Judge David S. Cunningham, Case Number: 22STCV09157, Date: 2024-09-04 Tentative Ruling

Judge: David S. Cunningham, Case: 22STCV09157, Date: 2024-09-04 Tentative Ruling

Moving Party: Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston (“RCAB” or “Defendant”)

This action (22STCV09157) is part of the coordinated Southern California Clergy Cases (JCCP 5101). Plaintiff claims a priest named Father Richard Coughlin sexually abused him in Orange County in 1967 when he was a minor. Plaintiff alleges that RCAB loaned Father Coughlin to the Los Angeles Archdiocese despite having actual or constructive knowledge of his pedophilia.

There are “two types of personal jurisdiction[,]” general and specific. (Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco County (2017) 582 U.S. 255, 262 (“BMS”).) Plaintiff only relies on specific jurisdiction.

“When determining whether specific jurisdiction exists, courts consider the ‘relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’” (Halyard Health, Inc. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5^th 1062, 1070.) “[C]ourts focus on the nature and quality (not the quantity) of defendant’s activity in the forum state.” (Edmond & Karnow, Cal. Practice Guide: Civ. Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group June 2023 Update) ¶ 3:240.) “[S]ingle or occasional acts of the corporate agent in a state” may be adequate as long as the lawsuit relates to the “in-state activity.” (Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) 571 U.S. 117, 127; see also Edmond & Karnow, supra, at ¶ 3:240.1 [“Provided a ‘substantial connection’ with the forum is created thereby, even a single act may support specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident.”].)

To exercise specific jurisdiction, a court must find purposeful availment (the defendant made purposeful contacts with the forum), relatedness (the litigation arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum contacts), and reasonableness (the forum’s “assertion” of specific jurisdiction “comport[s] with ‘fair play and substantial justice’”). (Halyard Health, supra, 43 Cal.App.4^th at 1070.)

Plaintiff bears the initial burden to establish specific jurisdiction. (See Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4^th 434, 449.)

“The purposeful availment inquiry focuses on the defendant's intentionality and is satisfied when the defendant purposefully and voluntarily directs his activities toward the forum so that he should expect, by virtue of the benefit he receives, to be subject to the court's jurisdiction based on his contacts with the forum.” (Archdiocese of Milwaukee v. Superior Court (2003) 112 Cal.App.4^th 423, 436, internal quotation marks omitted.)

. . . RCAB did not engage in any intentional conduct that was expressly target to or aimed at California, and there is thus no such conduct that RCAB could have been known would cause harm in California or which could have actually caused injury to Plaintiff in California.

In this case, Coughlin was ordained a priest by Cardinal Archbishop Richard Cushing and was incardinated as a priest of the Archdiocese of Boston in September of 1953, meaning that he was accepted as a priest of that Archdiocese. Following his ordination, Coughlin served as a priest in the Archdiocese of Boston until June of 1965. He worked in Stoneham, Massachusetts, from 1953 to 1960, and then in Lynn, Massachusetts, from 1960 to 1965.

RCAB did not direct, compel, request, or require Coughlin to go to California. To the contrary. In March 1965, Coughlin, on his own initiative, requested permission to go to the Archdiocese of Los Angeles on loan and with the intent to permanently incardinate (i.e., be accepted permanently as a priest) there. His stated reasons for seeking to go to California were to be with immediate family members who moved to Orange County, and to help his family care for his ailing brother.

At that time, Coughlin could voluntarily seek to serve in a different diocese where there might be a need for priests, under the authority of the local bishop in that diocese - something called "lend-lease."

In April 1965, Cardinal Cushing granted Coughlin's request, and Coughlin explored with the Archdiocese of Los Angeles the possibility of working there with a view toward his permanent incardination there.

In June 1965, Coughlin’s assignment in the Archdiocese of Boston was terminated, and he moved to California where he began serving the Archdiocese of Los Angeles, an ecclesiastical territory and jurisdiction that was and is at all times separate and independent from the Archdiocese of Boston and RCAB. Once Coughlin left for California, he was under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of his local Archbishop in California.

In June 1965, the Archdiocese of Los Angeles granted Coughlin temporary faculties and assigned him, initially, to Santa Ana.

From June 1965 on, Coughlin remained in the Archdiocese of Los Angeles and, per his request, was incardinated into the Archdiocese of Los Angeles and excardinated from the Archdiocese of Boston in February 1971. This means that he was released from the Archdiocese of Boston and accepted into another ecclesiastical jurisdiction outside of the Archdiocese of Boston, and was thus no longer a priest thereof. Coughlin was never incardinated back as a priest of the Archdiocese of Boston, and RCAB had no ability to assign, transfer, place, or supervise him with respect to his priestly activities.

RCAB did not assign, and could not assign, Coughlin to any parish in California nor otherwise assign him any duties as a priest in California.

When Coughlin was in California serving in the Archdiocese of Los Angeles from June 1965 on: (1) he was under and subject to the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Archbishop of the local archdiocese or the Bishop of the local diocese in which he served; (2) he was ministering to the faithful there as a priest under canonical faculties – such as the ability to celebrate Mass, hear confessions, or perform marriages in California – granted to him by the Archdiocese of Los Angeles or his delegate, because those local Church officials had the sole authority to regulate such faculties in that Archdiocese; and (3) RCAB did not supervise, and was not in any way responsible for supervising, Coughlin activities.

In short, RCAB did not derive any benefits, rights, privileges, or protections from California due to Coughlin's presence there or his activities as a priest serving in the Archdiocese of Los Angeles. Coughlin went there in 1965 on his own initiative and for familial reasons, with the intent to stay there permanently, and he was a priest in good standing at the time of that move. At no time prior to Coughlin's departure from Boston in 1965 did RCAB receive any reports, allegations, or notice that Coughlin had engaged in any sexual misconduct. In fact, no complaints, allegations, or any other notice of sexual misconduct on the part of Coughlin were brought to the attention of RCAB prior to 1985, which was almost two decades after Coughlin allegedly abused Plaintiff.

The fact remains that RCAB’s acquiescing to Coughlin’s desire to leave Boston and serve in California in 1965—particularly when there were no complaints, allegations, or any other notice brought to RCAB’s attention back then that Coughlin might present a risk to minors—is not a purposefully directed activity aimed at California or its residents.

The foregoing facts bear no resemblance to purposefully directing activities at a California resident, deriving benefits from activities in California, or availing oneself of the privilege of conducting activities in California. Plaintiff thus cannot satisfy his burden to proffer jurisdictional facts demonstrating any alleged purposeful availment, and a fortiori, cannot establish that RCAB had sufficient minimum contacts with California that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over RCAB would comport with traditional concepts of fairness and substantial justice.

(Motion, pp. 7-9, emphasis in original, citations omitted; see also id. at pp. 10-13 [distinguishing Archdiocese of Milwaukee, supra, 112 Cal.App.4^th 423, 436 and analogizing Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Cashel & Emly (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 209, Archdiocese of Detroit v. Green (2005) 899 So.2d 322, 323-326, and Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Boise, Inc. (1996) 121 N.M. 738, 743-745 (“Diocese of Boise”)].)

By granting Father Coughlin permission to conduct activities in the state of California, and thus removing a pedophile priest from its region, the Boston Archdiocese purposefully availed itself of the forum state and should have expected it would be subject to the Court’s jurisdiction. Indeed, because Father Coughlin’s assignment to the Archdiocese of Los Angeles required explicit permission from the Archdiocese of Boston, Father Coughlin’s request must have provided some benefit to the Archdiocese of Boston, or it would, logically, have denied his request to work elsewhere while remaining a priest of the Boston Archdiocese and permitting Father Coughlin to continue to provide Father Coughlin with medical and retirement benefits.

Defendant Boston Archdiocese improperly attempts to shift the focus entirely on Father Coughlin’s personal reasons for his request, which is immaterial to the fact that he was their agent sent and transferred to California with their permission to provide services to California residents. The Boston Archdiocese knew Father Coughlin, its agent, was engaged in activities in California and was therefore, on notice that it could be subject to Californian courts’ jurisdiction based on his activities in the state. It is further telling that it took Father Coughlin approximately six years to be incardinated into the Archdiocese of Los Angeles from his arrival to California in 1965 to his incardination into the Los Angeles Archdiocese in 1971.

Further, Plaintiff has alleged that the Boston Archdiocese knew or should have known that Father Coughlin was a danger to children and likely to sexually abuse them. Indeed, a nine-year-old boy was sexually abused numerous times by Father Coughlin in Massachusetts from 1958 to 1962 before being “loaned” to the Los Angeles Archdiocese. While the Los Angeles Archdiocese may have had the ability to assign Father Coughlin to parishes or direct his daily affairs, he remained an agent of the Boston Archdiocese. The correspondence on that front, while limited given the lack of discovery to date, amply demonstrates this fact. Given these representations – made by the Boston Archdiocese itself – Plaintiff is entitled to engage in discovery, like in Archdiocese of Milwaukee – to learn (1) the degree and exercise of control the Boston Archdiocese had over Father Coughlin while he was assigned to the Archdiocese of Los Angeles and (2) what the Boston Archdiocese knew about Father Coughlin and his sexual abuse of children before it allowed him to serve in Los Angeles and continue to sexually abused more children, including Plaintiff.

(Opposition, pp. 9-10, emphasis in original, case-name underlining added, citations omitted; see also id. at pp. 8-9 [analogizing Archdiocese of Milwaukee and Diocese of Boise].)

* RCAB did not control Father Coughlin while he was in California (see id. at pp. 1-2, 6-7);

* RCAB did not receive notice of sexual misconduct by Father Coughlin until almost 20 years after he moved to California and allegedly abused Plaintiff (see id. at pp. 1-2);

* Plaintiff’s newspaper articles are inadmissible and fail to show that RCAB had notice of sexual misconduct by Father Coughlin (see id. at pp. 2-3);

* Plaintiff cannot use allegations in the complaint to establish jurisdiction (see id. at p. 3);

* Plaintiff fails to demonstrate an agency relationship between Father Coughlin and RCAB during the California years (see id. at pp. 4-5);

* sexual abuse falls outside the scope of an agency relationship (see id. at pp. 5-6);

* mere approval of a priest’s transfer request is inadequate to show purposeful availment. (See id. at pp. 8-9.)

Both sides discuss Archdiocese of Milwaukee. There, the evidence demonstrated that “the Milwaukee Archdiocese intentionally sent [a priest] to California to get him out of Wisconsin where he had been convicted of sexual perversion against a boy and could create further problems for the Milwaukee Archdiocese.” (Archdiocese of Milwaukee, supra, 112 Cal.App.4^th at 438.) In fact, the evidence showed that the Milwaukee Archdiocese “chose to place” the priest “in California as a sort of lend-lease program with the hope that he would be out of their sight and out of their jurisdiction.” (Ibid.) Notably, “the Milwaukee Archdiocese knew [the priest] was a pedophile and posed a serious threat of sexually abusing boys in California.” (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal found that, “[b]y sending a known pedophile into California, the Milwaukee Archdiocese aimed its intentional conduct directly at this state” and “reasonably could expect to be haled into court in California to answer for the consequences of its actions.” (Ibid.)

The Milwaukee Archdiocese argued, unsuccessfully, that the evidence did not “support a finding of purposeful availment” since the priest “voluntarily moved to California . . . because he had family there.” (Id. at 438-439.) In rejecting the argument, the Court of Appeal highlighted several pieces of contrary evidence:

As part of his sentence for sexual perversion, Widera was ordered not to return to the Port Washington, Wisconsin area. Henke, the pastor of St. Andrew's Parish, wanted Widera removed. Concerns were raised over whether Widera could “in conscience” be reassigned within the Milwaukee Archdiocese “in view of Widera's record.” A cover story was created: Widera would go “‘on vacation’” to California. In the ombudsman's notes, the words “on vacation” were set off by quotation marks. When asked why he was leaving, Widera was instructed to say “only that he's going on vacation.” After going to California, Widera wrote: “It was on advice that I left the area.”

Once Widera was in California, the Milwaukee Archdiocese never recalled him, although it had the power to do so, never questioned him, never monitored his treatment, and never conducted an investigation to determine whether he continued to molest boys. The Milwaukee Archdiocese allowed Widera to be excardinated so he could be incardinated in the Orange Diocese. Accepting the trial court's resolution of factual issues and drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the trial court's order [citation], we conclude the evidence supports the finding that the Milwaukee Archdiocese made and enacted a concerted plan to rid itself of Widera by intentionally placing him in California.

Defendant claims Archdiocese of Milwaukee is distinguishable because Father Coughlin requested the move to California “on his own initiative” “to be with immediate family members . . . and to help his family care for his ailing brother.” (Motion, p. 8.)

Plaintiff disagrees. He contends Archdiocese of Milwaukee is analogous because Father Coughlin was Defendant’s agent, Defendant knew or should have known that Father Coughlin was a pedophile, and Defendant received a benefit by moving a pedophile out of its region. (See Opposition, pp. 8-10.)

On the current record, the Court agrees with Defendant. First, Plaintiff’s evidence lacks authentication and verification. (See Muradian Decl., ¶¶ 4-10, Exs. 3-10.)[1] Second, Plaintiff fails to show that Father Coughlin was convicted of child molestation in Massachusetts or anywhere else prior to being loaned to the Los Angeles Archdiocese or that Defendant knew of pre-loan incidents of child molestation by Father Coughlin (the newspaper articles were written in 1993, and Father Coughlin’s personnel record and the other letters do not reveal knowledge of child sexual abuse or a scheme on Defendant’s part to relocate him). (See id. at Exs. 3-4, 6-10.) Third, Plaintiff’s knew-or-should-have-known contention is just an allegation, which is not enough. (See, e.g., Edmond & Karnow, supra, at ¶ 3:388 [instructing that “[a]n unverified pleading has no evidentiary value in determining personal jurisdiction].) What is missing, agency or not, is evidence that Defendant targeted California with intent and incurred a benefit comparable to the benefit incurred in Archdiocese of Milwaukee.

The hearing is continued. A plaintiff is entitled to propound jurisdictional discovery before a motion to quash is decided. (See Edmond & Karnow, supra, at para. 3:380.) Plaintiff requests a discovery continuance (see Opposition, p. 14), and the request should be granted to give Plaintiff a chance to find the same kinds of evidence that the Archdiocese of Milwaukee court found compelling. Plaintiff also deserves an opportunity to depose Defendant’s declarants and/or to discover evidence countering their declarations. (See Straub Decl.; see also Crowley, Jr. Decl.)[2]

For the relatedness prong, “‘the suit’ must ‘aris[e] out of or relat[e] to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.’” (BMS, supra, 582 U.S. at 262.) “In other words, there must be ‘an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State’s regulation.’” (Id.)

. . . The Boston Archdiocese sent its priest, employee, agent, and/servant Father Coughlin to California and for approximately six years – from 1965 to 1971 – Father Coughlin served in California as an agent of the Boston Archdiocese. During that time, Father Coughlin used his position as a priest – a position he had been given by virtue of his incardination into the Boston Archdiocese – to sexually abuse Plaintiff. Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Father Coughlin was acting as the Boston Archdiocese’s agent and within the scope of his agency, and in his capacity as a priest, when he sexually abused Plaintiff in California. Therefore, this second requirement to establish specific personal jurisdiction over Defendant is easily met.

Plaintiff’s argument depends on knowledge and agency allegations. As explained above, allegations do not suffice, and the evidence in the current record fails to meet Plaintiff’s burden.

“Finally, it must appear that the exercise of jurisdiction by local courts in the particular case would ‘comport with fair play and substantial justice.’” (Edmond & Karnow, supra, at ¶ 3:244.) “The burdens on the nonresident must clearly outweigh the plaintiff’s and forum’s interests.” (Id. at ¶ 3:247.)

The burden of proof belongs to the defendant: “If plaintiff shows that the nonresident defendant has ‘purposefully availed’ itself of benefits and protections of forum law, that defendant bears the burden of proving it would be unreasonable for local courts to exercise jurisdiction.” (Id. at ¶ 3:255.)

For now, it is unnecessary to analyze this prong. Defendant’s burden to show unreasonableness does not arise unless and until Plaintiff proves purposeful availment and relatedness.

[1] Saying the exhibits are true and correct copies of documents produced in discovery is different than saying they are true and correct copies of the actual letters and newspaper articles and does not establish the truth of the contents.

[2] “The priest” in Diocese of Boise “went to New Mexico, where he was accused of molesting a boy.” (Archdiocese of Milwaukee, supra, 112 Cal.App.4^th at 440.) “The New Mexico Court of Appeals held the Roman Catholic Diocese of Boise was not subject to jurisdiction in New Mexico because the diocese played no part in the priest's decision to settle in New Mexico, but only granted the priest permission to leave Idaho.” (Id. at 440-441.) “The fact that after the Boise Diocese gave Father Garcia permission to leave Idaho, Father Garcia subsequently selected New Mexico from among several other possible diocesan destinations in which to seek employment as a priest” did not amount to “a purposeful act by the Boise Diocese to avail itself of the benefits and protections of New Mexico law.” (Id. at 441.)

Since a discovery continuance is warranted here, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to address Diocese of Boise and Defendant’s other case law in his supplemental brief following discovery.