Judge: David J. Cowan, Case: 23STCP00882, Date: 2023-12-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCP00882    Hearing Date: February 20, 2024    Dept: 200

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

WEST DISTRICT - BEVERLY HILLS COURTHOUSE

DEPT. 200

TENTATIVE REVISED RULING ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE

Matrix Oil Corp. et al. v. County of Los Angeles, et al., Case No. 23STCP00882 (related to Case Nos. 23STCP00884, 23STCP00893 and 23STCV11422)

Hearing Date: February 20, 2024, 8:30 a.m.

INTRODUCTION

          The amended petition in this case and in the related cases filed by certain oil drilling companies, as well as two oil industry associations, seek generally to challenge and set aside based on alleged violations of the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”) a County ordinance enacted in January 2023 banning in unincorporated parts of the County of Los Angeles (“the County”) new oil wells and requiring existing wells to cease operations within 20 years (the “Ordinance”). Allegedly, the Ordinance may affect some fifteen hundred wells. Petitioners argue also that the Ordinance is preempted by state law. In addition, the petitions seek a determination that the Ordinance constitutes a taking without just compensation. The administrative record has not yet been filed. Briefing of issues will not commence until 30 days after the County certifies the record.

          On November 21, 2023, Proposed Intervenors Black Women for Wellness, Center for Biological Diversity (“CFBD”), Natural Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”), Physicians for Social Responsibility – Los Angeles, Rising Communities, Sierra Club and Strategic Concepts in Organizing and Policy Education (“SCOPE”) (together referred to as “Intervenors”) filed the above-referenced motion for leave to intervene in this case, supported by numerous declarations of persons representing each of the Intervenors.[1] In addition, Intervenors filed the identical motion in the three related cases. They assert, inter alia, that they represent communities residing close to drill sites, that these communities are mostly low income and comprised of persons of color, and that they have borne a disproportionate amount of the health burdens from pollution emanating from the drilling. They also assert that they have been very involved in advocating that the County take actions against drilling and in fact are responsible for the County enacting a stronger ordinance than it had earlier proposed.  As a result, they contend that they have a significant interest in upholding the legality of the Ordinance and in assuring that local governments across the state adopt similar health protective measures. The declarations filed in support of the motion detail how each of the seven parties which seek to intervene have been involved in this process and how their members are now impacted.  

          On December 6, 2023, petitioners Matrix Oil Corp., RMX Resources and Royale Energy, as well as respondents the County and Board of Supervisors of the County, filed opposition to the motion. Petitioners and Respondents in each of the three related cases also filed largely identical papers in opposition to the motion filed in those cases. The County requests the Court take judicial notice of a Dept. of Regional Planning Dept, Statement.

          On December 12, 2023, Intervenors filed a Consolidated Reply Brief for this case and the three related cases, as well as a Supplemental Declaration of Damon Nagami, the So. Cal. Ecosystems Project at NRDC.[2]

          In advance of the December 21, 2023 hearing, the Court issued a tentative ruling. The Court then heard extended oral argument (for which there was no record.) In summary, the Court had the following concerns that the Tentative Ruling had not addressed: First, whether the applicable standard for potential injury to Intervenors was the same for permissive intervention as it is for mandatory intervention. Second, how Intervenors’ potential role in the takings part of this case might unduly complicate handling of this case. The Court therefore permitted the parties and Intervenors to further brief those issues and continued the hearing.

          On January 26, 2024, the Court received a joint brief from Petitioners (one filed in each case), as well as briefs from the County and Intervenors. As discussed further below, the parties (both Petitioners and the County) argued in summary that Intervenors had not shown a “direct and immediate” interest in the action, relying principally on City and County of San Francisco v. State of Calif. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4^th 1030 (“SF”), and in turn that Intervenors’ participation with regard to the takings aspect of this case in particular would “unduly complicate” these cases, warranting denial of the motion consistent with the ruling in South Coast Air Quality Mgm’t District v. City of Los Angeles (2021) 71 Cal.App.5^th 314. Conversely, Intervenors argue that SF, supra, is not on point where the intervenors there did not allege, as here, that they would suffer any tangible harm from an adverse judgment. In turn, they argue that their involvement as a party to at least the initial part of the takings aspect of the case would be appropriate but that, if necessary, they would be willing to forego their involvement in that part of the case if they can still participate in the earlier phases.

          By this revised ruling, the Court again addresses the motions in all four cases.  

STATEMENT OF CONTENTIONS

          Intervenors argue they are entitled to intervene based upon both the mandatory provisions under Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) sec. 387(d)(1)(b), as well as under the permissive provisions of sec. 387(d)(2).

          As to mandatory intervention, the Court shall grant a timely request for intervention if (1) the proposed intervenor “claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action,” (2) “the disposition of the action may impair or impede the proposed intervenor’s ability to protect that interest (see People ex rel. Rominger v. County of Trinity (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 655) and (3) existing parties do not adequately represent that interest. (Carlsbad Police Officers Ass’n v. City of Carlsbad (2020) 49 Cal.App.5^th 135, 148)

          Intervenors contend they have four significantly protectible interests: 1. Public health protections the Ordinance offers. 2. The environmental benefits of the Ordinance. 3. Their having played a pivotal role in advocating the enactment of the Ordinance. 4. Preserving local governments’ authority across the state to enforce similar phaseout measures.

          Intervenors assert two reasons why the County would not adequately represent their interests: First, the County must balance a broader set of concerns than the community members who are the Ordinance’s direct beneficiaries. (See Simpson Redwood Co. v. State (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1192, 1203-1204 (interests of a conservation organization “probably cannot be adequately served by the State’s sole participation) and Utah Ass’n of Counties v. Clinton, 255 F.3d 1246, 1254-1256 (10^th Cir, 2001) (County is obligated to balance a wide spectrum of policy goals) Second, Intervenors have an interest in retaining local governments’ authority to limit oil drilling across the state, whereas the County is focused on defending its own jurisdiction. Intervenors argue this is salient here where the County originally did not intend to enact as strong an ordinance as it did ultimately. (The burden to show inadequate representation is minimal. It is satisfied if the intervenor shows representation of its interests “may be” inadequate. Lewis v. County of Sacramento (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 214, 219) Intervenors argue their interests may diverge as regards settlement, pursuing an appeal or as concerns consequences outside the County.

          As to discretionary intervention, the court has discretion to permit intervention upon a timely application if (1) the proper procedures have been followed, (2) the nonparty has a direct and immediate interest in the action, (3) intervention will not enlarge the issues in the litigation and (4) the reasons for intervention outweigh any opposition by the parties presently in the action. (Id.)  Intervenors assert that they will not introduce new legal or factual issues or otherwise enlarge the issues herein. They will coordinate with the County to minimize duplication.

          Sec. 387 is to be liberally construed in favor of intervention to promote fairness by involving all parties potentially affected by the judgment to participate in the litigation. (Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. Of Equalization (1994) 30 Cal.App.4^th 1411, 1423)

          The County argues it and Intervenors have the same interest in the litigation – to defend the Ordinance against legal challenge – to protect the public health, safety and welfare of County residents.

            For purposes of mandatory intervention, the County argues the motion must be denied as the County adequately represents Intervenors’ interest in these cases. (There is a general presumption that the government adequately represents the interests of an intervenor with the same objective. San Juan Co., Utah v. U.S., 503 F.3d 1163, 1204 (10th Cir. 2007)[3]) Intervenors failed to identify with any specificity how they would better represent the County’s residents than the County itself or how the County would be reluctant to pursue all necessary issues. Whether intervention is proper is a fact-specific inquiry. (Rominger, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at 660) Contrary to Intervenors’ claim, this case is not just about the jurisdiction of the County; it is also about preemption.[4] Finally, Intervenors have not shown how there might be a divergence of interests between the County and Intervenors.

          For purposes of permissive intervention, the County argues Intervenors fail to establish that the reasons for intervention outweigh any opposition by existing parties. No original party supports intervention. The proposed addition of seven additional parties would further complicate case management, result in duplicative briefing and needlessly increased costs. There are already four cases (with multiple causes of action) addressing the ordinance – making coordination difficult. The parties have, however, already entered a stipulated case management order to streamline litigation by bifurcating different issues. In balancing the interests of those affected, the Court should look to the number of attorneys already, the complexity of the cases and likelihood of duplication of work. (South Coast, supra, 71 Cal.App.5^th at 320) There is no showing that the County lacks motivation to defend approval of the ordinance and thus it would be reasonable for the court to find Intervenors’ participation would unduly complicate an already complicated case. (Id., 71 Cal.App.5^th at 321) In turn, Intervenors have not shown how the litigation would benefit from their participation.

          Petitioners argue for purposes of mandatory intervention that Intervenors have the burden of proof. (Hausman v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 611, 615) Intervenors have not shown a “significant protectible interest” in the operation and effect of the ordinance. An organization’s general political interest in protecting a legal enactment (including its own efforts supporting enactment of the ordinance) is not sufficient to justify intervention. (Rominger, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at 662) The interest must be protectable under some law and there be a relationship or nexus between that interest and the claims at issue. (Citizens for Balanced Use v. Montana Wilderness Ass’n, 647 F.3d 893, 897 (9^th Cir. 2011)) Where an existing party and intervenor have the same objective and interest, and a governmental interest is acting already to protect those interests, there must be a “very compelling showing to the contrary.” (Arakaki v. Cayetano, 324 F.3d 1078, 1086 (9^th Cir. 2003)

          The eleven declarations filed with the motion of members of the various organizations reference oil wells or fields not affected by the Ordinance:  The Baldwin Hills Oil Field and adjacent park areas are specifically excluded from the Ordinance due to a discretionary permit from the County. The Murphy / Allenco drill sites are in the City of Los Angeles and therefore not affected by the Ordinance – the scope of which is only as to unincorporated portions of the County. The Las Virgenes Canyon preserve is in Ventura County (and hence not covered) and those wells nearby have been deserted and are already subject to separate state abandonment procedures. The Ordinance does not govern abandoned wells. The hiking areas in Malibu and Calabasas near the Pugh-Miller drill site and the Hoyt well again concern deserted wells and therefore are not covered by the Ordinance. The Sawtelle Field is within land of the U.S. Veterans Administration (“VA”) and again is excluded based on a discretionary County permit. References to other wells in Watts (in the City of Los Angeles) and in other cities are again not unincorporated areas of the County. Finally, Sierra Club and SCOPE members reside in unincorporated County land but do not identify proximity to any wells.

          Further, Intervenors have no interest related to the vested rights / inverse condemnation claims.[5] Finally, Intervenors cannot establish the County will inadequately represent their interests.

          Petitioners argue for purposes of discretionary intervention that Intervenors do not have a direct and immediate interest in this matter and that litigating the case without Inventors’ involvement outweighs the reasons for intervening. The Court must balance the interest of the original parties in pursuing this case unburdened by others against the interests of those affected by a judgment. (South Coast, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at 320) Courts can permit intervention where (1) the intervenor has a direct and immediate interest in the litigation, (2) intervention will not enlarge the issues and (3) the reasons for intervention outweigh opposition by existing parties. (Hinton v. Beck (2009) 176 Cal.App.4^th 1378, 1382-83) Petitioners argue this case is like South Coast, supra, where the denial of intervention was upheld notwithstanding that the union intervenor had a distinct interest in the port but that union participation would be largely “cumulative” and “unduly complicate an already complicated case.” (South Coast, supra, 71 Cal.App.5^th at 321) Were the Court to accept Intervenors’ logic, all those living near a well might be able to intervene also.

          Intervenors argue in reply that they qualify as of right based upon impairment of significantly protectable interests:

          They dispute the contention of Petitioners’ opposition that members of the various organizations do not live or “recreate” close to affected wells in unincorporated areas. They also argue that the Ordinance covers an “idle” well, i.e., that “deserted” wells are still subject to the ordinance unless the State Oil & Gas Supervisor has determined them to be “orphaned.”  Further, they indicate that the Inglewood Field wells are also impacted because the County is seeking to reach an agreement as to those facilities that would be consistent with the Ordinance.  They claim that the issues involved here go beyond the County and suggest that the filing of these actions may have a “chilling effect” on agencies seeking to avoid the threat of unanticipated financial liability. Finally, they explain how even the takings issues may impact implementation of the Ordinance going forward, as well as related matters including the Inglewood Field.

          They also argue that they met their minimal burden to show the County may not adequately represent their interests: Having the same goal as one side of the “v” cannot alone defeat intervention. For example, a court allowed a labor union to intervene as of right to defend a wage law where its interests were narrower than the interests of the public at large. (Allied Concrete & Supply v. Baker, 904 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2018)) Intervenors do not have to anticipate at this stage specific differences in strategy that might create divergence. (Sw. Ctr for Bio. Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 824 (9^th Cir. 2001)) They instead focus on the fact that a different decision on whether to appeal a decision may be grounds to show inadequate representation. (County of Fresno v. Andrus, 622 F.2d 436, 439 (9^th Cir. 1980) Similarly, governmental policies may change over time, thereby creating a need for Intervenors.

          Alternatively, Intervenors argue they should be “permitted” to intervene: They have a direct and immediate interest in the legality of the Ordinance, intervention will not enlarge the issues herein and the reasons for intervention outweigh opposition by existing parties. They contend the claims of added complication are exaggerated and that those whose interests are most impacted should not be marginalized in the interests of streamlining litigation. (U.S. v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391, 404, 9^th Cir. 2002)

DISCUSSION

          The Court grants County’s request for judicial notice of a County summary of the Ordinance (“RJN, Ex. A”). The Court overrules the Objections of Bridgeland to the Supplemental Declaration of Damon Nagami, finding it to be largely rebuttal and therefore permissible.

          The request to intervene is timely. The administrative record has not been filed yet and briefing has not begun.

MANDATORY INTERVENTION

           Intervenors need to show (1) they claim an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, (2) the disposition of the action may impair or impede their ability to protect that interest and (3) existing parties do not adequately represent that interest.

          As set forth below, the Court finds that Intervenors meet the first element but do not meet the second and third elements.

         Initially, the Court finds Intervenors have a “significant protectible interest” in the subject matter of the litigation. The Court recognizes that Petitioners were able to point out that some of those who submitted declarations did not in most cases live or work very close to an affected well. However, the declarants are not would-be class representatives where it is necessary that they have standing or a pecuniary or property interest per se in the litigation. The Court is not convinced that each of these organizations do not have some members who live or work close to an affected well. These organizations exist after all to protect those members’ interests. It is not the declarant who is the intervenor. It is based upon the direct impact to members that allowance of an organization to intervene is premised. (Rominger, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at 662-663. These members’ interests are not “remote or consequential.” Id.)  

          Further, there appears to be some controversy over which wells are in fact covered by the Ordinance. For example, it is not clear to the Court, as further discussed below, whether if there is a County lease this impacts coverage under the Ordinance. From Ex. A to the RJN, it is hard to determine whether the Ordinance also reaches still to be taken actions vis-à-vis wells that are pursuant to a discretionary permit, e.g., Sawtelle. The Court cannot rule on that issue on this motion without being provided further relevant detail.

          At the same time, Intervenors have not shown why hiking in the Santa Monica mountains gives hikers some special protected right over other residents who do not do so. Ultimately, however, even assuming County residents do have a right to “recreate” there safely, for sake of argument, this motion does not turn on this element.  

          The Court is not convinced that disposition of this action may impede their ability to protect those interests where relatedly the Court finds no good reason that the County will not now adequately represent that interest. The County, after all, enacted the Ordinance and has appeared herein to defend it. It has also secured outside counsel. The Court sees no divergence of interest at this time between those most affected by the wells and the position of the County that it is seeking to protect the health and welfare of all its residents, including those represented by Intervenors. While the Court recognizes the authorities that place a minimal burden on Intervenors in this regard, the Court still finds the arguments Intervenors present as reasons why there might be divergence to be speculative at this point. This case has just begun. The County has no reason to now consider whether it might appeal from a judgment against it herein where the judgment may be in its favor. Put another way, Intervenors have not rebutted the presumption that a governmental agency will represent the interests of all those under its jurisdiction. Their burden is a “very compelling” showing that a governmental agency would not protect that interest.

          That it is not disputed that Intervenors played an advocacy role in lobbying the County to pass the ordinance (and to make it stronger than it had been) still does not mean that the County will not stand by the ordinance it ultimately enacted.[6] Likewise, no showing was made that the County is not “invested” in the Ordinance or that it will not strongly defend the Ordinance.

          The Court rejects Intervenors’ “strawman” argument that the County is only interested in “defending its jurisdiction,” whatever that may mean. Intervenors have not provided any evidence to suggest that the County is not interested in the health and welfare of its residents. As in Oakland Bulk, et al., v. City of Oakland, 960 F.3d 603, 620 (9^th Cir. 2020), Intervenors have not shown how the County was “neither positioned nor willing” to make arguments of proposed environmental intervenors. In turn, the concern of the Court in Simpson Redwood, supra, in allowing leave to intervene was that there was a divergence of interest between the State and landowner intervenor whether the land should remain protected if the State sold the land. That divergence does not exist here. Likewise, unlike in Calif. Dump Truck Owners v. Nichols, 275 F.R.D. 303 (E.D. Cal. 2011), there is no evidence here that the agency is willing to compromise or eviscerate the ordinance in a way harmful to Intervenors.

          That Intervenors have a state-wide interest in this matter in terms of consequences elsewhere also does not by itself render the County’s representation inadequate.

          Similarly, even assuming the County may have had to balance competing interests in adopting the Ordinance, Intervenors have not shown how that is true in now defending the Ordinance against legal challenge.

          The Court also does not find any evidence to support the claim that the County’s alleged “resource constraints,” if any, might result in it not adequately representing the interests of those in frontline communities. The County is likely better funded to support the defense of the ordinance than Intervenors.

          Finally, and most significantly, Intervenors’ concerns are the same as those of the County – defending the Ordinance – and will therefore largely be cumulative.  

          For these reasons, Intervenors fail to meet the requirements under CCP sec. sec. 387(d)(1)(b).

DISCRETIONARY INTERVENTION

          Intervenors need to show (1) the proper procedures have been followed, (2) the nonparty has a direct and immediate interest in the action, (3) intervention will not enlarge the issues in the litigation and (4) the reasons for intervention outweigh any opposition by the parties presently in the action.

          Initially, the Court recognizes that both sides of the litigation agree this motion should be denied – which is a factor the Court has considered.

          That said, as set forth below, the Court finds that Intervenors meet all four elements:

          There is no real claim that Intervenors have not followed the proper procedures except that they might have brought this motion sooner. Existing parties, however, have shown no resulting prejudice. As discussed below, the issue with Bridgeland cannot be put at Intervenors’ plate.

          As to whether Intervenors have a direct and immediate interest in the action, the Court now recognizes that this level of interest differs to some degree from the more generalized interest “relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action,” that is in question for purposes of mandatory intervention. Hence, for discretionary intervention purposes, the Court will not follow the more “lenient” Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as it did for mandatory intervention (consistent with the cases approving courts doing so), but rather will apply the “stricter” test under CCP sec. 387(a). (SF, supra, 128 Cal.App.4^th at 1043) The Court finds, however, that even now following this higher level of scrutiny that Intervenors still meet this requirement.

          That interest is principally the harm to the health of Intervenor members resulting from the alleged effects of the pollution they assert emanates from the wells at issue – that would ensue were the Ordinance invalidated. Intervenors have sufficiently identified the “concrete” harm they might suffer for these purposes, as in Rominger, supra. This harm is not merely “consequential” and is “capable of determination” herein. (SF, supra, 128 Cal.App.4^th at 1037) The declarations specify what that alleged harm would be. Indeed, Intervenors argue the harm that they would directly and immediately suffer would be more than others in the County. Though the parties argue that if the Ordinance were invalidated Intervenors would merely return to the status quo and therefore have not lost any “legal right,” that ignores that were the Ordinance kept in place that alleged injury might have been alleviated.

          Petitioners argue also that Intervenors’ alleged injury is remote to the wells in question, many wells referenced would not be impacted by the Ordinance, certain wells are inactive and new wells are unlikely. The level of showing, however, required of Intervenors is relatively low (see Rominger, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at 663 (“a substantial probability” their relevant interest will be affected)) and even if the harm may not be as severe as claimed, for sake of argument, that still does not take it out of the “direct and immediate” category and into the “consequential” category. The harm alleged here is the whole point of the Ordinance. That harm is not just about having to hike near an abandoned well.  

          Hence, the cases here are not like SF, supra, where Intervenors did not allege that they would suffer tangible harm from an adverse judgment. In turn, consistent with SF, supra, the Court recognizes that the further harm Intervenors assert, i.e., their efforts in lobbying for enactment of this ordinance, is not a form of harm that would be a basis for direct and immediate harm.    

          As to whether intervention will enlarge the issues in the litigation; initially, the Court still reaches the same conclusion as it did previously as to the preemption and CEQA phases of these cases that intervention would not enlarge the issues: Intervenors assure the Court they will seek to coordinate among themselves and with existing parties to avoid extra work. In turn, the Court finds that is possible here where the issues over the four cases seem essentially the same at this point. 

          The recent briefing addresses how the inverse condemnation aspect of these cases would unfold: Intervenors do not seek a role in any jury trial calculating what “just compensation” or damages should be if the court were to find beforehand that the ordinance was a taking, as would be necessary. (Weiss v. People ex rel. Dept. of Transp. (2020) 9 Cal.5^th 840, 853, Regency Outdoor Adv. v. City of Los Angeles (2006) 39 Cal.4^th 507, 516) This concession addresses the Court’s earlier stated concern that Intervenors’ involvement in front of a jury might be unduly prejudicial to Petitioners where Intervenors have no direct interest in what any such compensation or damages would be and have no responsibility for paying any such amounts.[7] (It appears undisputed a jury would be required in a second phase of the inverse condemnation part of the case if there were a finding of a taking.) That said, the initial aspect of the inverse condemnation part of trial would be a bench trial (or potentially even a motion (see Healing v. Calif. Coastal Comm’n (1994) 22 Cal.App.4^th 1158, 1169)) - much like the earlier phases of these cases - where it would not appear that Intervenors filing an additional brief would so enlarge the issues at stake to warrant denial of permissive intervention.

          Though the parties assert that because inverse condemnation is a fact-specific inquiry, Intervenors may not be able to file a single brief and may pursue discovery, this would not necessarily be their fault. Whether the effect of the Ordinance on a particular property amounts to a taking would already be potentially subject to a property-by-property analysis.[8] Moreover, the Court retains its right to control the proceedings, including restricting briefing and issuing a protective order, if necessary, concerning discovery. The Court will endeavor to assure all concerned that these cases proceed in an appropriate way.

          Intervenors established a basis for why their involvement in this part of the case is justified – even if they do not claim any interest in Petitioners’ vested rights: Presumably Intervenors will argue why the effect of the Ordinance on the use of a particular property or as to a petitioner’s vested rights would not be a taking. In turn, Intervenors indicate that the County might seek to rescind the Ordinance if the court were to find the Ordinance was a taking. This would give Intervenors some “legal right” to be involved in this part of the cases.[9] While, as the County argues, the decision whether to rescind the Ordinance in whole or in part would be for decision by the Board of Supervisors, not this Court, citing Jones v. People ex rel Dept. of Transp. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 144, 154, Intervenors argue that their defending against these challenges may avoid that potential situation. Further, they point to Termo and Bridgeland’s stated intent to try to rescind the Ordinance through this Court issuing a writ. For these reasons, the Court again finds Intervenors’ involvement as limited here would not unduly complicate these cases.

           In terms of the fourth element, the Court exercises its discretion to permit intervention - solely by CFBD and NRDC - to thereby address the opposition asserted by the parties presently in the action as to the number of proposed Intervenors. The Court reaches this conclusion consistent with how CCP sec. 387 is to be liberally construed in favor of allowing participation. (Lincoln Nat’l Life, supra)

          In balancing the arguments for and against intervention, the Court has concern that though lawyers for two entities represent all seven intervenors, it has no assurance that each intervenor may not have a different (or even possibly conflicting) view about actions to take here – even taking account of counsel stating they are not seeking to have each client directly involved. Further, as Petitioners argue, still more residents who live close to the wells might seek to intervene.

          While the Court recognizes the enhanced concerns of “frontline” groups, the Court does not find that they will necessarily assist the Court in determining the legality or scope of the Ordinance over and above what the County will argue on their and others’ behalf as the responsible governmental authority. To the extent their counsel believes issues they bring to the table are pertinent, they can raise them as counsel for their own organizations that seek to protect those who may suffer more from any oil well derived pollution than others.  

          On the other hand, CFBD and NRDC are likely - as compared to the other five intervenors - to have the most to contribute knowledge-wise concerning the technical environmental and legal issues the Court will need to decide. They have demonstrated already that whether wells are subject to the Ordinance may be the subject of controversy and have therefore added to the information the Court will likely need to assess.[10] Further, given these organizations’ role in strengthening the Ordinance from an earlier version (at least from their perspective), their input may be useful concerning the issues surrounding likely future issues as to how to apply the Ordinance in a way that preserves Petitioners’ vested rights (during a later phase of this case.)

          As Intervenors argue, the cost of the Court finding a taking and the potential financial consequences may impact how the County chooses to proceed. Petitioners in the lead case alone have alleged that they expected to generate more than $1.3 billion in net future revenue over the next fifty years. In addition, as discussed above, Termo apparently seeks to rescind the ordinance on takings grounds. Further, there may yet still be a further issue about construing the Ordinance in a way that mitigates against a taking. Therefore, as the County implies, it is at least conceivable that if the Court were to find a taking that it might assert that the costs of going forward are unduly prohibitive, or seeks to proceed in a more limited fashion, but Intervenors contend otherwise.  

          Permitting intervention of these two parties may also avoid a multiplicity of additional proceedings since Intervenors might otherwise elect to bring some further proceedings if they are dissatisfied with the outcome herein. Should the Court find that the Ordinance is not entitled to a CEQA exemption, for example, and must issue a writ for the County to perform some form of further environmental review, as Petitioners contend, arguendo, it will be preferable to have all potential issues (and Intervenors’ input into those issues) considered by the County at one time instead of seriatim, with the resulting inevitable delay.[11] This way Intervenors will be bound based on all applicable input. However much the additional burden on the undersigned, it may still avoid another judge having to wade through these same issues.

          Moreover, this case is not litigation between private parties but rather addresses an issue of significant public interest of consequence to many constituents, as similarly noted in Rominger, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at 665.[12] Continued public involvement is likely depending on how the case develops, whether the Ordinance is upheld or otherwise: The potential costs alone for this ordinance and how that might impact the County’s ability to perform other services presumably has to be a relevant discussion point. See State Water Board Cases (2023) __ Cal.App.5^th  __, 316 Cal.Rptr.3d 170 (“The purpose of intervention is ‘to obviate delay and multiplicity of actions by creating an opportunity to those directly interested in the subject matter to join in an action already instituted’ (Citation omitted)”)

           The Court believes the foregoing considerations are important but also wants to avoid making this case impossible to manage or unduly costly to the existing parties.

          Existing parties though have not shown how Intervenors’ representation that they would not enlarge the issues would not be true. The Court does not believe that two additional parties, with counsel seemingly specializing in this area, will likely unduly interfere with the proceedings.[13] While requiring the input of two additional counsel adds to the work involved, the Court does not find that such extra work is inconsistent with the stakes involved in this litigation. Issues requiring agreement of all parties will be easier to secure with just two additional parties than the seven contemplated. Though the issues in these cases will likely be complex, the Court does not find that the addition of these two entities – by continuing to jointly file pleadings (or at least combining their positions if not identical in one pleading) - should make those issues more difficult. Their expertise – as well as that of counsel for existing parties – may in fact assist the Court in being able to focus on what is truly at issue. Should CFBD and NRDC significantly and unnecessarily expand the issues herein, contrary to what they represented, the Court may reconsider this order.[14] 

          The Court finds that the reasons for intervention, as limited here to these two parties, as to matters to be decided by the Court, outweigh those in opposition. Where this analysis is specific to the facts here, the Court finds those to be different from those in South Coast, supra, where a union’s interest in environmental issues was found “cumulative.”

          For these reasons, the Court finds that at least CFBD and NRDC meet the requirements under CCP sec. 387(d)(2).

CONCLUSION

          For these reasons, the Court grants the motion in part, based on permissive intervention, as to CFBD and NRDC only, and then only as to matters to be decided by the Court as opposed to by a jury, and denies the motion as to the other Intervenors based on both mandatory and discretionary intervention requirements.         

DATED:                                                                                     _________________________________

                                                                                                       DAVID J. COWAN

                                                                                                       Judge of the Superior Court