Judge: David S. Cunningham, Case: JCCP5244, Date: 2022-09-06 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: JCCP5244 Hearing Date: September 6, 2022 Dept: 11
Smithfield Wage and Hour Cases (JCCP 5244)
Petition for Coordination
Date: 9/6/22
Time: 1:45
pm
Moving Party: Smithfield Distribution,
LLC (“Petitioner” or “Smithfield Distribution”)
Opposing Party: Michelle Helaire (“Helaire”)
and Robert Sarabia (“Sarabia”)
Department: 11
Judge: David S. Cunningham III
________________________________________________________________________
TENTATIVE RULING
Petitioner’s petition for coordination is granted.
The Court recommends the San Bernardino
Superior Court as the site for the coordination proceedings, and the designated reviewing court is the
Fourth District Court of Appeal.
Petitioner’s stay request is denied.
BACKGROUND
The “Included Actions” are four “wage
and hour” class actions and four “wage and hour” representative actions pending
in San Bernardino County and Los Angeles County.[1]
Plaintiffs in the Included Actions seek
to represent current and former California employees of Smithfield Distribution
and other Smithfield entities.
On 8/1/22, the Chief
Justice and Chair of the Judicial Council issued an order assigning this Court
to sit as the coordination motion judge to determine whether the Included
Actions are complex and, if so, whether coordination is appropriate.
DISCUSSION
I. Complex Determination
Only “complex”
cases may be coordinated. (Weil &
Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide: Civ. Proc. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2021) ¶
12:374.5.) A “complex” case requires
“exceptional judicial management to avoid placing unnecessary burdens on the
court or the litigants and to expedite the case, keep costs reasonable, and
promote effective decision making by the court, the parties, and counsel.”
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.400(a).)
In deciding whether an action is a complex case under
(a), the Court must consider, among other things, whether the action is likely
to involve:
(1) Numerous pretrial motions raising difficult or novel
legal issues that will be time-consuming to resolve;
(2) Management of a large number of witnesses or a
substantial amount of documentary evidence;
(3) Management of a large number of separately
represented parties;
(4) Coordination with related actions pending in one or
more courts in other counties, states, or countries, or in a federal court; or
(5) Substantial postjudgment judicial supervision.
(Id. at rule 3.400(b).)
[A]n action is provisionally a complex case if it
involves one or more of the following types of claims:
(1) Antitrust or trade regulation claims;
(2) Construction defect claims involving many parties or
structures;
(3) Securities claims or investment losses involving many
parties;
(4) Environmental or toxic tort claims involving many
parties;
(5) Claims involving mass torts;
(6) Claims involving class actions; or
(7) Insurance coverage claims arising out of any of the
claims listed in (c)(1) through (c)(6).
(Id. at rule 3.400(c).)
As noted above, four of the
Included Actions allege class claims.
(See Moving Brief, pp. 3-9.) This
renders them provisionally complex.
The other four Included Actions
are PAGA cases. “Where appropriate,
cases brought under PAGA can be designated complex under the Rules of Court . .
. .” (Huff v. Securitas Security
Services USA, Inc. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 745, 761.) The circumstances here support designating
the four PAGA cases complex since they overlap with the four class cases. They involve the same Defendants and the same
or similar current and former California employees and assert similar Labor
Code violations.
II. Code of Civil Procedure Section 404.1
Section
404.1 lists seven coordination factors:
[W]hether
the common question of fact or law is predominating and significant to the
litigation; the convenience of parties, witnesses and counsel; the relative
development of the actions and the work product of counsel; the efficient
utilization of judicial facilities and manpower; the calendar of the courts;
the disadvantages of duplicative and inconsistent rulings, orders, or
judgments; and the likelihood of settlement of the actions without further
litigation should coordination be denied.
(Code Civ.
Proc. § 404.1.)
A. Predominating Common
Questions
Petitioner states:
[A]ll
of the cases assert claims for alleged failures to pay minimum wages; all
of the cases assert claims for failures to pay all wages at termination; and
seven of the eight cases assert claims based on alleged failures to provide
meal periods, rest breaks, and accurate wage statements. [Citation.]
Equally important, there is substantial overlap among the allegedly
affected current and former employees in the various cases who were purportedly
subject to [the] same Labor Code violations by the same employers. The first-filed cases – the Sarabia (Helaire)
Class action and Helaire PAGA Action – implicate all current and
former “Smithfield” employees in California during the limitations periods that
reach the furthest back.
[Citation.] And each follow-on
lawsuit attempts to vindicate alleged Labor Code violations committed against
some subset of the Smithfield employees at issue in those first-filed cases. .
. .
(Moving Brief, p. 11, italics in
original, underlined case names added.)
Helaire and Sarabia respond:
* “[T]here can
be no ‘significant overlap in the legal theories asserted’ among the various
Subject Actions, with some asserting claims on behalf of individual class
members, and others in representative capacity on behalf of the State of
California.” (Opposition Brief, p. 15.)
* “Nor is there
any overlap between the representative suits Petitioner seeks to coordinate and
the putative class actions with respect to the possible recovery at
issue.” (Ibid.) “Courts in California have unwaveringly held
that a plaintiff in a representative PAGA suit seeks recovery not for an injury
to the litigant’s own rights or recovery, but rather ‘directly
enforce[s] the state’s interest in penalizing and deterring employers
who violate California’s labor laws.’
[Citation.]” (Ibid., emphasis in
original.)
* “[T]he
putative class actions and the representative PAGA actions will only diverge
further as they proceed in litigation to settlement.” (Id. at p. 16.) “In representative cases under PAGA, courts
are vested with judicial discretion in assessing the fairness of civil
penalties awarded [citation], whereas a trial court’s discretion in reviewing a
class action settlement is limited.
[Citation.]” (Ibid.)
* “[T]he
first-filed cases, the Sarabia (Helaire) Class Action and Helaire
PAGA Action, implicate all current and former Smithfield employees in
California during the limitations period.”
(Ibid., italics in original, underlined case names added.) “This would necessarily mean that any
potential resolution in the first-filed actions could conclusively resolve the
issues for all such that coordination is not appropriate. Rather, a continued stay on those actions
would be the proper action.” (Ibid.)
The Court agrees with
Petitioner. This factor favors
coordination because the Included Actions allege several overlapping class and
representative claims. Common legal
questions result from the similar causes of action and common questions of
fact. The Court anticipates significant
motion practice on substantial, common legal issues. These issues should be heard by one judge to
ensure uniformity.
Helaire and Sarabia’s attempt to distinguish
the class claims and the PAGA claims is unavailing. There is nothing remarkable or problematic
about litigating related class claims and PAGA claims in a coordinated
proceeding. In fact, in the Court’s
experience, it is routine to coordinate class actions and PAGA actions that are
based on similar “wage and hour” allegations.
Moreover, the Court believes
coordination will promote, not hinder, the possibility that resolution of the
first-filed cases “could conclusively resolve” the other cases. (Ibid.)
B. Convenience
of the Parties, Witnesses, and Counsel
Petitioner contends:
[C]oordination will reduce the time, effort,
and expense necessary to prosecute and defend this litigation. Among other things, a single coordination
trial judge will be able to: (1) expedite the disposition of any dispositive threshold
issues; (2) determine the extent to which the follow-on cases asserting
duplicative claims should remain stayed; (3) appoint liaison counsel . . . to
streamline the proceedings, including discovery, to the extent the follow-on
cases present unique issues that should not be stayed; (4) establish a central
depository or depositories of documents and other materials to achieve
efficiencies; and (5) authorize the issuance of a single Belaire-West
privacy notice to minimize employee confusion. . . .
(Moving Brief, p. 12, underlined case name added.)
Helaire and Sarabia argue that coordination is unnecessary because the
Included Actions are only pending in two counties. (See Opposition Brief, p. 17 [claiming “this
factor typically weighs in favor of coordination only where the
litigation to be coordinated is substantially more widespread than here”],
emphasis in original.)
They also argue that “Petitioner fails to identify how coordination would
be beneficial to any witnesses at all.”
(Id. at p. 18.)
This factor favors
coordination. The Included Actions are
pending in San Bernardino Superior Court and Los Angeles Superior Court. The Court is persuaded that managing
discovery and deciding the common issues and claims in one forum will
convenience the parties, their witnesses, and their counsel, and it will
advance efficiency.[2]
C. Development
of the Cases and the Work Product of Counsel
This factor favors
coordination. Despite the differing
filing dates, the Included Actions are at an early stage. Discovery still needs to be conducted, and multiple
motions still need to be filed and heard.
(See, e.g., Moving Brief, p. 13 [representing that “[n]o formal
discovery has occurred in any case, and not trial dates have been set”].) Coordination will free up multiple courtrooms
from having to decide these similar matters.
The fact that the San Bernardino
County cases are months older than the first Los Angeles County case fails to
change the analysis. The work done in
the San Bernardino County cases, to date, concerned amendments to pleadings and
a motion to compel arbitration. (See,
e.g., Opposition Brief, p. 19.) Most of
the focus has been on mediation and “global resolution” (ibid.), which, again,
the Court believes coordination will promote.
D. Efficient
Use of Judicial Resources and Manpower
This factor favors coordination. Absent coordination, separate courts will
have to duplicate case efforts on the same issues and claims. Parallel litigation of the same issues and claims in multiple locations
will result in unnecessary consumption of judicial resources.
E. Calendars
of the Courts
This factor is neutral. The parties’ briefs fail to address the
specific, individual court calendars.
F. Duplicative
and Inconsistent Rulings
This factor favors coordination.
Since the complaints raise the same or similar issues and claims, there
is a risk that the courts will make duplicative or inconsistent key rulings,
orders, or judgments if coordination is denied.
Coordination will minimize this risk and advance the goal of “uniform
and centralized resolution on appeal.” (McGhan Medical Corp. v. Superior
Court (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 804, 814.)
G. Likelihood
of Settlement in the Absence of Coordination
This factor is neutral or favors
coordination. None of the cases has
settled so far. While mediation is
scheduled in the San Bernardino County actions, the Court expects that
coordination will advance the probability of a global resolution or, at least,
will not impede it.
H. Summary
The Court finds that the coordination factors support
coordination. The petition is granted.
III. Site for the Coordinated Proceedings
Rule of
Court 3.530(b) sets forth the factors that the coordination motion judge may
consider in making a recommendation for the site of the coordination
proceedings. The factors include: the number of included actions in particular
locations; whether the litigation is at an advanced stage in a particular
court; the efficient use of court facilities and judicial resources; the
locations of witnesses and evidence; the convenience of the parties and
witnesses; the parties' principal places of business; the office locations of
counsel for the parties; and the ease of travel to and availability of accommodations
in particular locations. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 3.530(b).)
Petitioner
requests the Los Angeles Superior Court because six of the Included Actions are
pending there, most of the counsel for Plaintiffs and Defendants reside in Los
Angeles County, and “a substantial amount of the evidence and witnesses are
likely to be located in Los Angeles County.”
(Moving Brief, pp. 14, 15.)
Helaire and Sarabia request San Bernardino
Superior Court, the location of the first-filed cases, asserting that “virtually
nothing has taken place” in the Los Angeles County actions, “which all have
been stayed virtually since their respective filings.” (Opposition Brief, 20, 21.)
The Court
recommends the San Bernardino Superior Court:
*
The San Bernardino County actions were filed first.
*
The Los Angeles County actions have been stayed from the start.
*
San Bernardino County is nearby and convenient, especially with the apparent
availability of remote appearances.
*
The scheduled mediation may result in a global settlement and should not be
disturbed or jeopardized by moving the first-filed cases to another
jurisdiction.
The Court
selects the Fourth District Court of Appeal as the reviewing court with
appellate jurisdiction.
IV. Stay Request
Petitioner
asks to stay the San Bernardino County cases until coordination is
decided. (See, e.g., Notice of Motion to
Stay, p. 2 [claiming a stay will “promote the ends of justice” and “preserve
the status quo”].)
The Court denies
the stay request. Given that the Court
recommends the San Bernardino Superior Court, and given the scheduled
mediation, a stay is unnecessary.
[1]
The eight Included Actions are listed in the petition. (See Petition, pp. 1-3.) The four representative actions were filed
pursuant to the Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”).
[2] The authorities cited by Helaire and Sarabia do not prohibit coordination of cases pending
in two counties. The Court knows of no
such authority.