Judge: David J. Cowan, Case: 22STCV17187, Date: 2022-12-08 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV17187 Hearing Date: December 8, 2022 Dept: 1
Tentative Ruling
Judge David J. Cowan
Department 1
Hearing Date:
Thursday, December 8, 2022
Case Name: Kristen M. Wallis v.
Robinson Helicopter Company, Inc.
Case No.: 22STCV17187
Motion: Transfer
Moving Party: Defendant Robinson Helicopter
Company, Inc.
Responding Party: Plaintiff Wallis
Notice: OK
Ruling: The Motion is DENIED.
Defendant
Robinson to give notice.
If counsel do not submit on the
tentative, they are encouraged to appear remotely rather than in person.
BACKGROUND
On May 24, 2022,
Kristen M. Wallis, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Tyson Wallis,
filed a Complaint against Robinson Helicopter Company, Inc. stating causes of
action for wrongful death, negligence, and strict product liability arising out
of the death of Tyson Wallis on March 25, 2022 when "a Robinson R44
helicopter . . . crashed in Rowlett, Texas."
On July 19, 2022,
Robinson filed a Motion to Transfer to Southwest District and a Notice of
Related Case indicating cases 22STCV17187 and 22TRCV00428 are related. Robinson
also filed a Cross-Complaint against Wallis and Roes 501-600 stating causes of
action for equitable indemnity, comparative indemnity, equitable apportionment,
contribution, and declaratory relief, asserting the injuries at issue in case
22TRCV00428 arising out of the same helicopter crash "were proximately
caused" by Wallis and Roes.
On August 24, 2022,
Wallis filed an Opposition to the Motion to Transfer.
On August 29, 2022,
Robinson filed a Reply to the Opposition.
On September 13, 2022,
Judge Malcolm Mackey found cases 22STCV17187 and 22TRCV00428 are not related.
On October 17, 2022,
Judge Mackey set the Motion to Transfer for hearing in Department 1, finding
that a "Motion to transfer to another district within the same County is
to be determined by Department 1."
On November 10, 2022,
the Court provided a tentative ruling and heard oral argument from the parties.
The Court then continued the hearing on this Motion to December 8, 2022 at 8:30
am in Department 1, and requested supplemental briefing from the parties
concerning whether the cases are related.
On November 23, 2022,
Robinson filed a Supplemental Brief.
On December 1, 2022, Wallis
filed a Supplemental Brief.
DISCUSSION
Applicable Law
“The term ‘venue’
denotes the particular county within the state where a case is to be heard,”
which is “determined according to the venue statutes,” CCP sec. 392 et seq.
(K.R.L. Partnership v. Superior Court (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 490, 496.)
Los Angeles Superior Court (LASC) Local Rule 2.3 regulates transfers between
the several districts of the Superior Court within Los Angeles County. (See
Local Rule 2.2 (identifying districts and the courthouses within each
district).) Local Rule 2.3(b)(2) authorizes the Supervising Judge of the Civil
Division to “transfer a civil case from one district to another” for “the
convenience of witnesses or to promote the ends of justice.” The burden of
proof in seeking transfer “rests on the party moving for transfer to establish
grounds for change of venue.” (Pesses v. Superior Court (1980) 107
Cal.App.3d 117, 124.)
Application to Facts
Transfer Between Districts
Robinson argues the
case should be transferred because "[n]o injury or damage related to this
action occurred in the Central District," noting that the helicopter crash
and other relevant "aspects of the training flight" occurred in
Texas. (Motion, p. 4.) By contrast, the "manufacture of the subject
Robinson R44 helicopter, occurred in the Southwest District" and
Robinson’s “only business address” is located in Torrance, within the Southwest
District. (Motion, p. 4.) Robinson also generally asserts that “all California
witnesses, information, and documents are located in Torrance.” (Motion, p. 3;
Reply, p. 2 (arguing “the Southwest District is the location . . . where the
majority of California witnesses reside and/or are employed.”))
Local Rule 2.3(b)(2)
authorizes Department 1 to order an intra-venue “transfer [of] a civil case
from one district to another” for “the convenience of witnesses or to promote
the ends of justice.” But Robinson has not identified any “witnesses” located
in Torrance or shown that it would be excessively inconvenient for any
witness(es) to travel to the Central District. To the extent Robinson seeks
transfer based on “information” and “documents” located at its Torrance
business address, Robinson has not shown that it would be prejudiced by producing
“documents” stored in Torrance for use in litigation in the Central District. As
Wallis points out, documents can likely “be delivered by electronic means.” (Opposition,
p. 5.)
Wallis opposes
transfer, arguing that Local Rules required her to file the action in the
Central District and arguing Robinson has defended dozens of cases in the
Central District. In response, Robinson argues Wallis’s choice of judicial
district is not entitled to deference because she “is a resident of Texas” with
“strong connections to Texas and no apparent connections to California.”
Robinson argues there is no “strong presumption in favor of a nonresident
plaintiff’s choice of forum.” (Reply, p. 3 (citing National Football League
v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 902, 923-24; Stangvik
v. Shiley Inc. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 744, 755; and Campbell v. Parker-Hannifin
Corp. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1534, 1543).)
But the cases Robinson relies
upon are irrelevant to intra-venue transfers. National Football League, Stangvik,
and Campbell all concern the doctrine of forum non conveniens, an “equitable
doctrine invoking the discretionary power of a court to decline to exercise the
jurisdiction it has over a transitory cause of action when it believes that the
action may be more appropriately and justly tried elsewhere.” (Stangvik,
supra, 54 Cal.3d at 751.) The doctrine enables a court to weigh whether an
“alternate forum is a ‘suitable’ place for trial” rather than California, against
the “private interests of the litigants and the interests of the public in
retaining the action for trial in California.” (Id.)
Fundamentally, forum
non conveniens is a doctrine addressing whether an action should be litigated
in California courts. (See id. at 752 (considering whether Norway
and Sweden are viable alternate forums)) It is intended to avoid “overburdening
local courts with congested calendars, protect[] the interests of potential
jurors so that they are not called upon to decide cases in which the local
community has little concern, and weigh[] the competing interests of
California and the alternate jurisdiction in the litigation.” (Id.
at 751 (emphasis added)) The doctrine does not determine which California county
superior court, much less which judicial district in a given county, is the
proper venue for litigation. (K.R.L., supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at
496.) By extension, forum non conveniens is not instructive for transfers
between districts of the same superior court.
The standard for
transfer between judicial districts within Los Angeles County is whether the
transfer would promote “the convenience of witnesses” or the “ends of justice.”
(Local Rule 2.3(b)(2).) It is Robinson’s burden to demonstrate the transfer
would achieve either goal. This burden is not carried by arguing there is no
“strong presumption” the case should stay in the Central District. Though
Robinson’s place of business is located in Torrance, Robinson has not
identified any witnesses whose convenience would be promoted by the transfer.
Robinson has not otherwise shown that the ends of justice would be meaningfully
promoted by transferring the case; litigation in the Central District does not
appear substantially inconvenient for Robinson.
Related Cases
Robinson also argues
the case should be transferred because "there is a Related Action
currently pending . . . in the Southwest District," case 22TRCV00428. (Motion,
p. 4-5.) But Judge Mackey found cases 22STCV17187 and 22TRCV00428 are not
related. Robinson did not adequately explain why the cases should now be
related, merely asserting the cases are related because they "arise[] out
of the same common occurrence." (Motion, p. 4-5; Reply, p. 2.) That is not
a basis to relate cases; common issues are also required. (CRC 3.300(a)(2)
(related cases arise out of the same events and require determination of
overlapping legal or factual issues))At the November 10, 2022 hearing, Robinson’s
counsel insisted that the cases are related and asserted that Wallis’s counsel
had previously agreed the cases were related. The Court then continued the
Motion and requested further briefing from the parties.
Upon review of the
supplemental briefing, Wallis’s counsel has never asserted that the cases are
related. Robinson relies exclusively on a Case Management Statement filed by
Wallis on October 13, 2022. (Tauscher Decl., Exh. E.) Wallis’s Statement
identified case 22TRCV00428 as a "companion, underlying, or related case[]”
because the "Trout Plaintiffs have moved to transfer to this Court, and
relate to this case, which is the first-filed action."
But the Case Management
Statement does not suggest the cases are related within the meaning of CRC
3.300(a), e.g., because the cases have overlapping claims or legal and
factual issues, or would require duplication of judicial resources if left
separate. Rather, the Statement merely indicates that the “Trout Plaintiffs”
are seeking to relate the cases. Wallis and the Trout plaintiffs are not
represented by the same counsel; the Trout plaintiffs’ opinion that the cases
are related cannot be imputed to Wallis. Wallis’s Statement did not address
whether the cases should be related, merely observing that the Trout
plaintiffs are seeking relation. Hence, the Court does not agree that
Wallis is being inconsistent by now arguing the cases are not related.
Wallis properly noted a pending request by other parties to relate the cases.
To the extent Robinson
argues Judge Mackey erred in declining to relate the cases, that is not a basis
for relief under Local Rule 2.3(b)(2), which permits the Supervising Judge of
the Civil Division to transfer cases between judicial districts to promote the
ends of justice and the convenience of witnesses. (Motion, p. 2 (“The basis of
this motion is that transfer of this action to the Southwest District will
promote the ends of justice pursuant to Los Angeles County Superior Court Rule
2.3(b).”)) Robinson could have instead filed a Motion to Relate the cases in
Department 1 after Judge Mackey deemed the cases not related, but Robinson did
not file a Motion to Relate. (See CRC 3.300(h)(1)(D), Local Rule 3.3(f)(3)
(authorizing the Supervising Judge of the Civil Division to hear motion to
relate cases after relation is denied))
Even if Robinson’s
Motion to Transfer is treated as Motion to Relate the cases, Robinson’s
original and supplemental briefing did not establish that the cases are
related. Robinson asserts the cases “arise from the same helicopter accident,
and bring identical causes of action, those of Strict Products Liability and
Negligence.” (Supp. Brief, p. 4.) But this does not support relation under any
prong of CRC 3.300(a). Initially, cases are related under CRC 3.300(a)(1) if
they involve the “same parties” and the “same or similar claims.” But even if
the cases involve “identical causes of action [for] Strict Products Liability
and Negligence,” the cases do not involve the “same parties” because there are
different plaintiffs in each case.
Cases are related
under CRC 3.300(a)(2) if they “[a]rise from the same or substantially identical . . . events requiring
the determination of the same or substantially identical questions of law or
fact.” Even if the cases “arise from the same helicopter accident,” Robinson has
not yet identified common issues of law or fact. On November 10, 2022, the
Court provided its tentative ruling to the parties observing that Robinson had
not identified any common issues that could support relation. Though the Court
permitted supplemental briefing, Robinson only vaguely references “common
themes as to the nature of the alleged defect(s)” and “common issues as to
design, manufacture, maintenance, and use.” (Supp. Brief, p. 4.) The Court is
unable to identify “substantially identical questions of law or fact” at issue
in both cases, other than that the same helicopter is at issue. However, the
Notice of Related Case explicitly states that the cases arise from the same
helicopter crash, yet Judge Mackey concluded the cases are not related—perhaps
because the cases are predominated by issues unique to each plaintiff (the
Trouts and Wallis).
Cases are related under
CRC 3.300(a)(4) if the cases are likely “to require substantial duplication of
judicial resources if heard by different judges.” Robinson argues the
cases should be related to promote efficient discovery because the cases will
involve common “evidence” derived from the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) investigation of the helicopter crash. (Supp. Brief, p. 4 (arguing the “information
gathered, the individuals involved in the investigation, witnesses interviewed,
and reports issued” will “be common to the evidence in both cases”)) However,
the cases need not be related for counsel to coordinate overlapping discovery
between the two cases; the Court is unpersuaded that potentially similar
discovery motions are a sufficient basis for relation.
CONCLUSION
The Motion to Transfer
is DENIED.
Robinson to give
notice.