Judge David S. Cunningham, Case Number: 23STCV14269, Date: 2024-04-17 Tentative Ruling

Judge: David S. Cunningham, Case: 23STCV14269, Date: 2024-04-17 Tentative Ruling

The instant case – Jones Fernandez (23STCV14269) – is a wage-and-hour putative class action.

Here, Brinker moves to stay Jones Fernandez pending resolution of a motion for class certification in an earlier-filed federal case called Hale (3:21-cv-09978).

Brinker contends the motion to stay should be granted based on either the Court’s inherent authority or the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction because (1) Jones Fernandez and Hale involve overlapping putative class members and allege the same class claims (see Motion, pp. 1-3, 7), (2) the certification ruling in Hale will narrow the certification issues in Jones Fernandez (see id. at pp. 4-5), and (3) there is no prejudice (see id. at p. 5).

Plaintiff disagrees. She contends the motion should be denied because (1) the putative classes differ (see Opposition, pp. 4-6, 8), (2) some certification issues differ and will not be resolved by the Hale ruling (see id. at pp. 8-9), (3) Plaintiff and the putative class will suffer prejudice (see id. at pp. 6-8), (4) the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction does not apply (see id. at p. 8), and (5) a stay will undermine enforcement of the representative Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) claim (see id. at pp. 9-10).

In reply, Brinker claims (1) Plaintiff’s putative class is part of the Hale putative class (see Reply, pp. 1-2), (2) Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction is inapplicable (see id. at pp. 2-3), (3) Jones Fernandez should be stayed to prevent duplication and inconsistent rulings and to promote comity (see id. at pp. 3-4), and (4) a stay will not prejudice Plaintiff (see id. at pp. 4-5).

Trial courts have inherent authority to manage and control their proceedings, “including the inherent authority to stay an action when appropriate . . . [to] overcome problems of simultaneous litigation.” (Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 18 Cal.4^th 739, 758.)

“Although the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction is similar in effect to the statutory plea in abatement, it has been interpreted and applied more expansively, and therefore may apply where the narrow grounds required for a statutory plea [in] abatement do not exist. [Citation.]” (People ex rel. Garamendi v. American Autoplan, Inc. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4^th 760, 770 (“Garamendi”).) “Unlike the statutory plea [in] abatement, the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction does not require absolute identity of parties, causes of action or remedies sought in the initial and subsequent actions. [Citations.]” (Ibid.) “If the court exercising original jurisdiction has the power to bring before it all the necessary parties, the fact that the parties in the second action are not identical does not preclude application of the rule.” (Ibid.) “Moreover, the remedies sought in the separate actions need not be precisely the same so long as the court exercising original jurisdiction has the power to litigate all the issues and grant all the relief to which any of the parties might be entitled under the pleadings.” (Ibid.)

Given these rules, the Court agrees with Brinker. The following factors – and, at minimum, the Court’s inherent authority – support granting Brinker’s motion:

* Hale is more advanced. (See Opposition, pp. 3-4 [conceding that (1) hearing date for certification in Hale is September 26, 2024, and (2) Plaintiff does not need to file her certification motion in Jones Fernandez until April 4, 2025].)

* The putative classes appear to overlap in that both include employees who cannot be compelled to arbitrate their claims. (See Rodriguez Decl., Ex. C, p. 2 [attaching 8/29/23 Hale Order Granting Motion to Compel Arbitration and Granting in Part Motion to Strike Class Allegations, which limits the Hale class definition to workers who signed unconscionable arbitration agreements]; see also Opposition, pp. 4, 5 [asserting that Plaintiff signed the arbitration agreement when she was a minor and subsequently disaffirmed it]; id. at 6 [acknowledging that some overlap may exist]; Reply, p. 2 [representing that Plaintiff’s putative class is a subset of the Hale putative class].)[1]

* Hale and Jones Fernandez assert numerous identical causes of action. (See Motion, pp. 2-3.)

* A stay will help to narrow the remaining certification issues, avoid inconsistent rulings, and boost comity.

* Absent a stay, the courts will need to duplicate case efforts on overlapping putative classes, similar certification issues, and the same claims.

* The prejudice, if any, is minimal since Plaintiff will have sufficient time, more than five months, to conduct discovery and to draft her certification motion after the Hale court rules.

* Because the stay’s duration is modest, prosecution of the representative PAGA claim will not be harmed.

The Court intends to set a status conference for early October 2024 to assess the status of the stay.

The stay does not apply to mediation efforts. (See Opposition, p. 3 [noting that the Court set a November 7, 2024 mediation deadline in Jones Fernandez].)

[1] Yes, the reason why Plaintiff cannot be compelled to arbitrate (she signed the agreement as a minor and later disaffirmed it) is different than the reason why the Hale putative class cannot be compelled to arbitrate (they signed unconscionable agreements as adults), but the result is the same. The Court’s understanding is that Plaintiff and the Hale representatives seek to represent all employees who cannot be compelled to arbitration. Overlap is inevitable.

The only way it might not be inevitable is if Plaintiff stipulates to shrink her class definition to workers, like her, who signed the agreements as minors and disaffirmed as adults. Even then, the Hale class definition might still encompass Plaintiff’s putative class.

The Court invites the attorneys to discuss the impact of such a stipulation during oral arguments.