely complete the meet and confer requirement at least five days before the original deadline of December 23, 2024. (12/23/2024 Batezel Decl.)

Accordingly, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, subdivision (a)(2), SFI was entitled to an automatic 30-day extension from December 23, 2024, establishing that January 22, 2025, is the deadline. However, SFI filed its Demurrer on January 23, 2025–one day beyond the extended deadline–rendering the filing untimely. Plaintiff’s Opposition, which was also untimely–filed only one day before the hearing–raises no objection regarding the issue of timeliness of the Demurrer. The absence of any such objection suggests that no prejudice resulted from the one-day delay.

The Court finds the single-day delay, without more, to be de minimis and legally immaterial. In the exercise of its discretion, and given that all other procedural requirements are met, the Court will consider the merits of the Demurrer, the Motion to Strike, as well as Plaintiff’s untimely Opposition to both. (See Jackson v. Doe (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 742, 750 [holding that the court acted within its broad discretion by considering defendant’s untimely demurrer when plaintiff was not prejudiced by the delay.])

B.     Meet and Confer

A party filing a demurrer “shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a).) A failure to meet and confer does not constitute grounds to sustain or overrule a demurrer. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(4).)

Here, SFI filed a declaration indicating that the parties were unable to timely meet and confer at least 5 days before the initial deadline of December 23, 2024. (12/23/2024 Batezel Decl.) SFI has not demonstrated any additional efforts to meet and confer.

Accordingly, the Court finds that SFI has not satisfied the requirements for telephonic or in-person meet and confer under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, subdivision (a).

Nonetheless, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, subdivision (a)(4), the Court will proceed with a review of the merits of the Demurrer and the Motion to Strike.

C.    Uncertainty

A special demurrer to a complaint is appropriate when the grounds of the pleading are uncertain, ambiguous, or unintelligible.¿(Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10(f); Beresford Neighborhood Assn. v. City of San Mateo¿(1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1180, 1191.)

However, Courts typically disfavor demurrers based on uncertainty, which the court strictly construes even when the pleading is uncertain in some respects.¿(Khoury v.¿Maly’s¿of California, Inc.¿(1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)¿A demurrer for uncertainty may be sustained when a defendant cannot reasonably determine to what he or she is required to respond.¿For instance, when a plaintiff joins multiple causes of action as one, fails to properly identify each cause of action, or fails to assert which party each cause of action applies to when there are multiple defendants, a complaint is uncertain.¿(Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp.¿(1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2. (Williams).)

Here, SFI contends that the entire Complaint is uncertain, arguing that all allegations are jumbled and fail to specify which causes of action are directed at SFI versus co-defendant PMP. (Dem. at pp. 3-4.)

The Court acknowledges that the Complaint, at times, blends allegations against SFI and PMP, by referring to them as “Defendants” collectively. (See e.g., Compl. ¶ 28.) However, the Complaint also sets forth distinct allegations against SFI, such as breaching the insurance policy (Compl. ¶ 23), and mishandling the claim. (Compl. ¶¶ 32, 56-57.) Notably, the Second Cause of Action is expressly asserted against SFI. (Compl. ¶ 32.)

While the Complaint may lack ideal clarity, the allegations provide enough details to permit SFI to respond. The Court does not find that any ambiguity rises to the level of legal uncertainty that would deprive Defendant SFI of a reasonable opportunity to understand the claims asserted and respond accordingly.

Therefore, in alignment with established legal principles, including those outlined in Williams, supra, 185 Cal.App.3d at p. 139 fn. 2, the Court finds that SFI has not demonstrated adequate grounds to sustain the Demurrer on the basis of uncertainty.

D.    First Cause of Action – Breach of Contract

“To prevail on a cause of action for breach of contract, the plaintiff must prove (1) the contract, (2) the plaintiff's performance of the contract or excuse for nonperformance, (3) the

defendant's breach, and (4) the resulting damage to the plaintiff. (Richman v. Hartley (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1186.) “A written contract may be pleaded either by its terms – set out verbatim in the complaint or a copy of the contract attached to the complaint and incorporated therein by reference – or by its legal effect. [Citations.] In order to plead a contract by its legal effect, plaintiff must ‘allege the substance of its relevant terms. This is more difficult, for it

requires a careful analysis of the instrument, comprehensiveness in statement, and avoidance of legal conclusions.’ [Citation.]” (McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1489 (McKell).)

            SFI argues that the First Cause of Action is subject to demurrer on the grounds that Plaintiff fails to attach the contract or plead any of its applicable terms. (Dem. at p. 4.)

            In Opposition, Plaintiff concedes that she inadvertently failed to attach the alleged contract to the Complaint and requests leave to amend. (Opp’n. at pp. 4-5”)

            Here, the Complaint identifies the insurance policy by number (Compl. ¶ 12) and alleges SFI’s obligation to pay for covered water damage (Id. ¶ 24). The allegation that water damage was a “covered peril” implies the existence of a contractual duty. (ibid).

Under California law, when reviewing a demurrer, courts liberally construe the allegations of a complaint with a view to substantive justice between the parties. (King v. Central Bank (1977) 18 Cal.3d 840, 843.) In light of this rule, the Court finds that the Complaint adequately alleges the existence of a contract between Plaintiff and SFI. Attachment of the contract is not strictly required under California law if the Complaint, like here, outlines the contract’s legal effect. (McKell, supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 1489.)

            However, while the Complaint sufficiently alleges the legal effect of a contract, it fails to allege with particularity the manner in which SFI breached the contract. The Complaint does not specify the amount of benefits claimed to be due, or identify the relevant policy provisions that were allegedly breached. For instance, the allegations that SFI “failed to fully and fairly pay” for losses (Compl. ¶ 23) and owes “hundreds of thousands of dollars” due to the property’s “total or complete loss” (id. ¶ 26) are conclusory and unsupported by specific facts. As a result, the Court finds that the Complaint fails to sufficiently plead the essential elements of a breach of contract claim. (Reichert v. General Ins. Co. (1968) 68 Cal.2d 822, 830.)

            Accordingly, the Court SUSTAINS the Demurrer as to the First Cause of Action against Defendant SFI only, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

E.     Second Cause of Action – Breach of Implied Obligation of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

The law implies a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract, including insurance policies. (Wilson v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 713, 720.)

“The covenant of good faith and fair dealing, implied by law in every contract, exists merely to prevent one contracting party from unfairly frustrating the other party's right to receive the benefits of the agreement actually made. (E.g., Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange, Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 36.)” (Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 349–350 (Guz).) (Emphasis in original.) As to the scope of the covenant, “‘[t]he precise nature and extent of the duty imposed by such an implied promise will depend on the contractual purposes.’” (Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 809, 818.)

“If the allegations do not go beyond the statement of a mere contract breach and, relying on the same alleged acts, simply seek the same damages or other relief already claimed in a companion contract cause of action, they may be disregarded as superfluous as no additional claim is actually stated. Thus, absent those limited cases where a breach of a consensual contract term is not claimed or alleged, the only justification for asserting a separate cause of action for breach of the implied covenant is to obtain a tort recovery.” (Careau & Co. v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1395 (Careau).)

“An exception to this general rule has developed in the context of insurance contracts where, for a variety of policy reasons, courts have held that breach of the implied covenant will provide the basis for an action in tort.” (Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654, 684.)

SFI’s Demurrer raises only one legal ground–uncertainty– that potentially applies to the Second Cause of Action. SFI does not present other legal arguments challenging the sufficiency of this claim.

As the Court has previously overruled the Demurrer based on uncertainty and found that the Complaint sufficiently alleges the existence of a contract, the Court further finds that the Second Cause of Action, which is derivative of the First Cause of Action, is sufficiently certain.

Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES the Demurrer as the Second Cause of Action.

F.     Third Cause of Action – Breach of Fiduciary Duty

A claim for breach of fiduciary duty consists of the following elements: (1) the existence of a fiduciary duty, (2) breach of that duty, and (3) damage caused by the breach. (Gutierrez v. Girardi (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 925, 932.) To plead a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must allege facts showing the existence of a fiduciary duty owed to that plaintiff, a breach of that duty and resulting damage. (Pellegrini v. Weiss (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 515, 524.)

“A fiduciary relationship has been defined as “any relation existing between parties to a transaction wherein one of the parties is ... duty bound to act with the utmost good faith for the benefit of the other party. Such a relation ordinarily arises where a confidence is reposed by one person in the integrity of another, and in such a relation the party in whom the confidence is reposed, if he voluntarily accepts or assumes to accept the confidence, can take no advantage from his acts relating to the interest of the other party without the latter's knowledge or consent.” (In re Marriage of Varner (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 128, 141.)

“The insurer-insured relationship is not a true fiduciary relationship in the same sense as the relationship between trustee and beneficiary, or attorney and client. It is, rather, a relationship often characterized by unequal bargaining power in which the insured must depend on the good faith and performance of the insurer. This characteristic has led the courts to impose special and heightened duties, but while these special duties are akin to, and often resemble, duties that are also owed by fiduciaries, the fiduciary-like duties arise because of the unique nature of the insurance contract, not because the insurer is a fiduciary.” (Vu v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1142, 1143 (Vu).)

SFI argues that this claim fails because no fiduciary relationship exists between it and Plaintiff. (Dem. at p. 5.) The Court agrees.

Here, the Complaint alleges SFI owed a fiduciary duty to act in Plaintiff’s best interest. (Compl. ¶ 41) and breached it by acting for its own benefit (id. ¶ 43).

However, the California Supreme Court has made clear that the insurer-insured relationship is not a “true fiduciary relationship” like that of a trustee or attorney, but rather a contractual relationship with heightened good faith duties. (Vu, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1143.) As such, Plaintiff’s allegations of bad faith, such as delaying claims or ignoring evidence, are appropriately addressed under the Second Cause of Action for Breach of Implied Obligation of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, not as a fiduciary duty claim. The Court is not aware of any California authority that supports imposing a fiduciary duty on insurers in this context. 

Therefore, the Court SUSTAINS the Demurrer to the Third Cause of Action against Defendant SFI only, WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

G.    Fourth Cause of Action – Business and Professions Code Section 17200 Et Seq.

California Business and Professions Code sections 17200 et seq are commonly referred to as California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), which prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200; see Clark v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 605, 610.) “An unlawful business practice or act is an act or practice,

committed pursuant to business activity, that is at the same time forbidden by law.” (Klein v. Earth Elements, Inc. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 965, 969.)

A private party has standing to bring a UCL claim if he or she has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of Defendant’s unfair competition. (See Law Offices of Mathew Higbee v. Expungement Assistance Services (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 544, 555-56.) “[A]n identifiable trifle [of injury] is enough for standing ...” (Id. at 561.)

The remedies for UCL claims brought by private individuals are limited to injunctive relief and restitution. (See, e.g., Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb and Lack (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1133 (Prakashpalan).)

SFI contends that Plaintiff cannot state a cause of action under the UCL, Business and Professions Code section 17200, because Plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law, thereby precluding the only permissible, equitable remedies – injunction and restitution – available under this claim. (Dem. at p. 6.) The Court finds this argument persuasive.

In Opposition, Plaintiff argues that the Complaint also alleges restitution in the alternative. (Opp’n. at p. 5.)

The Court finds SFI’s argument persuasive. Plaintiff’s reference to restitution is unsupported by specific factual allegations in the Complaint.

Here, the Complaint alleges that SFI engaged in unfair business practices through misrepresentations and breaches. (Compl. ¶ 48.) However, it does not identify or request specific equitable remedies. Instead, Plaintiff’s prayer for relief seeks monetary damages (Prayer ¶¶ 1-4, 6-7), which are not available under the UCL.

Therefore, the Fourth Cause of Action is insufficient as currently alleged, as it neither pleads an inadequate legal remedy nor seeks appropriate UCL relief. However, the Court finds that the deficiencies do not appear incurable on the face of the pleading and may be remedied through amendment.

Accordingly, the Court SUSTAINS the Demurrer to the Fourth Cause of Action against Defendant SFI only, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

H.    Fifth Cause of Action – Negligence

The elements of a negligence claim include: (1) legal duty owed to plaintiffs to use due care, (2) breach of duty, (3) causation, and (4) damage. (County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 318; Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917.)

However, the law is clear that conduct amounting to a breach of a contract becomes tortious only when it also violates a duty independent of the contract arising from principles of tort law. (Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 503, 515; Jones v. Kelly (1929) 208 Cal. 251, 255 [“An omission to perform a contract obligation is never a tort, unless that omission is also an omission of a legal duty.”])

SFI contends that an insurer does not owe a duty beyond the contractual obligation outlined in the insurance policy, and that such duties do not give rise to tort damage under a negligence theory. (Dem. at p. 8.)

In Opposition, Plaintiff argues that SFI’s conduct was unreasonable, beyond ordinary negligence. (Opp’n. at p. 5) However, Plaintiff fails to address the threshold legal issue–namely, that negligence requires the breach of a duty imposed by law, independent of any contractual obligations. Absent a legal duty distinct from contractual relationship, no tort liability may be imposed. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s argument is unavailing.

Here, the Complaint alleges that SFI had a duty to act as a reasonable insurer and breached the duty through delays, excessive documentation requests, and inadequate investigations. (Compl. ¶ 57.) However, these allegations mirror the claims underlying the Second Cause of Action and are rooted in SFI’s contractual duties under the alleged insurance policy. (Id. ¶ 32.) Plaintiff does not allege a separate tort duty outside the contractual framework that would support a cause of action for negligence. (Adelman v. Associated Int’l Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 352, 369.)

Even when the Complaint is liberally construed, no reasonable inference can be drawn that SFI owed Plaintiff a legal duty apart from its contractual obligations. As such, the Complaint fails to allege a key element–duty–necessary to support a negligence claim.

            Accordingly, the Court SUSTAINS the Demurrer as to the Fifth Cause of Action against Defendant SFI only, WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

I.       Motion to Strike

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).) The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false, or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)

In its Motion to Strike, SFI seeks to strike the following portions from the Complaint:

1.      Paragraph 46: “Defendants acted willfully, maliciously, oppressively, and in conscious disregard of the rights of Plaintiff Amato-Fogle and their fiduciary duties. As such Plaintiff Amato-Fogle are  [sic] entitled to punitive damages.”

2.      Item 3 of the Prayer: “For punitive and exemplary damages for fiduciary breach, according to proof at trial;”

3.      Item 6 of the Prayer: “For an award of prevailing party’s attorney’s fees;”

(1)   Punitive Damages – Paragraphs 46 and Prayer Item 3

Punitive damages may be imposed where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “Malice” is conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) “‘Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiff’s rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate.’ [Citation.]” (Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1210.)

A motion to strike punitive damages is properly granted where a plaintiff does not state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, including allegations that the defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. (Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) “Mere negligence, even gross negligence, is not sufficient to justify such an award” for punitive damages. (Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United California Bank (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 949, 958.)

            Here, paragraph 46 is pleaded under the Third Cause of Action for Breach of Fiduciary Duty. Similarly, item 3 of the Prayer seeks punitive damages for “fiduciary breach,” making clear that the request for punitive damages is premised solely on that cause of action.

            As the Court has sustained the demurrer to the Third Cause of Action without leave to amend, that claim is no longer viable. Without an underlying cause of action, the request for punitive damages necessarily fails.

            Moreover, even if a cause of action had survived, paragraph 46 contains only conclusory assertions devoid of any factual assertions supporting a finding of oppression, fraud, or malice. Such boilerplate pleading is insufficient to withstand a motion to strike. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041.)

            Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Strike as to paragraph 46 and item 3 of the Prayer against Defendant SFI only, WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

(2)   Attorney’s Fees – Item 6 of Prayer

In the absence of some special agreement, statutory provision or exceptional circumstances, attorney's fees are to be paid by the party employing the attorney. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021; Prentice v. North Am. Title Guaranty Corp., Alameda Division (1963) 59 Cal.2d 618, 621.)

Here, the Complaint does not cite a policy provision or statute authorizing an award of attorney fees. As such, the request is facially improper and subject to being stricken.

However, the Court does not conclude that this defect is incurable. Plaintiff may potentially amend the pleading to provide sufficient allegations of a contractual attorney fee provision within the insurance policy.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Strike as to item 6 of the Prayer against Defendant SFI only, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

CONCLUSION

Defendant State Farm Insurance’s Demurrer to the Complaint is SUSTAINED IN PART.

The Court SUSTAINS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND the Demurrer as to the First Cause of Action (Breach of Contract) and the Fourth Cause of Action (Business and Professions Code Section 17200 et seq.) against Defendant State Farm Insurance only.

Plaintiff is GRANTED LEAVE TO AMEND the Complaint as to the First and Fourth Causes of Action and shall serve and file a First Amended Complaint within 30 days.

The Court SUSTAINS WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND the Demurrer as to the Third Cause of Action (Breach of Fiduciary Duty) and the Fifth Cause of Action (Negligence) against Defendant State Farm Insurance only.

The Court OVERRULES the Demurrer as to the Second Cause of Action (Breach of Implied Obligation of Good Faith and Fair Dealing) against Defendant State Farm Insurance only.

Defendant State Farm Insurance’s Motion to Strike is GRANTED.

The Court GRANTS WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND the Motion to Strike as to paragraph 46 and item 3 of the Prayer, against Defendant State Farm Insurance only.

The Court GRANTS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND the Motion to Strike as to item 6 of the Prayer, against Defendant State Farm Insurance only.

Plaintiff is GRANTED LEAVE TO AMEND the Complaint as to item 6 of the Prayer and the supporting factual allegations and shall serve and file a First Amended Complaint within 30 days.

Moving party to give notice.