Judge David J. Cowan, Case Number: SC126845, Date: 2025-01-17 Tentative Ruling

On September 23, 2024, the Court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendants in the total sum of $19,796,939.00. The judgment was based on a jury verdict wherein Plaintiffs prevailed on each cause of action. The judgment represented an award of compensatory damages, penalties and punitive damages (after a finding of oppression, fraud or malice). The verdict set forth differing amounts as to each of the seven plaintiffs for compensatory damages comprised of past economic loss and past non-economic loss and emotional distress, as well as for penalties. The total compensatory damages and penalties for all seven plaintiffs was a total of $5,789,959. In addition, the verdict awarded each plaintiff the same amount in punitive damages as against Zohoury and Rahimi (respectively in the sums of $714,286 and $1,285,714) (i.e., each plaintiff received $2 million in punitive damages) (for a total of $14 million), and as against SBZ and SIDMA, both in the sum of $500.00 (i.e., each plaintiff received $1,000 in punitive damages) (for a total of $7,000).

On November 25, 2024, the Court filed its ruling denying Defendants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and conditionally granting the motion for new trial on damages and penalties subject to a remittitur for an amended judgment in the total amount of $9,000,000 as against defendants Zohoury and Rahimi, of which amount defendants SBZ and SIDMA were liable for $4,501,000. The Court ruled further that the proposed amended judgment would be divided between the different plaintiffs in the same proportion as the judgment.

On December 11, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their consent to the remittitur for an amended judgment The Court then denied the motion for new trial.

On December 20, 2024, Defendants filed a Notice of Errata: re Objections to the proposed amended judgment, attached their corrected objections filed the same date. Defendants requested oral argument on the objections pursuant to Rule 3.1590(j) of the Rules of Court. Defendants contended the amended judgment was for a total sum of $9,975,060.97, not $9 million. They also contended that the punitive damage award should not be joint and several where this was not part of the verdict.

On December 23, 2024, the Court set a hearing on the objections at the above-referenced date, concurrent with a hearing on a motion for attorneys’ fees and to tax costs.

On January 6, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a Response to Defendants’ objections. Plaintiffs argue that Defendants are seeking the Court to make substantive rulings concerning, for example, economic and relocation damages, where the time for the Court to make such rulings has now passed, as opposed to making objections to the form of the judgment. Specifically, they contend that Defendants are improperly trying to seek a determination that only statutory damages were awarded so they can then argue on the appeal that punitive damages are duplicative. Plaintiffs also indicate they do not know how Defendants calculated the proposed amended judgment would be for $9,975,060.97.

On January 10, 2025, Defendants filed a Reply to the Response to their Objections. They indicate that the parties need input from the Court as to how allocate the amounts within the reduced $9 million total that only the Court can provide. Their principal points are that the sub-totals add up to no more than $9 million and that there be no allocation for relocation damages or economic damages that they argue was wholly comprised of relocation damages) where the Court ruled previously that relocation damages were not recoverable. That said, they also - like Plaintiffs - take the position that the Court is now without jurisdiction to make further rulings except to ensure the judgment clearly sets forth its intent in issuing the remittitur. (Manson v. Iver & York, et al. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4^th 36, 43, Rochlin v. Pat Johnson Mfg. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4^th 1227, 1238)

On January 13, 2025, Plaintiffs submitted an alternative amended judgment. This still breaks down the final recovery by way of making an allocation as between economic and non-economic losses and in turn makes a further allocation as between compensatory damages and punitive damages, omitting the penalties.

The Court’s intent in its remittitur, if not stated sufficiently clearly, was for total compensatory damages and or penalties to be $4.5 million as against the four defendants that were part of this trial and punitive damages as against Zohoury and Rahimi to be $4.5 million and as against SBZ and SIDMA to be $1,000 (for a total of $9 million.) [1] As set forth below, the Court has taken the following steps to make the amended judgment consistent with the terms of the remittitur:

First, the Court determined the respective percentage interests each plaintiff had in the total amount of compensatory damages and penalties in the judgment and applied those percentages to the $4.5 million.[2] In its remittitur, the Court did not differentiate as between the different components or types of compensatory damages and penalties given the various issues identified in the rulings on the JNOV motion and motion for new trial. As permitted in a remittitur, the Court instead determined an award that attempted to be a “fair and reasonable” amount consistent with the evidence and various theories of relief. The Court no longer has jurisdiction to make further rulings as concerns the substantive issues in the motions.

Second, the Court divided by seven the $4.5 million in punitive damages against Zohoury and Rahimi and separately $1,000 as against SBZ and SIDMA.[3] The Court then divided those amounts against Zohoury and Rahimi by their respective proportionate shares (35.7% and 64.3%) from the judgment. The Court concurs that liability for these amounts is not joint and several, consistent with the verdict, except as to the awards against SBZ and SIDMA.

The Court does not know why Plaintiffs submitted a proposed amended judgment for $9,975,060.97 but in any event the amounts set forth below total $9 million. In addition, the way in which Plaintiffs have calculated economic and non-economic losses and punitive damages (and omitting penalties) - in both proposed amended judgments - is inconsistent with what the Court had intended. Again, the Court made no such rulings in the remittitur. Plaintiffs’ citations to the ruling concerned analysis of the original judgment and issues therewith, based on comparison of different parts of that judgment, as contrasted to the absence of any such breakdown in the remittitur. The Court determined that a conditional revised amount was a better way to assess the amount of liability instead of having a new trial that would have made those legal determinations. Finally, the Court did not here determine proportionate shares of the total judgment – but only reduces the compensatory damages / penalties part to $4.5 million -- as that was the only part where Plaintiffs’ recoveries differed between them. The Court did not wholly omit penalties, nor make the allocation between compensatory and punitive damages that Plaintiffs propose in their judgment. Nonetheless, the Court agrees that since each Plaintiff received the same amount in punitive damages, that amount could instead be simply reduced to $4.5 million (not what Plaintiffs suggest) and divided as set forth above.

Plaintiffs shall submit a further revised amended judgment for a total of $9,000,000 that provides in relevant part as follows:

Compensatory damages / penalties jointly and severally against all four defendants: $652,500

Compensatory damages / penalties jointly and severally against all four defendants: $661,500

Compensatory damages / penalties jointly and severally against all four defendants: $747,000

Compensatory damages / penalties jointly and severally against all four defendants: $805,500

Compensatory damages / penalties jointly and severally against all four defendants: $544,500

Compensatory damages / penalties jointly and severally against all four defendants: $477,000

Compensatory damages / penalties jointly and severally against all four defendants: $612,000

There shall be no further opportunity to object to an amended judgment inclusive of these awards.

[1] The Court acknowledges that it had not in making its ruling realized that the punitive damages award as against SBZ and SIDMA was a total of $7,000, not the $1,000 reflected in the remittitur, i.e., the amended judgment against these defendants would be $4.501 million. Given the remittitur for a total of 1,000, the Court has reduced that number as indicated below.

[2] Lackey: 14.5%, Camacho: 14.7%, Crosby: 16.6%, Pillarella: 17.9%, Yin: 12.1%, Ramirez: 10.6% and Delp 13.6% (The Court added .3% to Delp to make up an even 100%, consistent with Plaintiffs’ statement in the final filing.)

[3] 1,000 divided by fourteen (seven plaintiffs, two defendants) is 71.428. The total amount awarded is 12 cents short of $1,000 as this is the closest to 1,000 by dividing 1,000 equally between the seven plaintiffs and in turn the two defendants. Consistent with Plaintiffs’ statement in their final papers that Delp should receive the uneven balance, Delp is given below the extra 12 cents.

The amounts against SBZ and SIDMA are included within the calculation of the total of $4.5 million in punitive damages as opposed to creating a total amount of $4,501,000 in total punitive damages. Zohoury and Rahmi will owe $4,499,000 when SBZ and SIDMA pay the $1,000.

TENTATIVE RULINGS ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO TAX COSTS AND PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES

On September 23, 2024, the Court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendants in the total sum of $19,796,939.00. The judgment was based on a jury verdict on causes of action for nuisance, premises liability, statutory violations, breach of lease, tortious breach of warranty of habitability, intentional influence to vacate and intentional infliction of emotional distress – in which Plaintiffs prevailed on each cause of action. The judgment represented an award of damages, penalties and punitive damages (after a finding of oppression, fraud or malice).

On December 11, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their consent to the remittitur for an amended judgment in the total amount of $9,000,000.[1] The Court then denied the motion for new trial.

On October 23, 2024, Defendants filed the motion, seeking to tax costs of $15,777.09, comprised of witness fees of $120.00, court reporter fees per statute in the sum of $2,498.62, hotel and lodging in the sum of $6,582.13, subpoena fees of $4,003.28 and a trial database set up of $2,573.06. They argue that the memorandum of

- A verified memorandum of costs is sufficient evidence without providing further evidence. They nonetheless provide reference to the worksheets to the motion as well as exhibits to the accompanying declaration of counsel.

- Government Code sec. 68086(d) and Calif. Rules of Court, Rule 2.956(c)(1) permit the prevailing party to recover court reporter fees.

- The lodging and trial database are not expressly prohibited either and are for the Court’s discretion. Doe v. Los Angeles Co. DCFS (2019) 37 Cal.App.5^th 675 permitted recovery of costs of lodging for an out-of-town assistant during trial. The motion does not show either the lodging or trial database costs were not reasonable under the circumstances. Science Applications, et al. v. Sup. Court (1995) 39 Cal.App.4^th 1095 – that Defendants rely on - is outdated and superseded by other cases.

On November 18, 2024, Defendants filed a Reply in support of the motion. In summary:

- Filing the motion put the costs in issue, requiring further production of evidence. (Ladas v. Calif. State Auto Ass’n (1993) 19 Cal.App.4^th 761, 774)

- They acknowledge permissibility of reporter fees but for $23.62 that was unexplained.

- The subpoena fees were largely for document copying costs, not compelling the attendance of witnesses. (Lowry v. Port San Luis Harbor Dist. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5^th 211, 222)

On November 22, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the motion, seeking as statutory and contractual fees, based upon a lodestar amount, of $2,377,156 and a multiplier of 1.75 for total fees of $4,160,023. The motion was premised on CCP secs. 1032, 1033.5, Santa Monica Municipal Code (“SMMC”) Ordinance sec. 56.040 (the “Tenant Harassment Ordinance”) and sec. 4.36.090 (the “Relocation Ordinance”) and pursuant to the lease agreements. Plaintiffs reference the contingent nature of the fee agreement, the risk involved for counsel not recouping its costs or time spent, curtailed ability to take on other work, the difficulty of the issues, the thirty-six years of experience of counsel (including over forty jury trials), the result obtained and the almost eight years it took (from filing of the complaint on December 20, 2016) to recover a judgment.

This case was on behalf of eight tenants of the property at issue, involved nine causes of action against nine defendants and required a six-week jury trial. The verdict was in favor of Plaintiffs on all claims and included punitive damages. Counsel had to prepare for trial twice due to the re-assignment to a long-cause courtroom. Counsel advanced over $140,000 in costs though a small firm. Plaintiffs also recovered a settlement for one plaintiff pursuant to a 998 offer, exclusive of fees.

Plaintiffs seek recovery for their tort causes of action pursuant to the fee provisions under the leases, consistent with Cruz v. Ayromloo (2007) 155 Cal.App.4^th 1270, 1276-77 (in reliance on Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4^th 599, 608, permitting fee award to former tenants “in connection with” lease in claims for forcible detainer, wrongful eviction and negligent infliction of emotional distress against former landlord, including (as here) to some of tenants without a lease agreement providing for fees where other tenants did have such agreements as “incidental beneficiaries” and fees should not be reduced as a result where same work was performed for all tenants who were in substantially same situation regardless of whether there was agreement.)[2] (See also Calvo Fisher v. Lujan (2015) 234 Cal.App.4^th 608, 621-626 (permitting fee awards as to tort claims where scope of agreement permitted if success on noncontract claims contributes to success of contract claims or claims are so intertwined so as to make it impracticable to separate attorney time and apportionment is not possible))

Here, Plaintiffs prevailed under their causes of action under the leases for violation of the SMMC Relocation Ordinance, failure to provide habitable premises and for intentional influence to vacate. Both the Relocation Ordinance and the Harassment Ordinance have provisions for attorneys’ fees, “as may be determined by the court.” (See Action Apt. Ass’n v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4^th 1232, 1239 (concerning the Harassment Ordinance)

Plaintiffs contend a reasonable hourly rate for their attorneys, Dennis Riley and Rena Kreitenberg, would be $750 and for their associate, Mike Vo, $500, commensurate with the reasonable hourly rate in the community for similar work. (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4^th 1084, 1095) They cite various cases where they have been awarded $500 - $650 per hour and in one case a multiplier to make an effective rate of $750. In addition, they cite the DOJ Laffey Matrix for 2020-2021 for attorneys with more than thirty-one years-experience at $665 per hour.

Plaintiffs seek a fee enhancement based on a 1.75 multiplier. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4^th 1122, 1138) They reference published cases where multipliers are awarded between 1.25 and 2.5, as well as where counsel for Plaintiffs have received similar multipliers in other cases in the Los Angeles Superior Court. They justify a multiplier here based on risk of loss to counsel, skill of counsel, complexity of issues (including pertaining to the applicability of a Santa Monica Rent Control Board decision), the length of time this case was pending, and proportionality to results obtained. In addition, the case was forcefully defended by numerous lawyers.

On January 6, 2025, Defendants filed Opposition to the motion. They make the following principal points:

First, that Defendants be permitted to conduct discovery concerning the fee requests and redacted and incomplete billings.

As concerns a contractual basis for fees, they contend there is insufficient foundation for any underlying agreements where they were not received into evidence at trial. Moreover, as to the Trager lease, it concerns a different property. As to the Campbell lease from 1987, it cannot be authenticated where Campbell has now passed away and the lease was in any event not with Defendants but a prior owner. Similarly, the Pillarella / Crosby lease from 2010 was not with Defendants but a prior owner. Further, the agreement provides a $500 cap on fees. Likewise, the Camacho lease was with an entity that is not a party to this case and is in that part of the agreement concerning non-payment of rent and recovery of possession – that are not at issue here. Finally, there are no lease agreements (allowing fees) for the remaining plaintiffs, Lackey, Yin and Ramirez.

As concerns a statutory basis, they contend that the Court found that recovery was not proper under both statutes, which ruling Plaintiffs accepted by way of the consent to remittitur, and therefore fees are not permitted pursuant to statute.

Third, the hourly rates are excessive. Defendants point to an alternative rate aggregator as showing lower hourly rates for attorneys for civil litigation - $369 for Riley, $344 for Kreitenberg and $350 for Vo – as contrasted to the requested rates of $750 and $550. Defendants also contend that the hourly rates of smaller law firms such as that of Plaintiffs’ counsel generally have lower rates than those of larger firms which have greater overhead. Awarding high rates would be an improper windfall to Plaintiffs’ counsel. Defendants argue also that the case was not complex to justify a higher rate. The claims were “straightforward.”

Fourth, a positive multiplier is not warranted here. Defendants contend that the factors Plaintiffs cite in support of a multiplier have already been factored into determination of the hourly rate and therefore should not be factored in again. Further, they contend that there was no uncertainty as to their recovery of fees if they prevailed - given the leases and statutes - and hence contingent risk does not justify a higher rate. In fact, a negative multiplier is justified given their claim that the fees were excessive and comparing the amount of fees to the $9 million recovery.

- Billing for trial on three occasions for a total of 760.2 hours (or 95 days.) This should be reduced by two thirds to 500 hours.

- Billing 35.2 hours to draft the complaint. Meetings and communications with clients amounting to 256 hours.

- Kreitenberg billing some 600 hours is inconsistent with her not participating for the most part at trial.

- Billing some 200 hours related to defendants as to whom trial was severed and no judgment entered.

- Billing 13.7 hours for the McGrowther plaintiffs from whom Riley withdrew as counsel and against whom Defendants later obtained summary judgment and dismissals.

- Vo’s billing is vague and duplicative of Riley’s work. His billing 465.4 hours should be reduced by half.

In summary, Defendants argue in the alternative either that no fees should be awarded or if fees are awarded to those entitled to an award that the time be reduced by half and that an hourly rate of $350 be applied.

On January 10, 2025, Plaintiffs filed their Reply in support of the motion, together with declarations providing the foundation for the lease agreements in question. Plaintiffs argue:

First, there can be no question they are the prevailing parties, notwithstanding that the Court has not yet entered the amended judgment pursuant to the agreed remittitur – which is a formality at this point.

Second, under Civil Code sec. 1717, Defendants cannot assert there is no contractual right to fees where in their Answer to the complaint they themselves sought fees. (Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4^th 599, 617) The accompanying declarations supply the needed “authentication,” including providing the correct Trager lease. Further, that certain Plaintffs did not have a written lease providing for fees, and that one lease has a $500 cap, is immaterial where two of the leases with predecessor landlords do have broad fee provisions.

The claims of all seven plaintiffs here were essentially the same and cannot be apportioned between them, entitling recovery of fees by all plaintiffs. (Reynolds Metals v. Alperson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 124, 129-130), Calvo Fisher, supra, 234 Cal.App.4^th at 625-626 and other cases cited regardless of whether certain claims permitted fees and others did not) Hence, that there were severed defendants and one plaintiff elected to change counsel and then did not prevail does not take away from the work that was common to all plaintiffs and defendants in one way or another.

In turn, Defendants, as successors-in-interest to prior landlords, assume the benefits as well as the obligations that come with those leases. (Kirk Corp. v. First American Title Co. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 785, 809, DLI Props. v. Hill (2018) 29 Cal.App.5^th Supp. 1, 8-9)

Third, Plaintiffs are entitled to fees as prevailing parties pursuant to statute. Under the judgment already entered, they prevailed under both the relocation and harassment ordinances – each of which provides for fees. Where the Court denied the JNOV and new trial motions, their having prevailed remains true. The Court merely found, in conditionally granting a new trial as to damages, that recovery under the relocation ordinance was “invalid.” However, the Court could not at the same time grant JNOV as to this issue where the verdict did not make a separate award for relocation damages, instead providing more generally for economic and non-economic losses -that could have also comprised damages based on other theories presented to the jury.

Fourth, Defendants’ contentions as to reasonable rates are unsupported where the databases they reference were not attached nor shown to be ones a court could rely upon. Even if they were considered, they do not differentiate between junior versus more experienced lawyers like here, nor as between practice areas with more complexity like here. By contrast, Plaintiffs cite to published decisions applying the matrixes they use and argue that a determination of reasonable rates can anyway be decided by the court itself based on its own knowledge and experience in assessing counsel’s declarations. (Steiny & Co. v. Calif. Electric Supply (2000) 79 Cal.App.4^th 285, 293) Further, Defendants’ claims are belied by their not revealing what rates they were paid nor what amount of time they spent on this case.

Fifth, Defendants’ claims that there was no contingency here as to Plaintiffs’ recovery of fees – so as to preclude any multiplier - is incorrect in that there was no guarantee they would prevail, let alone have to wait outcome of this case eight years later – that it appears will also be the subject of appeal. Moreover, Defendants cannot argue credibly that there was no risk that Plaintiffs would obtain their fees if they prevailed but then also argue there is no statutory nor contractual basis for fees. Similarly, Plaintiffs complain that Defendants may not permissibly argue that the issues are complex when that helps them but then argue now the case was simple where they perceive it helps them.

Sixth, the claims that the billing was unsupported and or duplicative ring hollow: Defendants do not show how they calculated 760 hours to prepare for trial or what that includes. That block-billing was used on a few occasions does not mean the court could not assess whether the time was reasonable – that is the issue, not block-billing itself. In turn, that there were a few redactions does not preclude an award. (Rancho Mirage Country Club HOA v. Hazelbaker (2016) 2 Cal.App.5^th 252, 263) That said, Plaintiffs acknowledge certain errors and agree to a reduction in the lodestar amount of $23,625. That Kreitenberg did not appear at trial does not mean she did not perform work away from trial and in fact thereby shows what she did would not have duplicated what Riley and Vo did.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs are “prevailing parties.” The only reason the amended judgment in favor of Plaintiffs has not yet been entered is due to Defendants’ objections to its form – which issues will be decided concurrent with these motions.[3]

The parties differ over who has the burden of proof where a party provides a verified memorandum where the Opposition allegedly offers no rebuttal evidence. The Court finds that the Opposition here shifted the burden to Plaintiffs such that their verified Memorandum of Costs does not necessarily satisfy their burden. However, as discussed below, the other evidence Plaintiffs presented in opposition to the motion for the most part addresses the issues:

The worksheets provide the necessary foundation for the total witness fees of $120 for five witnesses.

Defendants acknowledge the court reporter fees except for $23.62 that was not explained. Ex. 1 to the declaration of counsel supports the amount requested. Further, the above-referenced Gov’t Code sec. and Rule of Court permit Plaintiffs to recover these.

The subpoena fees were justified as far as both foundation and reasonableness, even if they were for obtaining documents obtained pursuant to those subpoenas. (Naser v. Lakeridge Athletic Club (2014) 227 Cal.App.4^th 571, 578) Lowry, supra, does not hold otherwise.

The trial database costs were “reasonably necessary” to the litigation and were reasonable in amount. (Green v. County of Riverside (2015) 238 Cal.App.4^th 1363, 1374, Bender v. County of Los Angeles (2013) 217 Cal.App.4^th 968, 989-991) This trial involved considerable photo and video evidence requiring the use of these programs to facilitate an efficient presentation.

Doe, supra, permitted lodging costs for an out-of-town paralegal at trial under CCP sec. 1033.5(c)(2) and citing to Chaaban v. Wet Seal (2012) 203 Cal.App.4^th 49, 59 (permitting lodging costs for taking depositions under CCP sec. 1033.5(a)(3)). CCP sec. 1033.5(b) does not list lodging costs at trial as among the types of costs that are not permissible. The Court does not infer that because the costs of taking depositions is permitted (including for lodging) that the Legislature intended that the costs of attending trial was necessarily precluded. Here, as in Doe, supra, the Court finds the costs were reasonable in both amount and in terms of the need to avoid having to otherwise go back and forth to Orange County, which would not have been tenable given the conflicting obligations to prepare for the next day of trial.

Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiffs met their burden, notwithstanding the motion.

Initially, the Court denies Defendants’ requests to continue this motion to allow them to conduct discovery. As previously noted on the ex parte application, Defendants do not show why they would be allowed to conduct discovery post-trial. Even if legally permitted, they do not show good cause.

Second, the written leases with Yin and Crosby and Pillarella were limited to $500. Hence, even if Yin’s wife, Ramirez, is entitled to fees under the Yin lease (about which there is a question when she did not reside with Yin when the lease was executed), that would still be for solely $500.

Third, the four plaintiffs who did have written leases with fee provisions (Pillarella, Crosby, Camacho and Campbell) were leases with parties other than any of the defendants.[4] Though a purchaser of property ordinarily by operation of law takes over existing leases (see DLI Properties and Kirk, supra), here those leases had expired before the building was purchased and Plaintiffs were presumably resident at the property thereafter on a month-to-month basis when Defendants took the actions in question. There was no evidence as to what leases were assumed and by whom when the building was purchased. Further, neither of the cases Plaintiffs rely on concern attorneys’ fees. Hence, even if Defendants were not able to charge rent more than provided by the leases, or as permitted by law, it is not clear the terms of the written leases were still in effect.[5]

Fourth, neither Zohoury nor Rahimi were successor owners of the property that they would be personally bound to the terms of these leases – even assuming still in effect. SBZ was the owner of the property. Even if Zohoury and Rahimi may be liable in tort or under the ordnances for the actions in question, they were not parties or successor parties to these contracts.

For these reasons, the Court denies fees based on the leases. Zohoury and Rahimi have no responsibility at all. Liability of SBZ (and its general partner, SIDMA), if any, would be based on the Campbell and Camacho leases, and for $500 (or arguably $1,000 for the two plaintiffs) on the Crosby / Pillarella lease. Though a court may award fees to co-plaintiffs without a contractual right to fees who are in an identical position to those plaintiffs who have similar claims (as is true here), and do have a right to fees, even where most of the plaintiffs had a contractual right to fees (see Cruz, supra), there still remains the lack of privity concern. That Defendants prayed for fees in their answer does not change the foregoing.

On the other hand, the foregoing becomes immaterial where in any event all plaintiffs have a right to fees under the Santa Monica Harassment Ordinance as against all defendants. Though the cause of action under this ordinance was just one of many, the underlying facts that supported the verdict on this ordinance permeated the entire case. It would be virtually impossible to determine apportionment of liability between the facts underlying violation of this ordinance and the other facts with which they were intertwined. (See Calvo, supra, and Hjelm, supra, 3 Cal.App.5^thvat 1176-1178 (apportionment of fees not necessary where contract and tort claims intertwined in constructive eviction and breach of warranty of habitability claims)) Contrary to Defendants’ claim, though the Court conditionally ordered a new trial for damages (based on this and other causes of action), the Court did not find that there was no evidence to support the jury’s verdict of liability based on this ordinance.

In deciding that there is a statutory right to fees, the Court does so without relying on the relocation ordinance (that provides for fees also) in view of the issues the Court raised in its JNOV / new trial ruling concerning recovery under that ordinance.

Turning to the lodestar analysis, the Court finds first that the three hourly rates in question are reasonable based on the experience of counsel, the quality of advocacy and work product, the Court’s familiarity with rates locally through sitting on the bench (including for smaller “boutique” firms), as well as based on the type of case here and its complexities. These rates are consistent with the matrices Plaintiffs reference. The Court is not familiar with the matrices Defendants indicate. That insurance companies can secure discounted rates by offering lawyers volume business – or factoring in what lower rates newer lawyers might charge - does not apply to Plaintiffs’ counsel.

The Court was also not persuaded by Defendants’ claim the number of hours was excessive. Those examples Defendants suggested were not supported. While all parties may have had to prepare for trial more than once due to the re-assignment of this case, that was not the fault of Plaintiffs or their counsel. Further, the number of hours Defendants suggested was incurred in trial preparation could not be assessed, nor what else it might have likely included. Similarly, the Court could not assess how Defendants concluded the number of hours spent on drafting the complaint. That Kreitenberg did not participate in the trial itself does not mean she did not do the work beforehand or while trial was ongoing. The latter point suggests Defendants are simply finding any reason to seek a reduction, no matter its validity, as with their unjustified claim there should be a negative multiplier. That the Court did not proceed to trial as to parties who were not part of the Rent Control Board decision does not mean that work involving those parties was not necessary for determining the issues that did go to trial. Defendants do not show how those fees would not have been justified given the overlap. While the Court could not assess what precisely Vo’s role was – other than handling the technology (which was very necessary), it is routine for parties to have two lawyers attend trial so the case can be tried efficiently (which it was here.) Defendants cannot complain about Plaintiffs having two lawyers at trial when they did the same (and at times had three lawyers.)

All of that said, the Court wishes to ensure that Defendants should not pay any more than is required. Plaintiffs acknowledge some errors in the billing. Certain of Defendants’ estimates of time spent appear to be high – even if trial was continued. Where time keeping would not have to reflect a concern about client payment, the time spent may not have been as precise or time-sensitive as it would otherwise – that may also be hidden to a degree in block billing. In turn, any duplication coming from having more than one lawyer involved should be considered. The Court therefore exercises its discretion to impose a 10% reduction in the total fees to address such concerns. Base fees therefore would be $2,139,440.

Turning to a multiplier, the Court rejects Defendants’ frivolous argument that Plaintiffs’ counsel did not take this case on contingency. A reasonable rate does not by law factor in contingency – even if it factors in complexity. In addition, a reasonable rate does not take account of the eight years this case has been pending to determine whether Plaintiffs would prevail and there might be a recovery – an exceptionally long time. The foregoing added significantly to the burden in taking that risk. On the other hand, the Court has already in its base fee provided for a not insignificant fee at reasonable but still high rates. Further, at least for Vo’s work, these considerations are reduced. The Court wishes to avoid any argument that a multiplier is already included within the rate - as Defendants argue. For these reasons, a multiplier of 1.5 rather than 1.75 seems more appropriate. Total fees awarded are therefore $3,209,160. This fee also bears a reasonable relation to the recovery of $9 million, namely, just over one-third.

For these reasons, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to tax costs and grants Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees in the sum of $3,209,160.

[1] Concurrent with these motions, the Court will hold a hearing on objections by Defendants to entry of that amended judgment.

[2] The Campbell lease provides in relevant part; “In any legal action or proceeding be brought by either party to enforce any part of this Agreement…” The Camacho and Trager leases provide a unilateral fee provision for the landlord, and in the Camacho lease, including to “enforce any provision of this lease, or to obtain damages…” – which would operate against Defendants under Civil Code sec. 1717.

[3] Moreover, as Plaintiffs note in their Reply in support of the fee motion, the original judgment was in their favor in a higher amount than the amended one will be and more significantly for these purposes, the Court has now denied Defendants’ motion for new trial that was based in part on the claim that the statutory relocation award was invalid, which ordinance was one of the two statutory bases for fees. Hence, though the Court ruled that recovery under that ordinance would have been a basis for a new trial, ultimately the Court denied that motion. In any event, as discussed below, even assuming recovery under the relocation ordinance was not permissible here, Plaintiffs are still entitled to fees under the harassment ordinance and under the leases.

[4] The supporting Camacho Decl. provided the lease for this property and thereby cleared up the issue with the wrong lease submitted before as to a different property. The Delp Declaration provides sufficient foundation for admissibility of the Campbell lease where she is acting as his executor and Defendants have offered no basis to suggest that lease is not authentic. The Court will not presume that it is not authentic.

[5] In making this decision, the Court is not also finding that the subject matter of the case would not be one that would fall under the broad terms of the fee provisions of at least some of the leases if the leases were otherwise in play. See Hjelm v. Prometheus Real Estate Group (2016) 3 Cal.App.5^th 1155, 1169-1170