Judge: David S. Cunningham, Case: 23STCV15809, Date: 2024-07-02 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV15809 Hearing Date: July 2, 2024 Dept: 11
Cooper (23STCV15809)
Tentative Ruling Re: Demurrer/Motion to
Stay
Date: 7/2/24
Time: 1:45
pm
Moving Party: Lincoln Training Center and
Rehabilitation Workshop (“Lincoln” or “Defendant”)
Opposing Party: Ellis Cooper and Daniel Kays (collectively
“Plaintiffs”)
Department: 11
Judge: David S. Cunningham III
________________________________________________________________________
TENTATIVE RULING
Lincoln’s demurrer/motion to stay is sustained. The Court stays Cooper (23STCV15809).
BACKGROUND
Cooper (23STCV15809) is a
wage-and-hour putative class action against Lincoln.
Navarro (21STCV04685), an
earlier-filed case against Lincoln, is also a wage-and-hour putative class
action.
Cooper and Navarro
are pending before this Court.
Here, Lincoln moves to abate or stay Cooper until Navarro
is resolved.
LAW
Statutory Plea in Abatement
“Under the statutory plea in abatement, ‘[t]he pendency of
another earlier action growing out of the same transaction and between the same
parties is a ground for abatement of the second action.’” (People ex rel. Garamendi v. American
Autoplan, Inc. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 760, 770.) “A statutory
plead in abatement requires that the prior pending action be “between
the same parties on the same cause of action.”
(Ibid., emphasis in original.)
Exclusive Concurrent
Jurisdiction
“Although the rule of exclusive concurrent
jurisdiction is similar in effect to the statutory plea in abatement, it
has been interpreted and applied more expansively, and therefore may apply
where the narrow grounds required for a statutory plea [in] abatement do not
exist.” (Ibid.)
“Unlike the statutory plea [in] abatement, the rule of exclusive
concurrent jurisdiction does not require absolute identity of parties,
causes of action or remedies sought in the initial and subsequent actions.” (Ibid.) “If the court exercising original jurisdiction
has the power to bring before it all the necessary parties, the fact that the
parties in the second action are not identical does not preclude application of
the rule.” (Ibid.) “Moreover, the remedies sought in the separate
actions need not be precisely the same so long as the court exercising original
jurisdiction has the power to litigate all the issues and grant all the relief
to which any of the parties might be entitled under the pleadings.” (Ibid.)
Inherent Authority
Trial courts have inherent
authority to manage and control their proceedings, “including the inherent
authority to stay an action when appropriate . . . [to] overcome problems of
simultaneous litigation.” (Jordache
Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 18 Cal.4th
739, 758.)
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends Cooper
should be abated or stayed because it is duplicative of Navarro, and Navarro
is the first-filed case. (See
Demurrer/Motion to Strike, pp. 1, 6-11.)
Plaintiffs filed a late
opposition on June 28, 2024. The
opposition addresses a different issue.
(See Opposition, pp. 5-12.)
Plaintiffs do not oppose Defendant’s stay request. (See id. at p. 1.)
The Court agrees with
Defendant. As the following chart
demonstrates, Navarro and Cooper allege overlapping classes and
the same or similar causes of action:
|
Case |
Class Definition |
Causes of Action |
|
Navarro |
“[A]ll current and former non-exempt employees of
Defendants within the State of California at any time commencing four (4)
years preceding the filing of Plaintiff’s complaint up until the time that
notice of the class action is provided to the class[.]” (Navarro First
Amended Complaint, ¶ 31.) |
1. Failure to pay overtime wages 2. Failure to pay minimum wages 3. Failure to provide meal periods 4. Failure to provide rest periods 5. Waiting time penalties 6. Wage statement violations 7. Failure to indemnify 8. Unfair competition 9. Penalties per Labor Code section 210 10. Penalties per Labor Code section 11971 11. Penalties per Labor Code section 1197.1 12. Penalties per Labor Code section 2699 |
|
Cooper |
“All current and former hourly-paid or non-exempt
employees who worked for any of the Defendants within the State of California
at any time during the period from July 6, 2019 to final judgment and who
reside in California.” (Cooper First Amended Complaint, ¶ 14.) |
1.Unpaid overtime 2. Unpaid meal period premiums 3. Unpaid rest period premiums 4. Unpaid minimum wages 5. Final wages not timely paid 6. Wages not timely paid during employment 7. Non-compliant wage statements 8. Failure to keep requisite payroll records 9. Unreimbursed business expenses 10. Unfair competition |
Moreover, the class claims arise
out of the same alleged facts, and the primary rights involved are the
same. (See, e.g., Bush v. Superior
Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1374, 1384 [noting, in the context
of a statutory plea in abatement, that “[t]he identity of two causes of action is determined by a comparison
of the facts alleged which show the nature of the invasion of plaintiff's
primary right”].) Consequently, at
minimum, it is appropriate to stay Cooper pursuant to the Court’s
inherent authority. The demurrer/motion
to strike is sustained.
Defendant also argues that
Plaintiffs fail to plead with particularity and that the causes of action
seeking penalties under Labor Code sections 1174 and 1197.1 fail as a matter of
law. (See Demurrer/Motion to Strike, pp.
11-12; cf. Opposition, pp. 5-12 [asserting that Plaintiffs allege sufficient
facts and that there is a private right of action as to the section 1174 and
section 1197.1 claims].)
Given the preceding analysis, the
Court declines to reach these arguments.