Judge: David S. Cunningham, Case: JCCP5101, Date: 2022-12-06 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: JCCP5101 Hearing Date: December 6, 2022 Dept: 11
JCCP 5101 (Southern California Clergy Cases)
22STCV07886 (M.M.)
Tentative Ruling Re: Request for Certification for Interlocutory Review
Date: 12/6/22
Time: 2:30
pm
Moving Party: Doe 1, Doe 2, Doe 3 (jointly
“Defendants”)
Opposing Party: M.M.
Department: 11
Judge: David
S. Cunningham III
________________________________________________________________________
TENTATIVE RULING
Defendants’ request
for certification for interlocutory review is denied.
BACKGROUND
The coordinated Southern California
Clergy Cases (JCCP 5101) involve hundreds of Plaintiffs. The complaints allege that clergy members sexually assaulted Plaintiffs
when they were minors. The Institutional
Defendants allegedly failed to protect Plaintiffs from the alleged assaults.
At issue is M.M. v. Archdiocese of Los Angeles
(22STCV07886). On 10/12/22, the
Court heard Defendants’ motion to vacate/strike M.M.’s complaint and first
amended complaint (“FAC”). Defendants
argued that M.M. served defective certificates of merit and corroborative
fact. The Court found the motion
untimely and denied it. Defendants now
moves to certify five questions for interlocutory review pursuant to Code of
Civil Procedure section 166.1.
LAW
“Although not a prerequisite to writ review, the trial judge
may recommend writ review by indicating in the
challenged order ‘a belief that there is a controlling question of law as to
which there are substantial grounds for difference of opinion, appellate
resolution of which may materially advance the conclusion of the litigation.’” (Eisenberg, et al., Cal. Prac. Guide: Civ.
Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2022) ¶ 15:22.10 [quoting Code of Civil
Procedure section 166.1], emphasis in original.) “Such recommendation may occur upon ‘written
request of any party or his or her counsel, or at the judge's discretion.’ However, the denial of such a request or the
rejection of an objection to such a request cannot be the subject of an appeal
or writ petition.” (Ibid. [quoting
section 166.1].)
DISCUSSION
“On 3/3/22, M.M. filed the
complaint.” (10/12/22 Ruling Re: Motion
to Vacate/Strike, p. 2.)
“On 3/18/22, Judge William
Crowfoot granted M.M.’s ex parte application to approve the certificates of
merit, name Defendants by their real names, file the FAC, and serve Defendants
with process. Judge Crowfoot also sealed
the certificates of merit.” (Ibid.)
“On 3/22/22,
M.M. filed the FAC.” (Ibid.)
“On 3/29/22,
Defendants’ counsel acknowledged receipt of the FAC.” (Ibid.)
“Defendants moved to strike on
7/18/22, more than 30 days after Judge Crowfoot granted leave to serve process,
M.M. filed the FAC, and Defendants’ counsel acknowledge receiving the
FAC.” (Id. at p. 3.)
Accordingly, the Court denied
Defendants’ motion as untimely under Code of Civil Procedure sections 340.1(k),
435, and 1008 and further stated:
* the facts asserted by Defendants are not new or
different [citations];
* Judge Crowfoot reviewed the certificates of merit and
the certificate of corroborative fact and approved them, presumably finding
them compliant with section 340.1 since he allowed Defendants to be named by
their real names and authorized service of process [citation];
* it is improper to reconsider another judge’s ruling
[citations];
* the Court declines to second guess Judge Crowfoot.
(Id.
at p. 4.)[1]
With
these facts in mind, the Court turns to Defendants’ request. Defendants submitted five questions:
(1) Does ex parte
review of certificates of merit with no notice of the application deny
defendants due process and nullify an order granting leave to serve?
(2) Is an ex parte
order granting leave to serve that has no finding of merit and is based on
conclusory, fact-bereft certificates of merit invalid?
(3) Does an order
with no statement of reasons that declarations reviewed by the court shall be
sealed and not disclosed to defendants deny defendants due process and nullify
an order granting leave to serve?
(4) Is an ex parte
order granting leave to name defendants that has no finding of corroboration
and is based on a blacked-out certificate of corroborative fact, or on a
certificate that does not identify any corroborative fact, invalid?
(5) Is a party
precluded from challenging an ex parte order when it had no notice of the ex
parte application and no notice of entry of the ex parte order[?]
(Notice of Motion, p. 2.) The
Court’s task is not to answer the questions; it is to determine whether they
should be certified for interlocutory review.
One option is to deny Defendants’ request. The questions regard the constitutionality of
section 340.1’s ex parte process generally and Judge Crowfoot’s review of
M.M.’s certificates specifically, not the timeliness of the
motion to vacate/strike. This Court
denied the motion because it was untimely and did not reach Defendants’
constitutional arguments, so certifying the questions would not “materially
advance the conclusion of [M.M.’s] litigation.”
(Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 166.1.)
Another option is to grant Defendants’ request because the
questions recur in the Southern California Clergy Cases. Defense counsel files many motions to vacate/strike
that raise the constitutional arguments.
Even if appellate resolution would not benefit M.M.’s case, a reasonable
argument can be made that it would “materially advance the conclusion of the
[coordinated] litigation.” (Ibid.)
On balance, the Court adopts the first option because it is
doubtful that the Court of Appeal would decide the questions. Since the Court denied the motion due to
untimeliness alone, it is likely that the Court of Appeal would do the same
thing this Court did – find it unnecessary to analyze the constitutional
issues. (See People v. Barasa
(2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 287, 292 n.4 [“A fundamental and longstanding
principle of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching
constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them”]; see
also Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn. (1988) 485 U.S.
439, 445 [same].) At most, if the Court
of Appeal reversed the untimeliness ruling, it probably would send the matter
back to this Court to take the first shot at addressing the substantive merits. Certifying would waste time and would not
advance the ball.
The Court denies Defendants’ request for certification.[2]
[1] To the extent Defendants contend section 1008’s 10-day
time limit never commenced because M.M. never served them with notice of the
3/18/22 order (see Reply to Motion to Strike/Vacate, pp. 2-3), the outcome
remains the same. Judge Crowfoot made
the order, and Defendants essentially asked this Court to reconsider his
findings. Their request, which was at
least comparable to a sua sponte request, was not based on new or different
facts. Regardless, they should have directed
it to Judge Crowfoot, and the motion – noticed as a motion to vacate/strike –
still was untimely under sections 340.1(k) and 435.
[2] In
February 2022, the Court denied defense counsel’s global motion attacking the
ex parte process, which raised the constitutional issues. That ruling, if certified, would have put
Defendants’ questions front and center, giving the Court of Appeal a chance to
decide them on a coordination-wide basis.
The Court does not recall defense counsel requesting certification at
that time.