Judge: David B. Gelfound, Case: 24CHCV04420, Date: 2025-04-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24CHCV04420    Hearing Date: April 11, 2025    Dept: F49

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F49

MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT

Motion filed: 3/7/25

MOVING PARTY: Defendant J&J Hospitality Group LLC

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Northridge Multifamily Vertical, L.P.

NOTICE: OK.

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order vacating the summary judgment and entering a new and different judgment.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

This action arises from a commercial unlawful detainer dispute concerning the premises located at 19535 Nordhoff Street, Suite 50, Northridge, CA 91324 (the “Subject Premises”).

On December 2, 2024, Plaintiff Northridge Multifamily Vertical, L.P. (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against Defendant J & J Hospitality Group LLC d/b/a Tulsi Indian Eatery (“Defendant”) and Does 1 through 10. The Complaint alleges a single cause of action for Unlawful Detainer under Code of Civil Procedure section 1161(2). Subsequently, Defendant filed its Answer to the Complaint on December 30, 2024.

On February 10, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. Subsequently, on February 27, 2025, the Court entered Judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant (the “Judgment”).

On February 25, 2025, Defendant filed a notice of intent to move for a new trial.

On March 7, 2025, Defendant filed the instant Motion to Vacate Judgment (the “Motion”). Subsequently, Plaintiff filed an Opposition on March 14, 2025, and Defendant submitted an untimely Reply on April 7, 2025.

ANALYSIS

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 663, “[a] judgment or decree, when based upon¿a decision¿by the court,” may be vacated for either of the following causes: 

“1. Incorrect or erroneous¿legal¿basis for the decision,¿not consistent with or not supported by the¿facts; and in such case when the judgment is set aside, the¿statement of decision¿shall be amended and corrected. 

2. A judgment or decree not consistent with or not supported by the special verdict.” 

(Civ. Proc., § 663.) 

¿ 

A.    Procedural Defects

(1)   Failure to file a Separate Notice of Intent

Code of Civil Procedure section 663a requires strict compliance with the procedural steps necessary to bring a motion to vacate judgment:

“A party intending to make a motion to set aside and vacate a judgment, as described in Section 663, shall file with the clerk and serve upon the adverse party a notice of his or her intention, designating the grounds upon which the motion will be made, and specifying the particulars in which the legal basis for the decision is not consistent with or supported by the facts, or in which the judgment or decree is not consistent with the special verdict, either:

(1)   After the decision is rendered and before the entry of judgment.

(2)   Within 15 days of the date of mailing of notice of entry of judgment by the clerk of the court pursuant to Section 664.5, or service upon him or her by any party of written notice of entry of judgment, or within 180 days after the entry of judgment, whichever is earliest.”

(Code Civ. Proc., § 663a.)

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that the motion to vacate under Code of Civil Procedure section 663 is procedurally and substantively distinguished from a motion for a new trial which is governed under Code of Civil Procedure section 657. (Simac Design, Inc. v. Alciati (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 146, 153 [“A motion to vacate under section 663 is a remedy to be used when a trial court draws incorrect conclusions of law or renders an erroneous judgment on the basis of uncontroverted evidence.” In contrast, a motion for a new trial is “to be used when ... the evidence is insufficient to support the findings or verdict.”])

Here, Defendant filed the instant Motion on March 7, 2025, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 663, seeking to vacate the Court’s Judgment entered on February 27, 2025. The Motion explicitly invokes Code of Civil Procedure section 663 and argues solely that legal errors appear on the face of the record – grounds that fall squarely within the scope of Code of Civil Procedure section 663.

Because the Motion is not a request for a new trial but one seeking to vacate the judgment based on legal error, a separate notice of intent to move to vacate judgment was required under Code of Civil Procedure section 663a.

 Although Defendant filed a notice of intent to move for a new trial on February 25, 2025, it did not file or serve a separate notice of intention to move to vacate judgment – neither before nor following the entry of Judgment on February 27, 2025.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant failed to comply with the mandatory procedural requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 663a by neglecting to file and serve a timely, separate notice of intent to move to vacate the judgment.

While the Motion is procedurally defective due to the absence of a timely notice of intent under Code of Civil Procedure section 663a, the Court nonetheless proceeds to consider the Motion on its merits.

(2)   Untimely Reply

Code of Civil Procedure section 1005, subdivision (b), provides, in part, that “[a]ll papers opposing a motion so noticed shall be filed with the court and a copy served on each party at least nine court days, and all reply papers at least five court days before the hearing.”

Here, Plaintiff filed its Opposition on March 14, 2025, which is timely, as it was filed 19 court days before the hearing date.

However, Defendant’s Reply was filed on April 7, 2025, which is only four court days before the hearing. Therefore, the Reply is untimely, having failed to comply with the statutory requirement of being filed “at least five court days before the hearing.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b).)

Despite the one-day delay, the Court elects to exercise its discretion and consider the untimely Reply. (See Rancho Mirage Country Club Homeowners Assn. v. Hazelbaker (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 252, 262 [“a trial court has broad discretion to accept or reject late-filed papers.”])

Accordingly, although untimely, the Court will consider the Reply in its review of the Motion.

B.     Request for Judicial Notice

Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice (“RJN”) of the following document:

1.      Grant Deed for APN: 2761-035-015 (RJN Ex. “A.”)

            Pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (c) and (g), courts may take judicial notice of “[o]fficial acts of the . . . executive . . . departments of the United States and of any state of the United States”, and of “[f]acts and propositions that are of such common knowledge within the territorial jurisdiction of the court that they cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute.”

            While a grant deed may be judicially noticeable as an official recorded instrument, the Court finds that the standard of review governing a motion to vacate judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 663 confines its analysis to the existing record and precludes consideration or introduction of new evidence.

            As established in Payne v. Rader (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1574 [disapproved on other grounds], “a motion to vacate lies only where a ‘different judgment’ is compelled by the facts found. [Citation.] A motion to vacate under section 663 may only be brought when ‘the trial judge draws an incorrect legal conclusion or renders an erroneous judgment upon the facts found by it to exist.’” In other words, “[i]n ruling on a motion to vacate the judgment the court cannot ‘ “in any way change any finding of fact.”’” (Glen Hill Farm, LLC v. California Horse Racing Bd. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1296, 1302.)

            Here, Defendant seeks to introduce a 2015 Grant Deed as new evidence to challenge Plaintiff’s ownership of the Subject Premises. However, this evidence was not submitted during the summary judgment proceedings, and consideration of such new evidence is beyond the permissible scope of review for a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 663. The Court is limited to the face of the existing record and cannot evaluate newly offered factual material.

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s RJN.

C.    Plaintiff’s Ownership of Subject Premises and Standing in the Action

Defendant first argues that Judgment is unavailable to Plaintiff because Plaintiff is not the owner of the Subject Premises. (Mot. at p. 4.) In support, Defendant asserts that the true owner of the Subject Premises is an individual by the name of Brook Lynn Taylor, as purportedly reflected in a 2018 Grant Deed. (Id. at p. 5.)

The Court finds Defendant’s argument without merit for several independent reasons.

First, the Court emphasizes that title ownership is not adjudicated in an unlawful detainer action. Defendant’s challenge to Plaintiff’s ownership effectively amounts to standing argument, asserting that Plaintiff lacked legal capacity to initiate this action. However, as Defendant concedes – citing CACI No. 4302 – an unlawful detainer lawsuit may be brought by a plaintiff who either “owns [or] leases the property.” (Mot. at p. 3.) (Underlines added.)

Here, the evidentiary record considered in connection with the original motion for summary judgment establishes a clear chain of possessory interest: in 2015, Northridge Multifamily, LLC acquired an ownership interest in the Subject Premises; in 2016, it executed a Ground Lease to Northridge Multifamily II, LLC; in 2017, Northridge Multifamily II, LLC assigned its leasehold interest to Plaintiff, Northridge Multifamily Vertical, L.P; and finally in 2020, Plaintiff entered into a commercial space lease of the Subject Premises with Defendant, followed by subsequent amendments (collectively, the “Lease”), which forms the basis of the present action.

It is undisputed that the Lease is valid and enforceable, and Defendant has not denied the existence or terms of the Lease. In fact, Defendant’s Answer to the Complaint contains only a general denial and fails to specifically controvert Plaintiff’s ownership or possessory rights to the Subject Premises.

As such, Plaintiff has demonstrated sufficient standing to enforce the Lease and maintains this unlawful detainer action against Defendant.

Second, even assuming that Plaintiff’s ownership could be challenged in this proceeding, Defendant – as a tenant – is estopped from challenging the title of its landlord. California courts have long held that in an unlawful detainer action, a tenant may not challenge the title of the landlord from whom it accepted possession and agreed to pay rent. (Reay v. Cotter (1865) 29 Cal. 168, 170–171.)

Here, Defendant seeks to assert that a third party holds title to the Subject Property. However, such a claim does not impair Plaintiff’s right of possession as against Defendant, and Defendant is estopped by its Lease from raising title as an issue. Accordingly, title is not – and cannot be – made a question in this action.

Finally, just like the 2015 Grant Deed that Defendant seeks to introduce through its RJN, this argument rests solely on new evidence – specifically, the 2018 Grant Deed attached to the Motion. This evidence was not introduced during the underlying summary judgment proceeding and thus not part of the existing record.

The law is clear that “[i]n ruling on a motion to vacate the judgment the court cannot ‘“in any way change any finding of fact.”’” (Glen Hill Farm, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1302.)

Because the Court may not consider newly presented evidence, Defendant’s claim regarding Plaintiff’s alleged lack of ownership or right of possession is improper and factually unsupported under governing standards.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Defendant’s challenge to Plaintiff’s ownership and standing fails.

D.    Plaintiff’s Notice to Quit

Code of Civil Procedure section 1174, part of the unlawful detainer statute, “provides the court's jurisdiction to enter judgment for possession and to award incidental rents and damages.” (Hudec v. Robertson (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1156, 1163.) Section 1174 contains a special provision allowing the court to “find the amount of any rent due, if the alleged unlawful detainer be after default in the payment of rent.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1174, subd. (b).) Accordingly, assuming other statutory requirements are met, an award of back rent accrued before the unlawful detainer period begins may be allowable, so long as the unlawful detainer is based on the nonpayment of rent. (Saberi v. Bakhtiari (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 509, 515.)

Civil Code section 1671, subdivision (b), provides that “... a provision in a contract liquidating the damages for the breach of the contract is valid unless the party seeking to invalidate the provision establishes that the provision was unreasonable under the circumstances existing at the time the contract was made.”

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s notice to quit (the “Notice”) is defective for two reasons: (1) the estimate of rent demanded was not reasonable or in good faith, and (2) it includes late fees. (Mot. at p. 7.) Both of the arguments hinge on the assertion that the late fees were invalid and cannot be included in the Notice.

Defendant cites Del Monte Properties & Investments, Inc. v. Dolan (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th Supp.20 (Del Monte), arguing that a notice that included late fee was defective and could not support unlawful detainer judgment. (Mot. at p. 7.)

The Court finds Defendant’s reliance on Del Monte unpersuasive, for the following reasons.

First, unlike the late fee in Del Monte, the Lease expressly categorizes all fees as “Additional Rent.” Plaintiff’s evidence in the record support that the late fee in the present case is categorized as part of rent and therefore was properly included in the Notice. As cited by Defendant, Section 4.4 of the Lease states: “All monetary obligations of Tenant under Lease that are in addition to the Minimum Annual Rent shall be deemed additional rent (‘Additional Rent’). Minimum Rent and Additional Rent are sometimes collectively referred to herein as ‘Rent.’” (Mot. at p. 6.)

Plaintiff argues that the ordinary meaning of “all” encompasses all monetary obligations, including late fees, which are both monetary in nature and contractually owed. The Court agrees with this interpretation.

While Defendant points to Section 4.6 of the Lease, which provides for a late charge equal to 10% of the delinquent amount, this provision does not undermine the classification of late fees as “Additional Rent.” (Mot. at p. 6.) The reference to “late charge” alongside “Minimum Rent” and “Additional Rent” does not imply exclusivity or conflict. Rather, it serves to calculate the amount owed in the event of late payment.

Moreover, all relevant provisions – Section 4.2 (“Minimum Rent”), Section 4.4 (“Additional Rent”), Section 4.6 (“Late Payment”) – appear under the same “Article 4 RENT.” The placement of these provisions supports the conclusion that late fees are subsumed within the broader definition of rent under the Lease.

Second, the Del Monte decision involved a residential lease, to which Civil Code section 1671, subdivision (d) applies. Under that subdivision, late fees in residential lease are void unless the landlord proves reasonableness and impracticability of calculating actual damages. (Civ. Code, § 1671, subd. (d); Del Monte, supra.).

In contrast, the present case involves a commercial lease, governed by Civil Code section 1671, subdivision (b), under which liquidated damages provisions are presumed valid unless the party challenging the late fee provides that it is an unreasonable penalty. (Civ. Code, § 1671, subd. (b).)

Here, Defendant merely asserts – without evidentiary support – that the late fees are invalid.  Defendant offered no evidence during the motion for summary judgment proceeding and thus failed to establish that the fees were unreasonable at the time of contract formation. As such, Defendant has not met its burden under Civil Code section 1671, subdivision (b).

Finally, the Court notes that Defendant’s challenge is largely a rehash of arguments raised or available during the summary judgment proceedings. While styled as a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 663, the Motion seeks to revisit factual and interpretive disputes, not identify a facial legal error warranting relief under the statute.

The validity of the Notice was already addressed based on the facts in the record. Defendant offers no new legal basis showing that the Court drew an incorrect legal conclusion based on these facts.

Accordingly, the Court finds Defendant’s argument regarding the Notice unpersuasive.

Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES the Motion.

CONCLUSION

Defendant J & J Hospitality Group LLC’s Motion to Vacate Judgment is DENIED.

Moving party to provide notice.