Judge David S. Cunningham, Case Number: 56, Date: 2024-02-27 Tentative Ruling

Judge: David S. Cunningham, Case: 56, Date: 2024-02-27 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 56-2022-00573659 Hearing Date: February 27, 2024 Dept: 11

Southern California Clergy Cases (JCCP 5101)

RT Roe (56-2022-00573659-CU-PO-VTA)

Tentative Ruling Re: Demurrer to Adopted Amended Master Complaint

Date: 2/27/24

Time: 1:45 pm

Moving Party: Dignity Health dba St. John’s Regional Medical Center (“St. John’s” or “Hospital”)

Opposing Party: John RT Roe (“Plaintiff”)

Department: 11

Judge: David S. Cunningham III

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TENTATIVE RULING

The Hospital’s request for judicial notice is granted as to Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. The Court will judicially notice the existence of the documents but not truth of their contents.

The Hospital’s demurrer is sustained with leave to amend as to the first, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of action.

The demurrer is sustained without leave to amend as to the eleventh, fourteenth, and fifteenth causes of action.

BACKGROUND

This case (56-2022-00573659-CU-PO-VTA) is part of the coordinated Southern California Clergy Cases (JCCP 5101). Plaintiff claims Father Carl Sutphin sexually abused him when he was a minor. St. John’s allegedly employed Father Sutphin during that time. Plaintiff alleges that St. John’s had actual or constructive knowledge of Father Sutphin’s pedophilia.

Here, St. John’s demurs to the operative complaint.

LAW

When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context, and “treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) It is error “to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if the plaintiff shows there is a reasonable possibility any defect identified by the defendant can be cured by amendment.” (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)

DISCUSSION

St. John’s contends:

* The third (negligence), fourth (negligent supervision), fifth (negligent retention/hiring), and sixth (negligent failure to train, warn, or educate) causes of action should be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing a special relationship between the Hospital and Plaintiff and a special relationship between the Hospital and Father Sutphin. (See Demurrer, pp. 5-11.)

* The seventh (breach of fiduciary duty) and eighth (constructive fraud) causes of action should be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing a fiduciary relationship between the Hospital and Plaintiff. (See id. at pp. 11-12.)

* The first cause of action (intentional infliction of emotional distress) should be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing outrageous conduct by the Hospital or that the Hospital directed such conduct at Plaintiff. (See id. at pp. 12-13.)

* The eleventh (sexual battery in violation of Civil Code section 1708.5), fourteenth (violation of Penal Code section 288(a)), and fifteenth (violation of Penal Code section 647.6(a)(1)) causes of action should be dismissed because section 1708.5 does not apply retroactively, and Plaintiff fails to allege the claims with particularity. (See id. at pp. 13-15.)

Plaintiff does not claim the current allegations suffice to state claims. The demurrer is unopposed on that issue.

Instead, Plaintiff requests leave to amend. He claims he can add specific facts that establish special relationships, a fiduciary relationship, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (See Opposition, pp. 5-10.)

St. John’s asserts in reply that Plaintiff’s proposed new allegations would be inadequate to state any of the causes of action. (See Reply, pp. 6-10.) St. John’s contends leave to amend should be denied because it would be futile. (See id. at p. 6.)

The Court shares the Hospital’s doubt about the proposed amendments. Plaintiff claims his new allegations “would include additional facts showing that during the period of abuse, Plaintiff spent time at the Hospital in the presence of Fr. Sutphin, as Plaintiff’s mother was employed by the Hospital.” (Opposition, p. 2; see also id. at pp. 6-7.) “Additionally,” Plaintiff contends “the Hospital’s administrator was aware that Fr. Sutphin was often in the company of children, unsupervised, and spent a great deal of time with ‘young boys.’” (Id. at p. 2.) Plaintiff claims the administrator “was sufficiently troubled by Sutphin’s behavior to notify the Archdiocese, but did not notify either law enforcement or Plaintiff’s family.” (Ibid.) What is missing, though, are allegations that demonstrate that (1) the Hospital had custody or control over Plaintiff, (2) the Hospital knew (or should have known) of prior (or contemporaneous) sexual abuse by Father Sutphin, or (3) Father Sutphin sexually abused children at the Hospital and/or during hours when he was under the Hospital’s supervision.

Nevertheless, the Court agrees with Plaintiff. It would be inappropriate to deny leave to amend in a vacuum based on summaries and characterizations of the new allegations. Indeed, California’s policy in favor of leave to amend is liberal, so the Court needs to see the actual amendments to determine whether Plaintiff’s claims should survive. Granting Plaintiff an opportunity to allege new facts that he believes support his case is in the best interests of justice; consequently, the demurrer is sustained with leave to amend as to the first, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of action.

The potential exception is the eleventh, fourteenth, and fifteenth causes of action. Plaintiff does not address these claims in the opposition brief and appears to abandon them. The Court intends to sustain this portion of the demurrer without leave to amend unless Plaintiff’s counsel requests leave to amend at the hearing.