Judge David J. Cowan, Case Number: 19STCV01901, Date: 2025-06-12 Tentative Ruling

Ming-Chao Huang, et al. v. Michael Velcherean, Case No. 19STCV01901 (related to Case No. 18STPB11082)

TENTATIVE RULING ON HUANG FAMILY MOTION IN LIMINE No.1: APPLYING COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL BASED ON PRIOR RULINGS IN RELATED PROBATE CASE

On October 24, 2024, the Court filed its forty-six page Final Statement of Decision (“FSOD”) in the related Probate case following three bifurcated phases of trial as to whether two wills were duly executed, whether the harmless error rule should still apply to nonetheless allow for admission and whether the decedent Amy Huang (“Amy”) lacked capacity or was unduly influenced by Michael Velcherean (“MV”) in executing the wills.

On November 27, 2024, the Court entered an order admitting the latter will to Probate, as MV had sought. The Court, however, denied MV’s request to serve as executor, notwithstanding his designation as such in the will. At p. 45 of the FSOD, the Court ruled that given the findings against MV, MV was disqualified from serving as executor.

On January 9, 2025, Huang Family filed a notice of appeal from said order. MV did not file any appeal from the part of the order adverse to him, nor from the adverse findings in the FSOD, nor did he thereafter file any cross-appeal.

On October 23, 2024, the Court filed its Tentative SOD in the related Probate case following a trial on the petition of the Special Administrator Aileen Federizo concerning whether two accounts were property of Amy’s estate or joint accounts held by Amy and MV by reason of which they would have passed outside Probate by right of survivorship to MV. By order filed November 20, 2024, the Court adopted its Tentative SOD as Final and entered an order filed December 16, 2024 that these accounts were property of Amy’s estate (absent a showing after any further trial that Amy intended otherwise.)

On May 16, 2025, Huang Family filed the above-referenced motion in limine. Movants seek to preclude MV (and defendant companies that MV allegedly controls)[1] from introducing evidence to dispute findings they contend the Court made already in the Will Contest FSOD as to:

(d) that the 500,000 shares of O’Tasty Foods (“OTF”) were Amy’s separate property, not community property and

Huang Family contends that the Court’s findings are dispositive of these issues raised in the pending third amended complaint and first amended cross-complaint in this case. (See Roos v. Red (2005) 130 Cal.App.4^th 870, 880-881 (affirming trial court finding by way of MIL that Bankruptcy Court order was dispositive of issues to be tried, no matter that the Bankruptcy Court made these findings without a jury.) They argue that the order admitting the will to Probate is still final, notwithstanding the notice of appeal, where the findings in question here are not embraced by that order. Huang Family are necessarily not appealing from these findings that are favorable to them. (See Contreras-Velazquez v. Family Health Centers, et al. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5^th 88, 103)

On May 29, 2025, MV filed Opposition to the Motion.[2] MV argues the Court should deny the motion for the following reasons:

1) The motion does not identify what specific facts are sought to be excluded, what prejudice would result from its being heard, consistent with LASC Rule 3.57, and as to what issues have already been decided.

2) The prerequisites for applying collateral estoppel are not met here: a) the issues sought to be precluded from re-litigation are not identical to the issues decided in the former proceeding, b) the issues were not “actually litigated” in the earlier proceeding, c) the issues must have been necessarily decided in the former proceeding and d) the decision in the former proceeding must have been on the merits and final and e) the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same person as the party in the former proceeding. MV argues that the issues to be decided in this case, namely, dependent adult status, ownership of the Moreno Property proceeds and what funds are community versus Amy’s separate property, are not the same issues as decided before. In addition, he argues these issues were not “actually litigated” even if evidence concerning these issues was raised. Further, MV argues that the FSOD is not final since there remain other issues pending in the Probate case, including whether he should be disinherited under Probate Code sec. 259 by reason of the claim of financial dependent adult abuse.

3) Applying collateral estoppel here would have the improper effect of depriving MV of his Constitutional right to a jury decision in this case of the factual issues in the former Probate proceedings.

On June 5, 2025, Huang Family filed a substantially similar Reply to each Opposition.

Initially, the Court finds the motion meets the specificity requirement of Rule 3.57. Huang Family would be prejudiced by again having to try the facts tried previously. Decision of this issue by way of motion in limine is not an improper substitute for a motion for summary adjudication. (Amtower v. Photon Dynamics (2008) 158 Cal.App.4^th 1582, 1588, 1594) Here, Huang Family has a pending motion for summary adjudication – which remains relevant to determining what issues will remain for trial.

The order on appeal is “final” as to the part of the November 27, 2024 order adverse to MV, as well as concerning the above-referenced adverse findings in the FSOD. MV did not timely file an appeal from the part of this order adverse to him, not from the adverse findings in the FSOD.[3] In turn, he did not timely file any cross-appeal after Huang Family filed its notice of appeal. MV was “aggrieved” by that order and the FSOD that was the basis for it, for purposes of CCP sec. 902, since the Court denied part of the relief he requested, i.e., to serve as executor, as well as made numerous adverse findings which the Court expressly noted at the outset also concerned other ongoing litigation between the parties.

As a result, MV cannot now argue that these findings are not final. See generally TRG, CAL PRACTICE GUIDE: Appeals and Writs, secs. 2:303-2:304 and Hensley v. Hensley (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 895, 899 (an order may, in practical effect, be “unfavorable” to a party, thus rendering the party legally “aggrieved” for appeal purposes). Similarly, an order that, although “apparently favorable,” that is in fact adverse to a party is appealable by the party. (Corridan v. Rose (1955) 137 Cal.App.2d 524, 528). Hence, the failure to timely appeal from the part of the order and from the adverse findings renders those final. Where a party, as here, does not obtain all the relief it requested, it would be aggrieved and have standing to challenge it on appeal. (American Master Lease v. Idanta Partners (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1451, 1472) Here, there can be no question the findings in the FSOD were in most respects adverse to MV. In turn, expressly based on those findings, MV was not permitted to serve as executor.

The pending appeal by Huang Family of the part of the order admitting the will does not make it not “final” in regard to the issues on this motion, as discussed above (and MV at least does not argue otherwise.)[4] Huang Family’s appeal from the order on the will contest does not assist MV: Even if Huang Family were to prevail on its appeal, it would not change these facts. Rather, a successful appeal would only hurt MV: The will - leaving all Amy’s property to him - would then not be admitted to Probate. The issues sought to be excluded here are not “embraced” by the appeal. The opposition briefs do not show otherwise. By contrast, Huang Family states specifically it is not and cannot contest these findings as those are in their favor. There is therefore no “direct attack” on the findings. The issues here are collateral to the scope of this appeal. What the Family is contesting presumably is that based on those findings there was sufficient evidence for the Court to also have denied admission of the will.

As also discussed in Contreras-Velazquez, supra, on which Huang Family relies, by negative inference, merely because there may be an appeal as to certain causes of action does not mean that as to those causes of action that are not the subject of an appeal that those are not concluded.[5] (Id., 62 Cal.App.5^th at 101-103) As described above, an analogous situation is present here. Where there are severable parts to an order, as here, the un-appealed parts are final and left in full force. (Civil Appeals and Writs, supra, sec. 2:316) Huang Family cannot have appealed from that part of the order disqualifying MV where it was not aggrieved thereby.

Further, the Contreras-Velazquez court indicates that applying collateral estoppel is ultimately a matter of equity. (Id., 62 Cal.App.5^th at 100) As indicated above, as a matter of equity, Huang Family is not taking inconsistent positions in these cases concerning the same matters. Rather, it is MV who elected not to timely challenge the order disqualifying him as executor and the numerous adverse findings but now seeks to again contest them in the context of alleged dependent adult financial abuse and related damages claims.

MV also had the opportunity to “fully and fairly” litigate and did strenuously litigate the facts related to the foregoing identified issues.[6] As described in the FSOD, the third phase of trial was in broad in its scope and in deciding whether a will should be admitted considered all of these issues, as discussed below.

The referenced issues were “actually litigated” on the merits in the lengthy trial, and the Court made numerous conclusive findings based on the voluminous evidence presented by both sides on each of these issues as set forth in the detailed Will Contest FSOD -- and as prior counsel for MV acknowledged.[7] Relevant here, on p. 31 and p. 35, fn. 27, of the Will Contest FSOD, the Court found Amy was a dependent adult. At pp. 33-37, in particular, the Court discussed how MV unduly influenced Amy (even if not directly concerning the wills.) At pp. 37-39 and 42-43, the Court found MV had no right to the Moreno property sale proceeds. At p. 43, the Court found all of Amy’s property to be separate as opposed to community property. At pp. 37-39, the Court found Sophia had not agreed to pay MV any part of the Moreno sale proceeds.

The findings were each a necessary part of the mix of facts that each party presented competing views concerning and that led the Court to be able to decide the will contest. These findings are “sufficiently firm” to be accorded conclusive effect. (Border Bus. Park v. City of San Diego (2006) 142 Cal.App.4^th 1538, 1564)

Though the ultimate issues to decide in the civil case are necessarily different than the Probate issues, the issues depend upon essentially the same set of facts – be it for different purposes, damages rather than admission of a will – and hence collateral estoppel would apply. (Hernandez v. City of Pomona (2009) 46 Cal.4^th 501, 511-512)[8] Further, applying collateral estoppel here would not improperly deprive MV of a jury trial on these issues.[9] (Roos, supra) MV obtaining a jury trial on these same issues properly tried to the Court (where he had no right to a jury on the will contest) would allow him effectively a second bite at the apple, inconsistent with according the proper weight to the prior proceeding and which would be unfair to Huang Family. (Id.) MV has not shown how holding a jury trial on these issues “could readily cause a different result.” (Id.) There is no right to a jury trial on issues that have been conclusively resolved in prior action. (Id.)

For these reasons, the Court grants the motion. The final scope of trial and the practical effect of this ruling will depend upon the outcome of the pending motion for summary adjudication.

[1] Altrien, FMS Group, fka Miva Group, Cherry Culture and Fanfare Trading.

[2] Altrien and Cherry Culture also filed a substantially similar opposition, except as noted below.

[3] MV also did not file a notice of appeal from the December 16, 2024 order within the time to do so – which was also adverse to MV.

[4] Altrien and Cherry Culture raised this issue.

[5] In Contreras-Velazquez, the Court of Appeal held there was no error in the trial court determining that collateral estoppel did not apply as to that part of the jury verdict as to which the court had granted a motion for partial new trial – based on that part of the jury verdict as to which no new trial was granted – because even as to the latter there was still no final judgment for issue preclusion purposes at least until conclusion of the part of trial which was to be re-tried -- to meet thereby meet the one-judgment rule.

[6] The Court made no findings specifically concerning the OTF shares; however, the Court did find that whatever property Amy had was separate as opposed to community property. Any remaining issue as to the OTF stock will in any event be decided one way or another by the time this trial is heard: The Court will have conducted a separate trial already scheduled as to the OTF shares in the Probate case -- that will make it unnecessary for that evidence to be tried as part of this trial.

[7] That there remains an issue in the Probate case whether MV will be disinherited does not make the ruling on the will contest any less final. (See Estate of Dito (2011) 198 Cal.App.4^th 791, 803) As set forth in its ruling in the related Probate case filed January 3, 2025, the Court cannot adjudicate the sec. 259 claim as that depends on how this civil case is decided.

[8] If the ultimate issues were the same in both cases, claim rather than issue preclusion would apply. (Sabek v. Engelhard Corp. (1988) 65 Cal.App.4^th 992, 998)

[9] Though Altrien, FMS Group, fka Miva Group, Cherry Culture and Fanfare Trading were not parties to the will contest, the Court has ruled by orders in this case filed May 16, 2024 and in the related Probate case filed April 29, 2025 that Altrien and Cherry Culture are controlled by MV and in privity with MV. They would also be bound by the prior orders as to which issue preclusion is sought. (CCP sec. 1908(b)) These two entities are the ones raising this issue. Neither FMS Group nor Fanfare Trading – also allegedly controlled by MV - has asserted they would not be bound.

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Ming-Chao Huang, et al. v. Michael Velcherean, Case No. 18STPB11082 (related to Case No. 19STCV01901)

(2) Federizo Petition for Approval of Second Account Current and related relief

On February 4, 2022, MV filed this petition. Shortly thereafter, Judge Small stayed this petition pending resolution of the will contest.

On November 27, 2024, the Court entered an order deciding the will contest, admitting one of the two wills at issue into Probate.

On May 12, 2025, MV filed a Supplement to his petition, requesting initially that the Court lift the stay and restore the petition to the Court’s calendar. MV contends that Federizo has failed to marshal assets of the Estate, including 50% of Amy’s shares in O’Tasty Foods (“OTF”), Kentronics Corp., Cherry Culture and Fanfare Trading.[1] In addition, MV contends Federizo commingled the $3.5 million in Moreno sales proceeds he transferred to her with other Estate assets. Further, he argues that Federizo has filed to prepare for and defend litigation brought against the Estate, including as to the upcoming trial as to ownership of the OTF shares. Based on the foregoing, MV requests several forms of relief, including continuing trial.

On May 22, 2025, Federizo filed her Response and Objection to MV’s petition, arguing in summary:

As concerns the OTF trial, Federizo contends that she is required to be neutral as between beneficiaries of the Estate, including creditors as a type of beneficiary. (In re: Heydenfeldt’s Estate (1897) 117 Cal. 551, 552-553) Beneficiaries must instead protect their own rights. Further, the initial order of April 10, 2019 appointing Federizo contemplated that she would stay out of litigation between those interested in the estate, i.e., Huang Family and MV. Though the recent order related to which party had standing to pursue a dependent adult abuse cause of action against MV in the related civil case determined that Federizo was the one with the authority to bring that claim, that does not mean she had to exercise that authority. Indeed, ultimately Federizo declined to take on that responsibility where Huang Family was already pursuing that claim. Further, MV has himself taken the inconsistent position previously that Federizo should remain neutral and stay out of the litigation where Huang Family was already involved given the cost to the Estate. Finally, MV’s interest in the Estate is not adversely impacted by Federizo not having been involved in discovery prior to the OTF trial where both interested parties, Huang Family and MV, have actively prepared for trial.

As concerns marshaling, Federizo outlines how her activity has brought in property to the Estate and avoided depletion of Estate funds by remaining neutral, consistent with her duty to act prudently. By contrast, MV is self-motivated and his history of litigating this matter shows it would not benefit the Estate itself. His interests and those of the Estate are in conflict. There was no order that the Moreno Property proceeds MV turned over be segregated from other funds. In turn, the accounting shows those funds are still being held. Further, Federizo has had the OTF and Kentronics stock valued by the Probate referee. Federizo is also seeking a further valuation of this stock. All, not 50%, of this stock belonging to Amy is being held. Finally, Federizo is not able to marshal the stock of Fanfare Trading and Cherry Culture where those are controlled by MV and he is taking actions inconsistent with Federizo being able to do so. Hence, he cannot complain about her inability to marshal those assets.

The Court lifts the stay on this petition and restores it to the Court’s calendar. The Court will treat the supplement as the operative pleading given the lapse of time since it was first filed.

Based on the foregoing, there does not appear to be any exigency warranting suspension. What OTF stock is part of the Estate will be tried by way of the interested parties. Federizo’s input would be unnecessary. Federizo has also addressed other issues raised by MV. If MV still wishes to pursue removal, as opposed to suspension (which would require an evidentiary hearing,) he is ordered to set forth an offer of proof as to how he might still prevail. Otherwise, the decision on removal would be the same as with respect to suspension; namely, that there is no evidence of wrongful conduct and to deny the petition.

On February 28, 2025, Federizo filed her Second Account Current for the period of May 1, 2021 through October 31, 2024 and Report. She requests that the Court approve said report, as well as issue an order under Probate Code sec. 9611 related to the Estate’s entitlement to the sale proceeds of $3,520,000 from the Moreno property, based on the order of December 16, 2024, and in turn seeks payment of her and her lawyers’ fees and costs.

On March 20, 2025, Huang Family filed its Response and Objection to the Second Account Current. They assert that the amount of their claims is higher than stated, if that includes pre-judgment interest. They also dispute how Federizo came to obtain the proceeds based on how MV secured the funds – which might be relevant to whether those funds are property of the Estate or merely held in constructive trust (as discussed below.) Huang Family disputes that this money is property of the Estate based on their claim that Amy never properly had any right to the money in the first place and was subject to their claim of rescission. The Court’s decision concerning whether the accounts (where the sale proceeds were deposited) were joint was only as between Federizo and MV concerning the latter’s claim the funds passed to him directly by right of survivorship. That trial did not adjudicate the rescission claim. Hence, Federizo still holds these funds subject to a determination of “entitlement,” based on the order of December 11, 2020 that this was how these funds were to be held in the interim. Finally, they assert that payment of the fees of Federizo and counsel would require use of these proceeds that does not belong to the Estate. Hence, these issues need to be decided before payment of fees -- absent any settlement agreement by way of mediation. Huang Family complains in this regard that Federizo has not tried to resolve this case with MV – consistent with the April 23, 2024 order authorizing her resolve claims - thereby causing unnecessary additional litigation and delay.

On April 3, 2025, Federizo filed her Reply to Huang Family’s Response and Objection. She explains that by entitlement to the $3.52 million she meant only that this was the only possible result based on the determination concerning the joint accounts - not that the Estate itself was entitled to the proceeds (as opposed to the beneficiaries or creditors of the Estate.) She goes on to show why the determination should apply to resolve that this money is property of the Estate, as against MV, consistent with the conclusion reached in the Statement of Decision. In addition, she notes that there was no objection to the amounts of the different fees. Finally, she notes the reasons why she has not pursued further mediation with MV.

On May 2, 2025, the Court held a hearing on a number of motions and petitions and continued the hearing on this petition to allow for further briefing concerning the inability of the Estate to potentially have to pay both what Huang Family asserts is owed them and payment of the fees. At the hearing, pursuant to stipulation, the Court authorized an advance payment of $400,000 to Federizo and her counsel, without prejudice to claims by Huang Family.

On May 22, 2025, Huang Family filed its Supplement as to the Second Account. They dispute Federizo’s claim under Probate Code sec. 9651(d)(1) that she is entitled to fees from funds not property of an estate if the services were to “preserve, protect and maintain” such property. They assert instead that Federizo holds the funds merely as a constructive trustee and that fees are not due based on her merely holding funds in that capacity as opposed to as estate assets. (Henderson v. Fisher (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 218, 220) They explain how MV improperly secured these proceeds. Further, notwithstanding their stipulation, they contend that the $400,000 distribution is not permitted based on funds held merely as constructive trustee or based on sec. 9561 to preserve, protect and maintain. They request that the Court order a mediation between Federizo and MV.

On May 22, 2025, Federizo filed her Supplemental Reply to Huang Family’s Response and Objection to her report. She argues that the Family’s claim that none of what Federizo is holding is property of the Estate is “a stretch of logic and equity.”

On June 5, 2025, Federizo filed a further Response to Huang Family’s Supplement. She argues that Amy could not have been a constructive trustee of funds wrongly obtained from the sale of the Moreno property because she and her sister Sophie received that property pursuant to a divorce settlement agreement between her parents. Further, she contends Huang Family is taking inconsistent positions as between Sophia and Amy in not contending that Sophia should return to them hers her of the proceeds.

On June 5, 2025, MV filed a Reply to Federizo’s Supplemental Reply. He points out that the order on the joint accounts filed December 16, 2024 provides in paragraph 6 that it is without prejudice to the bifurcated issue of whether Amy intended the accounts to be joint. He requests that the Court restore his petition as to this issue to the Court’s calendar.

The Court is not in a position to decide this petition until the respective issues as between the Huang Family, on the one hand, and Federizo, on the other hand, as to entitlement of the funds in question is decided. That issue should be set for trial so this petition can be decided. The Court’s decision on whether the accounts were joint did not determine whether the money in those accounts was ever properly Amy’s in the first place (as opposed to whether that money passed to MV.) See December 16, 2024 order. Adjudication of the OTF trial – which is a similar claim of rescission by the Huang Family – may help make that determination. That issue is set for trial next month. This petition should therefore be continued until after completion of the OTF trial and entry of the resulting order.

That said, in the interim, the Court rejects Huang Family’s claim that Federizo holds these funds in constructive trust rather than as property of the Estate. Huang Family argues that fees of Federizo and her counsel are payable only from funds of the estate as opposed to funds held in constructive trust. Even if that argument was valid, which the Court does not now decide, Federizo is not holding these funds as constructive trustee. There is no wrongdoing on her part that would be the basis for that theory to apply here. Even though MV held the funds as constructive trustee, as discussed in the will contest trial, that does not mean Federizo now holds those funds in that way. Federizo received the funds pursuant to an order to MV that he turn over those funds to her as Special Administrator. Moreover, this issue may be moot depending on how the Court decides the rescission claim. If the Court denied that claim, the funds would be property of the Estate and payment of administrative expenses would be required prior to payment of any creditors’ claim such as that of the Huang Family.

Further, it is not clear what priority there is between the separate claims of Sophia Huang and other Huang Family members. Federizo indicates that there may be sufficient funds on hold to pay Sophia’s claim after payment of administrative fees.

The Court will not order a party to mediate with another party where one party does not believe it would be productive to do so and where there is not insignificant expense involved in doing so – leaving aside whether mediation can properly be ordered in the first place where mediation is by definition voluntary.

The Court confirms that Federizo may pay herself, Marvan and Rice, pro rata, as well as Yamamato in full (given the small amount of his final claim), based on the $400,000 previously authorized. The Court understands from the parties’ agreement at the last hearing that the foregoing does not implicate any potential loss of the ability to make any payment in full of the Huang claim (if approved) based on the current amount in the Estate.

Finally, in regard to the issue MV raises, the Court will restore this issue to the Court’s calendar. The Court orders the parties to meet and confer before the August 8, 2025 hearing and submit a joint report by August 1, 2025 on what evidence they intend to introduce, how long trial would take and how MV can prevail in view of the findings made already.

On May 28, 2025, MV filed his petition. MV requests that the Court again revisit an order of Judge Small that was premised upon its ruling that funds in the possession of Federizo as to which there was a dispute as to entitlement could not be considered in determining the amount of permissible family allowance to MV (and that without such funds the Estate was otherwise insolvent in view of administrative expenses arising out of the litigation herein.)

MV contends that the family allowance be modified because those funds as to which there was then a dispute as to entitlement when Judge Small issued that order has now been resolved or are not subject to dispute (and consequently that there are sufficient funds to pay a family allowance.) Specifically, MV contends that the Huang Family could not have any right to recover (by rescission of gift) from the Estate any of the $3.52 million Moreno Property sale proceeds because this Court had in a civil case as between Amy (her sister Sophia) and her father determined by judgment of July 30, 2004 that her father transfer the Moreno property to Amy and Sophia.[2]

Further, MV contends – consistent with his above-referenced petition to suspend Federizo - that had Federizo not sold certain securities during the pandemic there would be funds in the Estate that could be used for a family allowance.

Finally, MV explains why he needs a family allowance, why he should be entitled to a retroactive payment of an allowance and that Federizo be able to use funds in her possession deriving from dividends of shares Amy holds in OTF towards a family allowance.

On June 9, 2025, Federizo filed a Response and Objection to the petition. Initially, she disputes the claims about marshalling and accounting of assets and contends there is no basis for an OSC concerning same. In turn, she argues the motion is flawed as it does not comply with CCP sec. 10089b) in failing to identify by declaration what similar requests were made before and how new or different circumstances now exist. She contends that there are no new or changed circumstances warranting a different decision. Until such time as the Court makes those entitlement determinations, the Estate is insolvent. Moreover, even if the Estate becomes solvent, she contends MV has already received the equivalent of thirteen years of allowance at the requested rate based on spending all that he had been holding as constructive trustee and therefore should not be entitled to anything further. Finally, she argues MV’s conduct disentitles him to any allowance at all.

MV does not acknowledge that by ruling filed October 23, 2024 this Court already denied the second of the bases for this petition in ruling on an earlier petition by MV to modify his family allowance, as well as the request that the Court make a retroactive award of a family allowance.[3] Therefore, Federizo’s initial point is well taken.

However, the Court did not previously address the first of the bases for this petition: The Court nonetheless still rejects MV’s argument that the issue not previously determined has now been determined. As discussed above, there remains an issue as to whether the Moreno sale proceeds are property of the Estate as between Federizo and the Huang Family. In their papers concerning Federizo’s petition for approval of her second account, the parties differ over the exact issue as to which MV contends Huang Family cannot prevail, i.e., the transfer of the Moreno property by Amy and Sophia’s father to them. In turn, the trial concerning the OTF stock is scheduled next month.

Therefore, there remains the same predicament as caused the Court to previously deny the petition to modify the family allowance – and there are therefore no new relevant facts or circumstances warranting a different decision. The Court does not reach the other issues Federizo raises in the event the estate becomes solvent. The Court can only make rulings based on current facts.

On February 28, 2025, Huang Family filed a petition under Probate Code sec. 1003(c) for payment by the Estate of fees of Jackson Chen, an attorney, as guardian ad litem for petitioner Mei Jung Lin (“GAL”), in the sum of $180,675, representing his work from January 5, 2021 (the day after his appointment) through December 31, 2024, at the Court Appointed Counsel (“CAC”) rate of $250 per hour, plus costs of $344, together with supporting declaration of the GAL.[4]

At the hearing on this petition on May 2, 2025, MV raised the issue of whether his claim had statutory priority over the GAL claim. The Court ordered briefing.

On May 22, 2025, MV filed Objection and points & authorities re: priority of Family Allowance over GAL fees. MV relies on Probate Code sec. 11420 to argue that his family allowance claim has higher priority than the claim of GAL. In addition, he prevailed over GAL in the will contest. Further, he argues under sec. 1003(c)(3), the Court has discretion to award fees from any other source. He indicates it is unclear whether Mei Jung Lin has other means of paying GAL where she has the ability to hire counsel. He argues GAL should be paid from Lin’s own funds, subject to potential reimbursement after all matters herein are adjudicated and it is clear whether there is a deficiency in Estate funds to pay all claims.

On June 4, 2025, Huang Family filed its response to said objection. Initially, they argue that the objection is untimely. In turn, they argue that at the time of appointment they were willing to appoint a family friend as guardian ad litem without charging any fee, but MV objected.[5] MV should therefore be estopped to assert these fees should not be paid from the Estate. Further, they argue that the objection is based on the erroneous assumption MV is entitled to a family allowance. Finally, they argue GAL fees are not general debts but an expense that the Court already ordered should be paid from the Estate.

The objection is timely. At the time the objection was set to be filed MV had other counsel who thereafter withdrew. In the interim, MV was unrepresented. Objections are ordinarily permissibly stated for the first time at the hearing. Under these circumstances, not allowing objection would not be equitable.

Four years is a very long time to be paid. In the interim, Huang Family (which includes Mei Jung Lin) has paid its own attorneys very significant sums. Judge Small did not have occasion to address the issue the Court faces now where the Estate may be insolvent, and it is possible not all claims may be able to be paid in full. In turn, then counsel for MV qualified his statement by noting that this was his position at least at that juncture (when these issues had not arisen). Hence, estoppel does not apply here. The Court does not know what funds Lin may have to pay her GAL in the interim, subject to reimbursement by the Estate. Sec. 1003(c) indicates a court may consider other sources. Here, the fairest result would be for Lin to now pay GAL subject to reimbursement when the Court knows what is in the Estate and what claims and fees need to be paid. The foregoing assumes MV would not be paid a family allowance. Even without an allowance, there still may be a problem with the Estate paying all fees and claims. The Court cannot determine priority issues at this time.

On the petition of MV to suspend and remove Federizo: Denied as to suspension. Continue hearing as to removal to August 8, 2025 at 8:30 a.m. for offer of proof as to basis for removal. Offer of proof to be filed within 20 days. Response to offer five days before hearing. Absent offer of proof requiring evidentiary hearing, deny removal.

On the petition for approval of Federizo’s Second Account Current: Continued to August 8, 2025 at 8:30 a.m.

On the petition of MV for modification of family allowance: Denied. MV’s requests for an OSC are also denied.

On the petition of Huang Family for payment of GAL fees: Denied, without prejudice.

[1] Relatedly, MV contends that is entitled to a share of these assets by way of his pending Spousal Property petition.

[2] MV notes, however, that the $3.52 million is also subject to a claim by Sophia to $840,000 of that amount.

MV’s new counsel’s references to the sale proceeds passing directly to MV outside of Probate because they were held in a joint account fails to take account of the Court’s decision that notwithstanding how these accounts were labeled, they are property of the Estate and did not pass directly to MV.

[3] The Court infers new counsel for MV may not have realized that these claims were already made and rejected.

[4] The formal order of appointment filed March 15, 2021 provides that fees and costs of GAL “shall be paid out of the property of the Estate.” At the appointment hearing MV had objected to a family member or friend of Mei Jung Lin serving as GAL and argued that a CAC should be appointed.

[5] Significantly, then counsel for MV stated GAL: I think it should come out of the estate. It seems it be a cost of the estate at this juncture, at least.”