Judge David S. Cunningham, Case Number: 21STCV30808, Date: 2023-10-27 Tentative Ruling

Judge: David S. Cunningham, Case: 21STCV30808, Date: 2023-10-27 Tentative Ruling

Moving Party: Safe-Guard Products International, LLC (“Defendant” or “Safe-Guard”)

“Safe-Guard provides vehicle service contracts (‘VSCs’), which are agreements to repair and/or replace covered parts of leased vehicles.” (10/30/23 Ruling Re: Motion for Class Certification, p. 1.)

“Sotoodeh alleges that he obtained a VSC from Safe-Guard for his leased Rolls Royce.” (Ibid.) “He claims the VSC required Safe-Guard to replace the vehicle’s tires, and charge him a $100 deductible, regardless of the number of tires that need to be replaced during a service visit.” (Ibid.) “He alleges that Safe-Guard breached the VSC on multiple occasions by charging him $100 per tire instead of the $100 deductible.” (Ibid.)

The operative complaint is the first amended complaint (“FAC”). It “asserts causes of action for breach of contract, violation of the Unfair Competition Law (‘UCL’), and violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (‘CLRA’).” (Ibid.)

On 10/30/23, Sotoodeh’s motion for class certification came on for hearing. Sotoodeh sought to certify a putative class and subclass. The Court denied the motion without prejudice as to the putative class because it was not alleged in the complaint. (See ibid.) In addition, the Court denied the motion without prejudice as to the putative subclass because Sotoodeh “fail[ed] to show predominating common questions, typicality, and superiority.” (Ibid.) Sotoodeh received leave to file the FAC to allege the putative class and subclass, and the Court granted Safe-Guard leave to file a pleading challenge.

When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context, and “treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) It is error “to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if the plaintiff shows there is a reasonable possibility any defect identified by the defendant can be cured by amendment.” (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)

“[T]he UCL permits a cause of action to be brought if a practice violates some other law. In effect, the ‘unlawful’ prong of § 17200 makes a violation of the underlying law a per se violation of § 17200.” (Stern, Bus. & Prof. Code Sec. 17200 Prac. (The Rutter Group 2022) ¶ 3:53.) “Virtually any law or regulation — federal or state, statutory or common law — can serve as predicate for a § 17200 ‘unlawful’ violation. Thus, if a ‘business practice’ violates any law — literally — it also violates § 17200 and may be redressed under that section. [Citation.] As the California Supreme Court has said, § 17200 ‘borrows’ violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices independently actionable under § 17200.” (Id. at ¶ 3:56.)

“The second ‘wrong’ proscribed by § 17200 is ‘unfair’ business practices. Because § 17200's definition of the five proscribed ‘wrongs’ is set forth in the disjunctive, a business practice can be ‘unfair’ — and violative of § 17200 — even if it is not ‘deceptive’ and even if it is ‘lawful.’” (Id. at ¶ 3:112.) “The ‘unfair’ standard is intentionally broad, allowing courts maximum discretion to prohibit new schemes to defraud.” (Id. at ¶ 3:113.)

“The third type of conduct proscribed by § 17200 is ‘fraudulent’ business practices.” (Id. at ¶ 3:153.) “A business practice is ‘fraudulent’ within the meaning of § 17200 if ‘members of the public are likely to be deceived.’” (Id. at ¶ 3:154.) “An advertisement's potentially deceptive effect is measured by the audience to which it is addressed. Under the UCL . . . this will usually be the ‘reasonable person’ standard.” (Ibid.)

Proposition 64 limits “private standing . . . to any ‘person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property’ as a result of unfair competition [citations].” (Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4^th 310 320-321.) “The intent of this change was to confine standing to those actually injured by a defendant's business practices and to curtail the prior practice of filing suits on behalf of clients who have not used the defendant's product or service, viewed the defendant's advertising, or had any other business dealing with the defendant. . . .” (Id. at 321, internal quotation marks omitted.)

The CLRA does not contain a “general proscription against ‘unfair’ or ‘deceptive’ acts or practices. [Citation.]” (Stern, supra, at ¶ 10:4.) “Instead, the Act sets forth a laundry list of 24 activities defined to be ‘unlawful.’” (Ibid.) “Some of these practices are also found in the laundry list of practices that are deemed to constitute false advertising and, hence, are also actionable under” the UCL. (Ibid.)

The statute “broadly applies to any transaction involving the sale or lease of goods or services to a ‘consumer.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at ¶ 10:16.) A “consumer” is “an individual who seeks or acquires, by purchase or lease, any goods or services for personal, family, or household purposes.” (Id. at ¶ 10:26.) “The Act broadly defines ‘transaction’ as ‘an agreement between a consumer and any other person, whether or not the agreement is a contract enforceable by action, and includes the making of, and the performance pursuant to, that agreement.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at ¶ 10:18.)

“The CLRA is to be ‘liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes, which are to protect consumers against unfair and deceptive business practices and to provide efficient and economical procedures to secure such protection.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at ¶ 10:17.)

* the requested monetary relief does not qualify as restitution (see Demurrer, pp. 12-13 [claiming the requested relief constitutes damages rather than restitution]; see also Reply, pp. 7-8); and

* the requested injunctive relief is unavailable (see Demurrer, pp. 13-14 [arguing that “Plaintiff possesses an adequate remedy at law” (contract damages) and that “Plaintiff is not likely to suffer an irreparable injury”]; see also Reply, pp. 8-10).

Plaintiff contends the demurrer should be overruled because the Court rejected these same arguments during the first demurrer round. (See Opposition, p. 1.)

* he is entitled to “plead alternative cause of action and theories of relief” (id. at p. 8);

* “the remedies available under the [UCL] are cumulative to any other remedies available under California law” (ibid.);

* per Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4^th 163 and Espejo v. The Copley Press, Inc. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5^th 329, “restitutionary relief . . . does not lose its character as restitutionary merely because the same money could be recovered as damages” for breach of contract (ibid.);

* Defendant fails to cite a case “hold[ing], or even suggest[ing], that a UCL claim may be dismissed at the pleading stage because the restitution it seeks is duplicative of a legal remedy for the same harm” (id. at p. 9); and

The Court agrees with Plaintiff’s first two points. The Court’s intention in granting leave to demur to the FAC was to give Defendant an opportunity to contest the amended class and subclass allegations, not to reargue the UCL and CLRA claims. Plaintiff is correct; Defendant made the same arguments in the original demurrer, and the Court rejected them. Nothing has changed. The new allegations are not materially different. Plaintiff continues to have a right to allege alternative and inconsistent claims and remedies. Consequently, the Court incorporates the 6/13/22 ruling on the original demurrer and overrules the instant demurrer for the same reasons. (See Pang Decl., Ex. A, pp. 3-4.)

* Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendant made a “misrepresentation[] in connection with [the] sale or lease of a good or service” (Demurrer, p. 9, bolding deleted; see also Reply, pp. 2-3); and

* the VSCs are not goods or services (see Demurrer, pp. 10-12 [citing Fairbanks v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4^th 56, Campion v. Old Republic Home Protection Co. (S.D. Cal. 2012) 861 F.Supp.2d 1139, and High v. Choice Manufacturing Co. (N.D. Cal., July 24, 2012) 2012 WL 3025922); see also Reply, pp. 4-7).

* the FAC alleges misrepresentations by Defendant (see Opposition, pp. 11-12); and

The Court agrees with Plaintiff. First, the FAC states that Defendant made misrepresentations regarding the contractual terms. (See, e.g., FAC, ¶ 62 [alleging that “a representative of Defendant misrepresented the contractual terms to Plaintiff” and that “Defendant routinely responded to similar inquiries by misrepresenting the terms of the [VSCs]”], ¶ 74 [stating that “Defendant [] violated and continues to violate the CLRA by misrepresenting the terms of its contractual agreements to Class Members”].) The allegations must be taken as true. Second, the Court analyzed Fairbanks, Campion, and High last time and found them distinguishable. (See Pang Decl., Ex. A, pp. 5-6.) The ruling stands, and the demurrer is overruled.

The class allegations are addressed in the tentative ruling pertaining to the motion to strike.

The demurrer to the class allegations is overruled because it is a partial demurrer.

_________________________________________________________________________________________

Moving Party: Safe-Guard Products International,
LLC (“Defendant” or “Safe-Guard”)

“Safe-Guard provides vehicle
service contracts (‘VSCs’), which are agreements to repair and/or replace
covered parts of leased vehicles.”
(10/30/23 Ruling Re: Motion for Class Certification, p. 1.)

“Sotoodeh alleges that he
obtained a VSC from Safe-Guard for his leased Rolls Royce.” (Ibid.)
“He claims the VSC required Safe-Guard to replace the vehicle’s tires,
and charge him a $100 deductible, regardless of the number of tires that need
to be replaced during a service visit.”
(Ibid.) “He alleges that
Safe-Guard breached the VSC on multiple occasions by charging him $100 per tire
instead of the $100 deductible.” (Ibid.)

The operative complaint is the
first amended complaint (“FAC”). It
“asserts causes of action for breach of contract, violation of the Unfair
Competition Law (‘UCL’), and violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (‘CLRA’).” (Ibid.)

On 10/30/23, Sotoodeh’s motion
for class certification came on for hearing.
Sotoodeh sought to certify a putative class and subclass. The Court denied the motion without prejudice
as to the putative class because it was not alleged in the complaint. (See ibid.)
In addition, the Court denied the motion without prejudice as to the
putative subclass because Sotoodeh “fail[ed] to show predominating common
questions, typicality, and superiority.”
(Ibid.) Sotoodeh received leave
to file the FAC to allege the putative class and subclass, and the Court
granted Safe-Guard leave to file a pleading challenge.

“Motions to strike can be used to reach
defects in or objections to pleadings that are not challengeable by demurrer.” (Edmon & Karnow, Cal. Practice Guide:
Civ. Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group June 2023 Update) ¶ 7:156.) “Complaints, cross-complaints, answers and
demurrers are all subject to a motion to strike [citation].” (Ibid.) “Moreover, a motion to strike can be used to
attack the entire pleading, or any part thereof – i.e., even single words or
phrases (unlike demurrers).” (Ibid.)

The motion can be used to strike “any ‘irrelevant, false or improper matter inserted in
any pleading’” or “any pleading or part thereof ‘not drawn or filed in
conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order
of the court.’” (Id. at ¶ 7:167,
emphasis in original.)

40.
On behalf of the Tire and Wheel Class, Plaintiff alleges that Safe-Guard
systematically overcharges customers for vehicle service contracts that contain
a wheel and tire protection provision, regardless of the type of deductible
applicable.

42.
On behalf of the Tire and Wheel Overcharge Class, Plaintiff alleges that
Safe-Guard systematically overcharges customers with vehicle service contracts
that contain a wheel and tire protection provision, and were charged fees,
other than deductibles, in excess of the amount provided for by their vehicle
service contract—such as the unexplained $2.95 per-tire fee that Plaintiff was
charged on multiple service visits, which should have been covered by
Safe-Guard under Plaintiff’s Agreement.

All
California residents who, from August 20, 2017 to the present (both dates
inclusive), were or are holders of a vehicle service contract administered by
Safe-Guard (or as to which Safe-Guard is the obligor) which contains a tire and
wheel protection provision, and, which contains a provision stating that the
customer will be charged a single deductible per [visit or] claim for the
replacement of any tires or wheels, regardless of the number of tires or wheels
replaced at the time.

44.
On behalf of the Single Deductible Class, Plaintiff alleges that Safe-Guard
systematically overcharges customers with vehicle service contracts that
contain a tire and wheel protection provision, and, which contains a Single
Deductible Provision, and utilizes faulty contract management and claims
processing procedures.

All
California residents who, from August 20, 2017 to the present (both dates
inclusive), were or are holders of a vehicle service contract administered by
Safe-Guard (or as to which Safe-Guard is the obligor) which contains a tire and
wheel protection provision, and, which contains a provision stating that the
customer will be charged a single deductible per visit or claim for the
replacement of any tires or wheels, regardless of the number of tires or wheels
replaced at the time, who were charged multiple deductibles on a per tire/wheel
basis in connection with a single visit or claim.

46.
On behalf of the Single Deductible Subclass, Plaintiff alleges that Safe-Guard,
pursuant to errors in its contract management and claims processing systems,
overcharges customers with vehicle service contracts containing a provision
analogous to those in the Agreement, i.e., a contractual provision stating that
the customers would be charged a single deductible per visit or claim,
regardless of the number of tires or wheels replaced at the time (“Single
Deductible Provision”), by charging such customers multiple deductibles on a
per tire/wheel basis in connection with a single visit or claim. Plaintiff is
further informed and believes and based thereon alleges that for similar
reasons Safe-Guard misinforms customers about the nature of their contractual
terms and misrepresented to customers holding vehicle service contracts with a
Single Deductible Provision that the contracts instead charged separate
deductibles per tire or wheel.

47.
Excluded from the Classes and Subclass are: (1) Defendant, any entity or
division in which Defendant has a controlling interest, and its legal
representatives, officers, directors, assigns, and successors; and (2) the
Judge to whom this case is assigned and the Judge’s staff. Plaintiff reserves
the right to amend the definitions of the Classes and Subclass, and to add
additional subclasses, if discovery and further investigation reveal that the
Classes and/or Subclass should be expanded or otherwise modified.

* the
amendment exceeds the scope of the Court’s 10/30/23 order granting leave to
amend (see Motion, pp. 7-9; see also Reply, pp. 3-4); and

* it
“include[s] a vast number of members who did not suffer damages or actual harm,
and who will be unable to satisfy elements such as breach, reliance, and
causation” (Motion, p. 9; see also Reply, pp. 5-7).

* the
10/30/23 order does not limit the scope of amendment to “Plaintiff’s prior
certification requests” (Opposition, p. 5);

*
Defendant fails to cite a case that prohibits a plaintiff from “alleg[ing]
additional classes” “following an order denying . . . class certification with
leave to amend the complaint” (id. at p. 7).

It is
appropriate to file a demurrer or motion to strike when the “[a]mended
complaint alleg[es] facts beyond [the] permissible scope of amendment[.]” (Edmon & Karnow, supra, at ¶ 7:174.) “[T]he plaintiff may amend his or her complaint only as authorized by the
court’s order.” (Zakk v. Diesel
(2019) 33 Cal.App.5^th 431, 456.)
For example, “[t]he plaintiff may not amend the complaint to add a new
cause of action without having obtained permission to do so, unless the new
cause of action is within the scope of the order granting leave to amend.” (Ibid. [instructing that “[t]he granting of
leave to amend after a demurrer is sustained on one ground does not give the
plaintiff a license to add any possible cause of action that might not be
subject to dismissal on that ground”]; see also Edmon & Karnow, supra, at ¶
7:148.1a [instructing that “leave [to amend] must be construed as permission to
the pleader to amend the cause of action to which the demurrer has been
sustained, not add entirely new causes of action”], emphasis in original.)

* the
Court has discretion to allow the amendment despite the fact that it exceeds
the scope (none of the cases cited by Defendant divest the Court of
discretion);

* the
policies favoring amendments and deciding cases on the merits support allowing
it; and

* the
prejudice to Defendant is minimal (Defendant will be able to conduct full
discovery, oppose class certification, and move for summary judgment).

But more
analysis is needed. The next question is
whether the motion should be granted because the Tire and Wheel Class is
overbroad. The answer is yes. The definition is:

(FAC, ¶
39.) In other words, “all policyholders,
regardless of whether they even made claims or paid deductibles at all[.]” (Motion, p. 9.) The definition inevitably encompasses people
who have not been harmed and who cannot prove the elements of the causes of
action.

Plaintiff
asserts that the overbroad argument is premature and should be decided at the
certification stage. (See Opposition, p.
9.) The Court disagrees. It is obvious on the face of the FAC that the
definition is overbroad. Case law allows
the Court to strike class allegations where “there is no reasonable possibility
that the plaintiff[] could establish a community of interest among the
potential members[.]” (Shaw v. LAUSD
(2023) 95 Cal.App.5^th 740, 761.)

Should
leave to amend be granted? Only if
Plaintiff’s counsel is able to propose a reasonable, narrower definition at the
hearing.

Same
argument as above. Defendant contends
the motion should be granted because the Court did not grant Plaintiff leave to
add the Tire and Wheel Overcharge Class.
(See Motion, pp. 10-11; see also Reply, p. 7.)

The Court
disagrees. As a matter of discretion,
the Court finds that the amendment should be allowed.

Defendant
does not claim the Tire and Wheel Overcharge Class is overbroad, so the motion
is denied.

Defendant
contends the motion should be granted because the Single Deductible Class is
overbroad. (See Motion, p. 11; see also
Reply, p. 8.)

(FAC, ¶
43.) It is overbroad for the same
reasons that the Tire and Wheel Class is overbroad.

Defendant
claims the Single Deductible Subclass “is the same as the proposed subclass in
the prior motion for class certification[.]”
(Motion, p. 11.) Defendant
contends the motion to strike should be granted because:

* the
Court found that Plaintiff “fail[ed] to establish predominating common
questions” as to the proposed subclass (ibid., emphasis deleted); and

* the
FAC’s allegations fail to cure the commonality defect (id. at p. 12, emphasis
deleted).

The Court
disagrees. The 10/30/23 order provides:
“After [Plaintiff amends and Defendant’s pleading challenge is resolved],
Plaintiff will be permitted to file a new motion for class certification,
which, in part, should attempt to cure the defects applicable to the proposed
subclass.” (10/30/23 Ruling Re: Motion
for Class Certification, p. 8.) As
Plaintiff points out, the Court found his evidentiary showing
inadequate, not the allegations. (See
Opposition, pp. 11-12.) The Court did
not expect him to address the inadequacies in the FAC; he needs to address them
with new evidence in the new certification motion. The motion to strike is denied.

The FAC
alleges a new theory of liability, asserting that Defendant’s pricing of the
VSCs is unconscionable. (See, e.g., FAC,
¶¶ 1, 3, 5, 6, 11, 20, 37, 50(g).)

Defendant
contends the theory should be stricken because the Court did not grant
Plaintiff leave to allege it. (See
Motion, pp. 12-14; see also Reply, p. 10.)

The motion
is denied. The Court is allowing the
amendment as a matter of discretion.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________

Plaintiff’s second motion to seal
is granted in part, denied in part, and deferred in part.

Plaintiff must file a redacted
version for the public file that is consistent with the Court’s rulings.

“In opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for class certification,”
Defendant’s counsel, Spencer Kook, filed a declaration with “several
exhibits.” (10/27/23 Ruling Re: Motion
to Seal, p. 1.)

On 10/27/23, Plaintiff’s first motion to seal came on for hearing. The Court denied the motion “without
prejudice as to exhibits B and D through M” and denied it “with prejudice as to
exhibit C.” (Ibid.)

On 1/11/24, Plaintiff filed a second motion to seal, which also seeks to
seal exhibits B and D through M.

The court may order that a record be filed under seal only if
it expressly finds facts that establish:

(1)
There exists an
overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to the record;

(3)
A substantial
probability exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the
record is not sealed;

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule
2.550(d).) “These findings embody constitutional requirements for a request to seal
court records, protecting the First Amendment right of public access to civil
trials. (Edmon
& Karnow, Cal. Practice Guide: Civ. Proc. Before Trial (The Rutter Group
June 2023 Update) ¶ 9:418, emphasis in original.)

The
parties’ agreement to seal documents is not enough to support a motion to
seal. (Id. at ¶ 9:417.1 [“Parties
sometimes operate under an informal arrangement pursuant to which documents are
‘deemed filed under seal’ unless an objection is made. Such an arrangement ‘is entirely inconsistent
with the mandatory requirements of rules 2.550 and 2.551 and the constitutional
values informing those requirements.’”].)

“Only
the specific words of documents that constitute the sensitive material should
be sealed; generally, it is not permissible to seal the entire document.” (Id. at ¶ 9:418.5.)

Defendant deposed Plaintiff on
6/27/23. Exhibit B consists of more than
70 pages of the deposition transcript.

Last time, Plaintiff sought “a
blanket sealing order[.]” (10/27/23 Ruling Re: Motion to Seal, p.
2.) The Court found the request
“overbroad.” (Ibid.)

This time, Plaintiff seeks to seal portions of pages 17, 25, 26, 28, 35,
48, 49, 53, 55, 56, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 69, 70, 78, 84, 91, 95, 96, 99, 102,
116, 121, and 127. (See Pang Decl., ¶ 8,
Ex. B.) He claims the proposed
redactions pertain to irrelevant information, protected identification and
financial information, and “reference[s] [to] third parties.” (Id. at ¶ 5.)

Defendant contends Plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration is conclusory. (See Opposition, p. 5.)

In addition, Defendant contends the proposed redactions contain “publicly
available” information and do not reveal protected information. (Id. at p. 6; see also id. at pp. 7-9.)

The Court denies the motion as to pages 17:1-8, 25:9-13, 26:6-10,
28:18-25, 48:8-12, 49:1-18, 53:1-4, 56:6-25, 62:5-19, 62:22-25, 63:1-12,
64:1-16, 65:3-21, 66:18-24, 70:4-16, 91:13-25, 95:16-23, 95: 25, 96:1-8,
102:5-25, 121:1-17, and 127:19-20. These pages contain general questions and
answers regarding:

* the address of Plaintiff’s company, which is publicly available (page
28:18-25);

* whether Plaintiff pays corporate filing fees on an annual basis (page
48:8-12);

* the date when Plaintiff’s company became inactive and whether Plaintiff
maintains company records (page 49:1-18);

* Plaintiff’s method of payment for one of the cars at issue (page 53:1-4
[no private financial information disclosed]);

* the number of cars owned or leased by Plaintiff that had service
contracts administered by Defendant (page 56:6-25);

* a check written to pay the transfer fee for the protection plan related
to one of the cars at issue in the case, whether Plaintiff or his wife signed
the check, whether his wife’s company paid the transfer fee, and the reasons
why his wife’s company sometimes paid lease payments on his vehicles (pages
62:22-25, 63:1-12, 64:1-16, 65:3-21 [no private financial information
disclosed]);

* auto pay and whether “company accounts” means company bank accounts
(page 66:18-24 [no private financial information disclosed]);

* how account balances impacted payment decisions and who decided how
lease payments were paid (page 70:4-16 [no private financial information
disclosed]);

* whether Plaintiff leased two BMW M5s at the same time in 2018 and
whether he parked his vehicles at a particular address in 2017 (pages 95:16-23,
95: 25, 96:1-8);

* whether Plaintiff purchased two vehicles on the same day in October
2018 and whether he is wealthy (page 102:5-25 [no private financial information
disclosed]);

* the highest number of cars parked in Plaintiff’s driveway at one time
(page 121:1-17); and

This information does not qualify as protected information, financial or
otherwise. Nothing protected is disclosed.
Moreover, Plaintiff’s irrelevance argument is unavailing. The case has not reached the merits stage
yet, so it is premature to say whether the information is irrelevant, and,
regardless, irrelevance, alone, is inadequate to meet rule 2.550’s
heightened standard.

The fate of pages 35:8, 53:23,
55:1, 55:5, 69:18-25, 70:1-3, 78:14, ,84:20, 95:24, 99:7, and 116:23 will be
decided at the hearing. These pages
disclose:

* the names of third parties
(pages 35:8, 53:23, 55:1, 55:5, 69:18-25, 70:1-3); and

* the last four digits of the
Vehicle Identification Numbers (“VIN”) of some of the cars at issue (pages
78:14, 84:20, and 99:7).

The Court doubts that these
pieces of information should be sealed, but the Court will give Plaintiff’s
counsel an opportunity during oral arguments to make a showing.

The motion is granted as to pages
95:24 and 116:23. The pages disclose Plaintiff’s home address and mailing
address. The information is private
identification information. There is an
overriding interest in keeping the information confidential, the overriding
interest supports sealing the information, it is likely that the overriding
interest will be prejudiced absent sealing, the proposed sealing is narrowly
tailored, and sealing is the least restrictive means to protect the
information.

“Exhibits D through M are copies
of Plaintiff’s lease agreements and tire-and-wheel service contracts.” (10/27/23 Ruling Re: Motion to Seal, p.
2.)

Plaintiff moves to redact “[his]
address, [his] account and customer numbers, the VIN numbers of [his] vehicles,
portions of [his] credit card number and information about [his] credit card,
and the prices and payment terms of the various agreements that [he] was
subjected to.” (Second Motion, pp. 6-7.)

The Court finds that the motion
should be granted as to Plaintiff’s address, the account and customer numbers,
full VINs (as opposed to the last four digits), and full and partial credit
card numbers. These constitute private
identification information and meet the elements of rule 2:550.

The motion is denied as to prices
and payment terms. Defendant intends to
assert unique defenses against Plaintiff’s individual claims. The Court’s understanding is that the defenses
will involve discussing the number of cars Plaintiff leased and purchased and
the amounts he paid for them. It is
probable that the payment terms will be relevant to the defenses. On balance, these proposed redactions do not
satisfy rule 2:550.

The Court’s decision is deferred
with respect to insurance coverage information.
One page of exhibit K discloses such information. At the hearing,
Plaintiff’s counsel needs to explain why the information should be sealed.

The motion is granted as to the
proposed redactions on pages 0001, 0006, and 0007.

The motion is granted as to the proposed redactions on pages 00014
(except the pricing information), 00015, 00020, 00021, and 00022.

The motion is denied as to the proposed redactions on pages 00014
(pricing information only), 00023, 00024, 00029, and 00030.

The motion is granted as to the proposed redactions on pages 00031,
00036, 00043, 00044, and 00046 (except the pricing information).

The motion is denied as to the proposed redactions on pages 00037, 00038,
00046 (pricing information only), 00058, and 00059.

The motion is granted as to the proposed redactions on pages 00062
(except the pricing information), 00063, and 00065 (except the pricing
information).

The motion is denied as to the
proposed redactions on pages 00062 (pricing information only) and 00065 (pricing information only).

The motion is granted as to the
proposed redactions on pages 00080, 00087, and 00088 (except the pricing
information).

The motion is denied as to the
proposed redactions on pages 00081, 00082, and 00088 (pricing information
only).

The motion is granted as to the
proposed redactions on pages 00100, 00105, 00106 and 00107.

The motion is granted as to the
proposed redactions on pages 00111, 00118, 00119, 00121, 00122 (except
insurance coverage information), and 00124 (except pricing information).

The motion is denied as to the
proposed redactions on pages 00112, 00113, and 00124 (pricing information
only).

The ruling is deferred as to the
proposed redactions on page 00122 (insurance coverage information only).

The motion is granted as to the
proposed redactions on pages 00132, 00137, 00138, 00139 (except the pricing
information), 00151, 00156, 00157, 00158, and 00166 (except the pricing
information).

The motion is denied as to the
proposed redactions on pages 00139 (pricing information only), 00159, and 00166
(pricing information only).

[1]
Exhibit K to the 7/17/23 lodged Kook declaration ends on page 00127, and
exhibit L starts on page 00128. By
contrast, Exhibit K to Plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration in support of the
second motion to seal ends on page 00150, and Exhibit L starts on page 00151. The Court is using the page numbers in the
Kook declaration.