Judge: David S. Cunningham, Case: 23STCV24794, Date: 2024-06-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV24794    Hearing Date: June 21, 2024    Dept: 11

Wilcox III (23STCV24794)

Tentative Ruling Re: Demurrer

 

Date:                           6/21/24

 

Time:                          1:45 pm

 

Moving Party:           ATC Healthcare Services LLC (“ATC”)

 

Opposing Party:        Turesa Wilcox (“Plaintiff”)

 

Department:              11

 

Judge:                        David S. Cunningham III

________________________________________________________________________

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

Wilcox III (23STCV24794) is stayed.

 

BACKGROUND

 

Wilcox III (23STCV24794) is a putative class action.  The complaint asserts a single cause of action under the Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) based on alleged Labor Code violations.

 

Prior to filing Wilcox III, Plaintiff filed a putative class action under the Labor Code (Wilcox I (23STCV04472)) and a Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) representative action that asserts the same purported violations of the Labor Code (Wilcox II (23STCV13382)).

 

Wilcox I is pending before Judge Lawrence Riff in Department 7.  On June 4, 2024, he ordered ATC to file notices of related case in Wilcox II and Wilcox III.

 

Wilcox II is pending before Judge Gail Killefer in Department 37.  On November 8 2023, she granted ATC’s motion to dismiss or stay due to forum non conveniens and stayed Wilcox II.

 

Here, ATC seeks to abate Wilcox III pending the outcome of Wilcox I and Wilcox II.

 

LAW

 

Statutory Plea in Abatement

 

“Under the statutory plea in abatement, ‘[t]he pendency of another earlier action growing out of the same transaction and between the same parties is a ground for abatement of the second action.’”  (People ex rel. Garamendi v. American Autoplan, Inc. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 760, 770.) “A statutory plead in abatement requires that the prior pending action be “between the same parties on the same cause of action.”  (Ibid., emphasis in original.)

 

Exclusive Concurrent Jurisdiction

 

“Although the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction is similar in effect to the statutory plea in abatement, it has been interpreted and applied more expansively, and therefore may apply where the narrow grounds required for a statutory plea [in] abatement do not exist.”  (Ibid.)  “Unlike the statutory plea [in] abatement, the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction does not require absolute identity of parties, causes of action or remedies sought in the initial and subsequent actions.”  (Ibid.)  “If the court exercising original jurisdiction has the power to bring before it all the necessary parties, the fact that the parties in the second action are not identical does not preclude application of the rule.”  (Ibid.)  “Moreover, the remedies sought in the separate actions need not be precisely the same so long as the court exercising original jurisdiction has the power to litigate all the issues and grant all the relief to which any of the parties might be entitled under the pleadings.”  (Ibid.)

 

Inherent Authority

 

Trial courts have inherent authority to manage and control their proceedings, “including the inherent authority to stay an action when appropriate . . . [to] overcome problems of simultaneous litigation.”  (Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 18 Cal.4th 739, 758.)

 

DISCUSSION

 

For statutory plea in abatement, Plaintiff contends the requirements cannot be satisfied because Wilcox I, II, and III allege different causes of action.  (See Opposition, pp. 1-2.)

 

For the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction, Plaintiff contends the requirements cannot be satisfied because all three cases are pending in the Los Angeles Superior Court as opposed to in different counties.  (See id. at pp. 2-3.)

 

For inherent authority, Plaintiff contends a stay is unnecessary.  He suggests that ATC should move to relate and/or consolidate the three cases instead.  (See id. at pp. 3-4.)

 

The Court disagrees in part.  Judge Killefer already found that Wilcox I’s Labor Code class claims and Wilcox II’s PAGA representative claim “arise out of the same facts[.]”  (ATC’s Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. D, p. 3.)[1]  The same is true of Wilcox III’s UCL class claim.  All three cases allege the same class and/or representative group of aggrieved employees and the same Labor Code violations.  (See Demurrer, pp. 5-6; see also Reply, pp. 2-4; ATC’s Request for Judicial Notice, Exs. A-C; see also Wilcox III First Amended Complaint.)  The primary right involved in all three is the same.  (See, e.g., Bush v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1374, 1384 [noting, in the context of a statutory plea in abatement, that “[t]he identity of two causes of action is determined by a comparison of the facts alleged which show the nature of the invasion of plaintiff's primary right”].)  Consequently, at minimum, it is appropriate to stay Wilcox III pursuant to the Court’s inherent authority.

 

Nevertheless, the Court agrees that the cases should be related and/or consolidated.  Since the same primary right is involved, one judge should hear all three cases and all claims at the same time.  Wilcox I is the oldest case, so Judge Riff should be the one to decide the relation and/or consolidation issues.

 

Until then, the Court stays Wilcox III.

 

 


[1] ATC’s Request for Judicial Notice is granted.