Judge: David S. Cunningham, Case: 20STCV22696, Date: 2022-08-18 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV22696 Hearing Date: August 18, 2022 Dept: 11
20STCV22696 (Cooper)
Tentative Ruling Re: Motion to Appoint Successor in Interest and
Arbitrator
Date: 8/18/22
Time: 10:30
am
Moving Party: DeShawn
Cooper (“Plaintiff”)
Opposing Party: Bay Vista Healthcare & Wellness
Centre, LP and Bay Vista Wellness GP, LLC (collectively “Defendants”)
________________________________________________________________________
TENTATIVE RULING
The hearing on Plaintiff’s motion
to appoint is continued as to the “successor in interest” issue.
The Court adopts Plaintiff’s
selection process. Each side must pick
one arbitrator from the other side’s arbitrator list (Plaintiff picked retired
judge Diane Wayne). The Court will appoint
one of them.
BACKGROUND
On 6/12/20, Plaintiff filed the
complaint. The complaint alleges that Defendants operate a “24-hour Skilled
Nursing Facility” in Long Beach, California without a license and that they
fail to disclose their unlicensed status to customers. (Complaint, ¶¶ 4-17, 23-38.)
On 1/27/21, Judge Ann Jones
granted Defendants’ motion to compel individual arbitration and stayed the rest
of the case. (1/27/21 Minute Order, p.
1.)
On 2/3/21, Plaintiff filed the
first amended complaint (“FAC”).
On 11/3/21, Plaintiff passed
away.
On 6/16/22, this Court denied
Plaintiff’s ex parte application to appoint Sandra Palmer (“Palmer”) as Plaintiff’s
successor in interest. (See 6/16/22
Minute Order, p. 1.)
On 7/6/22, Plaintiff filed the
instant motion to appoint a successor in interest and an arbitrator.
The issue is whether the motion
should be granted.
LAW
“If a person dies having a cause
of action for injuries suffered during life, the claim ‘survives’ to his or her
estate under [Code of Civil Procedure] § 377.20 and may be prosecuted by a duly
appointed executor or administrator on behalf of the estate.” (
“If there is no personal representative for the estate (e.g., estate not
probated or probate completed), the ‘survival’ action may be prosecuted by the
decedent’s ‘successor in interest’ – i.e., the person(s) who succeeds, by will
or intestacy, to the cause of action or to the particular item of property that
is the subject of the action.” (Ibid.,
emphasis in original.)
The Code of Civil Procedure puts
it this way:
* “A cause of
action for or against a person is not lost by reason of the person’s death, but
survives subject to the applicable limitations period.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 377.20, subd. (a).)
* “A cause of
action that survives the death of the person entitled to commence an action or
proceeding passes to the decedent’s successor in interest, . . . and an action
may be commenced by the decedent’s personal representative or, if none, by the
decedent’s successor in interest.” (Id. at § 377.30.)
* “On motion
after the death of a person who commenced an action or proceeding, the court
shall allow a pending action or proceeding that does not abate to be continued
by the decedent’s personal representative or, if none, by the decedent’s
successor in interest.” (Id. at § 377.31.)[1]
“A successor in interest . . .
who seeks to be substituted as plaintiff in place of the decedent must execute
and file a declaration” containing the information set forth in § 377.32. (
In particular:
(a) The person who seeks to commence an action or
proceeding or to continue a pending action or proceeding as the decedent's
successor in interest under this article, shall execute and file an affidavit
or a declaration under penalty of perjury under the laws of this state stating
all of the following:
(1) The decedent's name.
(2) The date and place of the decedent's death.
(3) “No proceeding is now pending in California for
administration of the decedent's estate.”
(4) If the decedent's estate was administered, a copy of
the final order showing the distribution of the decedent's cause of action to
the successor in interest.
(5) Either of the following, as appropriate, with facts
in support thereof:
(A) “The affiant or declarant is the decedent's successor
in interest (as defined in Section 377.11 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure) and succeeds to the decedent's interest in the action or
proceeding.”
(B) “The affiant or declarant is authorized to act on
behalf of the decedent's successor in interest (as defined in Section 377.1 of
the California Code of Civil Procedure) with respect to the decedent's interest
in the action or proceeding.”
(6) “No other person has a superior right to commence the
action or proceeding or to be substituted for the decedent in the pending
action or proceeding.”
(7) “The affiant or declarant affirms or declares under
penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing
is true and correct.”
(b) Where more than one person executes the affidavit or
declaration under this section, the statements required by subdivision (a)
shall be modified as appropriate to reflect that fact.
(c) A certified copy of the decedent's death certificate
shall be attached to the affidavit or declaration.
(Code
Civ. Proc. § 377.32.)
DISCUSSION
Successor in Interest
Palmer’s declaration provides:
I, Sandra Palmer,
declare and state as follows:
1. I am the mother
of the decedent DESHAWN COOPER, who passed away on November 3, 2021 in
Westminster, California (a certified copy of Mr. Cooper’s death certificate is
attached as Exhibit “1”).
2. I am the
beneficiary of the estate of my son, DESHAWN COOPER, the decedent in the
above-captioned litigation. I am authorized to act on behalf of the decedent as
the Successor in Interest as defined in Section 377.11 of the California Code
of Civil Procedure with respect to the decedent in the action.
3. No proceeding is
now pending in California for administration of the decedent's estate.
4. No other persons
have a superior right to commence the action or proceeding or to be substituted
for the decedent in the pending action or proceeding.
I declare under
penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing
is true and correct. Executed this 3/18/2022, at Las Vegas, NV.
(Palmer Decl., ¶¶ 1-4.)
Her declaration includes the
requisite language, but more is necessary.
Section 377.32 requires “facts in support” of the assertion that Palmer
is Plaintiff’s successor. (Code Civ.
Proc. § 377.32, subd. (a)(5).)
The moving brief attaches
declarations from Plaintiff’s two sons.
Jeremiah DeShawn Cooper’s
(“Jeremiah”) declaration states:
I, Jeremiah DeShawn
Cooper, declare as follows:
1. I am a natural
born son of Deshawn Cooper. I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth
herein, except as to those stated on information and belief and, as to those, I
am informed and believe them to be true. If called as a witness, I could and
would competently testify to the matters stated herein.
2. I have been
advised that I may wish to seek independent counsel as it relates to the
present declaration.
3. I have been
advised that there is a litigation being instituted relating to the injuries
sustained by my father, Deshawn Cooper, and his wrongful death relating thereto,
as a result of his residence at Country Villa Bay Vista Healthcare.
4. I have been
advised that as a lawful heir of my father, that I am considered a “necessary
party” to the wrongful death cause of action under the “One Action Rule” in the
State of California. Under the one action rule, there generally may be only a
single action for wrongful death, in which all heirs must join; there cannot be
a series of such suits by individual heirs. Gonzales v. S. California Edison
Co. (1999) 77 Cal. App. 4th 485.
5. For reasons which
are my own, I do not wish to be involved in this litigation in any capacity and
through this declaration I am instructing the firm of Garcia & Artigliere
to refrain from including my name in the caption of the case or including me in
this litigation as a Plaintiff, Nominal Defendant, or in any other capacity. I
am also instructing the firm of Garcia & Artigliere to refrain from service
of a Summons and Complaint upon me and that I am to be considered “joined” in
the case for purposes of the “one action rule” absent service upon me of a
Summons and Complaint.
6. I do hereby waive
and abandon any and all interest that I may now, or in the future, in any award
of damages as it relates to the injuries sustained by or the wrongful death of
Deshawn Cooper caused by injuries he sustained while he was a resident at
Country Villa Bay Vista Healthcare. In so doing, I waive any rights I may have
as a “necessary party” to the wrongful death cause of action.
7. I understand that
by signing this document, I am forever releasing and holding Sandra Palmer, and
the firm of Garcia & Artigliere harmless for any claims herein waived by me
that I may have had for the injuries and/or wrongful death of my father,
Deshawn Cooper.
8. I understand that
this declaration may be presented to Defendants, their attorneys, and to the
Court to satisfy them that the “one action rule” has been complied with by
Plaintiffs and Defendants in this and any subsequent action I may institute in
the future.
I declare under
penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing
is true and correct. Executed 11/10/2021 at (city) Long [B]each, (state) Ca[.]
(Jeremiah Decl., ¶¶ 1-8.)
D’Anjelo Michael Mields’s
(“D’Anjelo”) declaration states:
I, D’Anjelo Michael
Mields, declare as follows:
1. I am a natural
born son of Deshawn Cooper. I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth
herein, except as to those stated on information and belief and, as to those, I
am informed and believe them to be true. If called as a witness, I could and
would competently testify to the matters stated herein.
2. I have been
advised that I may wish to seek independent counsel as it relates to the
present declaration.
3. I have been
advised that there is a litigation being instituted relating to the injuries
sustained by my father, Deshawn Cooper, and his wrongful death relating
thereto, as a result of his residence at Country Villa Bay Vista Healthcare.
4. I have been
advised that as a lawful heir of my father, that I am considered a “necessary
party” to the wrongful death cause of action under the “One Action Rule” in the
State of California. Under the one action rule, there generally may be only a
single action for wrongful death, in which all heirs must join; there cannot be
a series of such suits by individual heirs. Gonzales v. S. California Edison
Co. (1999) 77 Cal. App. 4th 485.
5. For reasons which
are my own, I do not wish to be involved in this litigation in any capacity and
through this declaration I am instructing the firm of Garcia & Artigliere
to refrain from including my name in the caption of the case or including me in
this litigation as a Plaintiff, Nominal Defendant, or in any other capacity. I
am also instructing the firm of Garcia & Artigliere to refrain from service
of a Summons and Complaint upon me and that I am to be considered “joined” in
the case for purposes of the “one action rule” absent service upon me of a
Summons and Complaint.
6. I do hereby waive
and abandon any and all interest that I may now, or in the future, in any award
of damages as it relates to the injuries sustained by or the wrongful death of
Deshawn Cooper caused by injuries he sustained while he was a resident at
Country Villa Bay Vista Healthcare. In so doing, I waive any rights I may have
as a “necessary party” to the wrongful death cause of action.
7. I understand that
by signing this document, I am forever releasing and holding Sandra Palmer, and
the firm of Garcia & Artigliere harmless for any claims herein waived by me
that I may have had for the injuries and/or wrongful death of my father,
Deshawn Cooper.
8. I understand that
this declaration may be presented to Defendants, their attorneys, and to the
Court to satisfy them that the “one action rule” has been complied with by
Plaintiffs and Defendants in this and any subsequent action I may institute in
the future. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of
California that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed 11/11/2021
at (city) Chandler, (state) AZ[.]
(D’Anjelo Decl., ¶¶ 1-8.)
The Court finds both problematic:
* The
declarations fail to state Jeremiah’s and D’Anjelo’s ages, so it is unclear if
they are adults with capacity to waive.
* Jeremiah’s
declaration is signed by Amy Troncosa, his purported guardian, but it lacks
facts showing who she is and whether, in fact, she qualifies as a legal
guardian with authority to waive his interests.
* Even assuming
capacity to waive, the waivers appear to regard “wrongful death” claims, but
this is not a “wrongful death” action; the complaint and the FAC do not allege
“wrongful death” claims.
The Court sees two more problems. Plaintiff’s evidence fails to show whether
Jeremiah and D’Anjelo are Plaintiff’s only living children and whether Plaintiff’s
father is alive. (See, e.g., Maconachy
Decl., ¶¶ 6-7 [stating that Stephen Cooper, Sr. is alive, resides in
California, and is believed to be Plaintiff’s father].)
The Court intends to continue the
hearing to give Plaintiff a chance to supplement the record to address these
issues.
Plaintiff’s reply evidence fails
to change the analysis. Palmer’s reply
declaration states:
2. The individual
who I believed was the father of [Plaintiff] refused to acknowledge he was the
father. No paternity was ever established and no father is listed on
[Plaintiff’s] birth certificate.
3. The person named
in the Declaration of Drew P. Maconachy in Support of Defendants’ Opposition to
Appoint A Successor in Interest and Motion to Appoint an Arbitrator, Stephen
Cooper Sr., is not [Plaintiff’s] father, but his uncle.
(Reply Palmer Decl., ¶¶
2-3.) Notably, the declaration fails to
demonstrate that there is no living father, and, regardless, Defendants should
receive an opportunity to respond.
Arbitrator
As noted above, Judge Jones
granted Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration on 1/27/21. (See 1/27/21 Minute Order, p. 1.)
Plaintiff contends the parties
made competing arbitrator lists but have been unable to agree on a
selection. Plaintiff suggests letting
“each side [] strike all but one proposed arbitrator from opposing counsel’s
list, leaving two remaining proposed arbitrators for the Court to choose
from.” (Motion, p. 5.)
Defendants ask the Court to
“appoint an arbitration provider[,]” namely, JAMS. (Opposition, p. 6.) They claim “appointing JAMS as the
arbitration provider promotes judicial efficiency as it avoids the Court having
to select a specific arbitrator or receive feedback from the parties on the
appropriateness of the specific arbitrator.”
(Id. at p. 7.) “Instead, the JAMS
procedures create an impartial process for selection of an arbitrator.” (Ibid.)
The arbitration agreement
emphasizes that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) applies. (See, e.g., Kiepen Decl., Ex. A, § 1.7.)
In terms of arbitrator selection,
the agreement provides:
3.1 The parties
hereby acknowledge that arbitration is preferable to a judicial forum and that
Federal and State law favors the enforcement of valid arbitration provisions. Arbitration
under this agreement shall be conducted by a single arbitrator agreed upon by
the Parties. In the absence of such agreement, the arbitrator shall be an
attorney or retired judge selected pursuant to Section 5 of the [FAA], 9 USC §
5. The arbitration shall be conducted in the county in which the
Facility is located, unless the Parties agree on a different location. In
reaching a decision the arbitrator shall prepare findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Judgment on the award rendered by the arbitrator may be
entered in any court having jurisdiction.
(Id. at Ex. A, § 3.1, emphasis
added.)
Since the parties do not agree,
the bolded words require the arbitrator to be an attorney or retired judge, and
he or she must be chosen pursuant to section 5 of the FAA.
Section 5 states:
If in the agreement provision be made
for a method of naming or appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire,
such method shall be followed; but if no method be provided therein, or if a
method be provided and any party thereto shall fail to avail himself of such
method, or if for any other reason there shall be a lapse in the naming of an
arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, or in filling a vacancy, then upon the
application of either party to the controversy the court shall designate and
appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, as the case may require, who
shall act under the said agreement with the same force and effect as if he or
they had been specifically named therein; and unless otherwise provided in the
agreement the arbitration shall be by a single arbitrator.
(9 U.S.C. § 5, emphasis added; see also Code Civ. Proc. §
1281.6 [giving courts similar power to appoint arbitrators].)
There is no crossover between the parties’ arbitrator
lists. Plaintiff proposes retired judges
Michael Latin, Victor Person, and David Chaffee and retired attorney Allan
Goodman. (See Motion, Ex. 3.) Defendants propose retired judges Carl West,
Gail Andler, and Diane Wayne. (See
Opposition, p. 8.)
Under the circumstances, Plaintiff’s suggestion is a
reasonable compromise. Plaintiff chose
Diane Wayne from Defendants’ list. (See
Motion, p. 5.) The Court orders
Defendants to choose one arbitrator from Plaintiff’s list, then the Court will
appoint one of the two.
The Court declines to appoint an arbitration provider at this
time, especially because Defendants made the request for the first time in
opposition (no notice), the arbitration agreement does not expressly mandate
JAMS, and, inevitably, the Court’s arbitrator selection will determine the
arbitration provider.
[1] “‘[D]ecedent’s
successor in interest’ means the beneficiary of the decedent’s estate or
other successor in interest who succeeds to a cause of action or to a
particular item of the property that is the subject of a cause of action.” (Id. at § 377.11, emphasis added.)
“Beneficiary
of the decedent’s estate” means:
(a) If the decedent died leaving a will, the sole
beneficiary or all of the beneficiaries who succeed to a cause of
action, or to a particular item of property that is the subject of a cause of
action, under the decedent’s will.
(b) If the decedent died without leaving a will, the
sole person or all of the persons who succeed to a cause of action, or
to a particular item of property that is the subject of a cause of action,
under Section 6401 and 6402 of the Probate Code or, if the law of a sister
state or foreign nation governs succession to the cause of action or particular
item of property, under the law of the sister state or foreign nation.
(Id. at § 377.10, emphasis added.)