Judge David S. Cunningham, Case JCCP5101 2022-09-20 Tentative Ruling

Moving Party: The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles and The Roman Catholic Bishop of Orange (jointly “Institutional Defendants”)

This coordinated proceeding involves approximately 475 Plaintiffs. The complaints allege that clergy members sexually assaulted Plaintiffs when they were minors. Institutional Defendants allegedly failed to protect Plaintiffs from the alleged assaults.

* “declaring that each case added on to JCCP 5101 and declared to be complex is not a complex case” (Notice of Motion, p. 2);

* “voiding all orders granting add on of cases to JCCP 5101 solely to the extent that such orders include a complex case designation or determination” (ibid.); and

* “ordering that future cases added on to this proceeding should not be designated complex cases” (ibid.).

Only complex cases may be coordinated. (Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide: Civ. Proc. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2022) ¶ 12:374.5.)[1] A complex case requires “exceptional judicial management to avoid placing unnecessary burdens on the court or the litigants and to expedite the case, keep costs reasonable, and promote effective decision making by the court, the parties, and counsel.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.400, subd. (a).)

In deciding whether an action is a complex case under (a), the Court must consider, among other things, whether the action is likely to involve:

(1) Numerous pretrial motions raising difficult or novel legal issues that will be time-consuming to resolve;

(2) Management of a large number of witnesses or a substantial amount of documentary evidence;

(4) Coordination with related actions pending in one or more courts in other counties, states, or countries, or in a federal court; or

Code of Civil Procedure section 404.1 lists seven factors – in addition to complex status – to be considered for coordination:

[W]hether the common question of fact or law is predominating and significant to the litigation; the convenience of parties, witnesses and counsel; the relative development of the actions and the work product of counsel; the efficient utilization of judicial facilities and manpower; the calendar of the courts; the disadvantages of duplicative and inconsistent rulings, orders, or judgments; and the likelihood of settlement of the actions without further litigation should coordination be denied.

Following coordination, “[t]he coordination trial judge may remand any action, or any severable claim, may transfer claims, may add on other cases, or may terminate the action or actions. [Citations.]” (Weil & Brown, supra, at ¶ 12:382.3.)

“A coordination trial judge may not in effect reverse the coordination motion judge's finding that cases warrant coordination,” but he or she “may refuse to add on substantively similar cases if they have distinguishing features which make coordination inappropriate (e.g., the new cases have completed substantial trial preparation or have imminent trial dates) because this may result in ‘costly duplication of efforts and delay.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at ¶ 12:382.4.)

“When a case is designated as ‘complex’ by plaintiff or the court [citation], a single $1,000 ‘complex case fee’ must be paid on behalf of all plaintiffs, whether filing separately or jointly, in addition to the original first paper filing fee.” (Weil & Brown, supra, at ¶ 12:47, emphasis in original.) “Each defendant, whether filing separately or jointly, must also file a $1,000 ‘complex case fee’ in addition to the original first paper filing fee, not to exceed $18,000 per case.” (Ibid., emphasis in original.) “If the total fees paid exceed $18,000, the parties may ask for an order returning the surplus. [Citations.]” (Ibid.)

“If the case was not originally designated or counterdesignated as ‘complex’ but is later determined by the court to be ‘complex,’ the fees must be paid within 10 calendar days of the court order.” (Ibid.) “Failure to pay has the same effect as failure to pay a filing fee. [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

“The total fees payable by defendants, intervenors, respondents or adverse parties are not to exceed $18,000 per case; defendants must still pay a complex case fee in addition to the original first paper filing fee. [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

Generally, when a case is designated complex and added on to the JCCP 5101 coordinated proceeding, each Defendant named in the add-on case must pay a $1,000 complex fee.

Institutional Defendants and their parishes and schools often get named in add-on cases and have paid numerous complex fees. (See, e.g., Motion, p. 1 [representing that (1) “the Archdiocese of Los Angeles has already paid at least $88,000 on behalf of itself and its parishes and schools . . . in 53 of the [62] cases in which first appearance fees have been paid[,]” and (2) “[t]he Diocese of Orange has paid at least $36,000 . . . in 23 cases on behalf of itself and its parishes and schools out of approximately 65 complaints served”].)

As noted above, Institutional Defendants move to declare all past and future add-on cases noncomplex and to void all prior orders that designate add-on cases complex. (See id. at p. 2; see also Notice of Motion, p. 2.)

* “[s]tanding alone any individual case included in this coordinated proceeding is not a complex case” (Motion, p. 1);

* “statutory requirements for coordination do not require a complex case designation” (id. at p. 2);

* “[c]ourts deciding add-on requests have no jurisdiction to decide either that add-on cases are complex or that they are not complex” (id. at p. 3)

* “[a] court cannot deny add on of non-complex cases within the scope of the original coordination order” (ibid.);

* consequently, “[t]he orders granting add on should be voided to the exten[t] they include a complex case designation and require complex cases fees for the add-on cases” (ibid.).

Plaintiffs filed a statement of non-opposition. They “do not oppose the relief sought in the motion so long as the ruling . . . applies equally to both plaintiff and defense complex fees.” (Statement of Non-Opposition, p. 1.)

The Court disagrees with Institutional Defendants. The Rutter Guide, statutory law, and case law state that cases must be complex to be coordinated. (See Weil & Brown, supra, at ¶ 12:374.5 [“Only cases that are ‘complex’ as defined by Judicial Council standards may be coordinated”]; see also Code Civ. Proc. § 404 [“A petition for coordination . . . shall be supported by a declaration stating facts showing that the actions are complex”]; Ford Motor Warranty Cases (2017) 11 Cal.App.5^th 626, 634, 640 [reasoning that (1) “[s]ection 404 governs a petition for coordination, and requires it to be supported by a declaration ‘stating facts showing that the actions are complex[,]” (2) “[s]ection 404 authorizes the coordination motion judge . . . ‘to determine whether the actions are complex, and if so, whether coordination of the actions is appropriate[,]’” and (3) “[t]he same coordination standards apply to a decision whether to grant a request to coordinate an additional action”].) “[T]he determination whether cases are complex [is] a determination for the coordination motion judge.” (Ford Motor Warranty Cases, supra, 11 Cal.App.5^th at 641.) Undisputedly, the coordination trial judge is prohibited from designating add-on cases noncomplex after the coordination motion judge finds the initial cases complex. (See Motion, p. 3; see also Ford Motor Warranty Cases, supra, 11 Cal.App.5^th at 640 [holding that (1) “[i]n the context of a request for coordination of add-on cases, the statutes and rules do not contemplate a further determination of whether the add-on actions themselves are complex[,]” and (2) “[t]he coordination trial judge is not at liberty to make a contrary finding with respect to substantively indistinguishable add-on cases”].) It follows that this Court cannot “order that each case added on to JCCP 5101 and declared to be a complex case is not a complex case[.]” (Motion, p. 2.) Nor can this Court “void all orders granting add on of cases to JCCP 5101 solely to the extent that such orders include a complex case designation or determination[.]” (Ibid.) Bottom line, the relief requested by Institutional Defendants is inappropriate and unavailable.

Institutional Defendants also contend the complex fees are inequitable, unreasonable, and discriminatory and violate the right of equal protection because Plaintiffs and Defendants pay different amounts sometimes. (See id. at pp. 1, 3-9 [arguing, in part, that there is no rational basis for the differential]; see also Weil & Brown, supra, at ¶ 12:47 [noting that (1) “[w]hen a case is designated as ‘complex’ by plaintiff or the court [citation], a single $1,000 ‘complex case fee’ must be paid on behalf of all plaintiffs, whether filing separately or jointly, in addition to the original first paper filing fee[,]” and (2) “[e]ach defendant, whether filing separately or jointly, must also file a $1,000 ‘complex case fee’ in addition to the original first paper filing fee, not to exceed $18,000 per case”], emphasis in original.)

* Institutional Defendants’ notice asks the Court to designate the past and future add-on cases noncomplex and to void the prior add-on orders, not to find the complex fees themselves unconstitutional and nonchargeable;

* it is also overbroad (the differential only arises in cases with multiple Plaintiffs, yet Institutional Defendants fail to identify specific add-on cases that involve multiple Plaintiffs and, instead, seek a blanket order finding all add-on cases noncomplex);[2]

* judicial policy favors avoiding unnecessary adjudication of constitutional issues (see, e.g., City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc. (1982) 455 U.S. 283, 294);

* the policy applies here given the notice defect and that the requested relief is inappropriate, unavailable, and overbroad.

Even if Institutional Defendants had teed up the issue correctly, the Court would be inclined to deny the motion because their discussion of rational basis appears insufficient to meet their burden. They do not appear to have submitted the full legislative history. The Court cannot determine if the Legislature had a rational basis for the differing fees on an incomplete record.

It is denied as to future add-on cases too. Such a ruling would be an advisory opinion. Moreover, courts deciding add-on requests are prohibited from designating add-on cases noncomplex. (See Ford Motor Warranty Cases, supra, 11 Cal.App.5^th at 640; see also Motion, p. 3.)[3]

[1] “For noncomplex cases, the proper procedure is to make a motion in the court where one of the cases is pending for transfer and consolidation[.]” (Ibid.)

[2] Many add-on cases have one Plaintiff. P.S. v. Archdiocese of Los Angeles (22STCV00571) is an example. It was added on via joint stipulation on 2/21/22. Presumably, P.S. and the named Defendants – the Archdiocese of Los Angeles and Our Lady of Malibu Church – paid $1,000 each. No differential, no purported constitutional violation, but Institutional Defendants still want the Court to declare it noncomplex as part of their overbroad request.

[3] Additionally, of course, the Court cannot tell whether future add-on cases will involve one Plaintiff or multiple Plaintiffs.