Judge: David S. Cunningham, Case: 20STCV04089, Date: 2022-12-15 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV04089 Hearing Date: December 15, 2022 Dept: 11
20STCV04089 (Chavez)
Tentative Ruling Re: Supplemental Briefs Re: Motion to Compel
Arbitration
Date: 12/15/22
Time: 1:45
pm
Moving Party: Salsbury
Industries, Inc. (“Defendant” or “Salsbury”)
Opposing Party: Rodrigo
Chavez (“Plaintiff” or “Chavez”)
Department: 11
Judge: David
S. Cunningham III
________________________________________________________________________
TENTATIVE RULING
The “class arbitration” issue is deferred to the arbitrator.
The Court grants Plaintiff leave to file a motion to conduct discovery to
find a new putative class representative.
BACKGROUND
Salsbury is “[a]
California corporation with its corporate headquarters and principal place of
business in Los Angeles[.]” (Second
Amended Complaint (“SAC”), ¶ 10(a).)
Culmin Staffing
Group, Inc. (“Culmin”) is “[a] Delaware corporation with its principal place of
business in New Jersey” and “conduct[s] business in numerous counties” in
California, “including in Los Angeles County[.]” (Id. at ¶ 11(a)-(b).)
Chavez “is a
California resident[.]” (Id. at ¶
8.) He alleges that Salsbury and Culmin
jointly employed him and that he worked for them as a general laborer from June
2017 to September 2019. (See ibid.)
Chavez filed the
instant case (20STCV04089) on 1/31/20.
He seeks to represent a class of Salsbury’s and Culmin’s current and
former hourly, non-exempt California employees, alleging “wage and hour”
violations under the Labor Code – e.g., failure to pay overtime and failure to
provide meal and rest breaks – and a representative PAGA claim.
He also filed an
individual action against Salsbury and Culmin (20STCV32978) on 8/28/20, which
settled on 2/2/22. He alleged
discrimination and retaliation claims.
(10/20/22
Ruling Re: Motion to Compel Arbitration, pp. 1-2.)
On 10/20/22, the Court heard
Salsbury’s motion to compel arbitration.
Salsbury argued that the arbitration provision in the settlement
agreement in the individual action “requires Chavez to arbitrate the claims in
the instant case.” (Id. at p. 2.) The Court granted the motion “as to Chavez’s
individual claims, including the individual PAGA claim[,]” and continued the
hearing for supplemental briefing regarding delegation and class
arbitration. (Id. at p. 1.)
Now, the Court considers the
supplemental briefs.
DISCUSSION
Delegation
The first issue is “whether the
‘class arbitration’ issue should be decided by the arbitrator or the
Court[.]” (10/20/22 Ruling Re: Motion to
Compel Arbitration, p. 1.)
Plaintiff cites Sandquist v.
Lebo Automotive, Inc. (2016) 1
Cal.5th 233, Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle (2003) 539
U.S. 444, and JPay, Inc. v. Kobel (11th Cir. 2018) 904 F.3d
923, contending the arbitrator should decide the issue. (See Plaintiff’s Supp. Brief, pp. 1-4.)
Culmin cites Shivkov v. Artex
Risk Solutions, Inc. (9th Cir. 2020) 974 F.3d 1051 and asserts
that the Court must decide the issue.
(See Culmin’s Supp. Brief, p. 4.)
Salsbury also cites Shivkov
and claims the Court must decide the issue because the FAA applies. (See Salsbury’s Supp. Brief, pp. 5-6.)
The parties’ arbitration
agreement states that the FAA governs.
(See 10/20/22 Ruling Re: Motion to Compel Arbitration, pp. 2-3.)
“In cases subject to the FAA, ‘gateway’ questions of
arbitrability are for the court to decide unless the parties clearly and
unmistakably provided otherwise.” (Knight, et al., Cal. Prac. Guide: Alt. Disp. Res. (The
Rutter Group 2021) ¶ 5:356.4.) “On the other hand, procedural questions that
grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition are not ‘questions of
arbitrability’ and, therefore, always are left up to the arbitrator.” (Ibid.)
The United States Supreme Court “held in a plurality opinion
that when an arbitration provision does not expressly permit or prohibit classwide
arbitration, the decision is for the arbitrator, not the court.” (Id. at ¶ 5:356.5 [citing Green Tree].)
Federal Courts of Appeals are split. (See, e.g., id. at ¶ 5:356.6; see also, e.g.,
JPay, supra, 904 F.3d at 935; Shivkov, supra, 974 F.3d at 1057 [“[W]e
join seven of our sister circuits in holding that the availability of class
arbitration is a gateway issue that a court must presumptively decide.”].)
In Sandquist v. Lebo Automotive, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th
233, the California Supreme Court agreed with the High Court plurality:
. . . neither appellate decisions
subsequent to Green Tree, nor the policy concerns Lebo Automotive raises,
persuade us the Green Tree plurality
was wrong. To the contrary, we agree with the plurality that the determination
whether a particular agreement allows for class arbitration is precisely the
kind of contract interpretation matter arbitrators regularly handle. Along with
the Green Tree plurality, we
find nothing in the FAA or its underlying policies to support the contrary
presumption, that this question should be submitted to a court rather than an
arbitrator unless the parties have unmistakably provided otherwise.
(Sandquist, supra, 1 Cal.5th at 260; see
also Knight, supra, at ¶ 5:356.7 [“Thus, when an arbitration agreement, drafted
by an employer and required to be signed by an employee as a condition of
employment, does not expressly permit or prohibit class arbitration but
contains a broad provision including disputes ‘having any relationship or connection
whatsoever’ with the employee's employment, and an additional clause naming
specific disputes that are not arbitrable (but would otherwise be within the
broad inclusive clause), the provisions suggest the decision is for the
arbitrator. Any ambiguities are resolved in favor of arbitration and against
the employer's interpretation as the drafting party. The availability of class
arbitration is to be resolved by the arbitrator instead of the court.”].)
On balance, the Court is inclined to follow the High Court
plurality and the California Supreme Court.
The Court finds Green Tree and Sandquist persuasive, and,
since the arbitration provision appears to be silent as to class arbitration,
the “class arbitration” issue should be deferred to the arbitrator.[1]
Class Arbitration
The second issue is “whether the agreement allows class
arbitration.” (10/20/22 Ruling
Re: Motion to Compel Arbitration, p. 1.)
Given the preceding analysis, the
Court declines to reach this issue.
Discovery
The parties disagree as to
whether Plaintiff should be allowed to conduct discovery to locate a new
putative class representative.
Instead of resolving the dispute
here, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an appropriate motion, which
will give the parties a full opportunity to brief the matter.
[1] The
Court notes that the Ninth Circuit decision – Shivkov – fails to discuss
Green Tree and Sandquist.