Judge: David S. Cunningham, Case: 23STCV20886, Date: 2024-07-18 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV20886 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 11
The People of the State of California v. Express Scripts, Inc.
(23STCV20886)
Tentative Ruling Re: Motion to Stay Pending Appeal
Date: 7/18/24
Time: 10:30
am
Moving Party: OptumRX, Inc., et al. (collectively
“Defendants”)
Opposing Party: The People of the State of California
(“Plaintiff”)
Department: 11
Judge: David S. Cunningham III
________________________________________________________________________
TENTATIVE RULING
Defendants’ motion
to stay is granted in part. Discovery is
stayed until the Court decides Defendants’ demurrer.
BACKGROUND
Defendants are Pharmacy Benefit Managers
(“PBMs”). They “administer
prescription-drug benefits for health-plan sponsors, including employers,
government entities, and unions.”
(Motion, p. 4.) “When a
beneficiary of a prescription-drug plan goes to a pharmacy to fill a
prescription, the pharmacy checks with a PBM to determine that person’s
coverage and copayment information.”
(Ibid.) “[T]he PBM [then]
reimburses the pharmacy for the prescription, less the amount of the
beneficiary’s copayment.” (Ibid.) “The prescription-drug plan, in turn,
reimburses the PBM.” (Ibid.)
Plaintiff sued Defendants for their alleged contributions to the opioid
crisis. Plaintiff claims Defendants
created a public nuisance. (See
Complaint, ¶¶ 260-273.)
Defendants removed Plaintiff’s
case to federal court, the federal court remanded it, and now the remand order
is on appeal before the Ninth Circuit.
Here, Defendants move to stay Plaintiff’s case pending the appeal.
DISCUSSION
As a result of the appeal,
Defendants claim Code of Civil Procedure section 916 applies and automatically
stays Plaintiff’s case. (See Motion, pp.
5-6; see also Reply, pp. 1-4.)
Plaintiff asserts that section
916 does not apply. (See Opposition, pp.
2-4.)
The Court finds that Defendants
fail to meet their burden. Section 916
provides:
(a) Except as
provided in Sections 917.1 to 917.9, inclusive, and in Section 116.810, the
perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the trial court upon the judgment
or order appealed from or upon the matters embraced therein or affected
thereby, including enforcement of the judgment or order, but the trial court
may proceed upon any other matter embraced in the action and not affected by
the judgment or order.
(Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 916,
subd. (a).) It is a California
statute. It applies to California
appeals. The plain language does not
mention appeals in federal court (sections 917.1 to 917.9 and section 116.810
do not concern removal and remand orders), and Defendants fail to cite case law
extending section 916’s reach to federal appeals.[1]
Since Defendants fail to show
that section 916 extends to federal appeals, the Court does not need to
determine whether upcoming proceedings in this Court will raise matters
embraced in or affected by Defendants’ appeal.
Next, Defendants contend the
Court should stay Plaintiff’s case under Griggs v. Provident Consumer
Discount Co. (1982) 459 U.S. 56 and Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski (2023)
599 U.S. 736 (“Coinbase”). (See
Motion, pp. 6-7; see also Reply, pp. 4-6.)
Plaintiff claims “Griggs
and Coinbase are inapposite.”
(Opposition, p. 4, capitalizing and bolding deleted, underlining of case
names added.)
The Court agrees with
Plaintiff. Griggs holds that,
during a federal appeal, “the district court generally is
divested of ‘jurisdiction’ over those aspects of the case involved in the
appeal.” (Goelz, et al., Rutter Group
Practice Guide: Fed. Ninth Circuit Civ. Appellate Practice (The Rutter Group
April 2024 Update) ¶ 3:406, emphasis added).
In Coinbase, the High Court applied the Griggs rule to the
arbitration context. Coinbase
analyzes section 16(a) of the Federal Arbitration Act. The decision instructs that court litigation
must be stayed while an appeal of an order denying a motion to compel
arbitration takes place. (See Coinbase,
supra, 599 U.S. at 738.) But Coinbase
is only applicable when a federal court denies an arbitration motion; it
does not apply to decisions by state courts. (See Knight, et al., Cal. Practice Guide:
Alternative Dispute Resolution (The Rutter Group December 2023 Update) ¶
5:338.2.) Indeed, “section 16 . . . is
not binding on our state court proceedings[.]” (Muao v. Grosvenor Properties
(2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1092 [analyzing section 16(a)(3)].)
Next, Defendants assert that
Plaintiff’s case should be stayed based on comity. (See Motion, p. 8; cf. Opposition, pp. 6-7
[claiming comity is inapplicable].)
When two actions – one in federal
court, and one in state court – cover the same subject matter, “the California
court has the discretion but not the obligation to stay the state court
action.” (Caiafa Prof. Law Group v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 800,
804.) “In exercising its discretion, the court should consider the
importance of discouraging multiple litigation designed solely to harass an
adverse party, and of avoiding unseemly conflicts with the courts of other
jurisdictions.” (Ibid.) “It should also consider whether the rights of
the parties can best be determined by the court of the other jurisdiction
because of the nature of the subject matter, the availability of witnesses, or
the stage to which the proceedings in the other court have already advanced.” (Ibid.)
On one hand, comity arguably does not fit the circumstances
here. There is only one action pending,
not two. The Ninth Circuit is only
reviewing the remand issue. A stay
arguably is unnecessary given that discovery and the demurrer and motion to
disqualify counsel do not touch on the remand issue.
On the other hand, a stay arguably should be granted to
ensure that the right court presides over the case. The federal court will be better suited to
resolve Defendants’ federal defenses if the remand order gets reversed. (See Motion, p. 8.)
Which brings the Court to judicial economy. Comity or not, the essence of Defendants’
argument is that staying the case will preserve judicial and party
resources. Defendants contend any
matters litigated in this Court will have to be relitigated in federal court if
the Ninth Circuit ends up reversing.
(See Motion, pp. 8-10; see also Reply, pp. 6-7.) Plaintiff, of course, disagrees. (See Opposition, pp. 7-8.) The Court believes this is Defendants’
strongest argument in favor of a full stay.
(See Freiberg v. City of Mission Viejo (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th
1484, 1489 [recognizing courts’ “inherent power to stay proceedings in the
interests of justice and to promote judicial efficiency”].)
On balance, though, the Court favors
a shorter, more limited stay. The Court intends
to go forward with the demurrer because it does not involve the remand issue
and could be dispositive. The Court
stays discovery until the demurrer is decided.
[1]
Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180
(“Varian”) is distinguishable.
(See Motion, pp. 5-6.) Post-remand,
the defendants filed motions to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP
statute. The state court denied
the motions. The question was whether
“the perfecting of an appeal from the denial” of the motions “automatically
stay[ed] all further . . . proceedings on the merits” in the state court. (Varian, supra, 35 Cal.4th
at 186.) The California Supreme Court
held that the appeal did trigger an automatic stay. (See ibid.)