Judge David J. Cowan, Case 18STPB11082 2023-05-18 Tentative Ruling

Judge: David J. Cowan, Case: 18STPB11082, Date: 2023-05-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 18STPB11082 Hearing Date: May 18, 2023 Dept: 200

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT – WEST DISTRICT

BEVERLY HILLS COURTHOUSE – DEPT. 200

JUDGE DAVID J. COWAN

TENTATIVE FURTHER RULING ON MOTION OF HUANG FAMILY FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

Ming-Chao Huang, et al. v. Michael Velcherean, Case No. 18STPB11082 (related to 19STCV01901)

Hearing Date: May 18, 2023, 8:30 a.m.

BACKGROUND

Prior to the hearing on the above-referenced motion on April 13, 2023, the Court issued its tentative ruling (which after the hearing was filed for the record).

On April 13, 2023, the Court heard oral argument on the motion. The Court agreed to continue the motion to allow the parties to brief further two issues: first, as discussed in the tentative ruling, what Judge Small intended by way of the Admitted Matters Order (“AMO”) and to clarify a point that movants contended was mistaken in this regard in the tentative. Second, in view of the issues raised in the tentative ruling, to hear from the parties as to what effect the AMO should have going forward in the various proceedings in this case and the related civil case.

On April 28, 2023, both moving and opposing parties filed supplemental briefs.

Movants contend as follows:

First, that by reason of an earlier motion for sanctions they filed due to an inability to obtain information about certain accounts (that according to them the Court mistakenly denied out of inadvertence), the AMO should not be viewed as an attempt by them to unfairly obtain MV’s admission that he has no ownership interest in those accounts. Hence, they contend the concern referenced in the tentative based on St. Mary’s v. Sup. Ct. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762, 783-84 is inapplicable here. Instead, they point to a remark of Judge Small wherein he indicates that he is aware that the AMO will be an “ultimate sanction.” Finally, Movants note that a court is required to deem matters admitted under CCP sec. 2033.280(b) without also finding there was “misuse of the discovery process.”

Second, that the orders of Judge Small referenced in the tentative did not concern the AMO but rather other admissions by the parties. Movants claim this issue impacts this Court’s whole analysis.

Third, the AMO applies to all petitions within this case, as well as to the related civil case. Movants point to Calif. Rules of Court, Rule 3.300, as well as Tritek Telecom v. Sup. Ct. (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1390. They argue that not applying the AMO in this way will cause there to be conflicting discovery rulings, which must be avoided where “the cases are consolidated for trial and no ground exists for treating the [AMO] different from other orders in these related cases.”

Fourth, this Court would be abusing its discretion by “seeking” ambiguity in the AMO to effectively revoke the AMO. The Court is not “reconsidering” the AMO.

Finally, they would be prejudiced were this Court not to apply the AMO as they see it.

MV contends as follows:

First, the AMO cannot apply to the petitions at issue on this motion where those were not pending when the requests for admission (“RFA”) were propounded. CCP sec. 2033.410(b) (Shepard & Morgan v. Lee & Daniel (1982) 31 Cal.3d 256)

Second, the scope of the AMO should be limited because the RFA’s are ambiguous.

Third, the scope of the AMO should be limited because adopting Movants’ interpretation would be an impermissible terminating sanction.

Fourth, that even if the AMO is construed broadly, the motion still needs to be denied because the facts offered do not show they are entitled to relief.

DISCUSSION

The April 13 tentative ruling, and in particular, its conclusion as to how to apply the AMO on the motion, does not depend on any finding that the Huang Family engaged in any “gotcha” tactic based on the admissions – that was the concern of the court in St Mary’s, supra that the Court quoted. Even assuming some level of bad faith conduct on the part of MV, the language cited is still instructive concerning the conflicting policy of deciding cases on their merits.

The reference to Judge Small’s December 30, 2022 order (in Ex. H to the Correll Decl.) as one of the two bases for the first reason there is ambiguity in how to apply the AMO (see p. 11 of April 13 ruling) was mistaken. It appears the admission by MV that Judge Small was referring to was not one of those that were the subject of the AMO. That said, the other order of the same date (in Ex. I to the Correll Decl.) does indicate Judge Small intended that other evidence was still relevant in determining who had right to the money in the account. Moreover, contrary to Huang Family’s claim, this error does not invalidate the balance of the ruling. There were at least four other separate reasons why the AMO was ambiguous in terms of how it should be applied.

Neither Calif. Rules of Court, Rule 3.300, nor Tritek, supra, mandate that a ruling in one case should apply in another case, or for that matter within a Probate case that a ruling on one petition necessarily applies to another petition. While obviously having one judge presiding over multiple related proceedings promotes judicial economy, that does not also mean that all rulings in those cases apply across the board. The parties and or issues may differ even if there are overlapping claims or facts. The one short passage in Tritec on this issue was to make sure that related cases were heard by one judge (rather than three judges); not how that single judge should apply rulings in one case in another case.

In turn, the contention that the petitions are consolidated for trial is incorrect. To the contrary: The court discussed previously it sought the parties’ input on how best to prioritize which of the many issues should be tried. The Court will discuss which of these petitions should be heard first at the upcoming trial setting conference.

As discussed in the April 13 tentative ruling, the AMO has the potential to result in inconsistent rulings across cases and petitions. The undersigned did not create this situation and will endeavor to work through it going forward.1 The Court cannot make matters easier by treating all cases and petitions as the same when they are not and there are other reasons that MV raises which may require they be treated differently.2

For example, MV raises a further problem with applying the AMO without consideration of other issues: Huang Family seeks to apply the AMO to petitions that were not pending when the response was provided. Under CCP sec. 2033.410(b), an admission “is made for the purpose of the pending action only.” (Emphasis added) A petition is a separate “action” from another petition.3 See Shepard & Morgan, supra (an admission by a defendant on a complaint cannot be used against that defendant for purposes of a cross-complaint in the same case against third persons where in each action the party may pursue alternative theories).4 Here, MV points out that the petitions on which Huang Family seeks summary judgment were not pending when the RFA were served on October 31, 2020. The Huang Family Probate Code 850 petition was filed shortly thereafter – on November 16, 2020 and MV’s 850 petition -also at issue on the motion – was not filed until September 26, 2022 – two years later.

While it is not clear whether MV would have still provided the same response even if those petitions were then pending, and it does not appear that this other action involved third parties as to whom MV might have taken a different position, as in Shepard & Morgan, supra, regardless of the AMO there were independent reasons why the motion was required to be denied – as set forth at length in the April 13 tentative ruling. The findings in the tentative ruling pertaining the disputed evidence do not depend on the AMO.

As a result, the Court does not need to now reach the parties’ differing views about the AMO as a permissible sanction; on the one hand, Huang Family arguing that it should have broad import because Judge Small referred to it as the ultimate sanction, and on the other hand, MV arguing that it should not be given that effect because a terminating sanction should have been based on an “incremental” approach towards discovery sanctions that may not have occurred here.

Finally, the Court does not find that Huang Family is materially prejudiced by how the court has applied the AMO on this motion. The Court has not yet set trial on any of the multiple petitions or in the civil case nor has it ordered any motion or discovery cut-off dates.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court adopts its earlier tentative ruling, except as noted above, and still denies both the motion for summary judgment and for summarily adjudication - on each of the issues identified.

Footnotes:

1) Huang Family argues that the Court is effectively reconsidering the AMO in how it is applying it. While the Court frankly expressed its concerns about the AMO, as well as the order denying the motion to withdraw the admissions, if the latter were to be reconsidered the Court would not have to work through the problems the AMO may create. Instead, as indicated, the Court intends to give it effect while recognizing other competing principles and rules. The Court is not “seeking” ambiguities; rather, it is trying to foresee the issues it may need to confront.

2) How the court ultimately does avoid inconsistent rulings is an issue for another day, including potentially by way of motion(s) in limine. Though the court invited briefing on this issue, after further consideration, it does not appear appropriate to provide guidance concerning issues that have not yet arisen.

3) See definitions of actions in CCP secs. 24 and 30.

4) This leaves aside the further issue under CCP sec. 2033.430(b) that an admission “shall not be used in any manner against that party in any other proceeding.” In other words, presumably an admission in the probate case cannot be used in the civil case – even if they have been related.