Judge: David J. Cowan, Case: 18STPB11082, Date: 2025-01-03 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 18STPB11082    Hearing Date: January 3, 2025    Dept: 200

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

WEST DISTRICT - BEVERLY HILLS COURTHOUSE

DEPT. 200

Ming-Chao Huang, et al. v. Michael Velcherean, Case No. 18STPB11082 (related to Case No. 19STCV01901)

TENTATIVE RULING ON WHETHER TRIAL OF PROBATE CODE SEC. 259 CLAIM SHOULD BE SCHEDULED BEFORE OR AFTER TRIAL OF CIVIL CASE  

Hearing Date: January 3, 2025, 8:30 a.m.

BACKGROUND AND CONTENTIONS

          At a trial setting conference on November 27, 2024, the Court set a three-week jury trial in the Civil Case to commence on September 15, 2025. At the same time, the Court set the above-referenced hearing date for argument on whether the claim in the Probate Case of the parents and sister of Decedent Amy Huang (“Amy”) (Huang Family”) that Amy’s surviving spouse, Michael Velcherean (“MV”) be deemed to have predeceased Amy under Probate Code (“PC”) sec. 259 should be before or after trial of the Civil Case.

          On December 18, 2024, MV filed a brief why the PC sec. 259 issue should follow the Civil trial. MV argues that hearing the PC issue (by the undersigned) before the Civil trial would deprive MV of his right to a jury trial. More specifically, MV takes issue with Huang Family’s acknowledgment that trial of the PC 259 claim would have collateral estoppel effects on what would need to be tried in the Civil Case. MV also takes note of comments of the bench suggesting that the PC 259 claim proceed after the Civil trial.

          On December 23, 2024, Huang Family filed their Reply concerning the order of trials. Huang Family argues that when these cases came to the undersigned for trial they had argued that there should be one trial combining all issues but that instead the Court adopted MV’s request that the Court try the will contest before the civil case. Given that ruling, Huang Family argues that the Court should now expeditiously complete the will contest trial by relying on the evidence heard at that trial (and such other evidence as may be necessary) to decide the PC 259 claim that the Court reserved for decision before conducting the jury trial (and which may then have collateral estoppel effect in the Civil case. (Roos v. Red (2005) 130 Cal.App.4^th 870, 879))[1] Huang Family argues further that the various findings and rulings of the Court adverse to MV warrant the Court now determining  the PC 259 claim against MV and thereby saving all parties the time and costs involved in the Civil jury trial. (Estate of Dito (2011) 198 Cal.App.4^th 791, 803) They argue also that MV simply wants a  jury trial to have a different trier of fact than the undersigned who has ruled already against him on various issues. Relatedly, they argue that the right to jury trial does not allow parties to relitigate issues already decided. (Roos, supra)  

DISCUSSION

          “It is well established that there is no right to jury trial in probate proceedings unless provided for by statute….An exception to this rule permits a jury trial when a probate statute provides for the formulation of issues of fact which, under section 1230, give rise to a jury trial on those issues if otherwise appropriate.” (Estate of Phelps (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 332, 336-337 (citing 7 Witkin, Cal Procedure (3d ed), sec. 96 and Estate of Beach (1975) 15 Cal.3d 623)) MV cites no statute requiring a jury trial for the PC 259 claim. However, MV may be entitled to a jury trial where the formulation of factual issues to that end would otherwise be appropriate for a jury.[2] As set forth in Phelps, supra:  

In Beach, the Supreme Court held there was no right to a jury trial in an action claiming mismanagement of estate assets in the form of objections to the executor’s first accounting. (§ 927.) The court in Beach rejected application of the line of cases granting jury trials when the code permits the formulation of issues of fact. (Estate of Beach, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 642, 125 Cal.Rptr. 570, 542 P.2d 994.) The Beach court distinguished between those cases presenting complex issues of accounting or involving the probate court’s supervisorial powers over the executor’s management of the estate and cases involving factual issues along the lines of those presented in a will contest; e.g., questions of mental capacity or undue influence. The court held that a jury trial was not available in the former class of cases but was available in the latter. (Id. at p. 643, 125 Cal.Rptr. 570, 542 P.2d 994.)

223 Cal.App.3d at 338. Beach was followed by Heiser v. Sup. Ct (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 276 concerning a petition under the predecessor version of PC se. 850. As summarized in Phelps, supra:

Although noting that section 851.5 did not provide for jury trials, the court observed: “Section 1230 [cf. § 1280] has been held to provide for the right of jury trial in ‘ “... those cases in which the code has expressly authorized issues of fact to be framed.” ’… After reviewing the Supreme Court’s decision in Estate of Beach, supra, 15 Cal.3d 623, 125 Cal.Rptr. 570, 542 P.2d 994, the Heiser court concluded that “in addition to a statutory provision for the joining or framing of factual issues, such issues must be appropriate for jury determination.” (Heiser v. Superior Court, supra, 88 Cal.App.3d at p. 279, 151 Cal.Rptr. 745.) The Heiser court went on to say that: “[J]ury trials are not available in probate proceedings when such would risk undermining the probate court’s supervisorial responsibilities or when the issue resembles an accounting wherein it is impractical for a jury to wade through a mass of figures. Jury trials are appropriate, however, when the issues involve such things as standard of conduct, mental capacity [citations], or credibility of witnesses.”… Thus, we interpret Heiser as preserving the right to a jury trial under section 9860 only to the extent that the right to jury trial would exist if the action were being tried outside of probate. Similarly, we conclude that section 1280 does not confer a greater right to jury trial than would exist in a nonprobate matter. It does no more than recognize that the right to jury, if it otherwise exists, is not lost because the proceeding occurs in probate. In the case before us, therefore, we must analyze the right to a jury trial by examining the underlying nature of the action.

223 Cal.App.3d at 338-340.

         Whether there was dependent adult abuse is an issue that absent a probate case would likely be one for which MV would be entitled to a jury in a civil context. A cause of action for damages (as opposed to disentitlement from an estate of amounts derived from abuse) based on financial elder or dependent adult abuse under Welfare & Institutions Code sec. 15657.5 is one for a jury. (See e.g., Conservatorship of Gregory (2000) 80 Cal.App.4^th 514, CACI 3100, et al) Similarly, per Phelps, “standard of conduct [alleged abuse], mental capacity [or at least undue influence], and credibility of witnesses” are central to this claim. A claim under PC 259 is not the same as a will contest that is routinely heard without a jury as part of the probate process (and hence was one of the reasons why that contest was decided already in this case) or otherwise involve the supervisory responsibilities of a probate court as in an accounting. Regardless, whether MV is entitled to a jury trial of the PC 259 claim under Estate of Beach, the issue here is easier: only whether to defer the PC 259 claim until after hearing the jury trial. In this regard, Probate Code sec. 854 is relevant:

          Probate Code sec. 854 provides: “If a civil action is pending with respect to the subject matter of a petition filed pursuant to this chapter this part and jurisdiction has been obtained in the court where the civil action is pending prior to the filing of the petition, upon request of any party to the civil action, the court shall abate the petition until the conclusion of the civil action. This section shall not apply if the court finds that the civil action was filed for the purpose of delay.”

          Huang Family filed their complaint in the Civil case on January 22, 2019. MV filed a notice of posting jury fees on May 3, 2019. MV filed his cross-complaint on February 1, 2021. The Civil Case has cross claims for damages against MV and Huang Family for Amy’s wrongful death, as well as for dependent adult abuse against MV. By contrast, in the Probate Case, Huang Family filed their petition under PC sec. 850 (including for a determination contesting Amy’s Wills) until November 16, 2020. Huang Family filed their Response and Objection (Will Contest) to MV’s amended petition for probate of wills on January 18, 2024.[3]  

          Based on these filing dates, jurisdiction had been obtained in the Civil Case prior to what Huang Family contends is its operative petition in the Probate case.[4] MV has in effect requested the Court “abate” the Probate case until a jury hears the civil case – consistent with the position he took at the initial status conference before the undersigned. The Court does not find that the civil case was filed for the purpose of delay. Indeed, MV did not file the civil case – Huang Family did so. MV has a Constitutional right to have a jury hear Huang Family’s complaint for damages – even leaving aside his own cross-complaint filed after Huang Family’s petition was filed. The Court also does not find that MV now seeking a jury trial – consistent with his posting jury fees back in 2019 – was for the purpose of delay.

          As discussed above, the subject matter of the civil case is substantially related to the subject matter of the PC sec. 259 claim. Sec. 259 is determined based in part on whether there was abuse of a dependent adult. The civil case also concerns whether there was dependent adult abuse – even if it is in the context of a claim for damages as opposed to determining what MV is entitled to from Amy’s estate. Huang Family does not argue otherwise. 

          For these reasons, abatement of the PC sec. 259 claim is applicable here and requires that the PC sec. 259 claim be tried after trial of the civil case, consistent also with Beach, supra. (See also Conservatorship of Pacheco (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 171)

          That in deciding the will contest the Court reserved the issue of PC sec. 259 (and interpretation of the will) should not be construed, as Huang Family does, that determining the applicability of sec. 259 is some proposed fourth phase of the will contest trial. The Court has decided the will contest. Determination of the applicability of sec. 259 is based on the Huang Family’s separate PC sec. 850 petition. See also Dito, supra, 198 Cal.App.4^th at 803 (“a section 259 claim [to be free from abuse] is distinct from, and unrelated to, a claim that an omitted spouse is entitled to a share of the estate.”) The factual issues may overlap but they are separate petitions with different considerations.

CONCLUSION

          For these reasons, including under the Constitution, the Court determines that the jury trial of the Civil case must proceed before the PC 259 claim, efficiencies notwithstanding. That said, the parties should be prepared to discuss at the hearing whether the PC 259 claim can be decided at the end of the civil trial, whether by the Court or the jury, based on the evidence submitted at that trial, without delay. (See Corder v. Corder (2007) 41 Cal.4^th 644 (concerning ability of court to allocate award for wrongful death without curtailing parties’ right to jury trial))  

          The Court also does not now decide what collateral estoppel effect, if any, prior rulings or findings may have on the civil trial that may mitigate the Huang Family’s concerns about the time and costs involved in the need to have multiple trials in these related cases.