Judge: David J. Cowan, Case: BC575230, Date: 2022-09-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: BC575230    Hearing Date: September 8, 2022    Dept: 1

Ruling

Judge David J. Cowan

Department 1


Hearing Date:                  Thursday, September 8, 2022

Case Name:                     Noushin Khoiny M.D. v. St. Mary Medical Center, et al.

Case No.:                         BC575230

Motion:                           Reassignment

Moving Party:                  Plaintiff Khoiny

Opposing Party:               Defendant Dignity Health (dba St. Mary Medical Center)

Notice:                             OK


Ruling:                             The Motion for Reassignment is DENIED. The case remains assigned to Department 52 of the Stanley Mosk courthouse.

 

Plaintiff shall give notice.

 

If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear remotely rather than in person.


 

BACKGROUND

On March 11, 2015, Plaintiff Noushin Khoiny, M.D. filed a Complaint against Defendants St. Mary Medical Center, Dignity Health, Chester Choi, M.D., Andrew Burg, M.D., Bahman Chavoshan, M.D., Maged Tanios, M.D., Brian Rayhanabad, M.D., and Does 1-30 stating causes of action for breach of contract, wrongful termination in violation of public policy, gender discrimination, retaliation, whistleblower retaliation, failure to prevent discrimination, defamation, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional interference with contractual relations.

On November 6, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint against the same Defendants asserting causes of action for breach of contract, gender discrimination, failure to prevent discrimination, retaliation, wrongful termination in violation of public policy,  violation of Labor Code sec. 6310, violation of Health & Safety Code sec. 1278.5, and defamation.

In 2019, following a jury trial, the jury "returned a verdict in favor of respondent Dignity Health . . . after being improperly instructed that [Dignity's] decision to terminate [Plaintiff] was entitled to academic deference in the first instance." (Khoiny v. Dignity Health (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 390, 396.)

On March 16, 2022, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and "remanded [the matter] for a new trial." (Id. at 420.)

On August 9, 2022, Plaintiff filed, in Department 1, a Motion to “Assign/Reassign Case to Department 8 Long Cause, Honorable Judge Susan Bryant-Deason Presiding, for Post-Appeal New Trial Proceedings.”

On August 25, 2022, Dignity Health filed an Opposition to the Motion.

On August 29, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Reply in support of the Motion.

On September 6, 2022, Dignity Health filed a Motion to Strike passages from the Reply.[1]

 

DISCUSSION

 

Applicable Law

Cal. Rules of Court (CRC) 3.734 provides that the “presiding judge may, on the noticed motion of a party or on the court's own motion, order the assignment of any case to one judge for all or such limited purposes as will promote the efficient administration of justice.” CRC 10.603(b)(1) and 10.603(c)(1) also permit the presiding judge to reassign cases “to different judges in appropriate circumstances” for “a variety of practical reasons.” (Ghaffarpour v. Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1471.)

 

Application to Facts

Plaintiff argues this case should be reassigned “for all purposes” to Judge Susan Bryant-Deason in Department 8 of the Stanley Mosk courthouse, one of three dedicated long cause courtrooms in the Los Angeles Superior Court, for three main reasons.

 

 

Long Cause Eligibility

First, Plaintiff asserts the case was remanded for re-trial on the same causes of action "that were already deemed by the Superior Court to be Long Cause and assigned to Department 16 Long Cause for trial in 2019." (Motion, p. 4; Khoiny v. Dignity Health (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 390, 420 ("the matter is remanded for a new trial").) Plaintiff argues there “is no reason why the case would be reclassified from Long Cause in 2022, but was not reclassified as such for the exact same causes of action tried recently in 2019.” (Motion, p. 4.)

The new trial, even if on the same claims at issue in the 2019 long cause trial, will not itself necessarily be a long cause trial. Though the same claims are at issue, the parties’ trial plans may have changed. Indeed, Plaintiff identifies unusual circumstances arguably affecting the length of the 2019 trial—for example, the dismissal of certain causes of action or the fact that "Plaintiff's counsel only substituted in one month before trial" and "was unable to prepare" for examination of several witnesses—as well as new facts which might alter the length of the new trial, such as “two key holdings” in Khoiny, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at 403, 409 that "will only increase trial testimony time." (Reply, p. 3-6.)

The Court is not assuming the case will be long cause eligible based on a stale determination from 2019. At this time, the Court has not been offered joint trial materials indicating this case will require more than 20 days (100 hours) of witness testimony—which is the threshold for long cause referral. (Local Rule 2.8(e).) To the extent the parties seek an order from Department 1 referring the case to a long cause courtroom for trial, they may seek this referral by submitting trial materials required by the Long Cause Trial Package Guidelines demonstrating that the parties are trial-ready and eligible for referral. There is no contention that the parties have finalized their trial materials at this point.

 

Lack of Disqualification

Second, Plaintiff argues Judge Bryant-Deason was "never disqualified" and thus must hear the case under CRC 10.608, which requires a judge to “[h]ear all matters assigned unless . . . disqualified.” But this is equally true of Judge Armen Tamzarian, the bench officer currently assigned this case, who also has not been disqualified. The argument therefore does not support transferring the case from Judge Tamzarian to Judge Bryant-Deason. Moreover, both judges are able to hear the cases, but only Judge Bryant-Deason is assigned to a specialized long cause courtroom. As discussed, the case was not shown to be trial-ready and long cause eligible.

 

Sanction Motion

Third, Plaintiff argues Judge Bryant Deason's June 29, 2016 and December 6, 2016 sanction orders will be at issue in an upcoming Motion for Terminating Sanctions. Relying on Abbott v. Mandiola (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 676, Plaintiff argues Judge Bryant-Deason must hear the Motion for Terminating Sanctions premised upon violations of those sanction orders.

Assuming the correctness of Plaintiff’s position for purposes of analysis, this argument would not support the relief sought: reassignment “for all purposes.” Plaintiff’s Motion for Terminating Sanctions can be heard by Judge Bryant-Deason without reassigning the case for all purposes, including trial. Transfer for trial is not required by Abbott or any other authority cited in Plaintiff’s Motion. Significantly, if the case is not trial-ready and long cause eligible, then reassignment for all purposes to a long cause courtroom would cause undue congestion and prejudice other litigants with long cause eligible cases. The requested assignment would not “promote the efficient administration of justice.” (CRC 3.734.)

It is true that a matter may be assigned “to one judge for all or such limited purposes as will promote the efficient administration of justice.” (CRC 3.734.) Hence, the case could be assigned to Judge Bryant-Deason for the “limited purpose[]” of hearing a motion for sanctions. But Plaintiff has not filed a motion for sanctions that could support the requested reassignment. (See Motion, p. 15 (discussing the merits of Plaintiff's “impending 2022 Terminating and Other Sanctions Motion”)) The Motion for Reassignment is premature to the extent it is based on an unfiled Motion for Terminating Sanctions.

 

CONCLUSION

The Motion for Reassignment is DENIED. The case remains assigned to Department 52 of the Stanley Mosk courthouse.

 

Plaintiff to give notice.

 

If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear remotely rather than in person.

 

 



[1] The Motion to Strike pertains to arguments raised for the first time in the Reply concerning long cause eligibility. The Court is not now determining whether the case is long cause eligible because the parties do not contend they are trial-ready, as required for long cause referral, and have not submitted trial materials for review in any event. Therefore, the Motion to Strike is DENIED as Dignity has not been prejudiced by arguments not reached.