Judge: David J. Cowan, Case: 22STCV17187, Date: 2022-11-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV17187    Hearing Date: November 10, 2022    Dept: 1

Tentative Ruling

Judge David J. Cowan

Department 1

Hearing Date:                  Thursday, November 10, 2022

Case Name:                     Kristen M. Wallis v. Robinson Helicopter Company, Inc.

Case No.:                         22STCV17187

Motion:                           Transfer

Moving Party:                  Defendant Robinson Helicopter Company, Inc.

Responding Party:           Plaintiff Wallis

Notice:                             OK     

Ruling:                             The Motion is DENIED.

Defendant Robinson to give notice.

If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are encouraged to appear remotely rather than in person.

BACKGROUND

On May 24, 2022, Kristen M. Wallis, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Tyson Wallis, filed a Complaint against Robinson Helicopter Company, Inc. stating causes of action for wrongful death, negligence, and strict product liability arising out of the death of Tyson Wallis on March 25, 2022 when "a Robinson R44 helicopter . . . crashed in Rowlett, Texas."

On July 19, 2022, Robinson filed a Motion to Transfer to Southwest District and a Notice of Related Case indicating cases 22STCV17187 and 22TRCV00428 are related. Robinson also filed a Cross-Complaint against Wallis and Roes 501-600 stating causes of action for equitable indemnity, comparative indemnity, equitable apportionment, contribution, and declaratory relief, asserting the injuries at issue in case 22TRCV00428 arising out of the same helicopter crash "were proximately caused" by Wallis and Roes.

On August 24, 2022, Wallis filed an Opposition to the Motion to Transfer.

On August 29, 2022, Robinson filed a Reply to the Opposition.

On September 13, 2022, Judge Malcolm Mackey found cases 22STCV17187 and 22TRCV00428 are not related.

On October 17, 2022, Judge Mackey set the Motion to Transfer for hearing in Department 1, finding that a "Motion to transfer to another district within the same County is to be determined by Department 1."

DISCUSSION

Applicable Law

“The term ‘venue’ denotes the particular county within the state where a case is to be heard,” which is “determined according to the venue statutes,” CCP sec. 392 et seq. (K.R.L. Partnership v. Superior Court (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 490, 496.) Los Angeles Superior Court (LASC) Local Rule 2.3 regulates transfers between the several districts of the Superior Court within Los Angeles County. (See Local Rule 2.2 (identifying districts and the courthouses within each district).) Local Rule 2.3(b)(2) authorizes the Supervising Judge of the Civil Division to “transfer a civil case from one district to another” for “the convenience of witnesses or to promote the ends of justice.” The burden of proof in seeking transfer “rests on the party moving for transfer to establish grounds for change of venue.” (Pesses v. Superior Court (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 117, 124.)

Application to Facts

Robinson argues the case should be transferred because "[n]o injury or damage related to this action occurred in the Central District," noting that the helicopter crash and other relevant "aspects of the training flight" occurred in Texas. (Motion, p. 4.) By contrast, the "manufacture of the subject Robinson R44 helicopter, occurred in the Southwest District" and Robinson’s “only business address” is located in Torrance, within the Southwest District. (Motion, p. 4.) Robinson also generally asserts that “all California witnesses, information, and documents are located in Torrance.” (Motion, p. 3; Reply, p. 2 (arguing “the Southwest District is the location . . . where the majority of California witnesses reside and/or are employed.”))

Local Rule 2.3(b)(2) authorizes Department 1 to order an intra-venue “transfer [of] a civil case from one district to another” for “the convenience of witnesses or to promote the ends of justice.” But Robinson has not identified any “witnesses” located in Torrance or shown that it would be excessively inconvenient for any witness(es) to travel to the Central District. To the extent Robinson seeks transfer based on “information” and “documents” located at its Torrance business address, Robinson has not shown that it would be prejudiced by producing “documents” stored in Torrance for use in litigation in the Central District. As Wallis points out, documents can likely “be delivered by electronic means.” (Opposition, p. 5.)

Robinson also argues the case should be transferred because "there is a Related Action currently pending . . . in the Southwest District," case 22TRCV00428. (Motion, p. 4-5.) But on September 13, 2022, Judge Mackey found cases 22STCV17187 not related 22TRCV00428, and so this is not a basis to relate the cases. Robinson also does not explain why the cases would be more efficiently determined together, merely asserting the cases are related because they "arise[] out of the same common occurrence." (Motion, p. 4-5; Reply, p. 2.) That alone is not a basis to relate the cases; no common issues have been identified. (CRC 3.300(a)(2) (related cases arise out of the same events and require determination of overlapping legal or factual issues))

Wallis opposes transfer, arguing that Local Rules required her to file the action in the Central District and arguing Robinson has defended dozens of cases in the Central District. In response, Robinson argues Wallis’s choice of judicial district is not entitled to deference because she “is a resident of Texas” with “strong connections to Texas and no apparent connections to California.” Robinson argues there is no “strong presumption in favor of a nonresident plaintiff’s choice of forum.” (Reply, p. 3 (citing National Football League v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 902, 923-24; Stangvik v. Shiley Inc. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 744, 755; and Campbell v. Parker-Hannifin Corp. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1534, 1543).)

The cases Robinson relies upon are irrelevant to intra-venue transfers. National Football League, Stangvik, and Campbell all concern the doctrine of forum non conveniens, an “equitable doctrine invoking the discretionary power of a court to decline to exercise the jurisdiction it has over a transitory cause of action when it believes that the action may be more appropriately and justly tried elsewhere.” (Stangvik, supra, 54 Cal.3d at 751.) The doctrine enables a court to weigh whether an “alternate forum is a ‘suitable’ place for trial” rather than California, against the “private interests of the litigants and the interests of the public in retaining the action for trial in California.” (Id.)

Fundamentally, forum non conveniens is a doctrine addressing whether an action should be litigated in California courts. (See id. at 752 (considering whether Norway and Sweden are viable alternate forums)) It is intended to avoid “overburdening local courts with congested calendars, protect[] the interests of potential jurors so that they are not called upon to decide cases in which the local community has little concern, and weigh[] the competing interests of California and the alternate jurisdiction in the litigation.” (Id. at 751 (emphasis added)) The doctrine does not determine which California county superior court, much less which judicial district in a given county, is the proper venue for litigation. (K.R.L., supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at 496.) By extension, forum non conveniens is not instructive for transfers between districts of the same superior court.

Instead, the standard for transfer between judicial districts within Los Angeles County is whether the transfer would promote “the convenience of witnesses” or the “ends of justice.” (Local Rule 2.3(b)(2).) It is Robinson’s burden to demonstrate the transfer would achieve either goal. This burden is not carried by arguing there is no “strong presumption” the case should stay in the Central District. Though Robinson’s place of business is located in Torrance, Robinson has not identified any witnesses whose convenience would be promoted by the transfer. Robinson has not otherwise shown that the ends of justice would be meaningfully promoted by transferring the case; litigation in the Central District does not appear substantially inconvenient for Robinson.

CONCLUSION

The Motion to Transfer is DENIED.

Robinson to give notice.