Judge David S. Cunningham, Case Number: 23STCV09947, Date: 2025-05-21 Tentative Ruling

Judge: David S. Cunningham, Case: 23STCV09947, Date: 2025-05-21 Tentative Ruling

Moving Party: Amazon Studios, LLC (“Amazon”) and Big Indie Pictures, Inc. (collectively “Defendants”)

1. This is a class action lawsuit brought on behalf of Plaintiff and other similarly situated persons who work or worked as non-union background talent for Defendants, Amazon Studios, LLC and Big Indie Pictures, Inc., who, in addition to their base hourly rate, earned other forms of compensation not excludable under California law when calculating an employee’s regular rate. Plaintiff’s claims for overtime and meal and rest period violations, inaccurate wage statement penalties, waiting time penalties, and unfair competition arise from Defendant’s failure to factor these forms of non-discretionary remuneration into the calculation of the regular rate of pay for the payment of overtime (and double time) and the calculation of the regular rate of compensation for the payment of break premiums under Labor Code § 226.7 and 512. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 382, Plaintiff seeks class-wide remedies for underpayment of premium wages for meal and rest period violations, underpayment of overtime wages, waiting time penalties in the form of continuation wages for failure to timely pay employees all wages, inaccurate wage statement penalties, equitable relief, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

2. Plaintiff, as proxy for the State of California, also brings this action pursuant to the California Private Attorneys General Act, Labor Code sections 2698 et seq. (“PAGA”) to recover civil penalties (75% payable to the Labor Workforce Development Agency and 25% payable to aggrieved employees). Plaintiff seeks to represent all aggrieved employees who suffered one or more violations of the applicable Labor Code.

19. Facts Related to Defendants’ Calculation of Overtime Wages: On February 13, 2023, Defendants employed Plaintiff as a non-union background actor to appear in the film, “Candy Cane Lane.” Defendants paid Plaintiff a base hourly rate of $16.50. Plaintiff worked at least eleven (11) hours.

20. Because Plaintiff worked at least eleven (11) hours, Defendants paid Plaintiff two (2) hours of overtime at one and one-half time her base hourly rate (or $24.75/hour) and 1.7 hours of double time at twice her base hourly rate (or $33.00/hour).

21. Plaintiff also earned and was promised an additional $14 for performing work that involved water (referred to on her voucher as “WET WORK”). The $14 promised payment was non-discretionary and, as such, was required to be factored into the calculation of Plaintiff’s regular rate of pay for the payment of her overtime and double time wages and into the calculation of Plaintiff’s regular rate of compensation for the payment of her meal period premium.

22. Despite Defendants’ promised payment of the non-discretionary “WET WORK” payment to Plaintiff, and other similarly situated hourly employees, Defendants failed to include the payment when calculating Plaintiff’s and other similarly situated persons’ regular rate of pay, thereby causing them to be underpaid all of their required overtime and double time wages. Instead, Defendants paid Plaintiff one and one-half times his base rate, which was not equal to one and one-half times the applicable regular rate.

23. On information and belief, during the relevant period, Defendants have failed to factor other forms of Incentive Pay into the regular rates of pay for the payment of overtime and double time wages to persons employed as background talent.

24. Facts Related to Defendants’ Failure to Pay Meal and Rest Period Premiums: On February 7, 2023, Defendant employed Plaintiff as a non-union background actor to appear in the film, “Candy Cane Lane.” Defendant paid Plaintiff a base hourly rate of $16.50 per hour. Plaintiff worked at least eight (8) hours that day with no meal or rest break as required under California law.

25. Section 11 of the applicable Wage Orders provides: “If an employer fails to provide an employee a meal period in accordance with the applicable provisions of this order, the employer shall pay the employee one (1) hour of pay at the employee’s regular rate of compensation for each workday that the meal period is not provided.” See, e.g., Wage Order 122001(11)(C), (12)(B) (same re rest periods) (emphasis added); see also Labor Code § 226.7(c) (“If an employer fails to provide an employee a meal or rest or recovery period in accordance with a state law, …, the employer shall pay the employee one additional hour of pay at the employee’s regular rate of compensation for each work day that the meal or rest period is not provided.” (Emphasis added)).

26. During the relevant period, Defendants failed to pay premium wages to Plaintiff and other members of the Break Premium Class for violations of the California’s meal and rest break laws. For example, because Plaintiff experienced meal period violations on February 7, 2023, due to Defendants’ failure to provide her with a compliant meal and rest period, Defendants were required to, but did not, pay her a premium in the amount of $16.50.

(Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), ¶¶ 1-2, 19-26, bolding, underlining, and italicizing in original.)

At issue here is Defendants’ demurrer. Defendants assert that the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action are preempted and that Plaintiff failed to exhaust contractual remedies.

When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context, and “treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) It is error “to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if the plaintiff shows there is a reasonable possibility any defect identified by the defendant can be cured by amendment.” (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)

Defendants removed this case to federal court, and Plaintiff moved to remand. The federal court not only granted Plaintiff’s motion but also rejected Defendants’ preemption arguments. (See Tehrani v. Amazon Studios, LLC (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2024, No. 2:23-cv-06385-CBM-JCx) 2024 WL 3730604, at *2-*5.)

Plaintiff’s counsel also filed two other cases against Amazon called Ferguson I[1] and Ferguson II.[2] Like Plaintiff’s case, Ferguson I and Ferguson II arise from film productions. They allege similar wage-and-hour causes of action and involve similar collective-bargaining agreements (“CBAs”).

Ferguson I is pending before Judge Laura Seigle. She recently denied Amazon’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. She found the preemption arguments unavailing and held that Amazon failed to show that the CBA there covers the plaintiff and the putative class.

Ferguson II is pending before Judge Samantha Jessner. The hearing on Amazon’s demurrer, which is based on the preemption arguments, is scheduled for July 8, 2025.

Defendants claim section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act preempts Plaintiff’s causes of action. (See Demurrer, pp. 15-24; see also Reply, pp. 7-12.)

The Court favors granting judicial notice for two reasons. One, numerous federal decisions and a California Supreme Court opinion allow courts to take judicial notice of CBAs. (See, e.g., Allmaras v. University Mechanical & Engineering Contractors, Inc. (S.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2025, No. 24-cv-02021-GPC-SBC) 2025 WL 454713, at *2 [recognizing that “[c]ourts routinely take judicial notice of CBAs, especially when reference to the CBA is required to resolve issues of preemption”]; see also, e.g., Hall v. Live Nation Worldwide, Inc.(C.D. Cal. 2015) 146 F.Supp.3d 1187, 1193; Lujano v. Piedmont Airlines, Inc. (C.D. Cal. 2024) 734 F.Supp.3d 988, 995; Densmore v. Mission Linen Supply (E.D. Cal. 2016) 164 F.Supp.3d 1180, 1187; Sarmiento v. Sealy, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2019) 367 F.Supp.3d 1131, 1142-1143; Johnson v. Sky Chefs, Inc. (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2012, No. 11-CV-05619-LHK) 2012 WL 4483225, at *1 n.1; United Teachers of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2012) 54 Cal.4^th 504, 529 [judicially noticing “a relevant collective bargaining provision of undisputed authenticity”].) Two, there is no real dispute as to the contents of the SAG-AFTRA agreements. (See Opposition, p. 5 [challenging the applicability of Defendants’ CBAs, not the authenticity of the contents].)[3]

Turning to the preemption arguments, the Court acknowledges that several rules govern the analysis:

Under section 301, federal law preempts state law pertaining to the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements. [Citation.] “[A]lthough state courts have concurrent jurisdiction . . . , the substantive law governing union-management labor relations is exclusively federal, and the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements is exclusively a matter for arbitration under federal law.” [Citation.] By enacting section 301, Congress sought to ensure nationwide uniformity with respect to the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements and preserve arbitration as the primary means of resolving disputes over the meaning of collective bargaining agreements. [Citations.]

However, recognizing that Congress intended to preserve state authority to regulate labor standards, the United States Supreme Court has made clear that “not every dispute concerning employment, or tangentially involving a provision of a collective-bargaining agreement, is pre-empted by § 301.” [Citations.] Section 301 preemption applies only to “state laws purporting to determine ‘questions relating to what the parties to a labor agreement agreed, and what legal consequences were intended to flow from breaches of that agreement.’ ” [Citation.] When liability is governed by independent state law, “the bare fact that a collective-bargaining agreement will be consulted in the course of state-law litigation plainly does not require the claim to be extinguished.” [Citation.]

Under section 301 preemption analysis, it is helpful to apply a two-part test to determine whether a claim is preempted. First, the court should evaluate whether the claim arises from independent state law or from the collective bargaining agreement. If the claim arises from the collective bargaining agreement, the claim is preempted as a matter of law. [Citation.] However, if the claim arises from independent state law, the court must then proceed to the second step. In this step, the court determines whether the claim requires “interpretation or construction of a labor agreement,” or whether a collective bargaining agreement will merely be “reference[d]” in the litigation. [Citations.] A state law claim is preempted if a court must interpret a disputed provision of the collective bargaining agreement to determine whether the plaintiff's state law claim has merit. [Citations.]

The term “interpret” in this context “is defined narrowly—it means something more than ‘consider,’ ‘refer to,’ or ‘apply.’ ” [Citation.] Although the plaintiff cannot avoid preemption by “artfully pleading” the claim [citation], the claim must “require interpretation ” of the collective bargaining agreement. [Citation.] Preemption does not arise when interpretation is required only by a defense. [Citations.] Preemption occurs when a claim cannot be resolved on the merits without choosing among competing interpretations of a collective bargaining agreement and its application to the claim. The determination of whether a claim is preempted depends on the particular facts of each case. [Citation.]

Although it is easy to state the rules applicable to section 301 preemption, applying these rules is not always a simple task. “The demarcation between preempted claims and those that survive [section] 301's reach is not ... a line that lends itself to analytical precision. As the [United States] Supreme Court acknowledged ..., ‘[t]he Courts of Appeals have not been entirely uniform in their understanding and application of the principles. . . .’ [Citation.] And little wonder. ‘Substantial dependence’ on a CBA is an inexact concept, turning on the specific facts of each case, and the distinction between ‘looking to’ a CBA and ‘interpreting’ it is not always clear or amenable to a brightline test.” [Citations.]

(Sciborski v. Pacific Bell Directory (2012) 205 Cal.App.4^th 1152, 1163-1165, emphasis in original.)

Given these rules, the Court believes the demurrer should be sustained with leave to amend. The plain language states that the SAG-AFTRA CBAs only apply to the first 57 “background actors (excluding swimmers, skaters and dancers, but including all except one stand-in) employed each day on theatrical motion pictures.” (Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. A, Schedule X, Part I, § 1(c)(2) [noting that the “Producer may hire background actors in excess of the foregoing numbers on such productions, but such additional background actors (referred to herein as "non-covered" or "waiver" background actors) shall not be covered by the terms and conditions of this Agreement”].) Plaintiff claims she was not one of the first 57 background actors. In fact, she claims the SAC effectively excludes the first 57 background actors from the class definitions. (See Opposition, p. 6 [claiming paragraph 27 limits the putative class to “non-exempt non-union employees . . . not covered by an applicable collective bargaining agreement”], emphasis added.) Actually, the SAC alleges:

27. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself, on behalf of all others similarly situated, and as a member of Classes defined as follows:

a. Overtime Class: All current and former non-exempt non-union employees of one or more Defendants employed as background talent in California who earned and were paid overtime wages on the same work day that one or more Defendants paid them Incentive Pay (as defined above) during the four years preceding the filing of Plaintiff’s Complaint through the date Notice is mailed to the members of this Class.

b. Meal Break Premium Class: All current and former non-exempt nonunion employees of one or more Defendants employed as background talent in California who worked over four or five hours during the four years preceding the filing of Plaintiff’s Complaint through the date Notice is mailed to the members of this Class.

c. Waiting Time Penalty Class: Members of the Overtime Class and members of the Break Premium Class whose employment by one or more Defendants ended at any time during the three years preceding the filing of Plaintiff’s Complaint through the date Notice is mailed to the members of this Class.

[d.] Wage Statement Class: Members of the Overtime Class and members of the Break Premium Class employed by Defendants at any time during the one-year period preceding the filing of Plaintiff’s Complaint through the date Notice is mailed to the members of this Class.

(SAC, ¶ 27, underlining in original.) The words “57 background actors” and “not covered by an applicable collective bargaining agreement” do not appear. If they were there, they would be sufficient to defeat the demurrer. Since they are not, the demurrer is sustained and leave to amend is granted to give Plaintiff a chance to allege, clearly, that she and the putative class were not among the first 57 background actors hired. Such an amendment would suffice to resolve the preemption issue at the demurrer stage.[4] [5] [6]

Last point. For now, Defendants’ exhaustion argument does not change the result. Defendants contend Plaintiffs’ causes of action “must be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to exhaust the mandatory grievance-arbitration procedures for background actors under the” CBAs. (Demurrer, p. 24; see also Reply, pp. 12-13.) The argument hinges on the CBAs being applicable to Plaintiff’s claims. If Plaintiff’s amendment ends up demonstrating that the CBAs did not cover her and the putative class, the argument would fail.

[1] Ferguson v. Amazon Studios, LLC (24STCV11214).

[2] Ferguson v. Picrow Streaming, Inc. (24STCV11571).

[3] “SAG-AFTRA” means Screen Actors Guild–American Federation of Television and Radio Artists.

[4] Plaintiff clarified to the federal judge that she intended “non-union” to mean “those background actors whose work was not covered by the CBAs – i.e., the putative class does not include background actors covered by the CBAs as part of the first 57 actors hired on a given day.” (Tehrani, supra, 2024 WL 3730604, at *4.) The federal judge accepted the clarification and remanded the case.

[5] The words are alleged in the Ferguson I complaint, so Judge Seigle denied judgment on the pleadings.

[6] Plaintiff worked for Defendants on February 7 and 13, 2023. (See SAC, ¶ 9.) According to the federal judge, Plaintiff’s payment vouchers for those days “show that she was paid the non-union rate – i.e., she was not covered by the CBAs, which set different rates for background actors working pursuant to those agreements.” (Tehrani, supra, 2024 WL 3730604, at *3.) Plaintiff is free to add these facts to her amendment.

The Court has considered the moving papers, opposition, reply, and all supporting documents.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ request for judicial notice is granted. The demurrer is sustained with leave to amend.

This is a wage-and-hour class action lawsuit brought by Plaintiff Josephine Tehrani on behalf of herself and other similarly situated persons who worked as non-union background talent for Defendants. The operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) alleges that in addition to a base hourly rate, Plaintiff and class members earned other forms of compensation that were not excludable under California law when calculating an employee’s regular rate. (Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), ¶¶ 1-2, 19-26.)

Plaintiff asserts claims for overtime and meal and rest period violations, inaccurate wage statement penalties, waiting time penalties, and unfair competition arising from Defendants’ alleged failure to factor these forms of non-discretionary remuneration into the calculation of the regular rate of pay for purposes of overtime and premium payments. Plaintiff also brings a representative action under the Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) to recover civil penalties for alleged Labor Code violations. (SAC ¶¶ 47-80.).

Specifically, the SAC alleges Plaintiff worked as a non-union background actor for Defendants on February 13, 2023, for the film “Candy Cane Lane,” earning a base hourly rate of $16.50. (SAC ¶ 24.) She worked at least eleven hours and was paid overtime and double time based on her base hourly rate. (SAC ¶ 20.) Plaintiff also allegedly earned and was promised an additional $14 for performing work that involved water, referred to as “WET WORK”. (SAC ¶¶ 21-22.) This $14 payment is alleged to be non-discretionary and, as such, should have been factored into the calculation of her regular rate of pay for overtime, double time, and meal period premiums. (SAC ¶ 23.)

· Failure to Pay All Wages Owed Upon Separation of Employment (Waiting Time Penalties)

· Overtime Class: Non-exempt non-union employees employed as background talent who received Incentive Pay and were paid overtime wages.

· Meal Break Premium Class: Non-exempt non-union employees employed as background talent who worked over four or five hours without a compliant meal or rest period.

· Waiting Time Penalty Class: Members of the Overtime Class and Break Premium Class whose employment ended within the relevant period.

· Wage Statement Class: Members of the Overtime Class and Break Premium Class employed within the relevant period.

Defendants demur to the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action, asserting they are preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”) and that Plaintiff failed to exhaust contractual remedies. (29 U.S.C. § 185 (“Section 301”).)

In considering a demurrer, the Court must accept as true all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Mendoza v. Continental Sales Co. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1402.) A demurrer challenges defects appearing on the face of the pleading or matters subject to judicial notice. (Id.) It is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is a reasonable possibility that any defect can be cured by amendment.

Defendants request judicial notice of the SAG-AFTRA collective bargaining agreements (“CBAs”) applicable to background actors on the production of Candy Cane Lane. (See Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Ex. 1 (Declaration of Bennett Kaspar-Williams (“Kaspar-Williams Decl.”) at Exs. A-C.) Plaintiff objects, arguing that judicial notice cannot be used to resolve whether the CBAs covered her. (Opp. at 6:2, fn. 2)

Courts may take judicial notice of documents like CBAs, especially when relevant to a preemption defense, as their authenticity and contents are generally not subject to reasonable dispute. This is true even if the complaint does not explicitly reference the CBA, as courts may consider matters outside the pleadings when determining complete preemption.

Judicially noticing a CBA is appropriate in determining whether a complaint is “completely preempted” under Section 301. Indeed, “[i]t is often necessary to consider the contents of a CBA to decide a motion to dismiss based on an argument of complete preemption, which is considered an ‘independent corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule.’” (See Patrick v. Nat’l Football League, 2023 WL 6162672, at 3 (C.D. Cal. 2023) (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987)). This is logical because a plaintiff cannot first “artfully plead” around referencing the Agreements in the SAC, then turn around and argue a CBA should not be considered because it is “outside the pleadings.” While judicial notice may establish the existence and contents of the CBAs, it does not necessarily resolve disputed factual issues, such as whether the agreement covered a specific plaintiff or class member.

Here, judicial notice of the Agreements should consider Defendants’ preemption arguments. Plaintiff does not dispute the authenticity or contents of the documents themselves, only their applicability. The Court grants Defendants’ request for judicial notice of the Agreements.

Section 301 of the LMRA preempts state law claims that require interpretation or are substantially dependent upon the interpretation of a CBA, to ensure uniformity in federal labor law. (Caterpillar, Inc., v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394 (1987); see also Levy v. Skywalker Sound, 108 Cal. App. 4th 753, 762 (2003) (holding by California appellate court that “the substantive law governing union-management labor relations is exclusively federal, and the interpretation of [CBAs] is exclusively…under federal law”). However, Section 301 does not preempt claims based on independent, non-negotiable state law rights, even if the facts underlying the state law claim are also addressed in a CBA. (Livadas v. Bradshaw (1994) 512 U.S. 107, 123; Cramer v. Consol. Freightways, Inc. (9th Cir. 2001) 255 F.3d 683, 691 [“if the claim is plainly based on state law, § 301 preemption is not mandated simply because the defendant refers to the CBA in mounting a defense”].)

Federal courts apply a two-part test to determine if a claim is preempted. (Sciborski v. Pac. Bell Directory, 205 Cal. App. 4th 1152, 1164 (2012) (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, at 213 (1985).) The first step asks if the asserted right exists solely as a result of the CBA. (Curtis v. Irwin Indus., 913 F.3d 1146, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 2019).) If it does, preemption applies. If the right arises from independent state law, the second step asks if resolving the claim requires interpreting the scope, meaning, or application of the CBA. (See Firestone v. Southern Cal. Gas Co., 219 F.3d 1063, 1064-66 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding preemption where the court was required to interpret and apply various provisions of the CBA, including the amount of the “regular rate” and “premium rate” paid under the agreement); McKinley v. Southwest Airlines Co., 2015 WL 2431644, at 6 (C.D. Cal. May 19, 2015) (holding preemption applied where CBA had to be interpreted to determine regular rate of pay). Interpretation in this context is narrow and requires more than merely referencing or consulting the CBA. However, defenses invoking the terms of a CBA are not grounds for § 301 preemption. (Cramer, supra, at p. 691.)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims, particularly those related to regular rate calculations and meal/rest period premiums, are preempted under both steps of the test. They contend that the right to receive “bump payments” like “wet work” pay arises solely from the CBAs, not state law. Defendants also argue that determining whether these payments are non-discretionary under state law requires interpreting the ambiguous terms of the CBAs and industry practice. Furthermore, Defendants argue that California Labor Code sections 514 (overtime) and 512(d) (meal periods) provide exemptions for employees covered by qualifying CBAs, and if those exemptions apply, the state law rights are displaced, and the claims arise solely from the CBA, leading to preemption under case law. (See Ascherman v. General Reinsurance Corp., 183 Cal. App. 3d 307, 310-11 (1986) (taking judicial notice of contracts made relevant by plaintiff’s allegations); Johnson v. Sky Chefs, Inc., No. 11-CV-05619-LHK, 2012 WL 4483225, at 1, fn. 1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2012) (finding judicial notice of CBA for determining preemption).

Plaintiff counters that her claims are based on nonnegotiable state law rights to an accurate regular rate of pay and to meal/rest breaks, which exist independently of any CBA. Plaintiff argues that the fact that the $14 wet work payment was made is undisputed, and the determination of whether it must be included in the regular rate as non-discretionary compensation is a question of state law (California law and FLSA standards), not CBA interpretation. Plaintiff contends that California law requires that non-discretionary incentive payments, once paid, be factored into the regular rate for calculating overtime and premium pay. (Ferra v. Loews Hollywood Hotel, LLC (2021) 11 Cal.5th 858.) This obligation exists independently of any CBA. Plaintiff contends that her claims do not require interpreting any disputed term of the CBA.

Crucially, the SAC alleges that Plaintiff and the putative class members are “non-union” and “not covered by an applicable collective bargaining agreement”. However, the class definition in the SAC, as pleaded in paragraphs 27(a)-(d), refers to "[a]ll current and former non-exempt non-union employees of one or more Defendants employed as background talent in California". It does not explicitly include the phrase "not covered by an applicable collective bargaining agreement" within the definition itself.

The SAG-AFTRA CBAs apply only to the first fifty-seven (57) background actors employed each day on theatrical motion pictures. (See Kasper-Williams Decl. at Ex. A (2014 Basic Agreement) at 2-5, § 2.) Background performers may be covered by the Agreements even if they are not members of SAG-AFTRA (i.e., “nonunion”) at the time they work and may work for up to 30 days without joining the Union. (Id.) Background actors hired in excess of that number are not covered by the terms and conditions of the Agreement.

The Court finds that the preemption argument, particularly under the Curtis Step One analysis regarding whether the right arises solely from the CBA (including the application of Labor Code exemptions like Sections 514 and 512(d)), hinges significantly on whether the Plaintiff and the putative class members were, in fact, covered by the CBAs. If Plaintiff and the putative class members were not among the first 57 background actors and were therefore not covered by the Agreements, their claims would not arise solely from the CBA, and the Labor Code exemptions would not apply. In that circumstance, the claims would be based on independent state law rights, and the preemption analysis would proceed to Step Two, focusing on whether interpretation is required.

As currently pleaded, the class definition does not explicitly exclude those background actors who are covered by the CBAs (the first 57). If Plaintiff intends to exclude individuals covered by the CBAs from the putative class, the pleading is ambiguous. If the SAC were amended to clearly allege and define the putative class as not covered by the applicable collective bargaining agreements (e.g., employees who were not among the first 57 background actors hired on a given day), this would be sufficient to defeat the demurrer based on the preemption argument at this stage.

Therefore, the demurrer should be sustained with leave to amend to allow Plaintiff to clarify the class definition and allege that the CBAs did not cover her and the putative class.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed because she failed to exhaust the mandatory grievance-arbitration procedures under the CBAs. (Demurrer, p. 24; see also Reply, pp. 12-13.) This argument is dependent on the CBAs being applicable to Plaintiff's claims. If Plaintiff successfully amends the complaint to demonstrate that the CBAs did not cover her and the putative class, the contractual grievance-arbitration procedures would not apply, and the exhaustion argument would fail.

Plaintiff also brings a PAGA claim. Courts have held that PAGA claims, which enforce public rights on behalf of the state, are generally not subject to CBA exhaustion requirements or LMRA preemption in the same manner as individual wage claims. PAGA arises from Labor Code § 2699 and enforces public rights that exist independently of any private agreement. (Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 980.) Courts have held that PAGA claims are not subject to LMRA preemption and do not require exhaustion of CBA procedures. (Herrera v. Doctors Medical Center of Modesto (2015) 67 Cal.App.5th 538.) The exhaustion argument hinges on the CBAs being applicable.

Defendants argue that the derivative claims (waiting time penalties, wage statements, unfair competition, PAGA) are preempted if the underlying wage claims are preempted. If the underlying claims survive preemption (e.g., due to lack of CBA coverage), the derivative claims would likely survive as well.

The parties reference prior federal and state court rulings in related cases. On May 3, 2023, Plaintiff filed Tehrani v. Amazon Studios, LLC, Case No. 23STCV09947 (“Tehrani”) in Los Angeles Superior Court based on work performed on the film Candy Cane Lane. On the same day, Ferguson v. Amazon Studios, LLC, Case No. 24STCV11214 (“Ferguson I”) was filed based on the production Daisy Jones & the Six. On May 8, 2024, Ferguson v. Picrow Streaming, Inc., Case No. 24STCV11571 (“Ferguson II”) was filed from the production Expats.

All three cases were removed to the Central District of California based on defendants’ assertion of preemption under § 301 of the LMRA. (See 2:23-cv-06385-CBM-JC (Tehrani), 2:24cv-06479-ODW-JPR (Ferguson I), 2:24-cv-06480-CBM-JC (Ferguson II).) On August 14, 2024, the federal court in Tehrani rejected the LMRA preemption argument and remanded the case to state court. (See Tehrani v. Amazon Studios, LLC (C.D. Cal., Aug. 7, 2024, 2024 WL 3730604, at 4, appeal dismissed (9th Cir., Sept. 27, 2024, No. 24-5382).) Following that ruling, defendants stipulated to remand Ferguson I and Ferguson II, and the Los Angeles Superior Courts entered remanded orders in both cases on October 16, 2024.

While not binding precedent in this specific posture, these prior rulings indicate that similar preemption arguments have been considered and rejected in related contexts. The Court notes that the federal court's remand order in this case applied a different standard than the standard for evaluating a demurrer under Rule 12(b)(6) or state law. The Defendants distinguish Ferguson I based on factual and pleading differences. Ferguson I is irrelevant here because it involved a different plaintiff, different underlying facts, different pleaded claims, and different productions. This case is also distinguishable from Ferguson I because the class definition in Ferguson I explicitly excludes nonunion background actors covered by a collective bargaining agreement, which is not the case here.

The Court finds that the current pleading is ambiguous regarding whether the applicable collective bargaining agreements cover Plaintiff and the putative class. This ambiguity is central to resolving the Defendants’ Section 301 preemption argument, particularly concerning the application of Labor Code Sections 514 and 512(d).

Therefore, the demurrer is sustained with leave to amend to allow Plaintiff to clarify the factual allegations regarding CBA coverage and to precisely define the putative class to exclude employees covered by the CBAs (e.g., those who were among the first 57 background actors hired on a given day), if that is Plaintiff’s intent. Such an amendment would address the primary defect identified by the Court at this stage of the proceedings.

Defendants’ demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

Plaintiff is granted leave to file a Third Amended Complaint within 30 days of the date of this Order to cure the pleading deficiencies identified herein, specifically regarding the applicability of the collective bargaining agreements to Plaintiff and the putative class members.

DATED: ______________________________________________ THE HONORABLE DAVID S. CUNNINGHAM III